

Hermeneutics & Horizons: The Shape of the Future

Edited by Frank K. Flinn


Proceedings of the Bahamas' Seminar on Hermeneutics & *Divine Principle*

9/22/82

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& Horizons:
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Preface

This volume contains the proceedings of the Seminar on Hermeneutics sponsored by the Unification Theological Seminary and held on Grand Bahama Island, on February 20-24, 1980. The essays and following discussions cover the topics of hermeneutics in scripture, theology, history, society and eschatology.

Most, but not all, the essays address a hermeneutical question raised by the principal Unificationist enchiridion *Divine Principle*. One thing should be made abundantly clear, however. The inspiration for this seminar did not come from Rev. Moon or any other member of the Unification Church. It came from myself and other scholars who are not members of the Unification Church. The dialogue that resulted is, to say the least, lively and, at times, heated. The open-endedness of the discussion speaks, I believe, for the willingness of the Unification Church to hear out both friend and foe, including friends who are critics.

The reason I wanted to be involved in a seminar on hermeneutics that examined *Divine Principle* stems from a judgment by the National Council of Churches that "the Unification Church is not a Christian Church" and that "the claims of the Unification Church to Christian identity cannot be recognized." These quotes are taken from a report of the Faith and Order Commission of the NCC entitled "A Critique of the Theology of the Unification Church As Set Forth in *Divine Principle*"

(June, 1977). The report was written by Sr. Agnes Cunningham, a Roman Catholic, Drs. J. Robert Nelson and Jorge Laura-Braud, Presbyterians, and Dr. William L. Hendricks, a Southern Baptist. I find it mildly amusing that these theologians, whose respective churches not so long ago labeled one another as “heretics,” are now united in designating still another religious group as heretical and even non-Christian. But I must avoid this sort of polemical irony!

The NCC report critiques *Divine Principle* on seven counts: dualism, secret revelations, a certain materialism, antisemitism, relativizing scripture, the triune God, and salvation-restoration-eschatology. Something could be said about each of these topics, but the section “Relativizing Scripture” is crucial to the context of this volume:

The Bible is frequently cited in *Divine Principle*, giving the initial impression to some readers that this work is in accord with the Scriptures. The use of biblical texts is arbitrary, however. They are more often cited to provide the names of actors in the drama of restoration than to serve as primal instances of revelation; or else, in the manner of many Christian literalists, the texts are adduced to prove the truth of teachings drawn from non-biblical sources. Yet of Christians who depend literalistically upon Scripture, *Divine Principle* says they are “captives to scriptural words” (p. 533). *Divine Principle* appeals to other revelations which contradict basic elements of the Christian faith.

Within the diverse communions and traditions of Christianity there are many ways of understanding scriptural authority and interpretation. Nevertheless, for Christians, the biblical witness remains the normative authority. This is not the case in *Divine Principle*, which acknowledges the higher authority of Sun Myung Moon.

I believe that the reader will find that nearly all of the objections raised by the NCC report are addressed in the course of this volume.

Now to the specific accusations. The report says that *Divine Principle* uses biblical texts arbitrarily. On this issue the reader is directed to the essays by Anthony Guerra, Kapp Johnson and Thomas Boslooper. I know of no theologian, ancient or modern, who can escape this kind of charge. Sometimes I think one of the functions of theologians is to quote scripture “out of context” in order to give the biblical

scholars something to do! More seriously, this charge would have had some weight had the NCC report sought to uncover the hermeneutical perspective from which *Divine Principle* does indeed cite the Bible.

According to its own self-claim, *Divine Principle* is written from the hermeneutical stance of the "Last Days" (*DP*, pp. 10-16). Its viewpoint is *eschatological*. The essays by Dagfinn Aslid, Frank Flinn, and Klaus Lindner (on eschatology), Lorine Getz and Frederick Sontag are pertinent to this topic. In the manner of the early Church Fathers, Unification sees the Last Things as inherently related to the First Things. The Last Things will be the restitution, recapitulation—or, to use the language of *Divine Principle*, the restoration—of the First Things. Unification theology has a two Article framework (Creation/Restoration) from which, admittedly, it selects the "text within the text" of the Bible. Personally, I think *Divine Principle* cites many texts out of context, but not so many as its harsher critics believe, given this hermeneutical framework. One might compare *Divine Principle's* two Article framework with the redemptocentric and even christomonistic framework of much contemporary neo-orthodox and liberal theology. On this point I direct the reader's attention to the essays by Henry Vander Goot, Donald Deffner, Jonathan Wells and Durwood Foster.

The NCC report goes on to assert that *Divine Principle* cites the names of the actors in the drama of restoration rather than submitting to the biblical texts as "primal instances of revelation." Here we can note two further aspects of *Divine Principle's* hermeneutical underpinning. Not only is it eschatological but also *typological* and *dispensational* as well. Typological exegesis has gone out of fashion, but it was the hermeneutical mode which shaped the first Christian exegetes' understanding of the Bible as a unity. The paramount typologist was Irenaeus who strove to hold together the two books of the Bible by a doctrine of real types. Presumably the dispensationalist aspect is what brings the NCC charge that *Divine Principle* interprets the Bible like certain Christian literalists. Per se dispensationalism hardly qualifies a religious group for the label "non-Christian." The real issue is whether dispensationalism broadly conceived is in consonance with the Bible's

own self-understanding. Certainly the New Testament stress on the disparities between This Age and the Age to Come, as well as Paul's not infrequent references to the *oikonomia tou theou*, point in the direction of dispensationalist conception of history. In this regard, the reader is referred to the essays by Dagfinn Aslid and Klaus Lindner (on history), Stanley Johannesen and James Deotis Roberts for the wide variety of interpretation of history. In fact, I think a strong case can be made that liberal Christianity has scuttled the dispensationalist mind-set of early Christianity in favor of the Enlightenment idea of "progress."

A final objection of the NCC report is that Unification appeals to "other revelations" than the "normative authority" of the biblical witness. Specifically, one can indicate the revelation to Sun Myung Moon (*DP*, p. 16) as well as the numerous references to religious ideas of the East in *Divine Principle*. The essays by Andrew Wilson, Lloyd Eby, Stephen Post, David Kelly and Lonnie Kliever address various aspects of this issue. The problem is the question of the indigenization or contextualization of Christianity. Was the Nicene and Chalcedonian transposition of early Christian faith into the categories of Hellenistic philosophy a departure from the "normative authority" of the Bible? Theologoumena like *homoousios* are not exactly biblical in wording and conception. Admittedly, there are many Eastern concepts in *Divine Principle* such as yin/yang (*DP*, p. 26), the transmigration of the soul (p. 167), concepts which show affinity with the Prophet in Islam and the *avatar* in Hinduism (p. 188), a confucian understanding of the family, etc. Sometimes the appeal to the "normative authority" of scripture is a disguised appeal for the normativity of the *Western* indigenization of the biblical witness. The real hermeneutical question about Eastern ideas in *Divine Principle* is whether the one Word of God can be addressed to concrete men and women in a way that dialectically preserves and reforms the cultural context in which they live, move and have their being. The Western pattern of evangelization, with few exceptions, has been not only to cancel out indigenous thought ("idolatry") but also the cultural wealth ("heathenism") with which all peoples meet the biblical message. To be sure, something different happens when the biblical

message becomes incarnate in non-Western cultures, but, one may add, something different happened to the Divinity when God became enfleshed. Aside from these considerations, I think that *Divine Principle* assumes a covenantal model of time and space fundamentally different than most Eastern modes of thought. It claims that what God has done with Israel is paradigmatic for all other peoples, places and times. Its daring is to bring that paradigm up to date and to posit boldly the Kingdom of God on earth as the goal of the universal covenant.

In the following essays and dialogues, the reader will encounter not only discussion about the hermeneutic of *Divine Principle* but also sharp exchanges about the multifaceted directions which the field of hermeneutics in general is taking today. As editor, I found the process of sifting through this material a genuine learning experience on reading the Bible and letting it read me.

Frank K. Flinn
Feast of Francis of Assisi
October 4, 1981
St. Louis

Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle*: In Search of a Context

M. Darrol Bryant

By way of introduction to this conference that will deal with hermeneutical questions which surround *Divine Principle*, I would like to mention the range of questions we will be exploring and note some of the larger historical and cultural developments which stand as the backdrop to our explorations. I offer these remarks, then, as notes towards a context for our discussions here over the next days.

The title of my remarks, "Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle*," is intended in its double sense. First, the title is designed to ask what, if any, are the *structures* of interpretation— theological, religious, philosophical, cultural, sociological, spiritual— inherent within *Divine Principle* itself which shape its interpretation of scripture, history, society, and the divine? We will call this "Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* I." Second, the title is designed to raise the question of the requisite understandings— theological, religious, philosophical, cultural, sociological, political, psychological, and spiritual— which we, as we approach the text, must acquire in order that we might read the text aright. Let us call this "Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* II." Although the bulk of our discussion will surround "Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* I," the second sense of our title is also critical. Here I will content myself with sketching some of the questions that we might deal with under each.

Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* I

At the very outset of our meeting in the Virgin Islands* the question was raised of how *Divine Principle* is using the Old and New Testaments. For many, the surface similarities between *Divine Principle's* use of scripture and fundamentalist proof-texting were striking and repellent. It did not appear that there were any consistent interpretive structures which governed *Divine Principle's* use of scripture. They appeared arbitrary and haphazard. Others felt that *Divine Principle* used scripture consistently but in accord with an interpretive structure alien to the Bible itself and was, therefore, to be rejected on normative theological grounds. From still others, especially Unificationists, there was an insistence that there was an internally consistent and coherent use of scripture in *Divine Principle* but there seemed to be some disagreement concerning precisely what that principle of interpretation was. Moreover, there was disagreement within the whole conference concerning the status of any such interpretive structure: Was it the familial tradition of Confucianism? Was it a principle revealed by God to Rev. Moon? Was it an ingenious theological answer to the question of what God's purposes in creation were? Was it something more bizarre than this? Was it some combination of these?

These questions were not resolved, but they obviously warranted further consideration. Moreover, from that beginning point several further questions arose which were posed in hermeneutical terms. Not only was it a question of *Divine Principle's* interpretation of the Bible, it was as well a question of *Divine Principle's* understanding of God, of history, of society. What if any were the interpretive structures that inform *Divine Principle's* account of God? What is the four position foundation? From whence does it arise? What does it illuminate? Is it just a new jargon to bewitch the bewitchable? What about the way

*The proceedings of this meeting which was held in the Virgin Islands on July 22-29, 1979, has been published as *Proceedings of the Virgin Islands' Seminar on Unification Theology*, Darrol Bryant, ed. (Barrytown, N.Y.: Unification Theological Seminary, 1980), distributed by The Rose of Sharon Press, Inc.

Divine Principle traces divine action in history? Are there any regulating structures which govern *Divine Principle's* tour of history from prehistorical Adam and Eve to the historical time of the patriarchs of the Old Testament through the centuries of the Christian era down to the World Wars of our own time? And why does *Divine Principle* read society in the way it does? Why the preoccupation with the condition of the family? Aren't the really important things the structure of the economy, the disposition of power? And so it goes.

These were a part of the cluster of questions that arose and that we have returned to explore again. Underlying the whole discussion was the question of the nature of the language of *Divine Principle*. How was it to be taken? Was it to be taken literally, or metaphorically, or allegorically, or in some combination of these ways? Was it a precritical text or post-modern? Was it a new mystification or a new revelation?

Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* II

It also emerged in our conversation in the Virgin Islands that there were a number of considerations requisite to the understanding of this text, that perhaps there was more going on in the text than many of us had initially presupposed, if only we acquired the eyes to see. What is the origin of the text? When was it written? In what context? By whom? With what intention? To whom is it addressed? Does the cultural context in which this text emerged shape it in any significant ways? If so, how? What were the religious conditions within Korean Christianity, indigenous and Eastern religious traditions, which may have influenced the shape the text took and the questions it addressed? What language was it written in? Are there problems of translation? What is the status of the text within the movement? Is it a new interpretation of the Bible? Or a Third or Completed Testament? If so, what does that mean? What are the implications for the Old and New Testaments, or for the claim of the movement to stand in the Christian tradition? Is this the final version of the text? Were there others? If so, how do they agree or disagree with what we have in the current version? What is the "Principle"? Is it this text? Is it a principle? Is it both? If it

is a principle, what does that mean? How is the Principle related to the text? And so it goes

These questions that we have grouped under “Hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* I & II” double back on one another to be sure. But there may be some point in initially keeping them distinct from each other in order to clarify the task that lies ahead of us.

While our discussion here, given its focus, is certainly distinct from other hermeneutical discussions currently taking place it nonetheless is relevant to that larger discussion.

Why has the concern about hermeneutical questions arisen? In the summary of scholarship reflected in James Hastings’ *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* published in Edinburgh in 1913, hermeneutics did not even rate a separate entry. Since that time, however, hermeneutics has emerged from obscurity to stand close to the very heart of the contemporary theological conversation and is a major theme in the intellectual discussions of our time. Why this shift in its place and status?


There is both a narrower and a larger context for the emergence of the hermeneutical discussion. The narrower context is the question which arises as a consequence of historical-critical scholarship of the Bible, namely, how can this ancient text speak to the twentieth century? The lines of that conversation are familiar to us, especially as it is focused in Bultmann’s proposal for demythologizing the Bible and the subsequent discussions of the “new hermeneutics.” But it is also worth recalling those larger developments in Western culture that have given rise to the hermeneutical question. Here let me mention three factors: (1) the rise of historical consciousness with its awareness of different historical eras and of historical distances; (2) the emergent awareness of cultural diversity which has made us increasingly aware that we do not all share the same universe of discourse or patterns of meaning which has forced us to a degree of self-consciousness that was not required when a highly integrated cultural context could be assumed; and (3) the rise of science which has required everyone in theology to reconsider the very foundations of religious claims to tell us about reality. These factors have created a climate in which the very activities

of speaking, translating, and interpreting—the root meanings of the Greek verb from which the term “hermeneutics” derives—have become problematic.

Against this larger backdrop our discussions here come into focus as a unique challenge to our capacities to speak truthfully to one another, to translate our concerns into terms accessible to one another, and to interpret the meaning of a text and its patterns of understanding in the light of its own unique cultural background. Perhaps this text with its claims to unite science and religion, to unify diverse cultural and religious traditions, and to restore the wounds of a broken history is the right text to confront and be confronted by the hermeneutical questions and quest of our time.

Hermes has returned with a vengeance. Does he still convey messages from the gods?

Hermeneutics of Scripture



Biblical Hermeneutics in *Divine Principle*: The Context of Confucianism

Andrew M. Wilson

The Unification Church is a new expression of Christianity coming out of the context of the culture and religious traditions of the Far East. Korea is a deeply Confucian country, and Rev. Moon is said to have studied the Confucian classics in his childhood.¹ It would therefore be surprising if much of Rev. Moon's theology was not framed by his Confucian cultural milieu. As a Christian doing Biblical exegesis, Rev. Moon apparently used elements of a Confucian world view in constructing his hermeneutic. These are used in many creative ways that might seem new to a Western mentality, but would seem natural to anyone from the Orient.² This paper is a result of two interests: one, to elucidate the presuppositions for the use of scripture in Unification theology that could clarify its hermeneutic, and two, to apply the tools of higher criticism to *Divine Principle* to delineate its *Sitz im Leben* and the traditions from which it draws. These two concerns are of course related because *Divine Principle* is itself a work illuminating the Bible.

But first, it will be helpful to make a preliminary remark about the assertion that *Divine Principle* contains a new revelation, since the work of the higher critic, who seeks to identify the sources and historical conditions behind sacred literature, is often seen as threatening to the theological status of the literature as divine revelation for the community of faith. *Divine Principle* holds that it contains a portion of the "Completed Testament Word" (*DP* pp. 16, 233)³, the "new truth" that will lead

humankind into a perfected relationship to God and a unified society of peace and brotherhood under God. To analyze *Divine Principle* into a mere confluence of Christianity with Eastern culture, neither of which has achieved the lofty goal of unification, would seem to contradict its very proclamation. We have an analogous situation in the New Testament: though it proclaims salvation through the lordship of Jesus Christ, many of the teachings of Jesus hardly differ from ideas current in Judaism of the period, either in ethical content or eschatological hope.

Several approaches to this problem may be put forward. One may seek the propositional content of the revelation in those concepts in *Divine Principle* that differ from the Christian or Confucian traditions, e.g., the four position foundation, the exposition of the fall of man, or the heart of God. One might thus seek to distinguish a "core" of revelation within the *Divine Principle* text. This approach would be similar to the New Testament scholar who might see Jesus' love ethic, or redemption through the cross, or the doctrine of the incarnation as the core of the New Testament revelation, differentiating it from the truths of Judaism.

Another approach views revelation not as a series of propositions, but as a word whose purpose is to bring its recipient into a new relationship to God. The text as a whole, with its new concepts together with its inheritance from the past, addresses the reader in an existential encounter that opens up a new life. In this sense, even though the New Testament brings few teachings that are not found in the Old Testament, it is a new revelation because it brings a personal relationship to Christ, forgiveness of sins, and a relationship to God which is qualitatively different from the experience of God in normative Judaism. Similarly, in Unification theology the believer becomes a "true child" of God, knowing the heart of God, and able to form a family, a society, and ultimately a world based on the love of God. Though the hope of this perfected relationship with God and of God's peaceable kingdom on earth is nothing foreign to the Jewish and Christian scriptures, the revelation in *Divine Principle* is asserted to be new because it empowers us to attain that perfection and that kingdom in the here and now.

As a third understanding of revelation, one may see the interaction of Christianity with the truths of the Orient as an occasion for a new manifestation of truth. According to the Principle, every God-centered interaction of two individuals creates a base for divine energy and the new creative work of God, as for example, the conception of a child from the love of parents (*DP* pp. 28-32). In this case, the interaction of Christianity with the traditions of the Orient creates the occasion for the vertical revelation of new truth, so that the whole Principle is greater than the sum of its parts.

Though this is not the place for an exhaustive discussion of revelation, any of these approaches can provide a context for the tasks of biblical criticism. As a revelation, Principle nevertheless came to be expressed in the particular context of the confluence of the Christian tradition with the religious traditions of Korea. The critical task of analyzing these older traditions need not detract from its uniqueness and revelatory quality.

What follows is a tentative exercise to surmise what might be the connections of *Divine Principle* to Confucianism, or more precisely, to the Neo-Confucian culture of Rev. Moon's Korea. The connections here will be broad and thematic. To determine the more precise confluence of Confucian, as well as Christian and Buddhist, ideas in the development of Rev. Moon's thought would require word studies, an intimate knowledge of Korean culture, and a source-critical analysis of *Divine Principle*. All these remain topics for further research.

The Original Principle and Neo-Confucian Principle

Principle is one; its manifestations are many. —Ch'eng Yi⁴

In Neo-Confucian thought, there is one unitary principle, *li* of heaven and earth and human life. This principle can be understood both by the investigation of nature and by the introspective rediscovery of the original nature of the self. Principle is thus both the metaphysical law operative throughout the natural order and the natural disposition of

human beings expressed in ethical actions. The sage finds principle by the investigation of things, and he realizes the principle in himself by conforming his life to the principle.

Divine Principle is the title of the English translation of the book whose Korean title is *Woun-li Kang-lon*,⁵ which literally means "Discussion of the Original Principle." The term "original principle," *woun-li*, is usually translated into English as "Divine Principle" or just "Principle," both when used by itself and in such terms as "Principle(s) of Creation," *chang-jo woun-li*, and "Principle(s) of Restoration," *pok-kui woun-li*.⁶ This is a new term, distinct in meaning and content from the Neo-Confucian principle, but containing the same character *li*, showing its etymological relationship to the Neo-Confucian term. Though it has a distinct content, Original Principle is functionally a principle in the Neo-Confucian sense. It is a unitary principle by which God operates in creating and maintaining the cosmos and in relating to human persons and by which people should live.

Neo-Confucianism understands "principle" as a metaphysical principle of a static, unchanging creation. There is no development within the principle; history is eternal or cyclical. The ancients were admired as most faithful to the principle—theirs was a long lost golden age.⁷ However, the metaphysics in the Bible is rather relational and dynamic. God, the unchanging center of biblical faith, whose purpose is the salvation of humanity and the establishment of his kingdom, operates historically through a covenant with individuals and peoples. Covenant theology is a principle within history moving from promise to fulfillment. God sought to bless man at the creation (Genesis 1:28) and made covenants with Noah, with Abraham and later with the people of Israel at Sinai. That covenant was renewed after the Exile by a new Exodus (Isaiah 43:16-19) and the reading of the law by Ezra (Nehemiah 8). Christianity established a new covenant through the blood of Christ (Matthew 26:28, I Corinthians 11:25).

In *Divine Principle*, the Neo-Confucian principle of the natural order and the biblical covenant in the historical order are subsumed in the Original Principle. Covenant is related back to creation. The

historical activity of God is predicated on the creative activity of God because the principles of God's historical work of salvation are derived from the eternal Original Principle manifest in God's original work of creation. Salvation equals restoration equals re-creation (*DP* pp. 104, 222). God's work of salvation means re-creating each person to the point where he can fulfill the Original Principle by which he was created. The end of God's activity in history, the eschatological reign of God, is identical with the intended state of humankind at the creation, the potential golden age in Eden before the fall. History is seen as beginning with the fall from the Garden of Eden, paralleling the Confucian deterioration from the golden age, and continuing through several cyclical attempts to restore Eden culminating with the coming of the Messiah. Covenant is therefore the biblical expression of the historical manifestation of development of the God-man relationship within the unchanging Original Principle.

Not only is the Original Principle formally a type of Neo-Confucian principle (*li*), but also the way of knowing the Original Principle bears certain resemblances to the Confucian way of knowing, but with some important distinctions.

In Confucianism, where principle pervades both the world of nature and the universe of human life, comprehending the principle is inseparable from the investigation of things (taken broadly to include both physical and human activity).⁸ But Unification theology's stress on the fallen state of human life makes any such natural law theology questionable. Instead, the Bible, as the record of God's efforts to restore fallen humankind, becomes the chief source to be investigated on several points.

First, it is a record of the work of God to save humankind through concrete expressions of the Original Principle, and especially, it records the life and teachings of the one man who was truly the incarnation of the Original Principle,⁹ who lived the Principle, and taught the Principle (though it was recorded unsystematically): Jesus of Nazareth. The hermeneutic of investigation is God's activities in the Bible rather than human activities in the natural world.

Second, the Bible is a repository of truth, a “textbook teaching the truth” (*DP* pp. 9, 131), and *Divine Principle* declares its continuity with the truths expressed in the Bible. Many biblical themes, e.g., the sovereignty and parenthood of God, God’s active providence in history, God’s ethical demands for justice, purity, and faithfulness, the Messianic hope, are reasserted in *Divine Principle*. Truth is asserted to be absolute and unchanging, not to be replaced, but rather explained and clarified. This idea of the continuity of truth is also an element of Confucianism: “I have transmitted what was taught to me without making up anything of my own. I have been faithful to and loved the Ancients . . .” (*Analects* 7:1) *Divine Principle*, like the Bible, is a textbook teaching the truth, and accords to the Bible an independent witness to the truth to which they both point.

But of course, *Divine Principle* must reinterpret the biblical word to fit the contemporary situation, and many biblical ideas are customs of former times rather than universal truths. The hermeneutical problem, shared by all interpreters, is how to judge which words in the Bible express universal truth and which refer only to the particulars of a dead civilization. Even in *Divine Principle*, the answers are not always clear. We no longer practice polygamy or levirate marriages, but are the biblical condemnations of adultery expressive of a universal truth? Holy war was a biblical institution for establishing God’s sovereignty over a territory; we too seek to establish God’s dominion on earth; shall we engage in holy war? The Confucian tradition, as we shall see, informs the manner in which Unification theology handles some of these questions.

Another use of the Bible is as a record of the lives of people who, as God’s chosen champions, sought to accomplish his will. We are urged to study their lives carefully and to model our own lives on the faithful element of theirs. Indeed, it is by experiencing their trials and victories, and by realizing the correspondences between these biblical figures and ourselves, that we can most fully grasp the Principle in our lives (*DP* pp. 237-38, 251, 261, 283, 338-42, 370-71). This use of the Bible, to connect personally with its people of faith, is no doubt influenced by the

Confucian emphasis on self-cultivation as patterning one's life after the sages of the past. Confucius in his *Analects* constantly points to illustrious predecessors like the Duke of Chou, Yao, and Shun. Truth and action are not separated in either Confucian or Unification thought; hence the truth of God is best understood in the actions of his champions. In this way, the Bible can be a source for interpreting one's concrete life experiences in terms of the Original Principle.

Self-cultivation begins with the life of the individual, and here also Unification theology shares with Confucianism a unity of truth and ethics, of knowledge and praxis.¹⁰ An exclusively intellectual apprehension of truth is inadequate; rather a well-ordered personality and a pure heart must be the ground for true knowledge. Chu Hsi taught: "The mind is not like a side door which can be enlarged by force. We must eliminate the obstructions of selfish desires, and then it will be pure and clear and able to know all." (*Chu Tzu ch'uan-shu* 44:13a)

Similarly, *Divine Principle* urges us to investigate and purify our own lives. Every person has an original nature within, though it is often obscured in the fallen state. By striving to live according to the will of God, by prayer, and by sacrificial service to others, we can uncover our original selves. The more we uncover and purify our original selves, the clearer becomes our grasp of the Original Principle. Hence each person must do his or her own part in order to come to true knowledge. It is not enough to believe a dogmatic teaching.

The Five Relations

There are five relations of utmost importance under Heaven . . . between prince and minister, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and younger brothers, and between friends. (Doctrine of the Mean XX, 8)

Confucianism stresses the five relations as the primary context for all human life. Persons are, above all, social beings, related to one another through the order set up by the five relations.¹¹ *Divine Principle* basically agrees with this view of life, and considers the greatest joy to come from the relationships that are shared with others, particularly in

the family. The values most stressed in *Divine Principle* are not traits of the individual person, such as intelligence, creativity, sensitivity, a warm disposition, etc., so highly valued in the West. Instead they are the virtues of true relations with others, such as loyalty to God, fidelity between husband and wife, parental love for children and filial piety toward parents (*DP* p. 48-9).

The stress on family, so often depreciated in our secular Western climate, was shared by the people of the Old Testament. Early missionaries to Korea have even commented on the striking similarities between the lifestyle of Koreans and that of the biblical Hebrews.¹² As in the Orient, the Hebrews saw themselves primarily in terms of their family roles. Children were expected to respect and care for their parents (Exodus 20:12, 21:15, Deuteronomy 27:16). Sexual mores were tightly regulated with the ideal of preserving family stability.¹³ The chief duty and joy of parents was to have prosperous offspring; this was the blessing which God promised through the patriarchal narratives. In a similar vein, Mencius said: "There are three things that are unfilial, and the worst of them is to have no posterity." (*Mencius* IV, i, xxvi)

The many genealogical lists in the Bible also testify to the importance of the family in Old Testament times for the individual's identity and social role. Hence the family orientation of *Divine Principle* may be appropriated for illuminating life in biblical times.

Divine Principle views each Old Testament personage in terms of the five relations. It speaks not only of Adam and Eve but of Adam's family, not only of Noah but of Noah's family, not only of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as independent patriarchs but of Abraham's family. Moses' mission is constantly related to the problems of his people's lack of loyalty. The roles of Saul and Samuel are seen ideally as that of a king and his sage advisor. In the stories of Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob, and the Northern and Southern kingdoms, the theme of the relationship between elder and younger brothers becomes paradigmatic for the Principle of Restoration.

Viewing these biblical personages in terms of these relations also clarifies *Divine Principle's* moral judgments on their behavior. Jacob for

many Western commentators is a sly and slippery fellow, whose greatest asset was the cunning by which he deceives first Esau and then Laban.¹⁴ But *Divine Principle* sees Jacob as a virtuous man, whose filial piety, first to his mother and later in his yearning to return home in spite of his brother's wrath, is commendable. He deserves the praise which scripture gives him. Another passage whose meaning is clarified by this perspective is that on the sin of Ham (Genesis 9:20-27). Though the Bible is ambiguous, since Canaan, not Ham, is cursed, from the viewpoint of the five relations it is Ham's unfilial conduct towards his father that is at issue. Not appreciating all his father had done in saving their family, he made light of him by being ashamed of his nakedness. Western commentators might easily overlook the kind of filial respect for parents that comes naturally to someone from an Oriental culture, and which must have also been the view of the Old Testament writers.

In considering Moses, *Divine Principle* focuses upon the relationship of God's representative to others. While some contemporary theologies, notably liberation theology, would focus narrowly on the Exodus-event, *Divine Principle* views the Exodus as only the beginning of the longer relationship between Moses as God's representative and law-giver and the people of the twelve tribes, whose chronic murmuring and lack of loyalty delayed their entrance into Canaan. The grace of God at the Red Sea and Sinai could not find completion until the entire congregation could unite with God's representatives in Moses, the Tabernacle, and Joshua. The hermeneutic in *Divine Principle* thus leads to the consideration of the Exodus-Conquest as an indivisible unit, much as it was intended by the authors of the Hexateuch and the older Song of the Sea (Exodus 15) in ancient Israel. The account of the Hexateuch and the theology of *Divine Principle* converge in their reasons for the delays on the way.

Similarly, sensitivity to the relationship between a leader and his followers informs *Divine Principle's* handling of the gospels. The dispute between Jesus and John the Baptist, a small matter to the evangelists, becomes a major concern since it bears directly on Jesus' efforts to find loyal followers. In contrast, the miracles of Jesus, which occupy so much space in the gospel narratives, have relatively little effect on

increasing the loyalty of Jesus' following. Hence their importance is downplayed in *Divine Principle*.

However, the witness of the Bible runs in direct conflict with one of the five relations—that between elder and younger brother. God consistently chooses the younger brother and wills that the elder serve the younger throughout the narratives in Genesis. This surprising fact, as contrary to prevailing Israelite customs as to Confucian values, cannot be ignored by *Divine Principle*, and it is the biblical pattern, not the Confucian ethic, that becomes normative. The biblical record informs *Divine Principle* that there must be a fundamental flaw in the traditional family as long as people are fallen and self-centered. The reversal of the elder and younger brothers, critiquing an institution as central to Unification and Confucian thought as the family, becomes a core concept of the principle of restoration of the ideal family. We see here that the word of scripture is allowed to challenge Confucian principles in the Unification hermeneutic.

Filial Piety and the Parenthood of God

The application of filial piety, the most central of the five relations, as a hermeneutic for scripture has far-reaching consequences for theology and piety. Jesus called God his Father; to see God as our Father means that our position and obligation is to be filial sons and daughters to our Heavenly Parent. Thus when Christianity came to China, Matteo Ricci was quick to identify God with the Lord of Heaven,¹⁵ to whom we owe filial service: "... men know their parents, but do not know that the Lord of Heaven is the parent of all. Men know that a nation must have a rightful ruler, but do not know that the Lord who alone governs Heaven is the rightful ruler of all. A man who does not serve his parents cannot be a (true) son; a man who does not know the rightful ruler cannot be a (true) minister; a man who does not serve the Lord of Heaven cannot be a (true) man."¹⁶

Divine Principle concurs with Ricci, and this has several implications. True daughters and sons of filial piety know their parents' heart; hence

we should know our Heavenly Parent's situation, God's wishes and undertakings through the centuries, so that we can understand our Parent's desire for us. The Bible is the historical record of God's dealings with us, his children. "Like an eagle that stirs up its nest, that flutters over its young, spreading out its wings, catching them, bearing them on its pinions, the Lord alone did lead him." (Deuteronomy 32:11-12) "Sons have I reared and brought up, but they have rebelled against me . . ." (Isaiah 1:2)

For this reason, *Divine Principle* requires a biblically grounded faith. Additionally, knowing God's historical situation requires that the providential events of the Christian era also be understood. God has continued to strive to lead his children through the last two thousand years. In this, *Divine Principle* recovers an Old Testament concern for the significance of the entire sweep of sacred history.

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 A filial son or daughter's obligation to parents only begins with a knowledge of their situation. Filial piety involves rescuing parents from their suffering, caring for them in their poverty, and fulfilling their desires: "Filial piety is seen in the skillful carrying out of the wishes of our forefathers, and the skillful carrying forward of their undertakings." (*Doctrine of the Mean* XIX, 2)

Divine Principle understands the heart of God to be suffering with the pain of his children's sufferings and with their bondage to sin.¹⁷ We find this sensitivity to God's grieving heart occasionally in the Bible (Genesis 6:6, Hosea 11:1-9, Matthew 23:37), but in Confucianism the sensitive heart of the parent or ruler is a key concept. Mencius said: "All men have this heart, that when they see another man suffer, they suffer, too. The ancient kings had this heart: when they saw men suffer, they suffered, too. Therefore, the former kings ran a government that, when it saw men suffer, it suffered, too . . . it's not human not to have a heart that sympathizes with pain." (*Mencius* II, i, vi)

This Confucian ideal of *jen*, or compassion for others, becomes in *Divine Principle* an attribute of God, the parent *par excellence*. When we know of God's suffering in the Bible and share in the agony of God's

situation in our contemporary world, we are moved by compassion to strive to ease our Heavenly Parent's heart. Ultimately, the desire of God is the ideal world; all his sons and daughters should make that their purpose as well. Specifically, Rev. Moon has understood his mission in this light. He strives to comfort the suffering of God and to carry forward God's will to achieve a world of love and peace.

Filial piety and *jen* (compassion) are humanistic values in Confucianism which, when applied to scripture as ways of understanding human relationships to God, make for a more intimate sort of piety in which God becomes intensely personal. As with the discussion of Principle, we can see that the form of Confucian thought is retained, but its object is shifted from natural human relations to relations with the deity. Confucianism by itself is non-theistic, but as the source of a hermeneutic for scripture, objective to the biblical word, it brings out a synthesis that is theistic and, I would maintain, Christian. The ethic of filial piety draws out the biblical doctrine of God as father. Predictably, shifting the ultimate subject of filial piety from the natural parents to God as parent has created tensions between faith and family affiliation.¹⁸

The Root and the Ends

A basic interpretive principle for Unification theology is that a thing is understood according to both the nature of its origins and its intended purpose. This is a concept deeply rooted in the Confucian tradition. Things have their root and their completion. Affairs have their end and their beginning. To know what is first and what is last will lead near to what is taught in *The Great Learning*: "The ancients who wished to make illustrious virtue throughout the empire first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts . . ." (3-4)

Generally, there exists in Confucian philosophy a sense that things have their roots, develop, and bear fruit, so that the root of a thing

determines its subsequent expression. The root of the individual begins in his mind and heart, and from that point his own actions, his family relations, and his role in society will result. Each of these levels: individual, family, society, nation, world, must be realized sequentially. Each greater level will be only as sound as the foundation of the lesser level allows.

Thus, for *Divine Principle* the development of the individual's faith in God, the foundation of faith, precedes the establishment of harmonious interpersonal relationships, the foundation of substance. Then, only when the family is established, can work at the level of society bear fruit. *Divine Principle* therefore devotes a full chapter to the series of family narratives in Genesis, which are relatively insignificant for many Christian theologies, because of this stress on the godly family as the root for the people of God. Similarly, Unification ethics gives priority to personal and family ethics as the precondition for justice in the larger society.

We can also find this orientation to roots in the frequent typologies in *Divine Principle*, e.g., the twelve disciples of Jesus are rooted in the twelve tribes of Israel, which originated from the twelve sons of Jacob and the twelve generations from Noah to Jacob. We can find it in the numerological principles in the discussion of providential time-identity, where a certain time period, such as the four hundred years from the Reformation to the coming of the Lord of the Second Advent, is seen as rooted in a four hundred year period from the reform of Ezra to the coming of Jesus. This in turn is rooted in earlier periods of forty: the forty years wandering in the wilderness under Moses, the forty-day spy mission, Moses' forty-day fast, etc. (*DP* pp. 383-87, 397-98, 402). We can find it in a historiography that sees the roots of democracy in the "Abel-type view of life" that began with the Reformation and ultimately in Hebraic thought, and the roots of communism in the "Cain-type view of life" that began with the Renaissance and the revival of Hellenism (*DP* pp. 459-63). We can find it in the depiction of the fall of man, in which the root of all human sinfulness is located in a corruption of the original love of the first human ancestors (*DP*

pp. 75, 83-91). We can also find it in the understanding of the Last Days, when the new age will begin as but a small movement within a larger culture ignorant of the time, which will eventually expand to fill the earth (*DP* pp. 133-36).

Using this context, *Divine Principle* interprets the rock at Rephidim to be the root of the tablets of stone, and hence of the Tabernacle, in that complex series of events that make up Moses' course (*DP* pp. 312-16, 319, 325-27). Extending this image to Jesus' identification of himself with the Temple, this meant that the rock was symbolically the Christ, the substantiation of the Temple and the tablets of stone. Is it surprising that Paul came up with a similar exegesis? (I Corinthians 10:4). The hermeneutic in *Divine Principle* leads to a richness of allegorical and typological interconnections which were understood in the world view of first century Israel, but which positivistic Western hermeneutics, with its emphasis on the discreteness and historicity of events, has lost.

The other half of this interpretive principle is that a thing must be understood according to its ultimate purpose. The Principle is even more thoroughgoing than most Confucian thinkers in asserting that each level is only harmonized and fulfilled when it exists for the larger purpose. That the individual finds meaning when he serves his family is a commonplace in Oriental thought, but the Principle insists that the family will find its harmony and value in serving the community, that the community should similarly serve the nation, that nations will ultimately find their prosperity when they sacrifice for the sake of the world, and that the world will find true peace only when it is fully dedicated to God. Principle applies the Christian ethic of self-sacrifice systematically to all levels of social existence. Though Confucianists and Christians both have the theological framework to understand sacrifice, they often fall short in practice when faced with the challenge of going beyond the national level to solve world problems. In the ultimate sense the purpose of history is determined by the will of God the creator, so that the root (the purpose of creation) and the ends (the eschatological kingdom of God) are one. Just as Jesus Christ is the alpha and omega, eschatology is grounded in the perfection of creation.

This kind of orientation towards ultimate ends and eschatology is the basis for *Divine Principle's* understanding of history. The periodizations of both Old Testament history and Christian history can only be constructed based on a view of development towards the historical fulfillment of the reign of God on earth. Thus Klaus Lindner¹⁹ has shown that *Divine Principle's* periodization of Christian history is in accord with the views of nineteenth century liberal Protestant scholars who also saw the purpose of history as the progressive transformation of the world into a world of God's sovereignty. It does not fit with the periodizations in Catholic histories which interpret events according to the growth of the institutions of the church, nor with twentieth-century nominalist histories that reject any hypothesis of a teleological purpose as "unscientific." Similarly, *Divine Principle's* view of history is in substantial accord with that of Old Testament writers such as the Yahwist and the Deuteronomistic historian, who saw in history the unfolding of God's promised kingdom in Israel.

The Role of the King and the Mandate of Heaven

The corollary to the preceding concept of the root as prior to and the basis of greater things is that the conduct of the government has an effect on the welfare of the nation. A typical Confucian statement in this regard is the following by Mencius: "When the prince is committed to the common good, everyone else is committed to the common good." (*Mencius* IV,ii, v)

A king should be a moral exemplar, who by practical measures of good government and by his example can teach people to live up to high standards. The Confucian tradition makes use of the concept of the "Mandate of Heaven," that when a dynasty ceases to rule justly, Heaven will remove it and replace it with a new one. Heaven's decrees were announced by signs and portents,²⁰ for when the king, as Heaven's representative, was out of step with the order of the universe, discord would be manifest in nature. It is by the king's leadership that society

prospers or suffers, but the king rules at the sufferance of Heaven, who will support just rulers but cast off tyrants.

Divine Principle assumes a similar view regarding the monarchies of ancient Israel. Like the Deuteronomistic historian, Confucian historians believed that the religious or moral behavior of the king was more important than his success in battle or his personal wealth. Hence *Divine Principle* takes the judgment of the kings of Israel and Judah in I and II Kings at face value. It also shares the analysis of prophets like Isaiah, who condemned as futile clever alliances and expediencies at the expense of trusting in God and doing justice.²¹ (Isaiah 30:1-2, 15, 31:1-5; Hosea 7:8-13).

In the Old Testament, two ideologies of covenant and election stand side by side. One sees covenant as a conditional contract between the community and God. If the contract is broken, God may cast off that community and choose another. This conditional covenant runs from Sinai through the prophetic denunciations of the various corrupt dynasties in the Northern kingdom, and finally to the Christian doctrine of a new, spiritual Israel which supplanted the recalcitrant Jews. The other idea is of an unconditional covenant, of a promise by God to Israel that can never be annulled. This so-called "Davidic covenant" centered in Jerusalem as God's eternal dwelling-place and in the house of David as God's chosen dynasty. Despite exile and many corrupt kings, the hope for the Anointed One (Messiah) and the righteous kingdom has persisted into Christian eschatology, still focusing on a scion of David and on Jerusalem. We would expect the Confucian notion of the Mandate of Heaven to predispose Unification theology to the former ideology, and that is indeed the case. Though the promise and will of God for the salvation of all is unconditional, a specific providential role need not necessarily remain attached to any particular person or group. Only persons who fulfill the responsibility to which they were chosen can remain God's elect; otherwise God will choose others to fulfill his will (*DP* pp. 199-203). This conditionality is an important self-critical principle in Unification theology, as in Confucianism, and should disabuse us of the idea that the chosen status of any

nation or church is not conditional and liable to judgment.

Interesting applications of the notion of the Mandate of Heaven to the Bible are found in *Divine Principle's* exegesis of Noah's ark and of Abraham's sacrifice (Genesis 15). The emperor in China was considered to correspond in his personal world to the cosmos in miniature. He was a "father and mother to the people."²² *Divine Principle* makes a similar point in its view of the human as the microcosm of the universe (*DP* pp. 38-39, 57-59). Noah's ark, then, is the cosmos in miniature. Noah, by his faith, preserved the cosmos intact (*DP* pp. 252f.), but by Ham's sin it was invaded by Satan. Similarly, Abraham, as the one man chosen to begin the dispensation to save the entire world (Genesis 12:3) and to restore the failure of Noah's family, has his sacrifice explained as symbolizing the cosmos (*DP* pp. 265-71). The failure to subject one part of the sacrifice to the symbolic cutting of good from evil can thus be interpreted as a mistake; one part of the cosmos is left unpurified. We can also surmise, using the theory of portents, that the evil signs which followed the offering (Genesis 15:11-13) meant that it had been carried out unacceptably.

Like filial piety, Confucian principles of kingship are transferred in Unification theology to the religious sphere, to the individual's relationship to God. While in Confucianism access to Heaven's Mandate was mainly the privilege of the emperor, *Divine Principle's* application of this idea to Abraham shows that every person of faith has such a mandate. Every man and woman is a microcosm of the cosmos. The cosmos revolves around and responds to the actions and feelings of each person. This is a transformation of Confucian concepts to the theocentric perspective of the Bible, where kingship is exercised by God and human kings are his surrogates. In Unification piety, the hymn *Tan Shim Ga* speaks of undying loyalty to God and his will, but it was originally written as a poem about a subject's devotion to his king by the Korean poet Chong Mong-ju (1337-1392).²³ Patriotism and nationalism are relativized to the higher value of the zeal for the universal will of God.

Therefore, *Divine Principle* does not accept Confucian political philosophy as the ideal for contemporary or future political society.

Monarchy is specifically judged as having failed to bring social justice and harmony both within ancient Israel and in the Christian era, and revolutions to democratic social and political forms are praised as in line with the will of God (*DP* pp. 424, 429-30, 441-6). Confucianism by itself in both China and Korea had failed to produce a just society. Instead it had stultified to the point where the five relations became the ideological justification for an oppressive hierarchical system of castes and the oppression of women.²⁴ The coming society is seen as a democratic socialist world community of people whose hearts and sensitivities have matured to the point where they will see the common good as their self-interest and highest desire. At the same time, the humaneness of Confucian values can be recovered and made to work if they are centered on God; i.e., when the parties in each of the five relations understand their responsibilities to each other before God, and fulfill them with love.

Concluding Comments

We have investigated several concepts from Neo-Confucian teaching that permeate Korean culture and have exerted hermeneutical influence on the interpretation of scripture in *Divine Principle*. We have omitted the Neo-Confucian doctrine of the Supreme Ultimate and yin-yang, whose obvious connection to the Unification doctrine of God has been described by S. Matczak.²⁵ There may very well be other concepts from Confucian culture relevant to the interpretation of scripture that have not been treated by this study; indeed this paper is but a precursor to a whole area of research in Chinese philology, history of Korean religion, and higher criticism of the texts of the Unification Church.

Rev. Moon has been called "the Tertullian of the Orient . . . who accomplished for the first time in a thoroughly consistent fashion the 'acute Orientalization of the Christian gospel.'"²⁶ This statement brackets the question of revelation, but for our purposes it expresses an important aspect of Rev. Moon's thought. By developing a biblical exegesis based on Oriental philosophy, Rev. Moon has made a great contribution to the

indigenization of Christianity in East Asia. *Divine Principle* is an honest indigenization because it not only expresses the biblical message in Confucian terms, but also allows the Bible to address and critique Confucian life and values.

The study of *Divine Principle* should be able to enhance and broaden a Western person's view of the Bible. We have already mentioned that certain of the insights from a hermeneutic drawn in part from Confucian culture are closer to the sensibilities of the biblical world view than our modern individualistic world view allows. At the very least, *Divine Principle* can sensitize us to parochial Western presuppositions which can limit our understanding of the Bible. Moreover, in an age when many Western people are attracted to the values of the East because of a lack in our own culture, *Divine Principle* may be teaching the particular understanding of the biblical word which will give new meaning to the Christian faith for the West.

FOOTNOTES

¹*Principle of Creation*, Vol. I of *The Divine Principle Home Study Course* (New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1979), p. ii. Korean Confucianism is dominated by the orthodoxy of the school of Chu Hsi and usually ignores the idealist school of Wang Yang Ming or the legalist school which were part of the spectrum of Chinese Confucianism. The narrowness of the Korean orthodoxy simplifies the task of this paper.

²Confucianism is only one of the sources of Rev. Moon's thought. Herbert W. Richardson in "A Brief Outline of Unification Theology" and Frank K. Flinn in "Unification Hermeneutics and Christian Theology," in *A Time for Consideration*, ed. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson (Toronto: Mellen, 1978), pp. 133-40, 151-56, have examined his Calvinist and Wesleyan roots. Sebastian A. Matczak in "God in Unification Philosophy and the Christian Tradition" has described the Neo-Confucian origins of the Unification doctrine of God, and Warren H. Lewis in "Hero with the Thousand-and-First Face" has traced an aspect of Rev. Moon's self-understanding of his mission to Korean shamanism, also in *A Time for Consideration*, pp. 222f, 277-86.

³All references to *Divine Principle* are to the second edition (Washington: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973); hereafter cited as *DP*.

⁴Ch'eng Yi, *Erb Ch'eng i-shu* 2A:1a, translated in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, ed. William Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 527.

⁵*Woun-li* is pronounced "wully" rhyming with "gully," since the n assimilates to the following l in Korean.

⁶Some papers on Unification theology have used the term "Divine Principle" for this metaphysical term. This is a poor choice of terminology, both because it is a mistranslation from the Korean and because of the resultant confusion with the written text entitled *Divine Principle*. The translation "Principle" or "Original Principle" is to be preferred. This paper will consistently use the term "Original Principle" for the metaphysical term *woun-li* to distinguish it from the Neo-Confucian principle, *li*. Note also that Chinese characters cannot distinguish between singular and plural.

⁷*Analects* 7:1.

⁸Ch'eng Yi, p. 531.

⁹*DP*, pp. 39, 131, 211. "Principle" and "the Word" are equated on p. 92, but a detailed discussion of the relationship of truth, Original Principle, and *li* will not be attempted here.

¹⁰In Confucianism, this unity is expressed by the doctrine of rectification of names (Cheng ming); see William McNaughton, ed., *The Confucian Vision* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 126-28. The problematic inherent in this unity has been described by Benjamin Schwartz in "Some Polarities in Confucian Thought," in *Confucianism in Action*, ed. David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 50-62.

¹¹McNaughton, pp. 41-58.

¹²Spencer J. Palmer, *Korea and Christianity* (Seoul: Hollym, 1967), pp. 32-33.

¹³For accounts of Hebrew family customs, see Roland de Vaux, Vol. I of *Social Institutions, Ancient Israel* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961); Raphael Parai, *Sex and Family in the Bible and the Middle East* (New York: Doubleday, 1959); and Johannes Pedersen, *Israel, Its Life and Culture*, Part I (London: Oxford, 1926).

¹⁴Martin Noth, *A History of Pentateuchal Traditions*, trans. Bernhard W. Anderson (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 91-94, 97. Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis*, trans. John Marks (London: SCM, 1961), pp. 262-63, 272, 275, 293-97.

¹⁵But in Neo-Confucianism, Heaven (*T'ien*) is impersonal (*DP* pp. 26-27), and Ricci railed against the school of Chu Hsi as a deviation from the way of Confucius, which he saw as *preparatio evangelica*. Korean Protestantism identified God with the personal monotheistic deity *Hananim*, rather than *T'ien*, and *Divine Principle* follows their practice. The personality of *Hananim* even carried over into the Korean version of Confucianism, but its true locus was in shamanism. See Palmer, pp. 5-8, 16-18. See also David Chung, "Religious Syncretism in Korean Society," Diss. Yale 1959, pp. 144-48, 274-78.

¹⁶Li Chih-tsoo, preface to Matteo Ricci, *T'ien-hsueh ch'u-ban*, in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, pp. 627f.

¹⁷*DP*, pp. 102-3; Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (New York: Golden Gate, 1975), pp. 31-5.

¹⁸The conflict between filial piety to one's family and piety to God as the ultimate parent is not new, either in the Biblical tradition (Lk. 8:20-21, 14:26) or in the Orient. When Buddhism was introduced to China, and many new devotees renounced the world to become monks and ceased to support their families or to provide offspring to perpetuate the family line, Confucianists accused the Buddhists of being unfilial. The Buddhists replied that their teachings taught the highest form of piety, and that their renunciation would bring salvation

to their parents and even to their ancestors of seven generations. That was far more filial, they argued, than merely to attend to their parents' material needs. Today many Unificationists argue similarly, that their work for God will ultimately save their parents as well as the whole world, and so it is the most filial life of all. See Kenneth Ch'en, "Filial Piety in Chinese Buddhism," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 28 (1968), 81-97.

¹⁹ Klaus Lindner, "The Periods of Christian History in Unification Theology," in this volume.

²⁰ Tung Chung-shu, "Chun-ch'iu fan-lu," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, pp. 186f.

²¹ This view contrasts with those contemporary schools of historiography that give the economic and social trends of the masses and the movements of great empires priority over the moral orientation and decisions of a nation's leaders. Instead, the chief concern is with the spirit of the nation and its leadership, its vision and faithfulness to its ideals, for these are what mostly determine a nation's fate. Unificationism's analysis of the state of the United States similarly places the nation's vision, idealism, courage, and morality as primary concerns. It is with these weapons, not nuclear missiles or economic muscle, that the United States can prevail in a hostile world.

²² Tung Chung-shu, pp. 178-81.

²³ McNaughton, p. 58.

²⁴ Palmer, pp. 37-46.

²⁵ Marczak, pp. 222-23.

²⁶ Lewis, p. 277.

The Use and Abuse of the Old Testament in the Christian Scripture

Henry Vander Goot

It is not out of proportion to the reality of the situation to speak today of a “crisis in biblical theology.”¹ Christian reflection today fails to view the scriptures as a single narrative whole. Modern theology seems unable to hold together in a positive, comprehensive, and coherent unity the Old and New Testaments. Much so-called “pre-critical” theology assumes—as does, for example, the Belgic Confession (Article IV)—that the Word of God is contained in both the *Old* and *New* Testaments. But under modern pressures, the scriptures have been treated as *disjecta membra*, with grave consequences for the Old Testament in particular. Though a part of the canon, the Old Testament is widely depreciated, or sometimes reconstructed on exclusively New Testament bases.

Failing to properly appreciate the Old Testament and its relationship to the New poses some problems for Christian reflection which I shall discuss later. But at this point it is necessary to survey briefly the modern theological landscape and to delineate theological positions which tend to rob the Old Testament of its true significance for the Christian church.

Historically, the Lutheran tradition is first. Though Lutheranism has produced Ernst Käsemann’s “canon within the canon” theology, which reduces the Word to the *in loco justificationis* as understood by Martin Luther,² Lutheranism itself is more complex. Rather than

reducing the Word (contained in the Old and New Testaments) to a theme or motif found in the New, Lutheranism has traditionally placed divine wrath *alongside* divine mercy, law *in sequence with* the gospel. Thus, in Luther's theology the Old Testament performs a necessary and indispensable function: it precedes and clarifies the New. For the Lutheran tradition, gospel cannot be what it is, namely victory, except that there be forces to overcome. Just as light depends on darkness, so gospel depends on law, and New on Old.

But though Luther affirmed the law-gospel sequence (which Käsemann, for example, fails to do), that sequence was conceived dialectically. Since the gospel was proclaimed to have overcome and put away the law, the Old Testament has become merely a preliminary to the New. Specifically, the Old Testament has been interpreted over against the New. Viewing the Old Testament strictly as a Hebrew document, Anders Nygren, for example, places the Old squarely in antithesis with the Agape perspective of the New.³ Thus, the impact of the Lutheran conception on the Old Testament and its status has been negative. (I cite other theological positions that have failed to give full, positive status to the Old Testament in the biblical revelation. The influence of the Lutheran tradition on these even more dubious views should be kept in mind.)

A second theological position which devalues the Old Testament stems from the Enlightenment, liberalism, and historicism. Many factors have contributed to this devaluation, among which anti-Semitism is not the least significant. But the most crucial factor is, I believe, the historicist and Enlightenment idea of progress, according to which human consciousness has undergone a progressive development from a primitive fertility religion involving enslavement to natural powers to an ethical-moral awareness, or, as the nineteenth century theologians put it, to ethical monotheism. According to this view, biblical religion marks a final stage in this development.

But even within the biblical material a further progressive differentiation of consciousness is noticeable, represented by the advance of the New Testament beyond the Old Testament and its mind. The

latter, according to liberal theologians, has not taken full advantage of the distinction between morality—the fulfillment of the moral law—on the one hand, and religion and the infinite worth of the free human spirit on the other. But in the New Testament, the consciousness of Jesus is indicative of that distinction and the advance to human freedom and autonomy which that distinction makes possible. Indeed, though the Old Testament overcomes nature viewed as a surd, biotic force, the New Testament overcomes nature viewed as objective consciousness and heteronomous law. Thus in liberalism the Old Testament still represents the enslavement of man to man. The New Testament represents man's liberation in more absolute terms.

Hence, liberalism, too, depreciated the Old Testament by application to the scriptures of its evolutionary conception of the emergence of religious consciousness from ethical awareness to idealized human freedom. In fact, the very ambiance of nineteenth century Germany fostered the neglect of the Old Testament. The heightened consciousness of freedom as exemplified by Jesus and his community was furthermore recapitulated, according to liberal theology, by the German people. Following Martin Luther, the German people committed itself to the struggle against Jewish legalism and French scientific rationalism. It is in this frame of mind that German higher and historical critical scholarship of the Old Testament was first developed into an imposing discipline.⁴

The third Christian position deserving mention is the neo-orthodox school. Here a more complicated relationship to the Old Testament appears, especially in the theology of Karl Barth. Although Barth neither ignores the Old Testament nor assigns it an indispensable negative function in relationship to the New, he does not allow the Old Testament to stand on its own feet. That is, he accords it no significance in its own right.

For this claim I present as evidence Barth's *redemptocentric* method of biblical interpretation, of which a revealing example is his exegesis of the Genesis story of creation.⁵ It is not only the case for Barth that God creates the world through Christ, that he moves towards the world

through his Son in order thereby to establish an orderly disposition and management of things. For Barth this action is very deliberately *not* distinguished from the work of election and reconciliation in Jesus Christ. Barth, then, views Christ's work in creation as a work of *saving* responsiveness, i.e., under the aspect of the Second Article of the Apostolic Creed. According to Barth, right in the very first words of the story of creation we see that in God's act of creation, he *protects* the world from the threat of the primordial chaos power, from the danger of *nicht sein*, or *das Nichtige*. In this way Barth rebuilds the Old Testament, seriously violating those elements in the Old Testament narrative that seem to fall—as to content—outside of the salvation-historical message, or outside of the immediate consciousness of Israel. Creation becomes for Barth a foil through which the people of Israel gave evidence of their faith in the lordship of Jehovah more comprehensively than they did in any other story in the Old Testament. Instead of coming first in the Bible, the story of creation should, for Barth's tastes, stand much later in the narrative.

Notice in the above that I have not criticized Barth's recasting of the Old Testament and creation into something other than they are with the labels "christocentric" or "christomonistic." With Barth (and Calvin, for that matter) I believe that all things (both being and faith) are in Christ and that, therefore, the Old Testament itself calls for a christological interpretation. The work of Christ cannot be restricted to the work of Jesus Christ in the redemption of the world. Christ the eternal Son of God has a cosmic, or creational, function too. That is, stressing classic trinitarianism, I follow Calvin's teaching that God the Father originates but Christ the eternal Son always reveals and mediates on behalf of the Father. "Even if man had remained free from all stain," says Calvin, "his condition would have been too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator."⁶ God moves towards the world only in and through the eternal *logos*. At this point the contribution of Barth can be appreciated in a general and formal sense.

However, in Calvin's theology this primary function of the eternal Son, the *logos asarkos*, is clearly distinguished from the work of election

and reconciliation in Jesus Christ. On this point Calvin and Barth quite obviously differ. Calvin never views Christ's mediation in creation as a work of *saving* responsiveness, i.e., under the aspect of the Second Article. As Calvin argues, "We understand first that the name of Mediator applies to Christ not only because he took flesh or because he took on the office of reconciling the human race with God. But already from the beginning of creation he was truly Mediator because he was always Head of the Church and held primacy even over the angels and was the first born of all creatures (Ephesians 1:2; Colossians 1:15ff; Colossians 2:10)."⁷

There is then the rule of God over all the world and the angels through the Son. In Calvinist thought this rulership is called "the Kingdom of God," and its christological equivalent, "the Lordship of Christ." These phrases indicate that from the beginning, before the fall, Christ was present as mediator. Only after the fall, because of sin, did this rule of God through the Son come to special expression in the church, where Christ the Lord of history performs his reconciling work, drawing the elect into fellowship. Outside of the sphere of the church, Christ always was and is Lord over all. But apart from the fellowship of belief there is no salvation and reconciliation.

Thus Calvin can distinguish the two orders of creation and reconciliation while at the same time viewing all of life as life in Christ the eternal Son. As David Willis has convincingly shown, there is in Calvin's theology a work of the Son that is not restricted to or exhausted by the humanity and flesh of Jesus Christ: the eternal Son has existence "also outside of the flesh" (*etiam extra carnem*). That is, Calvin subjects "the idea of mediation to two different nuances: mediation as reconciliation and mediation as sustenance." As reconciler, Jesus Christ came into the world because of the fall. But "as sustainer, the Mediator always was the way creation was preserved and ordered."⁸ Calvin's principle of unity in Christ thus does not force the trinitarian elements of the biblical narrative through the single funnel of the Second Article of the Apostles' Creed.

Finally, I would like to mention the evangelical interpretation of the Old Testament. Though this "position" is not as theologically

explicit as the others, it is widespread in practice. Its hallmark is simply to ignore the Old Testament except for the moral codes it contains. To these codes the literalist and legalist mind remains attracted. The quarters of the evangelical world which have been theologically influenced by the Old Princeton School of Archibald Alexander, Charles Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield are an exception. In this tradition the Old Testament is an authoritative repository of infallible propositions, errorless with respect to every topic even obliquely touched on.

Generally, however, the Bible is identified in the evangelical tradition with the story and red-lettered words of Jesus. It gets reduced to its "central saving message," to use the words of certain of evangelicalism's recent spokesmen. The rest of the Bible, namely, masses of important Old Testament material, belong—as Jack Rogers and Donald McKim have argued⁹ and as evangelical practice demonstrates—to the Bible's fallible human and cultural form. It can be set aside without damage to any effort to determine the Word of God in the Bible.

None of the four positions I have mentioned so far accords the Old Testament an equal and fully authoritative status with the New. None accepts the Old Testament as a positive, indispensable revelation of God that is both continuous with the New and its necessary *prolegomenon*. All fail to view the Bible comprehensively and affirmatively from beginning to end. None takes full interpretive advantage of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity when assessing the Bible, thus failing to see that scripture is a record of the works of God (and of men's responses to those works) from creation to consummation: from the work of the Father to the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit. All fail to see that the Bible is a total vision of reality, comprehending everything about life within the perspective of faith. All fail to see the Bible as universal history in the sense of Augustine's *City of God* and thus are unaware that that history is not itself a *Heilsgeschichte* but has a *Heilsgeschichte* within it. Each position tends to identify a single redemption-oriented element of the whole ongoing narrative with the narrative itself, thereby reducing the narrative's structural whole to some putative salvation-historical essence or center within the Bible. Not one understands that the theme, the fun-

damental motif, of the Bible is trinitarian, following the pattern "creation-fall, redemption, consummation."¹⁰

It appears that the one current within modern Christianity which overcomes the problems of the four positions I just briefly described is the Reformed, Calvinist tradition. It has granted full-fledged status to the Old Testament in complement with the New, for it regards the Old and New together as constituting an unbreakable positive continuity that loses its meaning if one of its narrative elements is neglected, recast in the image of *Heilsgeschichte*, or pitted dialectically against the New as *Nomos* versus *Agape*.

Calvin himself set the pattern for this positive appropriation of the Old Testament into the Christian faith. He understood that the one Word, the revelation of God, is given in the Old-New sequence, emphatically not in either alone. Calvin claims in effect that the Old and New say the same thing in substance and differ only as to form of management and administration. Old and New together present to us the one God who acts, has always acted, and will always act in *covenant* with us.¹¹

Thus for Calvin the biblical witness is not salvation history, a law-gospel dialectic, or *Nomos* piety alongside of *Agape* faith; it is, rather, preeminently one *Covenant history*. Covenant is the overarching concept which holds Old and New Testaments together. The common term "testament," meaning covenant, is used to designate both "books." Showing the foundational character of the covenant idea, Calvinist theology speaks in particular of a Covenant of Works in creation. From the beginning, man's relationship to God is a covenantal one. Covenant belongs to the very nature and order of things. Covenant relationship and dependence do not appear on the scene for the first time after the fall into sin. The Bible represents from beginning to end a history of man's obedience and disobedience in the face of God's faithfulness in the covenant. The covenant dynamic is the all inclusive, dominant concept in terms of which every element of the biblical narrative—including Jesus—is interpreted by the Reformed, Calvinist theologian.¹²

Moreover, this positive conception of continuity in which Old

precedes New and in which the one cannot be without the other (neither Old without New nor New without Old) determines the method of interpretation used in the Reformed tradition. Calvin scorned allegorical interpretation, attending closely to the so-called plain and simple sense in exegesis. In this regard his teacher was John Chrysostom. By his method Calvin stressed the replacement of allegory with typology.

Typology is closely related to repetition. This fact means specifically, for one thing, that events and persons as appearing in the biblical record do not represent earthly realities with heavenly meanings but rather types (beginning with Adam and Eve in creation) that will appear again and again in an ongoing, evolving narrative. The same situations and figures return repeatedly. New persons and events are described in terms of old ones in the Bible, (for example, Christ, the second Adam) and by the addition of each new event or person so described, a repetition occurs that contains progress and that presses on to a higher plain. (The idea of "progressive revelation" and the model of "promise and fulfillment" are subordinate dimensions of this method.)

Hence, what happens in "the below" of history does not signal "the above" but rather "the before" and "the after" in the ongoing development of scripture's narrative. As Hendrikus Berkhof has aptly put it: typology differs from allegory because "it does not think in terms of timelessness, but entirely in terms of history. For here the external is not a parable of the internal, but the earlier is a parable of the later, or better, the historical is like the Historical. Allegory looks inward, into the soul. Typology looks ahead, into history. That is, typology looks back into the past and there finds the key to the present and future in the encounters between God and the world."¹³

With its notion of covenant and method of typology, Reformed, Calvinist theology expresses its commitment to the Old Testament as a good and indispensable part of the Bible that has full-fledged, authoritative status with the New. *To understand scripture, the various parts of scripture—in this case Old and New—are needed to refer to one another; for scripture is its own interpreter.* Only when scripture is allowed to interpret itself in this way can certainty be produced and can analogy to

autonomous reason and experience be brought under the just judgment it deserves. Hence Reformed theology, especially Dutch Reformed exegetical theology, suspects and avoids the modern biblical theological method of dissonance that places things in the Bible *over against* one another. Rather it prefers and practices the method of consonance, taking full advantage of the analogy of faith in its interpretation of the Bible.

The Reformed tradition thus also bears witness to the systematic theological relevance and necessity of a positive use of the Old Testament. For Calvin the Bible is its own interpreter. The Bible provides even the categories, interpretations, and structures whereby its saving message can best become known. In brief, for Calvin this framework of judgments and structures is especially closely related (1) to the revelation concerning creation in the Bible and (2) to the dependence of that revelation of creation upon the presence of the Old Testament in the canon. The following pages represent an effort to explore the systematic theological interrelationship and significance of these two claims.

Crucial to an elaboration of Calvin's position on the first point is, I believe, Calvin's own deliberate location of the doctrine of scripture in the first pages of his *Institutes*,¹⁴ which opens with an extremely long book on "The Knowledge of God the Creator." (Few theologians have noticed this peculiarity, and fewer still have bothered to consider its systematic importance. For example, if the Barthians were to attend to this matter, their redemptocentric interpretation of the Bible would be seriously jeopardized.) Unlike the scholastic tradition to which much of his theology is a critical response, for Calvin creation (God's existence as well as the origination and determination of being) is emphatically not knowable by unaided reason but belongs (as all things do!) to the perspective of revelation and faith. Everything belongs to the Christian faith-perspective. Therefore, right from the outset of the theological enterprise where we discuss creation, the world, experience, and man and what each of these are and ought to be as well as how we are to understand their origin and total meaningfulness, scripture becomes necessary. This fact does not mean—as Barth supposes—that everything

is, therefore, purely gracious and in that sense purely christic, including creation and law. Rather this fact means that the purely gracious and christic in God's actions (*das Heil*) belong as one among many things to the perspective of faith, which encompasses also our understanding of being (*das Sein*) as such.

For Calvin, then, the Bible reveals not only a saving message, Jesus and our salvation, but also creation and law which are "first in the order right teaching requires." For a proper knowledge of both God and man, we are, according to Calvin, dependent upon the biblical revelation. Without it we flounder. And, therefore, even when not yet attending to "the proper doctrine of faith whereby men are illumined unto the hope of eternal life,"¹⁵ Calvin introduces scripture as an indispensable light unto our path and spectacles through which to see.

Scriptural revelation thus has minimally a two-fold purpose, or better, a two-fold content or word. Or, as Calvin himself puts it, scripture is a *duplex cognitio Dei*, a two-fold revelation of the knowledge of God.¹⁶ The Christian faith is not just a way of salvation, not just a religion of emergency. For the Christian revelation also speaks about the framework in terms of which the gospel must be understood and with which alone it is commensurate. For Calvin it is not possible for the gospel to be explained out of natural reason, unaided rumination on creation-reality, for such as are prone to do this exalt their own vanity. Furthermore, those that do this depend on themselves for a correct understanding of Christ—nothing could vitiate the Word more!—and finally remake Christ in the image and likeness of corruptible man. That an excellent defense be available to man for a correct understanding of Jesus and our salvation, scripture, specifically the Old Testament, provides us with the proper directives. For God's Word is not simply a proclamation of salvation from on high, but also a Word about the nature of the world below into which (and in terms of which) the Word from on high is spoken.

The second point in this argument is the assumption that it is exactly on the Old Testament in scripture that we are dependent for our conception of man and the world.¹⁷ The story of creation—the story of

God's making and governance of all things—is specifically important. Speaking of scripture as guide and teacher for anyone who would come to God the Creator, Calvin says:

There is no doubt that Adam, Noah, Abram, and the rest of the patriarchs with this assistance penetrated to the intimate knowledge of him that in a way distinguished them from unbelievers. I am not yet speaking of the proper doctrine of faith whereby they had been illumined unto the hope of eternal life. For, that they might pass from death to life, it was necessary to recognize God not only as Creator but also as Redeemer, for undoubtedly they arrived at both from the Word. First in order came that kind of knowledge by which one is permitted to grasp who that God is who founded and governs the universe. Then that other inner knowledge was added, which alone quickens dead souls, whereby God is known not only as the Founder of the universe and the sole Author and Ruler of all that is made, but also in the person of the Mediator as the Redeemer. But because we have not yet come to the fall of the world and the corruption of nature, I shall now forego discussion of the remedy. My readers therefore should remember that I am not yet going to discuss that covenant by which God adopted to himself the sons of Abraham, or that part of doctrine which has always separated believers from unbelieving folk, for it was founded in Christ. But here I shall discuss only how we should learn from scripture that God, the Creator of the universe, can by sure marks be distinguished from all the throng of feigned gods. Then, in due order, that series will lead us to the redemption. We shall derive many testimonies from the New Testament, and other testimonies also from the Law and the Prophets, where express mention is made of Christ. Nevertheless, all things will tend to this end, that God, the Artificer of the universe, is made manifest to us in scripture, and that what we ought to think of him is set forth there, lest we seek some uncertain deity by devious paths.¹⁸

But the story in Genesis of creation is not the only thing that is important. Its very inconclusion in revelation, its very restriction to the perspective of faith, indicates that scriptural revelation consists not just in the word of salvation (*kerygma*) but also in the Word spoken to us as the Bible all along the way judges, evaluates, approves or disapproves man's response to the divine, direct address. Creation is thus not present just in Genesis 1. It is present throughout the Bible in the fact that the Bible records for us not just what God proclaims but also how—whether

rightly or wrongly—men respond in their lives to that proclamation. That, too, belongs to the infallible Word of God and that, too, is creation, namely the creation and law of every human experience and character in scripture.

Scripture engages experiences, characters and human actions, and from its judgment of curse or promise of blessing—whichever the case may be—we learn about the world, its normative structures, and our proper response to God. Creation is not just the story about it in the Bible—though that story is the indispensable foundation of every other appearance of “creation” in the Bible! Nor is creation simply the condition in which all biblical characters live. It is also the creation-reality in which *we live today, now!* Creation is the truly universal element that links our lives with the Word spoken to men and women in the Bible so that finally the Word spoken to them is the Word spoken to men and women such as they are—ultimately, the Word spoken to us.

Without the presence of experience—the world, man, and ourselves—in the Bible, the proper meaning of the message of salvation is up for grabs. The Bible is its own interpreter (*sui ipsius interpres*). The experience relative to which the message of salvation can alone be properly disclosed is not brought to the Bible but is depicted by the Bible itself. Not only the answers that the Bible offers but also the questions we ask of it are finally authored, not partly by us and partly by the Bible, but wholly by the Bible itself.

A Christianity that does not honor as fully as possible the Old Testament as the Word of God (as none of the first four positions outlined above do) is in danger of fashioning not only its own vision of reality but also its own message of salvation. Such Christianity runs the risk of imposing on the New Testament an alien structure of concreteness. It runs the risk, for example, of interpreting redemption as the undoing of creation, as flight from creation, as the self-correction of creation, or as superordinate to the purpose of creation.

In the history of Christianity such mistakes have been made. In fact the most persistent major problem of Christianity in the West has been its accommodation to prevailing, “natural” conceptions of order

and experience. The New has been interpreted apart from the Old and has thus been interpreted, for example, spiritualistically, in Greek terms as the salvation of the immortal soul from the prison house of bodily existence; or, for example, materialistically, as the liberation of socio-economically poor classes from the rich. In the early church the battle over such distortion was fought in principle already against the Gnostics, and it was fought by the construction of an Apostolic Creed with three articles in which the one concerning the Father Creator comes first, and by the construction of a canon in which the Old Testament comes first and is given full authoritative status alongside the New.¹⁹ For the Early Church and for us, similarly confronted with syncretisms of many kinds, the Old is the only proper way into the New. Paul and Jesus are continuous with the Hebrew tradition.

In conclusion, I would simply repeat the Reformed claim that the Bible is its own interpreter. For Calvin this means that we know about creation and our condition only by faith. Moreover, *sola scriptura* means that scripture is a whole whose parts explain each other and that for a proper knowledge of ourselves and the world we are dependent especially upon the Old Testament as the foundation of the Christian faith content. It is to this part of the Bible alone that the disclosure of Jesus Christ is appropriate. Apart from it the entire story of the Bible becomes susceptible to transformation into an alternative and alien story about God, man and the world. Without the Old Testament within the canon, no vindication of the Word of God as it applies to our lives is possible. The whole house of Christian teaching rests upon the foundation of the Old Testament within the canon.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Cf. Brevard S. Childs, *Biblical Theology in Crisis* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970).
- ²Cf. John Gibbs, *Creation and Redemption* (Leiden: Brill, 1971), pp. 67f. and 95f.
- ³Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. Philip S. Watson (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953).
- ⁴Cf. Hans J. Kraus, *Geschichte der historisch-kritischen Erforschung des Alten Testaments von Reformation bis zum gegenwart* (Neukirchen, Germany: Neukirchener, 1956).
- ⁵Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III, 3 (Edinburgh:Clark, 1960), pp. 349f.
- ⁶John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), II.xii.1.
- ⁷John Calvin, "Responsum ad Fratres Polonos," *Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia*, 9:338.
- ⁸E. David Willis, *Calvin's Catholic Christology* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), p. 70.
- ⁹Jack Rogers and Donald McKim, *The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979).
- ¹⁰On the distinction between a trinitarian and christological interpretation of the Bible, see Amos N. Wilder, *Kerygma, Eschatology & Social Ethics* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), pp. 15-16.
- ¹¹Calvin, *Institutes*, II.x.1-2. In the Reformed tradition this dimension of Calvin has been developed especially by the line running through Ames, Perkins, Cocceius, and Edwards.
- ¹²For an example of how this interpretation is applied to the whole scripture, see Simon G. De Graaf, *Promise & Deliverance* (Dutch: *Verbondsgeschiedenis*), trans. H. Evan Runner and Elisabeth Wichers Runner, Vols. 1-4 (St. Catherines, Ontario: Paideia, 1977-).
- ¹³Hendrikus Berkhof, *Christ, the Meaning of History* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1979), p. 111.
- ¹⁴Calvin, *Institutes*, I.vi.-x.
- ¹⁵Calvin, *Institutes*, I.vi.1.
- ¹⁶Calvin, *Institutes*, I.ii.1.
- ¹⁷Cf. for example, the argument of Walter Zimmerli in *The Old Testament and The World*, trans. John J. Scullion (Atlanta: Knox, 1976).
- ¹⁸Calvin, *Institutes*, I.vi.1.
- ¹⁹Cf. Gustav Wingren, *Creation and Gospel* (Toronto: Mellen, 1979), pp. 17-26.

Discussion

Andrew Wilson: When I was given this topic I tried to sort out what I understood hermeneutics to be about, since that term is used in so many ways. I decided that before we could discuss more complicated issues of meaning we had to get straight if there are any consistent principles by which the biblical text is interpreted in *Divine Principle*. I will humbly offer a definition of hermeneutics in mathematical language: hermeneutics is a function which operates on a text to give an interpretation. What is the function whereby *Divine Principle* takes a biblical text and brings about an interpretation? Anyone who reads a biblical text brings some kind of operation to bear on the text which does not come only from the text itself. I'm uncomfortable with the idea that the text can simply interpret itself. Everyone brings with them a world view, a culture and various philosophical attitudes so that one text means different things to different people.

Frank Flinn: I would like to speak about the *woun-li* concept because it is a relational concept. I happen to like *Divine Principle* because it talks about relations, give-and-take relationships. Yet I see a kind of conflict in language between substance language and relational language in *Divine Principle*. Do you see this conflict?

Andrew Wilson: In Confucianism it is not a conflict. Confucianism understands the family as both relationships and hierarchy. I pointed out at the end of my paper that one possible view that Christians could

have towards *Divine Principle* is to see it as an indigenization of Christianity in the East and as a way that people in the West who have become interested in Eastern ways of life can find a Christian expression of Eastern spirituality. Part of the challenge for a Westerner in understanding *Divine Principle* is to see how hierarchy properly utilized can be a positive good. I don't know if that answers your question.

Frank Flinn: It doesn't resolve the conflict that has developed within the West between relational categories and hierarchical categories.

Durwood Foster: In general on issues of hermeneutics I would like to affirm Andy's view and proposal. It is hermeneutically wholesome and helpful to bring to bear interpretively on any text or anything to be interpreted as wide a range of interpretive insights, categories, and conceptualities as is possible. Indeed this seems to me to be a fundamental principle, implicitly and indeed explicitly for Christian hermeneutics historically. The universality of the Christian Gospel means that all conceptualities everywhere should respond to, amplify, and glorify the word of God. Taking the Gospel to all the world does indeed mean taking it to the principle of *li* in China and to all other conceptualities, touching and transforming those conceptualities with it. That to me is a hermeneutical general principle of cardinal importance.

More specifically on the matter of *li* in China, I think it is quite illuminating if we ask what specific strategic help comes from the employment of this principle. Andy says in an overarching way that the following is our situation: in the Bible we have the notion of covenant within the ethos of *Heilsgeschichte*, salvation history, but only deficiently in the biblical matrix do we have categories to deal with creation or ontology or metaphysical structure. So the Bible is very strong historically but perhaps inadequate or deficient ontologically. The principle of *li* offers us a way of bringing together creation and history so that we have in contrast with the idea of covenant a more embracing principle that unites two fundamental dimensions of reality. I think that there is something to be said for that affirmatively. The principle of *li* is potentially useful along these lines.

Where I would resonate somewhat with Frank—though I am not

really clear how “relational” this is and in what sense—is that it seems to me that we do have in the biblical tradition far more than merely historical categories such as the category of covenant. In this respect it seems to me, Andy, that your analysis is couched very largely in terms of the Old Testament. You haven’t exhausted that either, by any means. To jump to the center of the matter I would suggest that in the biblical tradition the idea of *logos* or word provides us with a category that does precisely what you are deducing that *li* also does. There is no reason why we shouldn’t *also* use *li* as a matter of hermeneutic communication to China and the world. But it does seem to me that in the idea of the *logos* and of the Christ as the incarnation, enhumanization, and inhistorization of the *logos* we have in our indigenous biblical tradition a very similar category. You haven’t brought that out in your paper. I just want to point that out.

Anthony Guerra: I just want to add a footnote to what Durwood said. If Andy’s analysis is correct—and I think it is—the Bible is deficient in ontological creation categories, substance categories.

Durwood Foster: That is Andy’s proposal.

Anthony Guerra: You share in that?

Durwood Foster: I wouldn’t share completely—because my observation is that the Bible *does* provide us with a categorically relevant conceptualization along that line, notably *logos*, or the word of God which is active both in creation and history.

Anthony Guerra: That’s true; it certainly comes through the Wisdom Literature which stands in the Jewish-Hellenistic tradition.

The point that I wanted to get to, however, is that the ambivalence which I sense we have when talking about *Divine Principle* uniting the principle *li* with the Bible is similar to that of Church Fathers such as Tertullian with regard to Greek philosophy. The Church Fathers did avail themselves of the Greek philosophical traditions which helped them articulate Christian convictions to the contemporary society. It may be the case that Oriental philosophy may serve in a handmaiden role in the articulation of the Christian faith for today’s world.

Frederick Sontag: The main issues really arise when you say, “Hence

the truth of the Bible is not replaced by *Divine Principle*, but rather it is explicated and clarified." Now you are not using neutral language. This is very controversial, because philosophers have been doing this for centuries, clarifying and explaining, but the clarification, the explanation is not just neutral. It doesn't just bring out what is there. Obviously we have been clarifying and explaining the Bible for centuries and we don't all come out the same. Clarification and explication depend upon certain premises of interpretation and these are themselves controversial. I think you really see that; I am just saying that there isn't some kind of neutral clarification and explication going on here.

I think the real issue comes on when you say "*Divine Principle* attempts to systematize and explain the variety of language in the Bible in one coherent system." Now that involves an enormous assumption, because it assumes that there is one coherent meaning in the Bible. If it isn't there—and I think the vast majority of people agree on that—then the only way to get it there is to use a framework that tosses it into one coherent explanation. I'm not opposing your doing that. That is quite all right with me, except that you surely see the whole burden falls not upon the biblical text, but upon the principle you are using to do that cohering and systematizing. This comes out most clearly when you say "It is only by rectifying the biblical language that the Christian denominations can be united." Now there is the real crux of the matter. How are we going to be united by rectifying biblical language?

Again later on you say, "*Divine Principle* gives itself the burden of explicating the truth hidden in the Bible's symbols. Hence it cannot dismiss the validity of any part of the text." But this makes an assumption that there is *a* truth hidden in the biblical symbols. Now that is an enormous assumption and everything depends upon it. It could very well be that there is no single truth hidden in the biblical symbols; it could be that there are a hundred and one truths. First, how do you prove that there is a single truth hidden in the scripture? Second, how do you prove that the principle you are going to use is the acceptable principle which we should all use?

Andrew Wilson: Your comments are well taken. This paper is

trying to describe the hermeneutic that was used, but very rightly some of the resulting assertions need to be questioned. The Neo-Confucian concept is that there is one principle which can be found if things are investigated. It is very similar to the view of modern science, if we study the phenomena of nature enough we will eventually come to one consistent truth about it.

James Deotis Roberts: I resonate with a lot of the issues that have been raised. From my own perspective it seems to me that you do have a situation which is similar to the question of contextualization between African and Afro-American ways of thought, experience, and religion. There are some basic things that we share with the African experience deep down and that makes it a little easier than the problem here would seem to be. You are looking at an Oriental kind of metaphysics and applying it in a Western context. The question is whether or not there is sufficient similarity of culture for people to adapt the conflict that Frank Flinn was talking about so that they can live with it. The other question that has been raised by the paper is whether or not a critique of Western exegesis is really a critique of what is really in the Bible itself or of the exegesis and hermeneutics that have been imposed on it. Even classical theologians like Calvin and Luther brought a bias to the text that does violence to the text. Perhaps one thing that we ought to do is to try and look at the Bible minus the biases which have been brought to it by the interpreters. Certainly the old tradition of exegesis and interpretation has been Greco-Roman as well as Judeo-Christian, and we have a lot of presuppositions built around that.

Kapp Johnson: My question is directed towards your use of the Hexateuch. At what level of biblical text do we begin to do our hermeneutic? It is one thing to use the various theories such as the Hexateuch theory to explain what is in the biblical text. But what do you do if another level of the text in its development seems to contradict what was at the hexateuchal level? One can use a *kerygmatic* procedure by going through the documentary hypothesis and drawing out the *kerygma* of the various sources. But what do you do when the various levels begin to contradict each other or have a different emphasis? At what level do we begin to

say, "Ah! that is the *kerygma* for me or for us now today." I think that is a methodological problem that is significant for the discussion.

Lonnie Kliever: I simply wanted to bring together and underline Frank's comment and Fred's comment in reverse order. It seemed to me that the crucial comment that Fred made was that our discussion will begin and end in arguing about the principle of unification or the principle upon which the scriptures are themselves articulated. Then there is Frank's flagging the whole hierarchical language and conceptuality which Andy's paper highlights. As a footnote on hierarchical language, the central kinds of categories that Andy has underlined, the categories of being children, servants, and subjects create insuperable problems of agreement or even understanding. To say it another way, the movement from the enlightenment forward is a movement away from the metaphor of the child, away from the metaphor of the subject, away from the metaphor of the servant in the direction of autonomy—I started to say of adultery and we have moved in that direction (laughter)—and certainly in the direction of partnership. It is very interesting that of the five relations that are of utmost importance under heaven the only relationship that seems peculiarly akin to modernity is the last one, the relationship between friends. Yet the relationship between friends—if amplified into a metaphysic or into an ethic—seems to be remarkably low key if not absent in the Principle. So I am throwing that out as a kind of further underlining of a point that has been made, because it seems to me that that is the crucial problem that the modern person faces in coming to terms with the Principle.

David Kelly: What happens of course is that statements in one context don't make sense in other contexts. Andy's paper is very nicely done. And I don't think I want any of the things that I am saying or the others are saying to take away from that. All of the things that we have built up in six months of work are now starting to come out.

There is a problem that I have between the kind of statement that Andy just made in his paper that this is an indigenization or contextualization of Christianity into Eastern thought. This is different from the notion that what Unification is really doing is giving us *the*

principle which is going to solve biblical hermeneutical questions, as Durwood pointed out, or which is going to solve social issues on a global level, and which is specifically aimed at the Western scientific “modern” intellect. When the typical layman picks up *Divine Principle* and opens the first page and it says, Now we are going to tell you in your modern minds. Obviously the typical layman can’t understand this kind of arcane stuff. The modern intellect can’t figure this out. And I say to myself, “This is somehow going to be an attempt to do this rationally, whatever rationally means.” Then we are told that in fact what Unification is is a contextualization or an indigenization of Christianity into a very different kind of milieu. There is at least a tension there of whether this is a rational unifying principle or whether Unification is in fact a perfectly delightful addition to Christianity in an Eastern context.

Darrol Bryant: Thank you for getting all your questions out on the table and I would like Henry to make some comments on his paper on use and abuse of the Old Testament in the Christian tradition.

Henry Vander Goot: Just a preliminary point, I am not a biblical theologian, I am a systematic theologian and so I am interested in the problem of the systematic theological consequence of not taking full interpretive advantage of the presence of the Old Testament in the canon of scripture.

Kapp Johnson: The problem of ontology for the Bible and particularly the Old Testament is one which in the last thirty years of Old Testament theology has been a very serious one. This is the case with von Rad and Eichrodt. Eichrodt’s covenant theology and von Rad’s *Heilsgeschichte* have fallen upon the rocks of Wisdom literature. They cannot account for the Wisdom parts of the canon. I don’t know how that dilemma is going to be resolved by those who are seeking for an ontology. There have been some proposals, e.g., finding an ontology in Yahweh or the Word event. But it is a very difficult problem.

Henry Vander Goot: On Calvin’s grounds you cannot get an ontology out of the Bible per se, but you can generate a Bible-informed ontology. The Bible isn’t the source of data on creation reality but is the source of

reflection on the data given in creation reality. That reflection can take place by several different means. It can take place by the light of scripture or by using the spectacles of scripture, to use Calvin's metaphor. Or it can take place by the light of some other principle. Calvin can speak of *sola scriptura* acknowledging that not everything that gets asserted is taken out of the Bible. He would say, I think, that you can't get an ontology out of the Bible.

Kapp Johnson: That is my point with both von Rad and Eichrodt. Eichrodt wanted to get an ontology out of the Bible, von Rad didn't. But both had the same problem.

Frank Flinn: I want to point out that we apply terms like "nature" to the Bible but in the Bible there is no term for "nature." There is "the heavens and the earth" but not "nature." Likewise, we apply the term "history" to the Bible—*Heilsgeschichte*. In the Bible there is the expression "events of the days" (i.e., Chronicles) and there is also "generations" of men, families, nations. But there is no term proper for "history." You have got to be very careful in saying that there is not a "metaphysics" in the Bible. Why not go all the way, Henry, and say that there is a biblical metaphysics?

Henry Vander Goot: Because the Bible isn't a data book. The Bible, one might say, is a book with a certain qualification. It is a religious book, not a philosophical text. It seems to me that a Christian has no right to want to circumvent the normal processes of thinking about the world. Now the question is always how does the world get thought about? And that is where the Bible plays its important role epistemologically as the means of knowledge but it doesn't provide the content of knowledge.

Kapp Johnson: So it is kind of a tool for an epistemology of the world?

David Kelly: I would consider it very much worth coming to the Bahamas if I could understand how scripture could be its own interpreter. (laughter) Now I understand the notion of comprehensiveness. That seems to me to be a norm that you want to take the Bible as a whole. I can see that as a basis and how you can fault certain interpretations

which focus too narrowly. That I can see but I am still struggling with the question. I don't quite get the notion of creation. I have read Genesis but somehow you are using that as some special kind of category which gives you some comprehensiveness. I don't quite see how that works—how something becomes a norm. Then you say that the parts disclose each other. One of the problems here is that there is some kind of assumption of internal unity to the scripture, but that seems to me a very questionable unity. The only thing I think you could do to rectify the mistake would be to make Calvin chairman of the editorial board that put together the scripture because it seems to me very badly done for those purposes.

Henry Vander Goot: Almost all of the history of all precritical theology makes that assumption.

David Kelly: Makes what assumption?

Henry Vander Goot: That there is an ongoing narrative unity to scripture. It seems to me that sixteen hundred years of Christian history is based upon that assumption. The Bible was perfectly adequately understood and sometimes even more adequately understood than than it has been in the nineteenth century.

David Kelly: But what if that assumption is wrong? I wonder if there are sixteen hundred years of unity on that. I don't understand that. Most of Roman Catholic theology did not make the assumption that the Bible had inherent unity. I thought that most Roman Catholic theology thought the opposite.

Henry Vander Goot: How the unity gets perceived is a matter of difference of opinion. That the Bible is a unity from creation to consummation, it seems to me, is unquestioned in so-called precritical theology.

David Kelly: Well if that is what you mean by unity—that there is a notion of creation and that there is a notion of consummation—then I can see that. But that doesn't give us an authoritative norm. That doesn't give scripture its own interpretative norm.

Henry Vander Goot: It seems to me that a general principle or fundamental motif does bear upon the praxis of exegesis in the major

theologians. How that gets worked out specifically can only be demonstrated by the text and the exegetical task. There is no time to discuss that here.

The Historical Jesus and *Divine Principle*

Anthony J. Guerra

Introduction

The present essay explores the possibilities for dialogue between the higher criticism of New Testament scholarship and *Divine Principle*. Is *Divine Principle* inherently antithetical or hopelessly irrelevant to higher criticism, or rather may it lend assistance on issues in which the scholarly enterprise has come to an impasse? I shall not conceal my optimism in this matter by confessing at the outset that I am of the latter opinion.

The topic of this essay, *Divine Principle's* reading of the New Testament, is very broad and complex. I decided that the best way to get a handle on the subject is to choose a pivotal problem of the critical investigation of the New Testament—namely the historicity of Jesus. In the first section, I describe in bold strokes the major phases up to the present of the quest for the historical Jesus and the methodological impasses in which they have terminated. In the second section, I present briefly several concepts in *Divine Principle* which seem to guide its interpretation of reality, including scripture. In the third section, I examine a few features of *Divine Principle's* construction of the historical Jesus and suggest some methodological questions relevant to their elaboration and verification and begin to measure the assertions of *Divine Principle* against the results of higher criticism. Again, I must note that these are tentative proposals which I hope can provide a

stimulus for a more thoroughgoing and comprehensive treatment of the subject.

The Quests for the Historical Jesus

The original quest for the historical Jesus was prompted by the Enlightenment reaction against dogmatic restrictions upon scientific and historical investigation.¹ The nineteenth century optimism that the historical method could provide an access to the actualities of history further supported the idea that a reconstruction of the biography of Jesus was possible "by means of objective historical method."² The acknowledgment of the inescapable relativity characterizing all historical reconstruction arising at the end of the last century and dominant in our own was to cast a persisting cloud of doubt over the advisability of the quest for the historical Jesus as originally envisioned. Moreover, a basic ideological objection levied at this first quest for the historical Jesus in the twentieth century questioned whether the object of the quest served only to falsify faith by providing assurance in knowledge rather than challenging the believer to a life of commitment. A positivistic construction of a historical Jesus would only serve to provide the believer with an idol rather than to confront him with the radical demand of Christ to live for the sake of God and neighbor.

In addition to the twentieth century changes in the notions of faith and history, there also came a fundamental reorientation of our understanding of the Gospels. The Gospels are now seen as primary sources for the history of the early church rather than for the history of Jesus.³ Karl Schmidt maintained that the order of events in the Gospels is not based upon a memory of the chronicle of events of Jesus' life, but rather is the result of the redactional work of the authors who arranged their material based on considerations other than chronology.⁴ Martin Dibelius and Rudolph Bultmann developed form criticism in order to identify the *Sitz im Leben* of the various units of tradition out of which the New Testament writings were composed. Much of the early enthusiasm for form criticism was generated by the hope that the earliest

oral tradition (i.e., Jesus' discourse) could be determined by its rigorous application.

As the results of form criticism proved meagre in determining with certainty the original tradition of Jesus—for even authentic sayings of Jesus were seen to be placed within narrative contexts reflecting not Jesus' situation but the life situation of the church—Bultmann expressed his skepticism concerning the possibility of knowing more than very little about the historical Jesus.⁵ Instead, Bultmann focused almost exclusively upon the kerygma of the church, despite his conviction that the continuity between Jesus and the kerygma could not be definitively asserted. Bultmann could hope, however, that the quality of self-existence which Jesus embodied and evoked from his disciples is preserved in the church's kerygma, and that this kerygma in turn evokes a qualitatively similar response from today's believer. Bultmann can be satisfied if there is a similarity in the functions between the sayings of Jesus and the kerygma of the Gospel in calling forth "authentic existence."

In subsequent years several of his own foremost students have come to object to the apparent limitations of Bultmann's approach. The division between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history seems to violate an essential aspect of the Christian perspective, namely the historical character of the Christian revelation, i.e., that God worked in and through Jesus of Nazareth. Simply put, God works in history through persons and not merely through proclamations; the deeds as well as the words of Jesus are of great significance. Ernst Fuchs, a Bultmannian, has written that it is Jesus' conduct which is "the real context of his preaching."⁶

James Robinson states that the possibility of a new quest for the historical Jesus after Bultmann rests on an acceptance of the contemporary notions of history and of the self.⁷ The focus of the concern must remain the intentionality and commitment of the historical Jesus rather than the chronology of his life. Areas of substantial disagreement emerge between Bultmann and his heirs, however. Bultmann had claimed that Jesus proclaimed the law, while Paul proclaimed the Gospel. The shift

from the old to the new aeon is a decisive factor distinguishing the situation of Jesus and Paul: "Jesus looks into the future, toward the coming reign of God, although to be sure toward the reign *now* coming or dawning. But Paul looks back, the shift of the aeons has already taken place Paul regards as present what for Jesus was future, i.e., a presence which dawned in the past."⁸

Bornkamm differs with Bultmann and accentuates Jesus' present as the time of salvation. Bornkamm's presentation of Jesus' situation equals Bultmann's presentation of Paul's situation.⁹ Käsemann asserts that it is with John the Baptist that the shift of the aeons takes place and therefore both Jesus and the church have their existence in the new aeon.

Bultmann further distinguished Jesus and Paul by claiming that Jesus preaches law and promise whereas Paul preaches "the gospel in its relation to the law."¹⁰ Robinson parts company with Bultmann, and after a comparative analysis of the church's kerygma and Jesus' messages, concludes that the classical Protestant distinction between law and grace no longer seems to separate Jesus from the church's kerygma.¹¹ Robinson argues that when one moves beyond a superficial level of comparison to the deeper level of meaning, the underlying similarity between the message of Jesus and the church's kerygma is apparent: "Thus the deeper meaning of Jesus' message is: in accepting one's death there is life for others; in suffering, there is glory; in submitting to judgment, one finds grace; in accepting one's finitude resides the only transcendence. It is this existential meaning latent in Jesus' message which is constitutive of his selfhood, expresses itself in his action, and is finally codified in the church's kerygma."¹²

Robinson attempted an *ad oculos* demonstration of his position by laying out in parallel fashion the authentic sayings of Jesus and the church's kerygma and exegetically arguing for their underlying similarity. Later in this paper we shall return to the methodological issues at stake in this discussion. At this point, I should like to remark that Robinson restricted his concern and the application of his methodology to the intentionality of Jesus and ignored the theological concerns for the shift

in aeons and the relative positions of Paul and Jesus, which were debated by Bultmann, Käsemann, and Bornkamm.

Concepts in *Divine Principle* which Shape its Picture of Jesus:

Give-and-take Action, Subject and Object, Foundation to Receive the Messiah, Foundation of Faith, and Foundation of Substance.

At the outset, we should face squarely that the problem of verifying the claim of revelation is intellectually insoluble. As a first premise statement, insolubility cannot be rationally concluded but only asserted. It may be the case that believers are convinced and therefore "know" the truth of such claims. But this conviction and knowledge is "from the Holy Spirit and not from the human mind."¹³ Herein, we are concerned with the hermeneutical principles of *Divine Principle's* scriptural exegesis, rather than from such first order claims. More accurately, I discuss here the *Divine Principle* world view, or the general presuppositions from which are generated all its hermeneutical principles including those scriptural, historical, ethical, *et al.*

Give and take is said to be the fundamental action generating all forces for existence, multiplication, and action (*DP* p.28). In *Divine Principle*, give-and-take action represents a value term as well as a descriptive term. Cooperative interaction is seen as a positive good because it reflects the image of God whose aspects are continually engaged in give-and-take action. The principle of reciprocity expresses the fundamentally interdependent status of all entities. The status of interacting entities is described most generally by the terms "subject" and "object." Subject and object mutually determine each other and for this reason *Divine Principle* states that there is no value distinction implied in these terms. Rather, value distinctions can be made only on the basis of the quality of the reciprocal relationships between a subject and object (*DP* pp. 46f.). The subject needs an object for its self-definition, and vice versa, the object requires a subject for its determination.

In a prelapsarian state, the principles of give and take, subject and object, and growth, operated both on the natural level via law and also within human society via the priority of love. Love implies relationships between subject and object. God-centered family love should characterize the quality of all human relationships. The three blessings spell out explicitly that each human being is responsible to love God. The postlapsarian state has created a disordering of human love (emotions) and thus of the individual's relationships to God and to other human beings. The purpose of God in his providential activity is to restore the lost love to his children.

The principle of restoration is simply a formula for the attempt to restore individual love relationship to God and neighbor. This can only be done to an inadequate, or limited degree, until the Messianic figure appears (*DP* pp. 221-22). On the other hand, the Messianic figure can only appear on the scene when some foundational unity and love has been accomplished. Thus the foundation to receive the Messiah equals a foundation of faith, which means the restoration of the individual's vertical relationship to God, combined with a foundation of substance, the restoration of the horizontal relationships between brother and brother, etc. (*DP* pp. 227-30). The spirit of God works continually to inspire the restoration of bonds of love.

Even from these preliminary remarks the approach that *Divine Principle* will take to the quest for the historical Jesus should be apparent. Jesus cannot be adequately or even most profitably comprehended as an individual in isolation, but rather in relationship to others. Therefore, *Divine Principle* speaks of Jesus in relationship to John the Baptist (*DP* pp. 153-62), Jesus and his twelve apostles, (*DP* p. 368) Jesus and the Jewish people (*DP* pp. 155-57), Jesus and the Roman Empire, Jesus and the Church, the resurrected Jesus and the believing apostles (*DP* pp. 361-62), Jesus and the Holy Spirit (*DP* pp. 214-16, 362). Jesus cannot be understood apart from his intentions and actions vis-à-vis others and their actions in response to him. I believe that *Divine Principle* has understood an essential implication of the creedal affirmation of Jesus as "truly man" when it consistently acknowledges

his vulnerability to society. Jesus, as with any truly human being, is vulnerable to the response of others. He is determined partly by the others' response as well as determining others. (A view of the self-limiting God would also not preclude that divinity is also determined by the response of human beings, even if this determination is only possible by the willful acceptance of God. This notion is especially central to *Divine Principle* which acknowledges a suffering God.) In other words, man is a social being, and if Jesus is to participate fully in the lot of humanity, he must perforce share in the vulnerability to others which characterizes human existence.

Divine Principle Reconstruction of the Historical Jesus.

In *Divine Principle* there are two chapters which deal extensively with Jesus of Nazareth, namely chapter 4 of Part I, "Advent of the Messiah," and chapter 2 of Part II, "The Providence of Restoration Centering on Moses and Jesus." The advent of the Messiah is preceded by a rehearsal of the biblical history from Adam through Moses. That is to say, in the second part of *Divine Principle* Jesus is formally set in the framework of biblical personages who preceded and helped prepare his way. In particular, the courses of Jacob and Moses are understood as prefigurements of the very pattern of the life course which Jesus followed. In the chapter devoted to Jesus in Part I of *Divine Principle*, Jesus' work is evaluated in terms of the criteria established in the preceding chapters: specifically, an understanding of God's original purpose of creation, the nature of the human fall, and the final goal of God's providential activity.

In chapter 4 of Part I there are two sections in which Jesus' work and life are considered: section I "The Providence of Salvation through the Cross," and section II, "The Second Advent of Elijah and John the Baptist." Formally defined, the second section is a history of religion's approach showing that the role of John the Baptist is to be understood in the context of the Jewish messianic expectations of the day, and in

particular the role of Elijah in the popular Jewish eschatology. Furthermore, this section is also an explanation of the cause of Jesus' passion: "Here, we come to understand that the greatest factor leading to the crucifixion of Jesus was the failure of John the Baptist" (*DP*, pp. 162-63). The failure was not Jesus' failure.

Let us investigate recent historical-critical studies bearing on the relationship between John the Baptist and Jesus. Bultmann and Raymond Brown agree that passages in the fourth gospel reflect the rivalry between the sects of Jesus and of John the Baptist (late first century).¹⁴ They recognize apologetic motifs in John 1:8-9 which states that Jesus, not John the Baptist, was the light; also John 1:30 which states that Jesus existed before John the Baptist and is greater than he; John 1:20 and 3:28 which stress that John the Baptist is not the Messiah; and John 10:41 which says that John the Baptist never worked any miracles. The question which confronts us from the perspective of biblical-critical methodology is whether a continuity can be assumed between the late first century polemical situation of the church and the early first century situation of Jesus and John the Baptist.

We can recognize here a case parallel to that discussed above of the relationship between the authentic sayings of Jesus and the kerygma of the church. Thus we may apply Robinson's methodology to the relationship between the authentic sayings of Jesus and of John the Baptist and the apologetically motivated biographical narrative passages of the evangelist. The issue is more complex than in the first case cited, as we must be concerned with trying to identify authentic sayings of John the Baptist as well as of Jesus. Nevertheless, we have set up the problematic in such a way as to make it amenable to solution by a methodology approved as effective in other instances.

Another line of argumentation may also be helpful in showing that *Divine Principle's* reading of the relationship between John the Baptist and Jesus is fundamentally correct. We know with certainty that a Baptist sect refusing to acknowledge the lordship of Christ and very probably affirming the messiahship of John¹⁵ existed at the time of the writing of the fourth gospel. Some would argue indeed that this sect

is the chief polemical target of the evangelist. If the founder of the Baptist sect had wholeheartedly and publicly proclaimed Jesus to be the Messiah, it seems unlikely that his adherents would have explicitly rejected his admonitions to follow Jesus and acclaimed John the Messiah instead. Historical reasoning would lead us to conclude that John the Baptist must have been less than clear in advocating Jesus as the Messiah and that herein lies a significant cause for the later conflict between the sects of John and Jesus. It should be noted further that Bultmann believes that the witness of John the Baptist to Jesus as the Messiah is the work of a redactor and not very likely an authentic saying of John the Baptist.¹⁶

Leaving many important matters in Part I, chapter 4 of *Divine Principle* for another occasion, I will now turn to the construction of Jesus found in Part II, chapter 2. As we noted previously, a fundamental disagreement between such New Testament scholars as Bultmann and Käsemann exists concerning whether John the Baptist or Jesus marks the end of the old age. In Part II, chapter 2, *Divine Principle* offers a schematization of the life of Jesus which bears directly on the problem of the change of aeons. For my purposes the nature of the parallels between the three courses of Jacob, Moses, and Jesus is not of primary concern, but rather my present interest is with the content and form of the courses of Jesus (see *DP* pp. 342-370).

In *Divine Principle's* reconstruction of Jesus' life, a first course is presented in which John the Baptist carries the burden of establishing the "Foundation to Receive the Messiah." Accordingly, John the Baptist must fulfill certain conditions: a life of sacrificial, saintly living (to establish his foundation of faith), and then assume leadership among the people (to establish the foundation of substance). John's conditions came to naught because of his failure to unite fully with Jesus. Thus a second restoration course had to be instituted in which Jesus substituted for John the Baptist and attempted to "make straight" his own way. Therefore, Jesus underwent a fasting period and confronted the three temptations (to lay a foundation of faith), and then he had to establish a foundation of substance—i.e., the apostles and especially the leaders of

the Jewish people were to accept his authority. These conditions would make the proclamation of Jesus's messianic role credible. The failure of the disciples and leaders to unite with Jesus resulted in the crucifixion as the only means for Jesus to make an offering to the Father in what now became his third restoration course. Once Jesus offered his own physical body on the cross—in *Divine Principle* terminology, “the conditional object of faith”—then a foundation of substance had to be established. This second foundation was successfully established when the apostles united in faith with the resurrected Jesus who appeared to them.

From the perspective of the scholarly debate on the changing of the aeons, this delineation of the life of Jesus is very helpful. *Divine Principle* seems to say that John the Baptist was supposed to close the old age by providing a foundation on which Jesus could be received as Messiah. The failure of John in this mission necessitated Jesus' adoption of the role of precursor and thus Jesus appears in an Old Testament role. A further nuance in the *Divine Principle* understanding of the mission of Jesus rests in the fact that Jesus could have realized the *eschaton* and obviated the need for a second coming of the Messiah if the response of individuals to him had been faithful. Instead Jesus wrought only the first turn of the cosmic wheel (an “already/not-yet” eschatology) by means of his death and resurrection. It is only the postmortem Jesus who closed the old age and opened the new.

The new life made available in Jesus Christ can be appropriated only when the connection is made between the resurrected Jesus and the earthly apostles. The historical reality of the fruits of Christ remained dependent on the willing, positive response of historical individuals. “Restoration must be accomplished on earth.” Because of the impossibility of establishing the foundation to receive the Messiah on the earth while Jesus still had his historical physical existence, then the third course was only spiritual.

The transition in interpretation from the text to the event itself which is spoken about in the text raises with new vigor the question of historicity. Although we cannot know with absolute certainty many of Jesus' precise sayings, teachings, and even his deeds, nevertheless we

can assert confidently that he did exist as an historical entity. At the most fundamental level the transition from interpretation of text to the interpretation of event itself is fully justified. *Divine Principle* offers also a realist-spiritualist perspective of the parousia as that moment when a historical individual cooperates with the spirit person Jesus, and together they fulfill the expectations for a kingdom of God on earth. Thus the relational hermeneutic by which, as we have seen, *Divine Principle* interprets the historical Jesus is applied also across time, so as to encompass the living spirit Jesus' relationships with other historical personages including the eschatological Lord.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Joachim Jeremias, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Debatte um das Problem des historischen Jesus," in *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift: Gesellschafts- und Sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe*, 6, No. 3 (1956-57), 165f.
- ²James Robinson, *A New Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Naperville, Illinois: Allenson, 1959), p. 29.
- ³The position dates from Julius Wellhausen, *Einleitung in die drei ersten Evangelien* (Berlin: Reimer, 1905).
- ⁴Karl Ludwig Schmidt, *Der Rahmen der Geschichte Jesus* (Berlin: Trowitzsch, 1919).
- ⁵An often used methodological principle to validate an authentic saying of Jesus is to determine that the saying is distinctive from both Jewish apocalypticism and early church theology. This negative criteria obviously grants the status of an authentic saying very sparingly.
- ⁶See Ernst Fuchs, "Die Frage nach dem historischen Jesus," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 53 (1956), 210-29.
- ⁷Robinson, pp. 70-71.
- ⁸Rudolf Bultmann, *Glauben und Verstehen* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1933), I, 200f.
- ⁹See Robinson, p. 116.
- ¹⁰Bultmann, p. 201.
- ¹¹Robinson, p. 116.
- ¹²Robinson, p. 123.
- ¹³I must thank Don Deffner for calling my attention to this quotation.
- ¹⁴See Raymond E. Brown, ed. and trans., *Gospel According to John* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), I, lxviii-lxix; and Rudolf Bultmann, *Gospel of John*, trans. G. R. Beasley-Murray (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1971), pp. 88, 167.
- ¹⁵Raymond E. Brown says that we can definitely know that the Baptist sect in the second century thought that John is the Messiah. But this very cautious scholar says it is less certain in regard to the first century. See his *Gospel of John*, Introduction.
- ¹⁶"The Baptist who bears witness to Jesus is a figure from the Christian interpretation of history." Bultmann, p. 167.

Luther's Reading of the New Testament

Donald Deffner

Luther read the New Testament in the light of the Pauline message that the just shall live by faith and not by works of the law.

Roland Bainton, *Here I Stand*, p. 331

(The) New Testament . . . is a testament when a dying man bequeaths his property, after his death, to his legally defined heirs. And Christ, before his death, commanded and ordained that his gospel be preached after his death in all the world (Luke 24:44-47). Thereby he gave to all who believe, as their possession, everything he had. This included: his life, in which he swallowed up death; his righteousness, by which he blotted out sin; and his salvation, with which he overcame everlasting damnation. A poor man, dead in sin, and consigned to hell, can hear nothing more comforting than this precious and tender message about Christ; from the bottom of his heart he must laugh and be glad over it, if he believes it true.

Preface to the New Testament, *Luther's Works*,
Word and Sacrament I, p. 359

The gospel, then, is nothing but the preaching about Christ, Son of God and of David, true God and man, who by his death and resurrection has overcome for us the sin, death, and hell of all men who believe in him. Thus the gospel can be either a brief or a lengthy message; one person can write of it briefly, another at length. He writes of it at length who writes about many words and works of Christ, as do the four evangelists. He writes of it briefly, however, who does not tell of Christ's works, but indicates briefly how by his death and resurrection he has overcome sin, death, and hell for those who believe in him, as do St. Peter and St. Paul.

Ibid., p. 360

In his book against Erasmus on *The Bondage of the Will* (1525) Luther gives an epitome of the New Testament.

A Summary of the New Testament. In the New Testament the Gospel is preached. This is nothing else than the message by which the Spirit is offered to us and grace for the forgiveness of sins, purchased for us by Christ Crucified—and all entirely free, through the pure mercy of God the Father, who thus favors us unworthy creatures, who deserve damnation rather than anything else. Then follow exhortations. These are to animate those who have already been justified and have received mercy to be diligent in producing the fruits of the Spirit and of the righteousness received, to practice love in good works, and courageously to bear the cross and all other tribulations of this world. This is a summary of the entire New Testament.

Ewald Plass, *What Luther Says*, p. 987

In the preface which he wrote to the New Testament in 1522 Luther expresses his preference for certain books of the New Testament because of their exceptionally rich gospel content.

The Primary Gospel Books. Saint John's gospel and St. Paul's epistles, especially that to the Romans, and St. Peter's first epistle are the true pith and marrow of all the books. They should justly be the first books, and every Christian should be advised to read them first and most, and by daily reading to make them as familiar to himself as his daily bread.

In them you do not find described many works and miracles of Christ; but you do find depicted in a masterly manner how faith in Christ overcomes sin, death, and hell, and gives life, righteousness, and salvation. This is the real nature of the Gospel.

Ibid., pp.987-88

In his explanation of John 14:5-6 (1537) the Doctor comments on the preciously unique character of this Gospel.

Especially John Pictures Christ as God and Savior. The evangelist St. John is wont to write and to emphasize that all our doctrine and faith should center in Christ and should cling to this one Person alone, and that we, brushing aside all science and wisdom, should simply know nothing but the crucified Christ, as St. Paul says in I Cor. 1:23 and 2:2.

Ibid., p. 988

Luther was also fond of the Book of Acts because of the emphasis it, too, places on "his" gospel of salvation by faith alone. He makes this statement in his introduction to Acts (1534).

Acts Commended. It is to be noted that in this book St. Luke teaches all Christendom to the end of the world the true, principal point of Christian doctrine, namely, that all of us must be justified only through faith in Christ Jesus, without cooperation of the Law or help from good works . . .

Therefore this book might well be called a commentary on the epistles of St. Paul. For what St. Paul teaches and insists on with words and passages from Scripture, St. Luke here points out and proves with examples and incidents, which show that it so happened and must so happen as St. Paul teaches, namely, that no Law, no work, justified man, but only faith in Christ. Here, in this book, you find a fine mirror in which you can see that it is true: *Sola fides justificat*, Faith alone justifies. *Ibid.*, pp. 988-89

The Letter and the Spirit

Luther was looking for a theology which would explore the kernel of the nut, the germ of the wheat and the marrow of the bones. It was with this desire that he studied holy scripture . . .

Gerhard Ebeling, *Luther: An Introduction to His Thought*, p. 96

. . . he never doubted that the will of God was revealed and comprehensible to men solely through the holy scripture . . . There are many difficulties in a formal scriptural principle. Such a principle can turn the scripture into an oppressive law. Obviously, if the scripture alone is valid, everything depends upon how this validity is understood, and how the scripture is interpreted. A proverbial saying with which Luther was acquainted sums up these hermeneutic difficulties: "The scripture has a wax nose": that is, its countenance can be changed and distorted in many ways by an arbitrary interpretation. An extraordinary degree of devotion to the scripture is necessary, in order not to do it violence by approaching it from individual and isolated points of view, but trying instead to understand the fundamental message. The less one approaches the scripture from a previously established position, looking for specific answers to specific questions, or in order merely to enrich one's knowledge, and the more radically one

accepts the challenge to one's own existential life of an encounter with the scripture, concentrating upon a single fundamental question aimed at human existence itself and touching one's very conscience, the more one looks ultimately for only one thing in the scripture, the word which brings certainty in life and in death, the better will be one's prospects of a real understanding and adequate interpretation of the scripture. For its fundamental theme is clearly the unique and ultimately valid word, which is called the word of God because it is a decisive utterance about our existence as human beings.

Ibid., pp. 96-97

Luther himself emphasizes that once he had attained a right understanding of Romans 1:17 ("I see in it God's plan for imparting righteousness to men, a process begun and continued by their faith. For, as the scripture says: 'The righteous shall live by faith.' " Philips translation) the whole Bible took on a new appearance for him, and that this one verse gave him an understanding which was of immense hermeneutic importance. But there is a danger here of seeing what took place in Luther's intercourse with the scripture from too narrow a point of view. His preparatory work for his first commentary on the Psalms is a unique testimony to the way he strove to understand the scripture in such a way that it did not remain merely the letter, that is, something alien, remote and external, but became the Spirit, that is, something alive in the heart, which takes possession of man. For the question of the true spiritual understanding of the holy scriptures, that is, an understanding through which the Spirit itself can take hold of a man, is identical with the question which tormented Luther, that of the reality of grace and the certainty which brings assurance to the mind and the conscience. For what is grace, except the presence of the Holy Spirit?

Consequently, Luther formulated the principle of interpretation for his first exegetical lectures as follows: "In the holy scriptures it is best to distinguish between the spirit and the letter; for it is this that makes a true theologian. And the Church has the power to do this from the Holy Spirit alone and not from the human mind."

Ibid., pp. 97-98

Thus the Spirit must be drawn out from the letter. The Spirit is concealed in the letter. But this must be understood in a profound and theological very significant sense. The letter is not a good word, for it is the law of the

wrath of God. But the Spirit is a good word, good news, the gospel, because it is the word of grace. *Ibid.*, p. 96

This distinction between an understanding based purely on the outward meaning of a text, and an understanding based on its inner significance, between remaining satisfied with the lifeless letter and going on to penetrate the living Spirit of a text, has become a general hermeneutic principle. *Ibid.*, p. 100

The Christological Meaning of the Text

(Luther's) whole attention was concentrated . . . on the relationship between the literal and the tropological sense. He understood the literal sense not, however, as the historical meaning, but as the christological meaning of the text. That is, the basic meaning with which the study of the text of the Psalter is concerned is Christ himself. The prayers of the Psalter are to be regarded as uttered by him; that is, if they are to be understood at all, they must be understood as if the person speaking in the Psalms, the "I" who prays in them, is not some arbitrary person, but Jesus Christ himself. To begin with Christ as the fundamental meaning and utterance of the holy scripture became Luther's basic hermeneutic principle. He says: "Others may follow more devious routes, and as though they were wilfully fleeing from Christ, neglect this way of coming to him through the text. But whenever I have a text which is a nut whose shell is too hard to crack, I throw it at once against the rock (Christ), and find the sweetest kernel."

Ibid., p. 104

The "Concealment Beneath the Contrary"

But if Christ speaks through the Psalter then it follows that in this understanding of Christ, the details of his Passion, of his bearing the sin of the world, and even of his abandonment by God are portrayed in all their severity. In this respect Luther's christological interpretation of the Psalms goes infinitely further than the tradition, and so prepared the way for his theology of the cross. But if Christ is the fundamental meaning, so that in him all words form a single word, then their application to the individual (the tropological sense of the scripture) must consist not of disconnected useful moral applications, or of a demand for similar works on the part of

man, but must be aimed solely at the faith which apprehends Christ. This is the ground on which the earliest form of Luther's doctrine of justification sprang up. We may also say that we find here an understanding of the Holy Spirit strictly orientated towards the crucified Christ, and consequently, therefore, towards the relationship between the word and faith. The concealment of God on the cross is paralleled by the structure of faith, which consists of concealment beneath a contrary. "For who would realize that one who is visibly humbled, tempted, rejected and slain, is at the same time and to the utmost degree inwardly exalted, consoled, accepted and brought to life, unless this were taught by the Spirit through faith? And who would suppose that one who is visibly exalted, honoured, strengthened, and brought to life, is inwardly so pitifully rejected, despised, weakened and slain, unless this were taught by the wisdom of the Spirit?"

Ibid., pp. 104-5

It now becomes clear what "spiritual" means here. It means everything, insofar as it is understood, "in the sight of God"; that is, in the sign of the cross of Christ, and therefore in the sense of the concealment of God beneath the contrary. Salvation is spiritual, insofar as it is not understood as the affirmation of worldly existence or as the bestowal of temporal goods, but as being crucified with Christ, and so possessing life in death. The believer is spiritual, insofar as he understands that he is hidden in God, and so affirms his concealment beneath the contrary. The Church is spiritual, as long as it regards itself as hidden in this life, and does not place its trust in earthly instruments of power . . .

Ibid., pp. 105-6

Luther the Expositor

1. *The Bible and the Word of God*. As a polemical theologian in his conflict with both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, Luther identified the Bible with the Word of God.

Jaroslav Pelikan, *Luther the Expositor*, p. 257

One of the copyists of Luther's *Table Talk* has transmitted to us a poem which the Reformer once wrote about the New Testament.

Preciousness of the New Testament.

This Testament is precious. Oh, how true!

Great art and wisdom it imparts to you.
 Blessed be the man who follows its direction!
 He will enjoy God's blessing and protection.
 The Word of God forevermore endures
 And heaven's kingdom unto us secures.
 For all must die and leave this world someday,
 And then the Word is our trusty stay.
 It strengthens us at our last, painful breath,
 And it redeems us from eternal death.

Ewald Plass, *What Luther Says*, p. 99

2. *Scripture and Tradition*. As the spokesman for a Biblically oriented Protestantism, Luther stressed the sovereignty of the scriptures over all tradition and dogma, however ancient . . .

3. *The History of the People of God*. As a man of scholarship, Luther employed the best historical-critical scholarship available to him and demanded that the historical sense of the scriptures receive the normative place in exegesis . . .

4. *Commentary and Controversy*. As an obedient expositor of the whole Bible, Luther endeavored to incorporate the full range of biblical language into his theology.

. . . in his exegesis—as in his doctrine, piety, and ethic—the Reformer represented himself as a son of the church and as a witness to the Word of God revealed in Jesus Christ and documented in the sacred scriptures. To that church, to that Word, to that Christ, to those scriptures Luther the expositor pointed.

He still does.

Jaroslav Pelikan, *Luther the Expositor*, p. 257-60

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Discussion

Anthony Guerra: I found the topic a large one and I decided to get at it by looking at *Divine Principle's* reading of the New Testament from the perspective of a particular problem in historical critical scholarship, namely, the quest of the historical Jesus. Now in doing that I have initiated a dialogue between higher criticism of the German kind and *Divine Principle*. Anglo-Saxon and French scholarship have not taken account of most of the problems German scholarship has sought to deal with. I am dealing with German higher criticism on the problem of the historical Jesus and how *Divine Principle* might come face to face with it.

Kapp Johnson: Is your schematization and delineation of the life of Jesus appropriate because it better explains the scholarly debate or because it better explains the text as it now stands?

Anthony Guerra: I don't like the form of your question because it implies a radical disjunction between biblical scholarship and the biblical texts.

Kapp Johnson: But you argue that it is best because it explains the scholarly debate.

Frederick Sontag: I would like to know whether your question is really, "Are *Divine Principle's* key concepts derived from scripture?" That seems to me to be the real question, but I don't think you really answer that in the paper. When you talk about cooperative interaction as a

principle by which God works, that is an interesting principle but I don't think that is derived from scripture. Then you say that biblical figures have to set certain conditions. That way of speaking is very common in *Divine Principle*, but I don't find that in the New Testament. On your key point about John the Baptist in *Divine Principle*, I don't think you want to say that it is correct, but that there is nothing in the statements about John the Baptist which forbids the interpretation you give. I don't think one can get the interpretation you give out of the scriptural passages alone. I would have a hard time doing it. Finally, you give very few of Jesus' words as justification for the notions of "foundation of faith" and "foundation of substance." Jesus doesn't explain his mission that way. You may interpret it that way, but then you come back to your question of whether the concepts in *Divine Principle* are biblically based. I don't see that you have proved it at all.

Anthony Guerra: What I say is that the question whether it is from scripture or divinely inspired is impossible to answer. It cannot be a concern in a discourse among scholars.

Frederick Sontag: What is the question?

Anthony Guerra: I think that the question is whether or not *Divine Principle* makes sense of the elements of the biblical traditions. Not only makes sense of them, but also finally aids one in living the life of love of Jesus. How can we decide whether or not it is derived from scripture? No person can stand outside the hermeneutical circle and rise above the presuppositions from which he inevitably begins.

Frederick Sontag: We could decide that it isn't derived from scripture. What does that have to do with the historical Jesus, then? What you are now talking about is that these are ways of understanding Jesus and ways which relate one to God and to Jesus. I wouldn't deny that. But what does that have to do with the question of the historical Jesus?

Anthony Guerra: What I mean by history in this case is not a nineteenth century view of history as a chronicle of events simply, but primarily the intentionality of Jesus. If you want to be connected to Jesus you need to know his intentions, otherwise you are connected to some figment of your imagination. So the question about what Jesus

really intended is a very important question.

Frederick Sontag: I've said that you haven't proven that. I think that one must understand Jesus' intentions, but Jesus does not say, "I have come to provide a foundation of faith and substance and John the Baptist has made this impossible for me."

Anthony Guerra: I was never arguing that. In any Christian theologian from Tertullian onwards, you are going to find that much of the language doesn't come from scripture. The point is—and this gets back to Kapp's question as well—that *Divine Principle* is providing concepts which make more sense of the biblical sayings and material than any other construction has.

James Deotis Roberts: My problem with the discussion is not so much what is here, but what isn't here. The issues that should be raised when you discuss the historical Jesus in relationship to *Divine Principle* and the whole Unification movement would imply a concern for experience and interpretations which are not limited to the Germanic perspective. You put aside the Anglo-Saxon contribution. I don't think even that is adequate. The broadening discussion of the real initiative in theology is coming from the third world theologians where contextualization is taking place. Certainly the implications of this movement are that it is a universal worldwide movement and to create a dialogue simply between the Germans and *Divine Principle* limits the discussion unduly.

The other point is that prominent Anglo-Saxon theologians have made a credible contribution to the quest for the historical Jesus. One of the classic statements from that point of view would be Donald Baillie's. He included engagement with the Germans, but he brought Scottish Common Sense to the discussion. His was a mediating position which was not as extreme as the Greek dichotomous approach, or the Germanic "this or that" approach which seems not really to cover the human experience. There is also the contribution of liberation theology to an understanding of the implications of the life of Jesus. You do not even mention it. Liberation theology has great importance at the present time. It seems to me that you have a very limited sample here. It

is not adequate, even for the Unificationist's point of view, which has this worldwide all encompassing concern about the human family.

Herbert Richardson: I think that Anthony has provided some very significant material for us. I would like to agree with him and then even broaden it a bit more. Let me say what it seems to me he has said. Something the Bible teaches has been neglected in biblical scholarship until recently: John the Baptist in relation to Jesus. John comes up again and again. John is a figure who is presented in interaction with Jesus. The British scholar T.W. Manson makes the point that the decision of Jesus to go into Jerusalem demonstrates a change in the form of his mission. He decides to go to Jerusalem to sacrifice his life. This decision follows the death of John the Baptist in the Gospel of Matthew. Insofar as I recall, the role of John the Baptist was bracketed out in nineteenth century historical Jesus scholarship. One dealt with Jesus as an isolated figure and John was not seen to have an important formative role in shaping Jesus' ministry. Now twentieth century scholarship shows that John played a formative role in shaping what Jesus did and that there was an interaction between them.

As an aside on Fred's question, maybe one doesn't want to use the words give-and-take and cooperation. But on the historical level there was or there wasn't formative interaction between these two figures. I think that contemporary biblical scholarship says that, Yes, there was.

That's the first point I'd like to make, now the second is this. Let us take as examples contemporary liberal theology, that builds on the historical Jesus, and liberation theology (Deotis' question). By liberal theology I understand a theology that takes as its foundation the historical Jesus and the quest for the historical Jesus. Contemporary liberal and liberation theology do not take into account on the doctrinal level the scriptural fact that John interacts with Jesus in shaping the form of the messianic ministry. That is to say, there is a doctrinal lacuna in contemporary liberal theology. Conservative, fundamentalist theology tends not to worry about John the Baptist for quite different reasons. Fundamentalist and conservative theology holds the view that the *life* of Jesus is not salvific but it is the *death* of Jesus which is salvific. We can

talk a little bit about that in a minute. All I want to say now is that the long history of theology has been governed by the problem of whether the historical life of Jesus before his death is salvific. Is Jesus' life already part of the new aeon or does the new aeon begin with the death and resurrection of Jesus? St. Anselm argues the entire life of Jesus belongs to the Old Testament. It is just obedience under the law and there is nothing significant in it, except his death which is a work of supererogation followed by resurrection. I believe that the Lutheran tradition, drawing on the Anselmic tradition, has always tended to believe that the life of Jesus is not salvific, but only his death. When Käsemann argues that the life of Jesus is salvific, he is arguing really with the Calvinist tradition which asserts that in Jesus' earthly obedience salvation for the world is already accomplished.

My third point includes my criticism of Anthony. The theology that was interested in the historical Jesus was interested in the historical Jesus not for purely academic reasons but because it believed that the life of Jesus belongs to the new aeon, that is, that the life of Jesus together with the obedience of Jesus is salvific. That meant a concept of salvation which is worldly. The theologians who said that the salvific significance of Jesus is in the death of Jesus always believed that salvation is other-worldly.

It is perfectly clear then, that Unification theology in being interested in the historical Jesus and in exposing the significance of John the Baptist (or, we can say, in understanding the intentionality of the historical Jesus) is making a couple of contributions. It is linking up its understanding of the ministry and salvific work of Jesus to the older theological debate about whether salvation takes place through the death or the life of Jesus. Unification theology makes a clear decision on the question of life, because it believes that you have a salvation in this world rather than in the other world. It claims that salvation has got to happen here. It then argues quite consistently that John the Baptist is a significant scriptural datum that has been neglected by liberal theology and proposes to look at the role of John the Baptist in shaping the ministry and intentionality of Jesus in order that we can understand

more fully not only what Jesus does but the meaning of the salvation that Jesus sought through his earthly obedience. Unification theology makes rather significant advances in relation to liberal theology and in relation to scriptural criticism by tying up the contemporary discussion with the longer tradition.

The thing that I find most wrong with your paper, Anthony, is that the people who argue that the historical life of Jesus is of salvific significance were always people who understood that the “old aeon, new aeon” language—with which you began your paper and which is coined from the sides of Bultmann, Anselm and Luther—means that God shifts from one kind of salvation to another kind of salvation. He is not going to try to save the world, but just souls from the conflagration of the world. The kind of sharp dichotomy with which you began your paper simply is inconsistent with the argument that you want to make. We can say that Calvin understood and *Divine Principle* teaches that whatever is new in the New Testament is not so new that the kind of salvation that is being sought—or really the mode of seeking it—are fundamentally different. It is only new in the sense of another try. There is where I detect your real failure and the problems that you are going to run into in trying to advance your theory as you have.

Anthony Guerra: I don't think that I was trying to say that Bultmann's interpretation of the old aeon and new aeon was *Divine Principle's* point of view. I think that issues that informed Bultmann's refusal to say that Jesus begins the new aeon are comprehended in *Divine Principle's* assertion that because of John the Baptist's failure, Jesus had to assume the role of precursor.

Durwood Foster: First just a word of appreciation for Anthony's paper. It is a very rich paper and could be addressed at a number of levels, some of which are very general and important. Then there are certain pivotal concrete, extremely specific issues. I want to address two of those very quickly.

I want to address the point on which Herb spoke illuminatingly. To recapitulate, this way of contrasting sharply the old and the new aeon is really unacceptable and quite inadequate at this point. The Bultmannian

Fragestellung at this point is entirely too simplistic, for example, in suggesting that the Old Testament is all law and the New Testament is all grace, or that the kingdom has not yet come at all, that it is coming at some further moment rather than dialectically standing over and invading the present in every moment. Implicitly there is a kind of interplay and intermixture of the old and the new aeon running through both the Old and the New Testaments and that needs to be said. I think it has been said very clearly that Jesus as the Christ clearly indwells and participates in the old aeon as the one in and through whom the new aeon is also breaking in. By the same token it is quite wrong to think of Jesus' death only as salvific in contrast to his life. I think substantively St. Anselm does not do this. It is very clear in St. Anselm and in the classical tradition that the life of Jesus as the Christ is the indispensable presupposition of the saving significance of the death, and in that sense then the life is also decisively salvifically significant. We just have to see that Bultmann blew it. Bultmann is a very bright mind and has contributed tremendously, but there are certain points where he has twisted the discussion and we ought to be clear about that.

The other specific point that I want to speak to is this question of the role of John the Baptist in salvation history. The striking thing about the presentation in *Divine Principle* is that John the Baptist is saliently indicted as the one who fouled up what God and Jesus had in view, and thus in some very decisive way was the one who was at fault that the kingdom did not come through the ministry of Jesus as had been planned. I would like to point out that, incidentally, that is contrary to the historic classical Christian theological way of assessing the role of John the Baptist. Unificationism sharply departs from the tradition in its theological evaluation of John the Baptist. Whatever the underlying history might be—and there are some very intriguing issues, as Anthony sees—in the tradition, John the Baptist is given a *positive* role as forerunner and witness.

One great symbolic expression of this is the Isenheimer altar painting of Grünewald where John the Baptist is the climactic witness to Jesus as the Christ. In the classical tradition John the Baptist figures

largely, however deficient liberal theology may be on this. Unificationism reverses the judgment of the classical tradition and Christian iconography and negates John the Baptist rather harshly. You can't, of course, swiftly settle the issue in its historiographic aspects. Nevertheless it seems to me that this indictment of John by *Divine Principle* and by Unification theology is greatly exaggerated. It is overdoing it by far to single him out in this almost exclusive way as the one who failed to provide the foundation of faith and the foundation of substance that would have implemented the salvific plan. The failure that occurs here—as the New Testament itself makes very clear and as the tradition has seen—is much more general than this: “He came unto his own and his own received him not.” Well, “his own” wasn't just John the Baptist. The failure of faith and of substance was a failure in the religious situation of the time but even more importantly and essentially it was the failure of humanity. Humanity was in the final and ultimate sense “his own.” It was the failure of faith and of substance on the part of us all that frustrated the immediate coming of the kingdom and that necessitated the cross, all foreseen according to the tradition in the providence of God. To single out John and to put the whole burden on his shoulders seems to me implausible and unconvincing. This is not to say that John played his role perfectly. No, we wouldn't for a moment think that. In, through, and under the somewhat legendary form in which the remembrance of John appears in the scripture there were probably things that happened that made John even more responsible for things going awry than the tradition leaves in the picture. We can all say that, but to single him out as the only one seems to me to be quite wrong and I think that the traditional image is far more adequate.

Anthony Guerra: I find that very helpful, Durwood. May I make one small point? I have always wondered why *Divine Principle*, in order to explain the failure of John the Baptist, goes into his fallen nature. Now I am beginning to understand why there is that section in *Divine Principle* which talks about the failure of John the Baptist not in terms of John the Baptist as a person but rather in terms of his fallen nature, that is, in terms of the condition of sin in which we all participate as children

of Adam and Eve. What you have just said in any case helps me understand the explanation for the blame in terms which I had not seen before.

Andrew Wilson: The focus on John the Baptist is very helpful in overcoming some of the anti-Semitism in the gospel narratives. *Divine Principle* focuses on John, instead of on the Jewish people as a whole, as a primary stumbling block in the way of Jesus. This provides one avenue which can help overcome some anti-Semitic tendencies in Christianity. Secondly, the focus on John grows out of the Confucian background of the importance of hierarchy and leadership in the way an Asian would see it.

Klaus Lindner: I would even go a little bit further and say that the focus on John is partly brought about by the focus of the Bible on John as the one who prepared the way for Jesus. The Bible singles out John. Therefore *Divine Principle* follows precisely that avenue and singles out John, too, and why the people were not prepared.

Lonnie Kliever: Taking my own reading of *Divine Principle* and picking up on the title of part four of Anthony's paper, "*Divine Principle as Reconstruction of the Historical Jesus*," it seems to me that one way to understand what Anthony is doing is to see the use of historical critical methods as a way of recovering the problematic that the early Christian movement faced. That problematic focuses dramatically on three problems: 1) the problem of the relationship between Jesus and John, 2) the problem of the meaning of the death of Jesus, and 3) the problem of the delay of the parousia. This last problem has not entered our discussion. One can see the written gospels as a way of wrestling with those three problems. My reading of *Divine Principle* is that it is an alternative to the way in which the written gospels solve those three problems. Now that creates an embarrassment. On the one hand, we could say that *Divine Principle* is an alternative to the written gospel's account of these three problems and, on the other hand, we could say that *Divine Principle* is in some sense a commentary on, or completion of, or fulfillment of the scripture itself. What then interests me in a more careful reading of Anthony's paper is how historical critical methods themselves support an alternative handling of these problems, and if *Divine Principle's*

reconstruction handles the problems more creatively with greater historical fidelity and theological richness than the written gospels do themselves.

Darrol Bryant: I think that is a good point at which to bring Don Deffner's contribution into this discussion.

Donald Deffner: The first point is a quotation from Roland Bainton's *Here I Stand*: "Luther read the New Testament in the light of the Pauline message that the just shall live by faith and not by works of the law."

I'll pick some of Luther's main themes and comment on them with reference to or in contrast to Unification theology.

Our Lord commanded his disciples to preach the gospel to all the nations, for repentance and the forgiveness of sin (Luke 24:44-47). Christ swallowed up death. For Luther the work was complete. I would disagree with Unification theology and I know that Luther would too, to say that Christ suffered an undue death, that in effect God's will was tragically thwarted by the crucifixion of Jesus (see *DP*, p. 217). I believe with Luther that Jesus did fulfill his mission and sin was overcome.

Again Luther picks out certain books of scripture because they show that faith in Christ overcomes sin, death and hell. This is the real nature of the gospel. Paul says not another gospel but Christ always at the center of it—this one person alone, know nothing but Christ, him crucified. Luther would also say, I believe, there is no need for a Lord of the Second Advent.

Luther places emphasis on *sola gratia*: by grace were you saved through faith, not of yourself but by the gift of God. We hear in Unification theology that five percent is our responsibility. Luther would say that it is totally God at work in us. Looking at scripture itself, Luther never doubted that the will of God was revealed and is comprehensible to man solely through the holy scripture. I would go along with many Lutherans who at least idealistically strive for the principle that the scripture interprets itself—the Bible in the light of the Bible.

Sola gratia is really Luther's hermeneutic, being the grace that is the presence of the Holy Spirit. A key to this is the concealment of God on the cross which is paralleled by the structure of faith which, in turn,

is concealed beneath a contrary. It was the Augustinian friar Luther who discovered that the *Deus absconditus* is really the *Deus revelatus*.

Andy Wilson said that there is an uncomfortableness in Unificationist thought with paradox and mystery. I think the fantastic thing about the cross and resurrection is that God was concealed beneath that which the human mind does not want to accept. So absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. The *silence* of God is the silence of *God*.

For Luther there are three *solas*: *sola scriptura*, *sola fide*, and *sola gratia*. This is at the heart of much of our discussion. Where some feel that Christ failed on his way to the cross and that the mission was not accomplished, to me the incredible thing is that the beauty of God's plan of redemption is that he completed it in the face of rejection. Herein is love, not that we love God but that he loved us and sent his son for us.

Herbert Richardson: Are you going to tell us now, Don, what this salvation is that is accomplished in this way? Isn't the *Deus absconditus* the God in the midst of what we see? Is not this the God who is invoked in the midst of Auschwitz while everybody says, "It is all right, it is all right; God is here," while Auschwitz goes on?

Luther manages to say all these things about Christ by denying salvation and by accepting sin as an unconquerable reality. Everything that you have said seems to me to be an *apologia* for Satan. The people who believe that Jesus Christ is the kind of person that you have described are people who have found through that faith a way of accepting the world in its sin as an ultimate that can never be redeemed. I would like to know from you what that redemption is that Jesus Christ brings us in the way that you just described. I want to know what is accomplished by this, other than that Satan goes on reigning in the world. Did Luther by the way believe that Satan will go on in the world forever and ever? Did Luther believe that?

Donald Deffner: I think that he would say until the parousia, Yes. To answer your question on salvation, I would say I have forgiveness by grace through my faith in Christ. I would have to add that Luther was speaking to a certain situation in his day and age. But as I read the

whole of scripture this faith must be lived out. I grant that those who would just read Luther and misapply it have done nothing in terms of social justice.

Herbert Richardson: Why is that misapplication? That seems to me to be consistent application. What theological foundation is there within that position that you have advocated for anyone feeling that God wills him to live justly in this world?

Donald Deffner: In my own theology there is a foundation. But I don't equate that with Luther. In this presentation I was seeking to explicate what Luther's approach was to the New Testament.

Herbert Richardson: Well, that is to say you believe that the teaching you have just presented is unacceptable because it has these demonic consequences.

Donald Deffner: I don't feel that Luther is complete in terms of what I need to do today.

Herbert Richardson: Fine. Now I would like to hear a contemporary Lutheran tell me what foundation is going to be built theologically for going beyond those statements in Luther that are so unacceptable.

Darrol Bryant: Let me interject one point here. I think these are interesting questions to pursue but in a sense you are being fundamentally unfair to what I asked Don to do. I asked Don to present Luther's reading of the New Testament. I think that is what he has done. One point for asking him to do that was to get it on the table that within the history of theology there are different readings, different interpretations, different identifications of central structures of interpretation which we find within the Christian tradition for the understanding of the scripture.

Donald Deffner: I would just refer to one other thing about the implications of Luther's theology for Auschwitz. I think it is in Elie Wiesel's *Nights* where a young boy and two men are hung and this one person whispers to the other, "Watching this, where is God now?" It took the boy about a half an hour to die, and the answer was, "He is at the same place as when his son died on Calvary." But this is not meant to be an easy answer to Herb's question.

Could we deal at some point with the absence or undesirability of

paradox and mystery in Unification theology and the implications of the contrary?

Klaus Lindner: I found Herb Richardson's comments very interesting because they relate to something I have been working on—Luther's concept of immanent eschatology. What was inadequate in Luther's concept of redemption is something that Luther himself thought was inadequate too, namely, the concept of the parousia. This is something which has been much neglected in Luther but which Luther stresses very often. He considers the last days to be sweeter than the gospel. He says something to the effect that if the world stays the same and if the last days will not come soon then I would rather not have been born. He sees precisely that the present social and religious situation is intolerable to God and to himself and that is why he prays so desperately for the coming of the last days. That is something which has been in much of Lutheranism. I think that side of the Lutheran tradition against which Herb reacted has reflected that fundamental conviction of Luther that the present order is not a situation which should be tolerated and which should continue.

Jonathan Wells: This issue of the completeness or incompleteness of Christ's work is very important. But I would like to get back to the specifically hermeneutical question. I thought your paper was a very important contribution. I was particularly interested in your distinction between an understanding based purely on the outward meaning of a text and an understanding based on its inner significance—between remaining satisfied with the lifeless letter and going on to penetrate the living spirit of a text.

I would like to make some methodological distinctions which may help our discussion. On the one hand we could be debating with each other whether a particular interpretation is better than another interpretation, or whether in fact there is one best interpretation that happens to be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. However, I am inclined to think that the Bible could be interpreted in many different ways, all of them valid on different levels. But I do believe in the law of non-contradiction. You do too, Fred, don't you?

Frederick Sontag: I guess so, what are you getting at? (laughter)

Jonathan Wells: Although there may be many valid interpretations, I don't think that they could contradict each other. If they do, then we have to get to the bottom of the contradiction and solve it. That would be my approach.

David Kelly: You mean mutually exclusive interpretations?

Jonathan Wells: Yes, exactly. That has to be resolved. On another level, it seems that what we are doing is trying to find out whether our various interpretations are justifiable or pertinent, and not necessarily whether one is "better" than another.

My last point deals with the distinction between the letter and the spirit. We need to concede right off the bat that there are no presuppositionless interpretations. To talk about the Bible interpreting itself in some way that everyone can agree with is obviously not true or it would have happened a long time ago. What we are dealing with here is a variety of ways of interpreting the Bible. All of us come to the text with some presuppositions. We owe it to ourselves and each other to consider what those are and be responsible to justify them.

Andrew Wilson: I would like to second Jonathan's point. In my own presentation earlier this morning I spoke about what I thought were certain presuppositions or certain contexts out of which *Divine Principle* does its hermeneutic. Luther makes a big point about how his interpretation of scripture is the result of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. I would like to ask if you know of Luther scholars who have tried to understand what the cultural philosophical presuppositions are that Luther brought to the scriptures to make the various hermeneutical decisions that he made.

Donald Deffner: All I can say is that Lutherans have sought an ideal of letting the Bible interpret itself.

Frank Flinn: I am a Roman Catholic as everybody knows. I see this strange paradox in the two wings of Protestantism. On the one hand you have the Calvinist impulse which I see epitomized in the most beautiful way by Milton, namely, trying to make plain the ways of God to man. On the other hand you see this more paradoxical approach in

Lutheranism. I see a kind of conflict about the *sola scriptura* principle itself that needs to be resolved. There is a contradiction here, for both Luther's and Calvin's hermeneutic are based on *sola scriptura*. I have a little understanding of this conflict within Protestantism, but it still mystifies me. That needs to be gotten at on a much deeper level than it has ever been gotten at. But I'm just an outsider looking in.

Durwood Foster: Just a word about Luther and the assessment of the Lutheran heritage in more recent and contemporary theology. I think that is interesting, at least in the context of this discussion. I think that certainly in the Protestant spectrum, and maybe even in the general Christian spectrum, we recognize Luther as a great saint of theology who laid a foundation of substance, if I can lift that phrase from *Divine Principle* . . .

Frederick Sontag: Durwood, there are no saints in theology.

Durwood Foster: In my theology there are (laughter). We can talk about categories later, Fred. I just want to say that as far as Luther himself is concerned, he is what Karl Barth has characterized as an aphoristic rather than primarily a systematic theologian. I think this is generally granted. Further there is a certain preeminence, or salient conspicuousness in his message of the theme of justification by faith alone, the *sola gratia*, *sola fide* theme. Nevertheless, as was mentioned here by one or two people it is very clear in Luther that there is a very painful consciousness of the lack of the full and complete coming of the kingdom of God. The parousia is still outstanding in the full pathos of Luther's consciousness. Still, this motif is registered in spite of his aphoristic one-sidedness in which other themes like justification seem to hit you first in the face.

But let's go beyond Luther himself. Catholic theology on the whole sees Luther as singling out a fragmentary motif that needs to be placed within the more comprehensive synthesis of Christian truth. The Catholic analysis of Protestantism is that it is a fragmentation of the whole Catholic faith. But within Protestantism itself I think there tends to be a general agreement that this theme in Luther and/or in Lutheranism has been one-sidedly and therefore deficiently expounded.

One manifestation of that is of course what Frank Flinn called attention to. That is, alongside Lutheranism you have Calvinism and Methodism. Alongside the Lutheran emphasis upon the paradox of justification you have the Calvinist and Methodist emphasis upon the perfection of the moral life and moral obedience to God in history—and that very self-consciously. Other Protestant traditions have been supplementary to what Luther has stressed.

In modern theology particularly within Lutheranism itself, you have a number of theologians who strive to go beyond Luther. One who always comes to my mind because I have a kind of special liking for him is Albrecht Ritschl who flourished toward the end of the last century and who indicted not so much Luther himself, because he had a deep respect for Luther, but Lutheranism. Ritschl, by the way, was a Lutheran who had a kind of special affinity for Calvin. That is my kind of theologian (laughter). Ritschl indicted Lutheranism rather than Luther himself as having foreshortened and forfeited the full Christian concern for the actuality of the kingdom of God.

Jumping up to the present day, let us take Karl Barth briefly. Karl Barth in his exposition tried to do justice to Luther but in volume four of *Church Dogmatics* he says Luther is not enough. Along with the principle of justification by faith, we need other principles to get the whole of the Christian gospel.

Last of all and most especially, I want to mention Dietrich Bonhoeffer who is a deeply faithful Lutheran and a splendid son, if you will, of the Lutheran tradition. Yet Bonhoeffer provided a very incisive indictment of Lutheranism under the rubric of “cheap grace.” This has somewhat the same impact as Ritschl’s analysis, but in some ways it is even more pointed and telling. Let me note that Bonhoeffer attempts to justify Saint Martin himself (or Saint Luther). He says Luther has to be understood as emerging from a polemical context—which is a very good hermeneutical point. You have to see Luther in his own context and if you do see Luther in that context according to Bonhoeffer, you will see that Luther doesn’t really mean to rest everything simply on faith alone. Faith alone is to be seen in terms of Luther’s immense

commitment in his own existence to satisfying the demands of the law. If you take it out of that context you totally falsify him. You always have to have the paradox or the dialectic that is expressed by this context. On the one hand, Bonhoeffer, in *The Cost of Discipleship*, says that only a person who believes can be obedient. On the other hand, only he can believe who is committing his whole life to obedience. If you compromise that dialectic you ruin Luther and you mess up the whole issue.

Frederick Sontag: There is actually a passage in Deffner's presentation which gives me a clue to what I want to say about Anthony's paper. I think the two go together. I am still struggling with the notion of trying to figure out why Anthony is interested in the quest and what the point is. I think I have got it now. Don Deffner used a quote from Luther: he says "The primary gospel books are St. John's gospel and St. Paul's epistles." You have a clue there, in the fact that Luther likes John. I know many New Testament scholars who would have been much happier if John had been left out of the canon because they think it is too theological and too interpretative. Here is where you get your contrast. You are going to have a harder time with *Divine Principle* if John is the primary gospel because it is already high theology.

Frank Flinn: More accurately it is Romans and John 3:17 only. It wasn't the whole gospel of John (laughter).

Frederick Sontag: It is still the picture of Jesus as it is in the fourth gospel that is the key. The issue is that a key principle in *Divine Principle* is that Jesus' strategy changed. Unless that is held, I don't know what *Divine Principle* is saying. But we know from modern textual scholarship that we do not have Jesus' own pure words but we have interpretations of Jesus. Therefore, in order to try to find out what Jesus is really saying, we have to get at the historical Jesus. This is the whole thrust behind the quest for the historical Jesus.

Frank Flinn: But you use the word we "know" that. We do not "know" that. We do not even know that we do *not* have the words of Jesus!

Jonathan Wells: No one knows what the words are so you could just

as well begin with the assumption that what we have got in the text are the words.

Frederick Sontag: That is the craziest conclusion that I have ever heard. We don't know which they are, so we might as well . . .

Andrew Wilson: That might be the least speculative and the least arbitrary.

Anthony Guerra: You are both wrong (laughter). Even under the strictest historical critical criteria—of dissimilarity and coherence—some authentic sayings of Jesus can be determined.

Frederick Sontag: There is a reasonable agreement. Let me get to my major point which I think I can put fairly simply. What I think you really want to do is to be agnostic or skeptical about the possibility of the quest for the historical Jesus. If we could complete that and get to the definitive doctrine of Jesus, then I think *Divine Principle* is out. There doesn't seem to be any evidence that we are going to be able to get to the historical critical statement which says, Yes, this is Jesus' own self-consciousness: "I have to play my role as it comes, I see certain changes and I adapt the role as it comes." There is very little evidence for anything like that. You have to be skeptical about the possibility for the quest for the historical Jesus, because that leaves you open to make an assumption about Jesus' own understanding of his role which the texts do not support.

Andrew Wilson: I would like to get back to the relationship between the historical critical method and *Divine Principle*. I think the main thing that Fred was getting at is that there are two very different methodologies here. The historical critical method presupposes that, through some kind of scientific investigation with rigorous criteria which can be debated on their own merit and which have absolutely nothing to do with theology, we can arrive at some kind of historical picture of Jesus, perhaps of his life, perhaps of his intentionality. Anthony seems to be claiming in his paper that *Divine Principle* by a very different process, not using scientific method at all but rather through perhaps the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, is claiming we can arrive at a historically accurate picture of the life of Jesus.

Frederick Sontag: What do you mean historically accurate?

Andrew Wilson: If *Divine Principle* is, by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, coming to something that is congruent with the results of historical science, then this is a very radical statement about the hermeneutic of *Divine Principle*. It elevates the inspired quality of *Divine Principle* and makes the inspiration of *Divine Principle* testable. Because if it turns out that scholars using the historical critical method after another generation come up with very different conclusions about, say the role of Jesus and John, then this claim by *Divine Principle* will challenge it.

Kapp Johnson: I would like to affirm what Jonathan said about the importance of method. I think that is where the crux of the whole thing lies. The appropriateness or inappropriateness of the methodology is where I think the discussion has to begin and maybe we can even do that tonight. As far as Anthony's question or Andy's question on contemporary Lutheran scholarship, of course there are various movements in Lutheranism, right and left. But generally contemporary Lutheran scholars recognize the contemporality of Luther's own method in his own angst. What was coming out of him certainly very much influenced the way he read the New Testament and where he found light became the principle whereby it opened all the rest of scripture and his theology from that. What Lutherans now have tried to do in remaining true to the insights of that tradition is to talk about the categories but in somewhat different kinds of ways. Categories are not entirely thrown out but we have to recognize that there is law/gospel in the Old Testament as well as law/gospel in the New Testament and these kinds of things.

Jonathan Wells: It seems to me that the discussion of the last twenty minutes has demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between the levels on which we are operating. For example, Rahner points out that we *know* (in a rigorously historical way) only that Jesus lived and that he was crucified, because Josephus told us so. This information is independent of the Bible. But when we deal with the scripture itself we talk about the more or less probable. We have very

good reasons to doubt the truth of some statements, while others seem to be more reliable. Or, we can take everything in scripture as a statement of the piety of the early Christian community. A lot of the disagreement is really about what level we are operating on here.

Herbert Richardson: The whole discussion about John and Jesus has focused on New Testament texts because we have a couple of New Testament scholars. In fact the Old Testament hasn't been talked about at all. We talk about *sola scriptura* but the Bible is the *whole* Bible and there are a lot of things in the Old Testament—I don't like the word "old." From the Bible's point of view, there are a lot of things in the earlier part of the Bible (laughter) that illuminate later things. I stress "from the Bible's point of view" and not from the historical point of view say of Ernst Käsemann. From the Bible's point of view many earlier things illumine what is going on between Jesus and John. Now what would those things be? *Divine Principle* says that all kinds of brother relationships in the Bible illuminate a little bit what is going on between Jesus and John. In reality, it is in terms of the internal historical symbology within the Bible—not the modern critical history, but this is real history—by which claims can be made, and probably sustained, that the John-Jesus relationship be interpreted in the light of Cain and Abel, Ishmael and Isaac, Esau and Jacob, Joseph and his brothers, and a number of other similar relationships. This is not a matter of doctrine or faith, but a matter of how you interpret the text if you have a text of a full five-act play. If you decide that you are going to interpret the whole play in terms of just the content of the fourth act, you will never adequately understand what is going on. In the Bible itself there are things about the way in which God deals with human beings, the way in which human beings deal with one another, that is part of the Bible's story of how Jesus and John are dealing with one another. That is part of the internal symbology of the Bible.

And we haven't even talked about here the fact that the reason why John is so essential to the history of Jesus is because within the Bible the brother pattern comes up again and again in relation to the structure of salvation and reprobation beginning with Cain and Abel and running

on through. Now that is not a matter of doctrine or faith. That is a matter of the internal meaning of the text on a historical level which has not been talked about here.

When Andy Wilson, for example, said, Well maybe *Divine Principle* says it is going to illuminate history, I would say *Divine Principle* illuminates that the modern notion of critical history is not an adequate notion of history to interpret the full teaching of the Bible.

These are the two points that I want to make. First, the Bible is the *whole* Bible and the church has accepted that when we start talking about interpreting the Bible through the Bible, it means basically that you cannot interpret texts in Matthew without taking into account texts in Genesis and in Kings. That is what is meant by interpreting the Bible through the Bible. You can't run directly from a Bible text to how you feel about it when you hear it, but you have to relate texts to one another. That is the *sola scriptura* principle and I think we haven't given adequate attention to the Old Testament. Second, when you do relate the Old to the New Testament, John is important to the ministry of Jesus because on a certain level of symbology within the Bible patterns of historic interaction between brothers emerge and give rise to symbolic meanings.

Is it significant, for example, that Mary and her father Joachim are in the priestly pattern and representatives of the priestly tradition in Israel? This is a historical datum in the Bible which is very important for understanding the ministry of Jesus, one would think, right? Where does contemporary Christian scriptural study or theology do anything about this? It is simply not dealt with at all. Now these are questions worth discussing a bit.

Henry Vander Goot: I was going to say nothing about how the previous discussion tied in with this but I would just say that so much of the historical method is beside the point. We have to deal with the text as we have it as a structural narrative whole. The historical method doesn't help us to get on with that. In that sense it is a frustration.

Herbert Richardson: Let me just add to Henry's point. I am sorry that Lonnie Kliever is not here because he said that what an embarrassment

it is to Unification theology which says the Bible has a doctrine of the parousia that is so unambivalently clear and so different from what the Unification Church teaches. If there is any clear doctrine of the parousia in the Bible I sure have never known anybody who thought that there was one. There is total disagreement on the matter. As to Lonnie's other points, I thought his first one was really good, namely that the New Testament has canonical interpretations of John the Baptist. If there were a canonical interpretation of the parousia, why would Christians and Jews be disagreeing with each other today?

James Deotis Roberts: I want to limit the discussion of interpretation of scripture. I refer to my involvement at present with the movement in South Africa. What is on my mind is the actual situation of millions of people in that country who have been oppressed because of the tradition which we all know. What kind of difference does this make whether we interpret the Bible from a Lutheran point of view or a Catholic point of view if in fact our interpretation gives complicity with the oppression of millions of people? One reason why the situation is so intractable is because interpretations of scripture in some of the church traditions in that land actually sanctify the status quo. If scripture interprets itself, whether we talk about a Lutheran point of view or a Catholic point of view, how do we have a breakthrough in the church for the liberation of the oppressed anywhere in the world? This is a question which needs to be raised by those interpreting scripture from Roman Catholic or Lutheran points of view or from the point of view of *Divine Principle*. We are dealing with a real situation in the contemporary world, not with something like slavery or the holocaust which are behind us, but with people who are actually suffering at this moment. How do we have a breakthrough with the interpretation of scripture that speaks to this situation?

Andrew Wilson: I want to speak both to Deotis' point and to Herb's point on the paradigm of the brothers. The relationship of brothers in *Divine Principle* is very interesting. It is clear in *Divine Principle* that in terms of relationship between elder and younger brother the biblical witness is the reverse of the Confucian relationship. In the Confucian

relationship it is the younger brother who must defer to the elder, but in *Divine Principle* it is the elder brother who must defer to the younger. Certainly that is true in the case of Jacob and Esau and it is true in the case of John the Baptist and Jesus because John the Baptist is Jesus' elder. In *Divine Principle* there is a tremendous amount of respect for the biblical text and for seeking to find meaning in the biblical text. Even though there may be Confucian ideas behind Rev. Moon's exegesis of scripture, when the scripture unequivocally comes out against Confucian notions and particularly the relationship of brothers, scripture has priority. In fact this is a very important scriptural concept which *Divine Principle* applies in many relationships in the world today among nations and among peoples where the wealthy nations in the position of elder brothers should defer to and serve their younger brothers in the third world.

Critique of the *Divine Principle* Reading of the Old Testament

Kapp L. Johnson

Any reading of the Old Testament is by its very nature a literary, theological, and historical task. It is literary because the Old Testament is an ancient literary work faithfully transmitted through the centuries by the communities which esteem it special status. It is theological in two ways. First, the Old Testament defines a community grounded in God. This grounding is at the level of three relationships: the relationship of the community to God; the relationship of the individual to God; and the relationship of individual to individual. Second, the Old Testament has God in general and Yahweh in particular as its *ultimate concern*.¹ *Ultimate* in the sense of the *quality* of the human experience of Yahweh, *concern* in the sense of the *affective* or *motivational* aspect of the human experience of Yahweh. It is historical in two ways as well. First, it is historical in the sense that the literature is conditioned by the context in which, and audience to whom, it was written. That the context and audience no longer exist makes the process of reconstructing them a priority in the interpretive task. This process of reconstruction is a constitutive element of what we define as historical. Second, it is historical in the sense that the Old Testament claims that Yahweh acted in *history*.² The events which called Israel into being as a people of God are not narrated as taking place outside of human experience. Rather human experiences are proclaimed as acts of God. As a result, the experience of liberation from slavery is proclaimed as an act of Yahweh

as is the experience of exile. Thus human experience is the stage on which the drama of Yahweh is played and the recital of that drama the record of what God has done. It is precisely on these three points that the *Divine Principle* reading of the Old Testament falls short.

"Any normative concept in interpretation implies a choice that is required not by the nature of written texts but rather by the goal that the interpreter sets for himself."³ That this is particularly true for *Divine Principle's* reading of the Old Testament is immediately apparent in its presentation of history, creation, and the fall of man.⁴

History in *Divine Principle* is the history of restoration. Restoration is the process of "restoring fallen man to his original state endowed at the creation, thus fulfilling the purpose of creation" (*DP*, p. 211). One of the purposes of *Divine Principle* is to explain "the meaning and significance of the events of the Jewish people as told in the Old Testament."⁵ It is interesting to note that the *Six Hour Lecture* uses the language of meaning and significance for there is a question as to whether the *Divine Principle* reading of the Old Testament distinguishes between the two. The significance of the events narrated in the Old Testament is that they are "the central history through which God operated His providence of salvation."⁶ The meaning of these same events seems to be that which contributes to its significance in the dispensation of God. Thus *Divine Principle* appears not to distinguish between its response to the Old Testament and the Old Testament itself.

E.D. Hirsch has analyzed this problem, i.e., the failure to distinguish meaning and significance, and has offered the following definitions: "*meaning* is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author meant by his use of particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. *Significance*, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception or a situation."⁷ He continues by defining *verbal* meaning as "whatever someone has willed to convey by a particular sequence of linguistic signs and which can be conveyed (shared) by means of those linguistic signs"⁸ and *interpreter's response* as "... the more or less personal significance he attaches to a verbal meaning..."⁹ This is to show that making the distinction

between meaning and significance is fundamental to the interpretive process and that this process is in some way related to the text. That is to say, if an Old Testament text is significant, that significance is in some manner related to the text's meaning which is in some manner controlled by the text. Consequently to argue, as does *Divine Principle*, that a significance of the Old Testament events is their paradigmatic character applicable to all histories is unintelligible without first rigorously pursuing the meaning of the Old Testament text in its own setting. When that meaning is found, then the task is to find a valid mode of expressing that meaning in contemporary settings.

In light of this discussion, one would have to argue that the age of providential time-identity and the providence of restoration as they pertain to the Old Testament are not substantiated by the Old Testament itself. Their level of meaning starts outside the text and then applies that significance to the text. They are interpretive principles which come from outside the Old Testament and are superimposed on the Old Testament. *Divine Principle* uses the events and characters of the Old Testament while at the same time denying or at best ignoring the Old Testament's self-understanding of those same events and characters. The Old Testament persons who were responsible for the present level of the text were likewise concerned with the meaning and significance of the events which they narrated. And likewise they asked what was the driving force of history. But the Old Testament comes to conclusions very different from *Divine Principle*. The point of congruity is only at the level of events and characters and not at the level of interpretation, for the two go their separate ways.

As an example, it should be noted that *Divine Principle* does not do justice to the Exodus event in its discussion of it in connection with the providence of restoration and condition of indemnity. The Exodus event is the paradigmatic salvation event in the Old Testament. It is paradigmatic in two ways; first, Israel is continually reminded of the event as it is the center of their confession of Yahweh (cf. Psalms 78), and second, it is the event which calls Israel into being (Exodus 6:6-8). As paradigm, the Exodus becomes the standard whereby all other salvation

events are judged (cf. Isaiah 43). In spite of this, *Divine Principle* interprets the years of slavery in Egypt as a period of indemnity for Israel due to Abraham's failure in his first offering (*DP*, p. 268). The exegesis of Genesis 15:10-13 provides this explanation as being "elucidated only through the Principle" and as such, Moses becomes the hero of the Exodus and not Yahweh (*DP*, p. 291; cf. Exodus 6:6).¹⁰ It is the Old Testament's proclamation that the Exodus event was an act of God's grace on behalf of Israel. Israel did not earn her deliverance through any meritorious acts of her own. To the contrary, God chose Israel freely to be his people. This is also true in Israel's return from the Babylonian exile. It is Yahweh who will freely lead Israel back to the land to reconstitute the exiles as His people. Consequently, grace not indemnity is the center of history in the Old Testament.¹¹

Creation is the beginning point of Unification theology and the principle of creation that which seeks fulfillment in the history of mankind. The fundamental concept of the principle of creation comes from Oriental philosophy. Thus, the use of the Old Testament by *Divine Principle* is at best as a proof text to the points it wishes to make. Thus Genesis 1:27 is used to illustrate God as absolute subject who exists with the dual characteristics of positivity and negativity (*DP*, p. 24); Genesis 2:22 and 2:18 also are used to illustrate the subject-object relationship between Adam and Eve (*DP*, pp. 21, 24); Genesis 1:4-31 "indicates that God wanted all of His creation to be good objects," (*DP*, p. 41); Genesis 2:17 is used to illustrate man's choice "either to continue to live by obeying God's warning or accepting the way of death by going against it" (*DP*, p. 54); and Genesis 1:28, the giving of the three blessings. This is basically the *Divine Principle* reading of the Old Testament as it pertains to creation.

Divine Principle proclaims "God is the Creator of all things," (*DP*, p. 27). It continues to describe him as "the absolute reality eternally self-existent, transcendent of time and space," (*DP*, p. 27). What is peculiar to these statements is that they are made in the context of creation, but the Old Testament reference is Exodus 3:14! The context of this reference is the call of Moses and the particular verse is an etymology

of the Israelite name for God, YHWH. W.F. Albright¹² proposed the meaning of the name of God of Israel "He causes to be, He creates." Albright suggested that YHWH was a third person form of the verb "to be." The conclusion being that the name does not necessarily indicate God's eternal being but rather his action and presence in history. That creation is to be understood as taking place in time is evidenced by its being marked into days. Thus creation becomes an act of Yahweh, indeed, his first act which is then followed by other works. But creation is not just an act in history but an act which brings history into being, emphasizing Yahweh's lordship over history. The movement from chaos to order and the references¹³ in Isaiah and Psalms to creation and redemption indicate a saving event in the creation itself. Consequently, creation is the first of God's mighty acts which stand at the beginning of God's saving history, indeed, of history itself.¹⁴ That *Divine Principle* does not take this perspective into account gives further evidence of its deficiency in reading the Old Testament.

The fall of man comes closest to what would be called an exegesis of an Old Testament text. Here the story of Adam, Eve, and the serpent are used to explain the root of sin, Satan, and the consequences of the fall (*DP*, p. 65-97). *Divine Principle* begins by arguing that the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and evil are not to be taken as literal trees but rather symbolically. It rhetorically asks, "But, how could God—the parent of man—make a fruit so tempting (Genesis 3:6) that His children would risk falling in order to eat it? How could He have placed such a harmful fruit where His children could reach it so easily?" (*DP*, p. 66). It then argues from Matthew 15:11 that food cannot be the cause of the fall.¹⁵ Interpreting the tree of life and the tree of knowledge of good and evil as symbolic poses no real problem for the text. Ancient Near Eastern texts are replete with such symbolism. The problem is the rhetorical question which begs the issue and the fact that Adam, Eve, and the serpent can be interpreted literally or symbolically as well.

This leads to the question as to what is at stake in the story. The issue is the disobedience of Adam and Eve and God's response to that

disobedience. It is not a question of whether Adam and Eve ate of a literal fruit from literal trees but rather it is a question of man's guilt.¹⁶ Nevertheless, for *Divine Principle*, the historicity of Adam and Eve and the symbolic nature of the fruit are necessitated by its understanding that "original sin" is inherited and that which is inherited is passed on through the blood lineage (*DP*, p. 66). This notion *presupposes* a historical Adam and Eve and a symbolic fruit. It also *presupposes* a non-literal understanding of the serpent for *Divine Principle* reasons that the serpent was spiritual, i.e., non-literal. Then *Divine Principle* asks rhetorically again, "What kind of spiritual being could have conversed with man, known God's will, lived in heaven (the world of the spirit), even after this being's fall and degradation?" (*DP*, p. 70) *Divine Principle* concludes that there "is no being endowed with such characteristics except an angel. The serpent, then must have been a figurative term for an angel" (*DP*, p. 70-71).

At the present level of the text, the serpent is nothing more than one of God's created creatures (Genesis 2:19). As G. von Rad points out "in the mind of the narrator it is not the symbol of a 'demonic' power and certainly not of Satan. What distinguishes it a little from the rest of the animals is exclusively its greater cleverness."¹⁷ Thus once again there is no particular need for the serpent to be identified with a symbol, an angel, or Satan, unless an *a priori* necessitates such a reading.

The necessity of a historical Adam and Eve and an angel symbolized by the serpent is indicated by the *Divine Principle* understanding of "original sin" and how it is inherited among humans. "Original sin" is explained in the section on "The Fall of the Angel and the Fall of Man." Two scripture verses are used to explain the sin of the fall: fornication. First, Jude 6-7 is used to reason "that the angel fell as the result of an immoral act of unnatural lust, and that act was fornication," (*DP*, p. 71). The crime of man was also fornication. Here Genesis 3:7 is used to argue that "if they had committed sin by eating an actual fruit of a 'tree of knowledge of good and evil,' they would have concealed their hands and mouths instead. It is the nature of man to conceal an area of transgression. They covered their sexual parts, clearly indicating that they

were ashamed of the sexual areas of their bodies because they had sinned through them. From this we know that they committed sin through the sexual parts of their bodies," (*DP*, p. 72). Job 31:33 is also used to show that Adam concealed his sexual parts thus revealing the nature of his transgression. The conclusion drawn is that there was committed an act of adultery between man and the angel which led to the fall of both. The angel became Satan and man was to be dominated by him.

The use of Jude 6-7 as indicating the nature of the crime of the angel is once again an unacceptable use of scripture interpreting scripture. There is nothing in the Genesis 3 text to indicate a sexual relationship between man and the serpent nor is there any indication in Jude 6-7 that it is referring to Genesis 3, rather it is referring to Genesis 6.¹⁸ The connection is made once again outside the text. This method does justice to neither text. The relationship is artificial and created for the purpose of the theology and not whether this is the self-understanding of the text. Thus the text is used to conform to Unification theology and not Unification theology to the text.

The psychologizing of Genesis 3:7 and Job 31:33 once again clearly indicates the intention of *Divine Principle* in its reading of these texts. These verses are used as a kind of proof text to further support the interpretation of the fall as the illicit sexual relationship between the angel and man, thus further indicating that the root of sin was not that Adam and Eve were disobedient but rather that they had an illicit sexual relationship with an angel. As the sin which Adam and Eve committed was disobedience, the consequence of that disobedience was guilt and shame *symbolized*¹⁹ by their covering themselves. To appear before God naked was an abomination in Israel. Every form of bodily exposure was carefully guarded against (Exodus 20:26). Thus to cover their nakedness was not an act of covering their sin but evidence of their guilt and shame before God. They hide themselves from God because now they fear him. Job 31:33 also indicates that the consequence of guilt and shame is to hide it. Job keeps his transgression to himself hidden from others. As a result, there is no compelling reason to interpret the fall narrative as a sexual sin.

In conclusion, the problems of *Divine Principle's* reading of the Old Testament are many. Generically it is neither a commentary on nor interpretation of the Old Testament. It is rather a theological treatise which randomly uses the Old Testament when necessary. The *Sitz im Leben* of the *Divine Principle* appears to be a kind of fundamentalist Christianity mixed with Oriental philosophy. It is fundamentalist in that it takes a dispensational type view of history with literal readings of the text where you need them and metaphorical ones where necessary. It is Oriental in its exposition of reality. There is no apparent hermeneutical clue indicating when a text is to be interpreted literally or metaphorically outside of the theology itself. The interpretive tools are used to go against the text and not as a means of bringing out the meaning and significance of the text. The sometimes arbitrary juxtapositioning of texts together raises the question as to whether the texts have any integrity of their own. Thus the *Divine Principle* reading of the Old Testament falls short literarily because it confuses the relationship between the text, meaning, and significance; theologically because it does not concern itself with the theology of the Old Testament; and historically because it does not take the context and audience into consideration in its discussion.²⁰

FOOTNOTES

¹Tillich's definition of religion as ultimate concern seems to be the best in describing religion in its broadest phenomenological aspect; see John A. Hutchison, *Paths of Faith*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 1-6.

²Cf. G. Ernest Wright, *God Who Acts*, (London: SCM Press, 1952).

³E.D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 24.

⁴This can also be shown for other major topics in *Divine Principle*, e.g., the mission of Jesus, eschatology; for the purposes of this critique, history, creation, and the fall of man have a particular relationship to the Old Testament.

⁵*Divine Principle, Six Hour Lecture*, (New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1977), p. 30.

⁶*Divine Principle, Six Hour Lecture*.

⁷Hirsch, p. 8.

⁸*Divine Principle, Six Hour Lecture*, p. 31.

⁹*Divine Principle, Six Hour Lecture*, p. 39.

- ¹⁰It may be argued that in Unification theology, God is the one who offers salvation alone and is thus truly the hero in man's history. Though this is true in *Divine Principle*, God is limited according to man's ability or inability to fulfill his portion of responsibility. Thus God cannot freely give his salvation unless the condition of indemnity is fulfilled, and those who fulfill it are truly the heroes in the history of the Providence of Restoration. To argue that this is a self-limitation on the part of God is a sufficient explanation within Unification theology but it is insufficient to explain the Old Testament self-understanding of redemption, for the concepts are alien to the Old Testament.
- ¹¹This is not to ignore that judgment, too, is an element in Old Testament history. Ancient Israel paid a heavy price as a consequence of her sin. However it must be emphasized that the suffering Israel experienced was a consequence of her breaking the covenant, and not indemnity. Atonement was in the sacrifices, not the exile. The return was due to God's grace and not Israel's time spent in exile.
- ¹²Cf. William F. Albright, "Contributions to Biblical Archaeology and Philology," *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 43 (1924), 363-93; "Further Observations on the Name of Yahweh and Its Modifications in Proper Names," *JBL* 44 (1925), 158-62; "The Names of 'Israel' and 'Judah' with Excursus on the Etymology of *todah* and *torah*," *JBL* 46 (1927), 151-85; and *From Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1957), pp. 197-99.
- ¹³Isaiah 43:1, 44:24b-28, 47:5, 51:9, 54:5; Psalms 74, 77:17ff., 89.
- ¹⁴For a more detailed theological interpretation of creation see Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), I, 136-53.
- ¹⁵This is an unacceptable use of the principle of scripture interpreting scripture. Jesus' dialogue with the Pharisees over the tradition of the elders has nothing to do with deciding whether the fruit is literal or symbolic.
- ¹⁶Because *DP* ties its interpretation of the fall as a sexual act to the symbolic sense of the fruit, the issue of the nature of the fruit is central to the discussion at one level. If we understand the overall purpose of the story as a question of disobedience and guilt, the issue of the nature of the fruit is left for the quibbling of those who do not know better.
- ¹⁷Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis*, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), p. 87.
- ¹⁸It appears to be a midrash on Genesis 6.
- ¹⁹There is no problem in taking the whole story or elements thereof as symbolic. What requires close scrutiny and justification is how interpreters proceed in drawing their conclusions.
- ²⁰To be sure, the criticisms offered here of the *Divine Principle* reading of the Old Testament can equally be said of much of contemporary readings of the Old Testament. This would indicate some major hurdles have to be removed as we consider anew the relationship between the Bible and theology.

Critique of *Divine Principle's* Reading of the New Testament

Thomas Boslooper

At the meeting of the American Academy of Religion and the Society of Biblical Literature, in St. Louis, Missouri, in October 1976, Bernhard Anderson, the distinguished professor of Old Testament at Princeton Seminary and author of *Understanding the Old Testament*, made a speech in which he called for a synthesizing approach to the study of the Bible in order to bring the word of God in a more constructive and powerful way to the world and society in which we live. The Unificationists' interpretation of the Bible may be looked upon as one major response being made to this call. Unification hermeneutics may be seen as a very real attempt to form a synthesis between wholly disparate approaches to the understanding of the Bible.

In this paper I shall attempt briefly to sketch in what area and in what ways this is done. At the same time I shall point out that some major aspects of Unification hermeneutics are in keeping with the major trends in contemporary approaches to the Bible, and more specifically, the New Testament. I should like to state at the outset that my basic reaction to Unification hermeneutics is genuinely positive. I see in Unification hermeneutics the possibility for resolving some historical questions and bringing about needed syntheses. At the same time I do see problems, and I have questions. What I have to say that may appear to be negative is intended not so much to be criticism as it is

intended to point out areas that are in need of more careful analysis and further development.

From the earliest Christian times until the Protestant Reformation all approaches to the interpretation of scripture may be generally characterized as supernaturalistic. Even though there were two basic variations in the methodologies by which scripture was interpreted, i. e., the Antiochian and the Alexandrian, the former more literal and conservative and the latter more symbolic and liberal, in general the Bible was considered to be supernaturally inspired, authoritative, and infallible. From the time of the Protestant Reformation until now the conservative view of scripture has been maintained in both Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions. In many Christian quarters the Bible is still subject to a literal and what may be called supernaturalistic interpretation. This type of interpretation had its reorientation in Luther and Calvin and was perpetuated through a long line of both Protestant and Roman Catholic biblical interpreters.

During the Protestant Reformation another type of approach to the Bible emerged. Sebastian Franck (1499-1542), a contemporary of Luther and Calvin, criticized the prevailing approaches to the study of scripture in 1539 with the publication of *Das mit sieben Siegeln verbutschierte Buch*. He felt that the Bible is full of discrepancies and contradictions when interpreted literally. Franck's pointed analysis of the problem of the interpretation of scripture set the stage for an approach to the interpretation of the Bible which may be characterized as naturalistic.

This type of interpretation had its development by way of the contributions of Francis Bacon, René Descartes, and Thomas Hobbes, by way of applying reason and philosophy to the excesses of religion, by way of what John Toland, Thomas Chubb, and Voltaire had to say about the relationship of philosophy to religion itself, and by way of the applications which David Hume, Herman S. Reimarus, and Gotthold E. Lessing made of naturalistic philosophy to scripture. The thorough-going rationalism of these philosophers was somewhat modified by the attempts of Kant, Hegel, Herder, and Hess to demonstrate that the Bible must be understood primarily on the basis of moral and ethical

values and what Hess called "inner realities." So, too, Schleiermacher and Ritschl pointed biblical interpreters in the direction of "inner experience" and "moral superiority."

With the publication of David Strauss' *Das Leben Jesu* in 1835 the question of the literary nature of the New Testament writings, and especially the four Gospels, came under careful scrutiny. For Strauss, the gospel record should be looked upon substantially as myth. For him the application of the mythical principle would provide the synthesis for the thesis and antithesis created by supernaturalistic literal interpretation and naturalistic rationalistic interpretation. Bruno Bauer in his *Christus und die Caesaren* in 1877 took Strauss' mythical principle and applied it to not just the historical Jesus but also to the early church. For Bauer to "experience" the early church was the real cause of the portrait of Jesus in gospel history. Other interpreters, taking their cues from Strauss and Bauer, made of interpretation of the Gospels as well as the rest of the New Testament a game of determining what in the writings was or was not myth. Not only were the biblical records doubted, the very historical existence of Jesus himself came into question.

The most healthy reaction to the radical positions of what came to be known as "the Christ-myth school" and the weaknesses of Strauss' approach to the scriptures came in the form of the beginnings of what has come to be called "tendency criticism" and "source criticism." Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792-1860) accepted from Strauss that the mythical approach to scripture destroys the historical truth of much of the biblical record. However, he felt that the critic must go on from there and try to discover the whole connection of circumstances out of which not only individual ideas but a writing itself arose. Adopting a Hegelian scheme of thesis and antithesis, he asserted that much of the New Testament witnesses to various reactions to and attempts to create a synthesis between the conflicting aspects of Judaism and Paulinism. Similar approaches were taken by Adolf Hilgenfeld (1823-1907), who pointed out the Jewish "tendency" in the Gospels and by Otto Pfleiderer (1839-1908), who showed how Christian ideas developed not only against Jewish backgrounds but also against such rivalries as the early

Christian community carried on with the disciples of John the Baptist.

During this same period and as part of this same movement Gustav Volkmar (1809-1893) made the Gospel of Mark the sole source for his life of Jesus. Volkmar did not believe that the historical Jesus had put forth any Messianic claims and looked at ideas which had developed in the gospels as expressions of attempts to reconcile opposing Petrine and Pauline factions in the early Christian community. Volkmar had support for his use of Mark, for within literary criticism what has come to be called "the Marcan Hypothesis" had already been developed by Karl Lachmann (1835), Christian H. Weisse (1838), and Christian G. Wilke (1838).

From this point on other scholars emerge as more familiar names and figures—Albert Schweitzer, Martin Dibelius, Rudolf Bultmann, and more recently Gustav Conzelmann, Gunther Bornkamm, and Wolfhart Pannenberg, Walther Eichrodt, Theodorus C. Vriezen, and Gerhardt von Rad, who develop the methodologies of form criticism and redaction criticism.

In his recent analysis of the methodologies that have been applied to the Old Testament, Gerhard Hasel (*Old Testament Theology*, 1972) outlined the modern variations by biblical theologians on traditional themes. He outlined five methodologies:

1) *The Descriptive Method*, employed by Wrede, Stendahl, E. Jacob, and G.E. Wright, in which the focus of attention is on describing "what the text meant."

2) *The Confessional Method*, diametrically opposed to the historical method, employed by Eissfeldt, Vriezen, and G.A.F. Knight, which emphasizes the faith of the people of Israel, a community concept.

3) *The Cross-Section Method*, used by Eichrodt which seeks the inner unity of various structures of Old Testament beliefs with an interchange of relationship between the Old and New Testaments found in the concept of covenant.

4) *The Diachronic Method*, employed principally by von Rad, in which special attention is given to the chronological sequence of the

various traditions and books which have produced a "world made up of testimonies."

5) *The New Testament Quotation Method*, advocated by B.S. Childs, in which theology must "begin with specific Old Testament passages which are quoted within the New Testament."

Hasel points out the obvious fallacy of the majority of Old Testament biblical theologies (and the same may be said for the various types of biblical criticism): the attempt to find a single center or major trend in the Old Testament. Hasel argues that scholars must give up an overspecialized approach to the Old Testament and urges consideration of "longitudinal perspectives of the Old Testament testimonies" that can be achieved only on the basis of a multitrack treatment.

This of course should and can be said also of studies of the New Testament. Reducing the major questions of interpretation of any book in the New Testament to matters of background, form, or source is highly restrictive not only to the determination of what a passage meant but also to what it means. An additional important consideration is the question of the relationship between the Testaments. From Bauer to Bultmann there have been advocates of the separate treatment of the Testaments. Hasel, however, taking tips from Eichrodt and Pannenberg, challenges the biblical scholar to pay special attention to the concept of the kingdom of God, which is of course to be found in both Testaments and which apparently forms the most natural bridge between the two. "The central concern in the whole Bible is not reconciliation and redemption but the Kingdom of God" (p. 70). Hasel also notes the importance of a revival of an older type of methodology in relating the Testaments, that is, the use of typology. Used both by Eichrodt and von Rad, typology is a designation for a peculiar way of looking at history, the types being persons, institutions, and events of the Old Testament which are regarded as divinely established models or prerepresentations of corresponding realities in the New Testament salvation history.

Over against the background of this brief sketch of the history of interpretation the significance of Unification hermeneutics begins to emerge. Several aspects are worth underscoring, in that they relate to

traditional problems and recent developments in the history of biblical interpretation. I shall enumerate and discuss seven points.

1. Unification hermeneutics provides the possibility for the resolution of the historical conflict between the two traditionally opposed approaches to the Bible: the supernaturalistic and the naturalistic. 2. In Unification hermeneutics a decision never has to be made against a narrative or an idea because of its literary classification. Ideas and narratives may be viewed as either mythic or historical or as both mythic and historical with no consequent depreciation in moral or spiritual value. 3. In Unification hermeneutics the entire Bible of the Hebrew Christian tradition, the Old Testament and the New Testament, is considered together and integrally related to each other. 4. In Unification hermeneutics the kingdom of God is considered to be central to the theme of both Testaments. 5. In Unification hermeneutics typology is prevalent as an important hermeneutical instrument. 6. In addition, Unification hermeneutics uses eschatology as a principal perspective by which history may be viewed and biblical history understood.

Over against typical liberal and modernistic considerations of Christian theology that reject the idea of the second coming of Christ or the future coming of the kingdom of God, Unification theology understands the totality of the biblical witness and of human history to point to an eschaton of total and complete proportions for the restoration of the heavens and the earth, the spiritual and the physical.

Also Unification theology sees the church today as functioning in kaironic time rather than on chronological time. What for God is the right time will be when his rule is consummated. We have clues for what this time will be like from the ministry of Jesus. The kingdom will come at that time when mankind instead of rejecting Christ, responds to the absolute and radical demands of his ethic: total obedience to the will of God, complete opening of the hearts of men to his mercy and love.

The time for the coming is always soon since the needs of man as well as the potential for proclaiming the gospel continue to mount and God's purpose is eternal and inevitable. The time is not necessarily now,

since mankind may choose to persist in rejecting a life of total love and obedience and faith.

7. Unification hermeneutics is also in keeping with the revival of interest in apocalyptic literature.

Not too long ago Klaus Koch, Professor of Old Testament at the University of Hamburg, posed a crucial question: "Has biblical scholarship really done everything that it was possible to do by historical methods?" (*The Rediscovery of Apocalyptic*, 1970). He answered the question himself by suggesting that biblical criticism has dealt only sparingly with eschatology and has given short shrift to the special dimension of eschatology and apocalyptic. Koch emphasized how apocalyptic concepts formed the final stage in the religion of the Old Testament and provided a determining role for the origins of Jesus as well as primitive Christianity. He outlined in detail his thesis that scholars are still far from an adequate overall grasp of this subject.

Koch pointed out how interest in apocalyptic literature in German theological education practically disappeared from the 1900s to the 1950s. He credits Ernst Käsemann with pointing out how "apocalyptic was the mother of all Christian theology . . ." and both Käsemann and Wolfhart Pannenberg with engendering in certain of the younger German theologians a positive apocalyptic renaissance. He also shows how Martin Noth, O. Plöger, and D. Rossler helped to resume research into this area so long ignored in German scholarship. Koch reminds us how Rudolf Bultmann contributed to the neglect of proper treatment of apocalyptic literature. In his essay "The New Testament and Mythology" Bultmann wrote: "The cosmology of the New Testament is essentially mythical in character . . . The mythology of the New Testament is in essence that of Jewish apocalyptic and Gnostic redemption myths . . . This mythology is outdated for every thinking person today, whether he is believer or an unbeliever . . ." Koch sketched the rise of interest in apocalyptic literature among British and American scholars signaling the major contributions made by R.H. Charles, George Foot Moore, R. Travers Herford, H.H. Rowley, W.D. Davies, and C.K. Barrett.

He also reminds us of Rudolf Otto's judgment: "Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom is manifestly connected with (and yet, in definite contrast to) an earlier historical phenomenon, i.e., the later Jewish eschatology and apocalyptic... Jesus' preaching both reflects and transforms them." He also allows Ethelbert Stauffer to speak again: "The world of apocalyptic ideas is the one in which the New Testament writers were really at home." But Koch laments that voices like these became lost in the great chorus of New Testament scholars who view apocalyptic of every kind with mistrust and discomfort—even the book of Revelation. For some, such as Gerhard Ebeling, apocalyptic suggests a heretical tendency, and many scholars are not unsympathetic with R. Travers Herford's dictum about eschatology and apocalyptic: "Although both are the children of prophecy, the one is Jacob, the other (apocalyptic) is Esau." Koch's conclusion: "The prevailing opinion among German New Testament scholars is still that apocalyptic is a marginal phenomenon which undoubtedly played a certain role in some early Christian circles but which, seen as a whole, is unimportant" (p. 92).

In spite of the general reluctance of German scholars to give apocalyptic its due and in spite of both English and American theological worlds leaving apocalyptic primarily in the hands of obscurantist sects and cults, Koch insists that Pannenberg and others have helped launch a renaissance of apocalyptic. "Everything suggests that in the coming decades theology will have to concern itself increasingly with the apocalyptic writings" (p. 129).

Unification hermeneutics takes seriously the eschatological framework of biblical thought and tries as well to treat apocalyptic literature as an authentic stratum of biblical literature. Unification hermeneutics, however, is not without problems. Three areas may suffice to illustrate.

1. In the interpretation of the relationship between the mission of John the Baptist and the mission of Jesus, John the Baptist is criticized for not investing his mission with that of Jesus, for going on his separate way, and for engaging in a relatively insignificant campaign of criticizing Herod's family and court. Overlooked is the obvious criticism that

should be made of John the Baptist, that is, in his lack of acceptance of the role of Elijah he failed to fulfill the mission of Elijah which, as spelled out in Malachi 4, was to be one of restoration of relationships between fathers and children and children and fathers. Overlooked is also the implication that the process of restoration of the family appears possibly to be the mission of the prophet rather than the mission of the Messiah, or of forerunner rather than Christ. Overlooked also in the Unificationists' view of the relationship between John and Jesus is the fact that because of the "failure" of each to accomplish his mission, there was failure to unite the northern (Galilean) and southern (Judean) segments of Hebrew life and culture: Jesus' mission being primarily in the north, and John's being primarily in the south.

2. In the Unificationists' concept of Jesus' intention to marry and establish a family, note is not taken of the fact that the witness of the gospel record seems to indicate the opposite—the lack of importance of the family in the kingdom of God. Also, the idea that Jesus or Christ is the new Adam is a Pauline concept, and if developed at all, the idea of Jesus as the new Adam and the bride of Jesus as the new Eve, should be developed as a trajectory of Pauline theology rather than of the evangelical tradition.

3. In dealing with some of the historically difficult apocalyptic passages in scripture, the Unification hermeneutic sometimes comes up with esoteric and exotic explanations which are debatable if not questionable. In finding Rev. Sun Myung Moon as well as his bride in the Apocalypse and making an association between the 144,000 and the Unification Church, Unificationists should be reminded that this kind of obscurantist use made of the Apocalypse has been a major contributor to the delay of the coming of the kingdom of God. A more credible interpretation of these passages should be pursued along other lines.

The message and the essence of apocalyptic literature is the conviction that God will surely save and restore his people and establish his kingdom. Apocalyptic literature, therefore, presents a philosophy of history rather than predictions of historical events and personages. The book which closes the Christian canon, the last book of the New

Testament, in highly symbolic language presents the philosophy for the present decade, the tenth decade A.D., and for all succeeding decades and centuries: God will vanquish Satan, good will overcome evil, Christ will conquer Caesars, the Church will outlast empires, and Christianity is and will be the central religious force in society.

Hopefully Unificationists will focus less attention on questionable interpretations of selected verses. Rather, in consonance with the philosophy of the author of the Johannine Apocalypse, they will elucidate these general themes which flow out of the fundamental conviction of the sovereignty of God. "The kingdoms of this world have become the kingdom of our God and of His Christ, and he shall reign forever and ever."

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The Hermeneutics of Completed Testaments

Frank K. Flinn

What is Hermeneutics?

In any discussion such as this, one needs to define some terms. The word "hermeneutics" is derived from the Greek god Hermes, who ferried messages between gods and men. In this sense, hermeneutics is the art of interpreting divine messages (cf. Plato, *The Statesman* 290c). In our time, the notion of hermeneutics has a much more limited meaning. In general, hermeneutics for us is understood as the art of deciphering "texts." The word "texts" is taken in a wide sense. We speak of the Book of Nature, for example, which modern science decodes and interprets.

One more thing needs to be said about the notion of hermeneutics before I proceed to the main theme of my essay. Why do we need to interpret at all? The reason is that "texts" are *ambiguous*. This is particularly true about religious texts which are couched in symbolic expressions. In this narrower sense, hermeneutics is the art of deciphering ambiguous expressions. Ambiguous expressions are what I call *symbols*. Symbols are contrasted with signs. Signs are univocal meanings which have distinctness and clarity. For example, the sign which is placed above a door to mark the exit has little or no ambiguity about it. Symbols, on the other hand, are multivocal, i.e., they have a plurality of meanings which are attached to them. The expression "Kingdom of God" in the Bible would be an example of a symbolic expression. Signs

are referential, symbols are condensational.¹ Besides condensing many referential meanings into a unified whole, symbols, according to Victor Turner, also unite a sensory pole with an ideological or normative pole.² The multileveled dimension of symbols, in the words of Paul Ricoeur, makes them opaque.³

Ricoeur adds that symbolic expressions “mean something other than what is said.” The literal meaning gives rise to another meaning, expressed in and through the literal sense itself. Many thinkers, such as Aquinas and Kant, believed that this second meaning arises by *analogy*. We encounter such analogies in the Parables of Jesus which begin, “The Kingdom of God is like . . .” In saying that the kingdom of God is like a grain of mustard seed, Jesus seems to have intended an analogy. We can be too literalistic about the analogy (being literal and literalistic are two different things). In referring to the image of the tiny mustard seed and its growth into a gigantic tree in which birds find their nesting place, Jesus brings at least two meanings into relation in a complex symbol. One way of putting this is to say that the *ordinary* (a grain of mustard seed) is like the *extraordinary* (the kingdom of God). The tiny mustard seed gives sensory evidence of extraordinary growth, thereby pointing to the unexpected arrival of the kingdom of God and its immense growth. By drawing our attention to the simple grain of mustard seed, Jesus, as it were, challenges the mundaneness of our everyday perception. Ordinarily, we do not pay attention to mustard seeds. And in our everyday lives we do not read the signs of the things around us as symptoms, so to speak, of the kingdom of God. The Parable of the Mustard Seed pierces us to the heart, thereby making us alive and open to the arrival of the kingdom. To say this in other words, we do not ordinarily live eschatologically, ready and welcoming the imminent coming of the fullness of the kingdom, and the Parable of the Mustard Seed lays bare this tendency in us to succumb to the powers and principalities of our everyday lives.

I have used the Parable of the Mustard Seed to illustrate Ricoeur’s statement that symbols mean more than what is said literally. Furthermore, my exegesis, which is not the only possible exegesis but one among

many, illustrates how a second meaning (the extraordinary event of the kingdom) arises in and through the image of the mustard seed. The ordinary meaning, taken from everyday experience of horticulture, both points to itself and beyond itself. In sum, it has, at the very minimum, a double meaning. It is this double meaning that calls forth the necessity of hermeneutics. Because symbolic expression is opaque, multivalent, and ambiguous, there arises the need to "dis-implicate" the symbol.

There is one more task of hermeneutics that I would like to point out. On the one hand we have to understand ancient texts in terms of what they *meant* in their own times and, on the other, in terms of what they *mean* for us. The first task can be called descriptive and the second can be called interpretive.⁴ Here, it is not a question of archaizing the text or of modernizing it. Rather, the question is to attain what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls a *Horizontverschmelzung* (a merging of the horizons) in *Truth and Method* and what Paul Ricoeur calls a "second naiveté" in *The Symbolism of Evil*.⁵ There is a double reflexive character between the descriptive and interpretive tasks. In order to describe the contents of the Bible, for example, I need to translate its categories into the categories of my own times. This "translation," however, will not be authentic if I do not let the horizon of the biblical message enter into and challenge my own horizon. Stated in another way, I cannot read and interpret the Bible if I do not let the Bible read and interpret me.

This double reflexive character of description and interpretation presents problems to those who want "to play Bibleland" and maintain that we can naively approach the Bible without any critical interpretation as well as to those who subject the biblical writings to critical historical interpretation and claim that the Bible speaks to an earlier time and a "mythic mentality" that has long since been superseded by modern science. The point is not to reject either naive or critical consciousness but to find the thread of unity. Paul Ricoeur has pointed out how we pass from naive faith to critical consciousness and then again to what he calls a "second naiveté" which synthesizes the former two. James Fowler, applying Piaget's model of structural development to the faith dimension, has shown how individuals pass from a magical-numinous understanding

of symbols to a critical translation of symbol into ideas and finally to a universalizing reappropriation of symbolic content in what might be called a post-critical phase of development.⁶ Those rare individuals who attain this post-critical phase are called "regenerators of symbols" who incarnate the relation between symbols and the wealth of Being on a universal basis. One can cite the examples of St. Francis of Assisi, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King.

Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of "the merging of the horizons" and Paul Ricoeur's idea of a "second naiveté" along with Fowler's notion of "symbolic regeneration" can assist us in avoiding the pitfalls of bestowing a "false modernity" on ancient texts like the Bible or of imprisoning it in a "false antiquity". Conservative and fundamentalist interpretations of the Bible often are subject to the first pitfall, while liberal and critical interpretations fall into the second trap. The task of hermeneutics is to ferry the meaning of the Bible across the divides of time in a way that interprets the Bible as it interprets itself and in a way that lets it challenge our self-interpretation of the most important things.

Completed Testaments

In the first centuries of Christianity the theological concept of the Testaments, Old and New, was developed in relation to the formation of the three Articles of the Creed. The background of the twin concepts of Testaments and Creed was the Gnostic controversy. Today we have a much clearer picture of what this controversy was really about.⁷ There were many varieties of Gnosticism and it is difficult to come up with any general descriptions which apply to all of them.

There is one general statement, however, which applies to most, if not all, brands of Gnosticism. That statement is: the Gnostics were convinced of *the irrelevancy of the body*. For some the body was illusion, for others the physical body was positive evil. But, in general, one can say that the material, physical and bodily conditions of existence were irrelevant and that the meaning of salvation was to escape from the

inauthenticity of bodily existence to one's authentic home in the region of the spirit.

It is against this background that one must see the struggle in the first centuries to retain the Old Testament as normative for Christianity and to interpret that struggle in light of the *priority* of the First Article of the Creed. The First Article speaks of creation. The whole creation, material and spiritual, is created by the Father and therefore good.⁸ To be sure, the Old Testament needed to be interpreted in light of the New by the early Christian theologians. What needs to be pointed out, however, is that the New Testament did not entail, as it did for Marcion, a "cancellation of the creator's claim to his property."⁹ Rather the creation, subjected to distortion and the structures of domination in the fall, needed to be restored. It is interesting to note that the Second Article of the Creed, which treats of redemption through the Son, speaks of very physical things: Jesus being born, suffering in the body, dying and rising in the body. Likewise, the New Testament stresses Jesus' healing of people's bodies and not just their spirits.

The theme of restoration links the Second Article to the First. The Second Article, for Christians, also goes beyond the First. We may say that Sin (the hare) got a headstart on Grace (the turtle) in the Fall, but the dispensation of Grace eventually overtakes Sin. Sin may have increased by arithmetic progression, but Grace, once it got its toehold in the faith of Abraham (Romans 4), grows according to a geometric progression. This is what I take Paul's expression, "Sin abounding, Grace superabounding" to mean (Romans 5:15 ff.) Nonetheless, the Second Article, which generally corresponds to the New Testament is not the end of the story. There is a tension between the "already" and the "not yet" in the New Testament. Paul expresses this tension by saying that in baptism we *have died* in Christ (the already) but *will rise* in the age to come. Even the gift of the Spirit is seen as a downpayment on the age to come.

The fundamental tension in the Second Article is what motivates the completion of the Creed with a Third Article, which looks to the fulfillment of the restoration. Under the Third Article fall the traditional

topics of the gifts of the Spirit, ecclesiology, the communion of the saints (= theological sociology!) and the hope of the resurrection of the dead.

There are two things to keep in mind about the Third Article. First, it deals with the Last Things (the *eschata*). The Last Things, according to the earlier Fathers of the Church, were *like* the First Things (the *protia*). Thus the promise of dominion over the earth (Genesis 1:28) reappears in New Testament passages about the End (cf. I Corinthians 15:24-28; Revelation 20:1-3; 21:1-4). Although these passages are written in highly symbolic language, it is important to note that they do not refer to an ethereal "heaven" but concrete flesh-and-blood realities such as wiping away tears from men's eyes.

The second thing we need to keep in mind about the Third Article, is that Christianity has had difficulty in concretely embodying its meaning. The reasons for this are multiple and I cannot hope to entertain all of them in this lecture. I would like to underline the following points. First, as Christianity became more hellenized, so the earlier Christian belief in God's dispensation and, in particular, in the *parousia*, the coming of the kingdom of the Son on earth, became ontologized into a vertical geography, e.g., "heaven" vs. "earth." In this ontological landscape the doctrine of the Church became a doctrine about an institution (the *civitas Dei*) alongside other institutions (the *civitas mundi*). This is St. Augustine's compromise. Luther continues this line of thinking on an inward plane by maintaining that we are *simul justus et peccator* until the Final Days. A second consequence of the delayed *parousia* (perhaps mainline Christians should call it the permanently procrastinated *parousia*!) is that it was imagined more and more as a magical and cataclysmic event to be brought about by a Super-hero God. This fantasizing of the kingdom, I suggest, comes from disassociating the Third Article from the First.

Now I find it interesting that we find a correspondence between the Old Testament (Creation and Law) and the First Article and a correspondence between the New Testament (Gospel and Grace) and the Second Article, but we find no Testament which corresponds to the

Third Article. There are two ways of looking at this situation. First, in one sense there is no need for a "Third" Testament for the doctrine of the millennium is already contained in the Old and New Testaments. On the other hand, the freedom that started with the New Covenant, which is the fulfillment of the Old, allows for freedom of interpretation and the construction as it were of a Third Testament. Traditionally, this "Third" Testament was constructed out of certain passages of the Old Testament, especially the Book of Daniel, and of the New Testament, especially the Book of Revelation.

Problematic of the "Third" Testament

The question of a "Third" Testament presents very thorny problems for it covers things which are "not yet" but which we of the earth may hope for. I will try to cover the question under a number of topics.

1. Prior to the Constantinian Era (300 A.D.), Christianity both was more pluralistic (it had four gospels, various centers of authority, different dates for Easter in different churches, different liturgies, etc.) and more eschatological. Gustav Wingren has shown that this eschatological hope was not sundered from the hope of all the earth.¹⁰ Despite persecution and even martyrdom, the early Christian theologians could decipher the work of God in the Creation outside the Gospel. Even in "pagan" writings they could detect a *praeparatio evangelica*, a preparation and yearning for the Gospel. Their Creation faith, so to speak, balanced their Redemption faith and stressed that salvation was not flight from Creation but hope for Creation.

After the "victory" of Christianity over the Empire, there was an increasing bureaucratization of Christian theology. The Gospel became official, that is, it became legalized and served as the means to preserve the status quo. Within the Holy Roman Empire there was the intramural competition between imperial theology (the Emperors claimed superiority by grounding the divine right of kingship in the will of the Creator) and ecclesiastical or episcopal theology (the bishops countered by maintaining that the Son, from whom they had their office, was not "secondary" to

the Creator Father but *homoousios*, "of the same substance"). The church/state question was a matter of verticality in which the dispensation of God's providence in time got lost. With the addition of Aristotelian categories in the High Middle Ages, the ontologization and verticalization of Christian theology (e.g., in the oppositions between supernature and nature, revelation and reason) became complete. Even today one can visit the medieval cathedrals, which are nonetheless very beautiful, and see the themes of creation, redemption, and final consummation frozen into the "realized eschatology" of hierarchical stones.

2. It was in reaction to this ontologization and verticalization that the neo-apocalyptic movements of the Middle Ages broke out. On one side, the neo-apocalyptic movements touched base with the earlier Christian belief in dispensations and in the *parousia* in time and space. From another side, the neo-apocalyptic movements were a departure from earlier Christian eschatology. Joachim of Fiore, for example, in his *Commentary on the Apocalypse* departed from the early Christian Fathers' formula that "the Last Things are like the First Things." Joachim divided and sundered the dispensations from one another in the manner of Marcion. Creation, the Father, and married clergy belonged to the first dispensation; redemption, the Son, and celibate clergy to the second. Though Joachim had overlapping periods of incubation (e.g., St. Benedict begins the New Age), his typology implied that the first two dispensations were "outdated" and over with. The Joachimites, especially the Franciscan Spirituals, looked forward to the final Age of the Spirit, in which there would be no clerical structure, no sacraments and no church, but all would be "monks." Some of the Franciscan Spirituals discerned in the writings and life of Francis a "Fifth Gospel." This, again, is evidence of an impulse toward a "Third" Testament.

The history of the Western millennial groups—Beghards, Brethren of the Free Spirit, Ranters, Levellers, etc.—has been traced by Norman Cohn in *The Pursuit of the Millennium*.¹¹ Cohn takes a rather dim view of all these movements and sees in them the precursors of modern totalitarian-fanaticism. In *The Ritual Process* Victor Turner gives a much more balanced view of millennial groups.¹² Millennial movements begin

among liminal or threshold groups on the fringes of structured society. In millennial movements, *communitas*, equality, propertylessness are opposed to the structured *societas*, ranking, property, and status, etc.¹³

I think that one of the most interesting aspects of millennial or *communitas* movements is that they point toward the *future* (the Kingdom in Judeo-Christianity, the Pure Land in messianic Buddhism, etc.) by pointing *backwards* to the common shared humanity of all living men and women. This is not unlike the early Christian belief that "the Last Things are like the First Things." The *communio sanctorum*, which belongs to the Third Article of the Creed, is both the hope of the future and the rediscovery that all men and women are created equally "in the image of God," a teaching that belongs to the First Article. Secondly, the initiators of movements which re-envision the *communitas*—Turner compares the examples of St. Francis and Chaitanya, the Bengali founder of the religious group we know as the "Hare Krishnas"—embody the *communitas* by undergoing humiliation, anonymous existence, "nakedness," suffering, and deprivation. They touch base, so to speak, with the earth itself and the religious movements which follow these initiators incorporate this "religion of the earth" in their communitarian and egalitarian ideals.

Yet one of the problems which has always beset Western millennial movements has been the tendency to drift either into spiritualism, as was the case with the Franciscan Spirituals and their successors, or into materialistic hopes for power, as was the case with Thomas Müntzer's Peasants' Revolt. There has always been a problem in co-ordinating the regeneration of inwardness with outward restoration of fallen structures of society. In North America the Great Awakening (ca. 1740 A.D.) portended both the spiritual and social regeneration of America. In the next century this double desideratum degenerated into Evangelicalism, which stresses inner conversion almost exclusively, and the Social Gospel movement, which devoted itself to the outward renovation of society.

3. In modern cultures, millennial *communitas* movements carry in their wake a *regeneration of symbolic content* that both points toward the

openness of meaning and promulgates a shared praxis toward realizing new meaning. In the framework of interpretation I have pointed out, these movements tend to generate what I have called "Third" Testaments. Those who have status within a given society have great difficulty in classifying these new Testaments. The orthodox do not know whether they are "inspired interpretations," "tangential commentaries," or just plain "fictions."

In North America we have had several such "Third" Testaments, most notably *Science and Health* by Mary Baker Eddy and *The Book of Mormon* by Joseph Smith. The criterion by which "orthodox" Christianity has judged these is that "the Bible itself is not merely *interpreted*; it is *added to*, with an authority and novelty which exceed the limits of sober, scholarly interpretation."¹⁴ What this statement by A. Leland Jamison fails to take into account is that "sober, scholarly interpretation" more often than not serves the hermeneutical interests of the establishment and the status quo. Traditionalist hermeneutics even of the "higher critical" kind, is devoted to literal-historical analysis of the text. According to Jürgen Habermas, traditional hermeneutics is directed toward "the maintenance of the inter-subjectivity of mutual understanding" which, in turn, has the practical interest of maintaining control within a given community.¹⁵ Literal-historical exegesis, while leading toward "the attainment of possible consensus among actors in the framework of self understanding derived from tradition,"¹⁶ also runs the risk of objectifying the "text" and thereby of sterilizing knowledge and locking history up in a museum.¹⁷

Against this *hermeneutical closure* arises what may be called *dialectical, emancipatory hermeneutics* which attempts to liberate the "text" from the class interests of the status quo. Critical, emancipatory hermeneutics naturally gravitates toward those passages in the Old and New Testaments which the tradition-bound community chooses to leave in symbolic obscurity. It seeks to make plain the "Last Things." One of the risks of emancipatory hermeneutics is that it can precipitate into chiliastic catastrophism. Such was the case with the Millerite millenarians in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹⁸ When the literal Second Coming

failed, people substituted scientific progressivism and moral gradualism for the "Last Things," thereby reducing the latter to the categories of temporal evolution. The problem with eschatological hermeneutics has always been the problem of finding a mediate way between chiliastic catastrophism and mundane gradualism. There is also the problem of how to relate inward regeneration with outward reformation.

Divine Principle as a Completed Testament

In many discussions between mainline Christians and Unificationists I have detected a hermeneutical gap. I think there is an explanation for that gap and it is that most mainline Christians are speaking out of a framework whose perimeter is the New Testament and the Second Article of the Creed whereas the Unificationists are speaking out of a framework whose perimeter is the First and Third Articles of the Creed and an implied "Third" Testament. This situation is further complicated by the fact that theology in the twentieth century has not been simply christological but christomonistic. Karl Barth, for example, subordinates and derives the First and Third Articles of the Creed from the Second: "Indeed, the second article does not just follow from the first, nor does it just precede the third; but it is the fountain of light by which the other two are lit."¹⁹

The christomonistic stance has important consequences. First, it implies a "No" to the "old Adam" (creation rather than a restoration). Secondly, eschatology is reduced to an "inner event" (Bultmann) and the work of God in time and space remains hidden, not even identifiable with the Church. These consequences, I suggest, amount to a Docetism of the First and Third Articles of the Creed.

It is precisely the First and Third Articles which are most amply articulated in *Divine Principle* (cf. esp. *DP*, pp. 51-57; pp. 129-37). Yet the presentation of the doctrines of Creation and the Last Things in *Divine Principle* has presented problems to those of a more orthodox temperament. This can be explained in part by the fact that there are several *hermeneutical*

levels in the articulation of these two doctrines in *Divine Principle*. Below I will try to indicate some of these levels.

A. *Messianic Shamanism*. There is a saying that in pre-technologized Korea, the average Korean was “a Confucianist in social relationships, a Buddhist when philosophizing and a Shamanist when in trouble.” Shamanism has been the persistent background of Korean religion. The word “shaman” is derived from the Tungus tribes in Upper Mongolia. In Korea the word is *mudang* (or *moo-tang*), and almost all who are adepts in spirit communication are females who, in more traditional sectors of the society, pass on their skills to their offspring.

We in the West have been chiefly interested in the techniques of shamanism. The important thing to point out in this context is that shamanism in the Far East is the “democracy of religious belief” and has been the source of *revitalization movements* both in Korea and Japan.²⁰ Often this strand of religious belief is combined with messianic Buddhism. The important feature of shamanistic belief is that it holds that there can be contact between heaven and earth, the spirit world and the physical world, through a special medium.

Shamanism, I think, accounts for one hermeneutical level in *Divine Principle*.²¹ This shamanistic strand, however, goes beyond the nationalistic religious revival of the nineteenth century Tong-Hak movement in Korea.²² Like the Tong-Hak movement, Unification emphasizes the “chosenness of Korea” and the earthly paradise, but unlike Unification, Tong-Hak stressed the opposition between “the eastern way” (= Tong-Hak) and “the western way” (= So-Hak, especially Catholicism). In *Divine Principle* the nativist strand in Korean religion has been universalized and globalized.

B. *Dispensationalism*. A second hermeneutical level I detect in *Divine Principle* is its dispensationalist framework. Behind this dispensationalist framework is the belief that God’s dealing with Israel is the *type of universal history*. (cf. *DP*, pp. 405-48). This typologization of history is not unlike the kind of typologizations depicted in medieval representations of the tree of life nor unlike the kind of dispensationalism one discovers in the Scofield Reference Bible.

In the Scofield Bible one can find seven dispensations, beginning with the dispensation of Innocency (Genesis 1:28) and ending with the dispensation of the Fullness of Times (Ephesians 1:10). It is worth noting that Ephesians 1:10 does not etherialize the kingdom but states that "in the dispensation of the fullness of times [God] might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth." Likewise the Scofield Bible enumerates periods of "providential time-identity," e.g., the seventh and the last of the ordered ages is "identical with the kingdom covenanted with David" (*The Scofield Reference Bible*, New York, 1945, p. 1250, n. 3).

We ought not to forget that Unificationism is shaped by the kind of American dispensationalist Calvinism represented in the Scofield Bible. The singling out of Korea as a "chosen people" is an extension of the Puritan tenet that America was a "new Israel." In *Divine Principle* we see an Oriental indigenization of what was once an American type of dispensationalism. In conversation with Korean converts to Presbyterianism I have learned that the identification with ancient Israel is far from accidental. First, the Korean high-god Hananim (the term used to translate God in Korean Bibles) is a more personal god, like the God of the Fathers in Genesis, than the more abstract Confucian term *ti-en* ("Heaven"). Secondly, Korea in relation to the history of the Far East was suspended between the two great empires of China and Japan just as Israel was the nodal point between Egypt and Assyria. Korean Presbyterians often attribute one of their motives for conversion to Christianity to their identification of the history of Israel with the history of Korea and to the recognition in the God of the Fathers a kinship with their native god Hananim.

C. *Post-millennialism.* Another factor shaping the hermeneutics of *Divine Principle* is its post-millennial stance. Unificationists believe that the Fullness of Times has already begun. However, they do not subscribe to the millennial catastrophism that was in evidence in nineteenth century America, nor do they capitulate to scientific and cultural progressivism. They are not simply waiting for the kingdom but striving to bring it about. For this reason, they do not see the *eschaton* as

an "event," whether internal or external, but as a *process eschatology* that dovetails with the process of completing the creation.

By linking the Fullness of Times with the theme of creation, *Divine Principle* develops what might be called a realistic eschatology. God allows political, social, and intellectual structures to arise on the basis of the creation and intervenes only at providential moments to bring to fruition creational processes. This realism saves *Divine Principle* from much of the pre-millennial esoterism which afflicted the millennialist groups of nineteenth century America. The millennialism of Unification is a relational and unifying millennialism. From the start, the Unification movement has not taken a sectarian stand toward the world or even toward other religions but rather seeks to unify "the family of religions" and the interests of science with the interests of religion.

Despite these different hermeneutical levels in *Divine Principle*, it has a consistent viewpoint. Mainline Christians may argue that we are not in a post-millennial situation, but I do not think that they can argue about the consistency of the theological language. Some may object that the language about "give and take" belongs to an Oriental mode of thought that cannot be reconciled with the Bible. But biblical scholars are quick to point out that Second Isaiah employed and transformed mythic language from Mesopotamia, just as the New Testament was not above employing language derived from Orphism and the mystery religions. Likewise, the Church Fathers resorted to the language of late Hellenistic philosophy to articulate the Creeds of Nicaea and Chalcedon.

Although *Divine Principle* is not the complete articulation of "the Principle," it functions as a "Completed Testament" for the Unificationists. Yet it is not an addition to the Bible. I have used the phrase "a post-millennial inspired interpretation" to define it. This is not to deny that it proclaims a "new truth;" but that new truth does not appear in a vacuum but is related to prophecies both in the Old and New Testaments.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Cf. Edward Sapir, "Symbolism," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 24, pp. 492-93.
- ²Victor Turner, *Forest of Symbols* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 28.
- ³Paul Ricoeur, *Freud and Philosophy*, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 11-13, 30-31.
- ⁴Cf. Krister Stendahl, "Biblical Theology," in *The Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible* (New York: Abingdon, 1962), I, 419-20.
- ⁵Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 273-74; and Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon, 1967), pp. 347-57.
- ⁶Jim Fowler and Sam Keen, *Life Maps*, ed. Jerome Berryman (Waco, Texas: Texas Christian University Press, 1978), pp. 87-95, 99.
- ⁷Cf. Elaine Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels* (New York: Random, 1979); Hans Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston: Beacon, 1958); and Gilles Quispel, *Gnosis als Weltreligion* (Zurich: Dörig, 1951).
- ⁸See especially Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* iixxx. 7-9.
- ⁹Jonas, p. 139.
- ¹⁰Gustav Wingren *Creation and Gospel* (New York: Mellen, 1979).
- ¹¹Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961).
- ¹²Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969).
- ¹³Turner, *The Ritual Process*, pp. 106 ff.
- ¹⁴A. Leland Jamison, "Religions on the Christian Perimeter," in *The Shaping of American Religion*, ed. James W. Smith and A. Leland Jamison, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), I, 181.
- ¹⁵Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon, 1961), p. 176.
- ¹⁶Habermas, p. 310.
- ¹⁷Habermas, p. 316.
- ¹⁸Cf. Whitney R. Cross, *The Burned-Over District* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 287-321.
- ¹⁹Karl Barth, *Dogmatics in Outline* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 65.
- ²⁰Cf. Ichiro Hori, *Folk Religion in Japan*, ed. Joseph M. Kitigawa and Alan L. Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 217-31.
- ²¹Warren Lewis, "The Hero with the Thousand-and-First Face," in *A Time for Consideration*, eds. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson (Toronto: Mellen, 1978), pp. 274-89. I do not agree with Lewis that Rev. Moon is a "shaman." Rather, Unificationism issues from a cultural base where shamanism (the communication between the spiritual and the physical) serves as a preconditioning background.
- ²²Cf. Roger Leverrier, "Arrière-plan socio-politique et caractéristiques des nouvelles religions en Corée: les cas du Tong Hak," *Social Compass*, 25, No. 2 (1978), 217-37.

Discussion

Darrol Bryant: We have three papers that are on the agenda for this evening. Kapp Johnson's "Critique of *Divine Principle's* Reading of the Old Testament," Thomas Boslooper's "Critique of *Divine Principle's* Reading of the New Testament," and Frank Flinn's "Hermeneutics of Completed Testaments."

Andrew Wilson: I was so impressed and provoked when I read Kapp's paper that I decided to write a rebuttal. I agree with the idea of separating significance and meaning. Significance and meaning are not meant to be equivalent because our context of interpreting the Bible is different from the context of people living in the Old Testament period. I believe that everybody brings something with them to the text that mediates between significance and meaning. For example, the Christian interpretation of messianic passages in Isaiah as referring to Jesus Christ is something that was not meant by Isaiah himself. The real issue is whether there is still a relationship once the mediation is begun. What is the nature of the relationship and how is it mediated?

I sense in Kapp's paper that he was implying but not saying that the original meaning of the text was the primary criterion for its contemporary significance and that this is an either-or situation. Either a text's significance has to stem directly from its meaning to the Israelite audience as determined by literary critical methods, or it is considered inadequate.

However I don't think that the case is either-or. A relationship between significance and meaning is not derived from its original setting without being mediated by various structures that we have discussed. Take, for example, the idea of the providence of restoration. To argue that that idea comes from outside the Old Testament is to ignore that the development of Jewish and Christian biblical theologies themselves were based on the biblical text. The concept of providence comes from the Old Testament through Christianity. Furthermore, already in the Old Testament there is periodizing of history by various authors including the writer of Daniel and the Priestly writer who distinguishes about different covenant ages. Having a dispensationalist approach to history is thus not unrelated to what is in the Old Testament.

With regard to the Exodus story, to say that God is the hero of the Exodus in the Bible and Moses is the hero of the Exodus in *Divine Principle* is unfair to both. In the Old Testament there is the J strand which had God the hero, and the E strand which had Moses as the hero. *Divine Principle* (p. 340) explicitly refers to the Exodus as God's work.

The relationship between grace and indemnity is quite complex. Indemnity is for the purpose of grace, that is, indemnity is to lay a foundation so that grace may be received from God. The Old Testament theology of covenant is also not a theology of grace but of grace predicated on works, where a person's obligations to the covenant have to be fulfilled before the promise of the covenant is realized. It is not too difficult to draw similarities between the idea of covenant in the Old Testament and the idea of indemnity in *Divine Principle*. In the covenant formula the prologue contains a recounting of God's prior election and grace to his people. Then there follows a section which lists the people's obligations. The covenant concludes with blessings and curses depending on whether the people obey or not. In *Divine Principle's* idea of indemnity, you have first of all the idea of God's primordial blessing and the history of the people's relationship to God which forms a prologue for what is the indemnity condition they must fulfill. This corresponds to the obligations. The result of their fulfilling the obligations is the

blessing that the Messiah will come. So there is a formal similarity between the form of the covenant in the Old Testament and the concept of indemnity in *Divine Principle*.

Finally, on the question of the fall of man. It seems clear from ancient Near Eastern texts that the sexual nature of the story of Adam and Eve is only thinly disguised. For example we have a parallel in the Epic of Gilgamesh. Enkidu who was living in harmony with the animals in nature had sexual relations and his eyes were opened. He could no longer live as a nature-boy, the animals flee, he realizes he is naked and he clothes himself. Then he has to leave the garden and enter civilization. Likewise, the language in the text of Genesis 2 and 3, "to know good and evil," is used in II Samuel 19:35 to refer to sexual activity. The idea that the shame that Adam and Eve felt was shame towards God and not shame towards each other is belied by the use of the verb *bosh* (to be ashamed) in the Hithpael in Genesis 2:25 which means that Adam and Eve before the fall were naked and unashamed in a reciprocal sense towards each other. Textually there are many many supports for seeing the fall of man sexually.

There are some poor uses of scripture in *Divine Principle*, for instance Job 31:33 and Jude 6:7. However the identification of the serpent with Satan in Revelation 12:9 is a proper use of scripture interpreting scripture. There are many inaccuracies in Kapp's paper and that is why I was motivated to give this response.

Jonathan Wells: What I have to say actually ties into that. I was also going to bring up the fall and specifically the identification of the serpent in Revelation 12:9. I will just reduce my comment to a question. If the Unification identification of the serpent with Satan is not legitimate then what do we do with the standard Christian interpretations of the fall by Augustine, Irenaeus and many others?

Kapp Johnson: I will respond to Jonathan's first. The development of the interpretation of the serpent as Satan is a very long one. One has to recognize that historical process. The Unification interpretation of the serpent faces the same kind of problem as the christological interpretation of Christ in the Old Testament. G. Ernest Wright calls this christo-

monism. That is the hermeneutical problem. This hermeneutical step is not being delineated and spelled out satisfactorily either in *Divine Principle* or in contemporary theologies of the Old Testament.

Frank Flinn: Kapp, what you are doing, though, is resorting to the lowest level of literal historical criticism as it is now understood. I would go back to the Church Fathers and ask: Why is your literal historical critical method better than the typologization that I find in Augustine? In terms of holding the Bible together, I think Augustine does a better job than any modern biblical scholar I know. I grant he has deficiencies but he holds the whole thing together in many better ways.

Donald Deffner: Your conception of what is inherent is problematic. Luther's conception of the literal sense, or the plain and simple sense, includes christological interpretation. It wasn't conceived as some kind of second order significance of the text. Your conception of inherency is problematic.

Kapp Johnson: No, I would say it is the other way around. We have confused the steps. The christological interpretation is a separate step from what I call the literary critical interpretation of the text. That once again is the hermeneutical problem. When I was using language of the literal meaning of the text, I was not placing an a priori on the text. For me an a priori would be what is the fundamental basis of human communication. That is my starting level, whether communication be oral or written. Part of that fundamental basis is intentionality. That is not to say that one climbs into the author's mind.

Frank Flinn: You are going to run into a fact-value argument. This is my whole objection to the modern positivistic interpretations of the Bible.

Kapp Johnson: It is not positivistic.

Frank Flinn: Well, that is what your roots are, and we have got to pay indemnity for all our roots. (laughter) Your roots are in the belief that you can arrive at an a priori, a *tabula rasa*. I think there is no such thing as an a priori.

Herbert Richardson: May I ask a question? You don't deny, do you,

that the literal meaning of certain New Testament texts is precisely their interpretation of Old Testament texts?

Kapp Johnson: No.

Herbert Richardson: That is, the literal interpretation or the literal historical meaning for the writers of certain New Testament texts can be understood only as an interpretation of an Old Testament text.

Kapp Johnson: That was the New Testament self-understanding.

Herbert Richardson: And not only that. Within the Old Testament itself there are texts in which the literal meaning is an interpretation of other Old Testament texts.

Kapp Johnson: That's right.

Herbert Richardson: I might say this is true for a whole series of texts then. They are to be interpreted as types intended by the author of earlier texts.

Kapp Johnson: As an example, would you be referring to Deutero-Isaiah as a new Exodus event?

Herbert Richardson: That could be an example. Now I want to ask you this. Is it the case that you would want to argue that every single text which functions as a type of an earlier event is intended by the author as such a type? Or is the author merely working within a tradition that has a certain symbology and it comes almost unconsciously to his mind?

Kapp Johnson: To what extent can those be separated?

Herbert Richardson: That is exactly my question. If that is the case, then it would be the case that not only are there types *backwards* but also types *forward* which are also genuine types underneath the literal meaning. That is, if we are dealing here with a symbolic tradition that people are working in and you acknowledge that the meaning of the type, even if it is not intended by the author, is in a sense borne by the character of the language, then it is the case that prophecies forward are this way. I might even say that the meaning of the text in Deutero-Isaiah literally, even though not intended by the author, is literally completed, or the significance of the symbolic structure of the language is literally completed by certain things that happened in the New Testament.

Kapp Johnson: No.

Herbert Richardson: Oh, then I would like to know how you get out of that argument. Because you have already granted a certain structure to the language and its symbolics, and you just can't keep going backwards. You have to be able to allow it to go forward too.

Lonnie Kliever: Why is that, Herb? I mean it makes perfectly good sense to say that in a community nourished by a historic tradition of symbols, subsequent events are unconsciously interpreted in the light of the symbols. I don't really see the force of your argument that the same kind of move forward is implied. I really don't.

Herbert Richardson: Well, I think I could give it to you. It would be something like this but on another level. Let us suppose that I give an argument for a certain thing on the level of sheer logic and I haven't really thought out the logical implications of what I've said. But if somebody would say, "Well, if you've said that, then you're committed to this." And I say, "I don't see that, I am not intending that." And he would say, "Well, look at this and this and this; it follows from your argument." So I have said something forward.

One might say that, though the logic isn't quite as tight, the same thing happens when you have a history and a system of symbols that are operating. They are operating with a forward intentionality and tendency. It is quite clear within language and literature. Just think a little about this. Though I don't wholly buy Pannenberg's christology, he points out that the dynamic of the christological symbols, say of Nicaea, is not just an interpretation backwards but also contains within itself a logic forward. It seems to me the same thing is true within a whole group of texts within the Bible itself. I don't want to fight the matter out too much. My point is only this: vis-à-vis Kapp's paper, namely, that what Kapp is calling significance and type is not merely our interpretation of the Bible's text but it is within the Bible's own interpretation of certain biblical texts.

Kapp Johnson: Wait a minute. You might be shooting past people. What I would say is that if the Bible in its reinterpretation of certain traditions and symbols does . . .

Frank Flinn: But is it reinterpretation?

Kapp Johnson: Maybe reinterpretation is not a good word, but when it deals with the significance of this kind of typology, it is at that level of hermeneutics that I am talking—namely, the meaning of the Exodus event as a salvation event, the constitution of Israel as a people of God. The new Exodus event is a proper resignification of the Exodus event in the sense of the reconstitution, not the constitution, of a people. It functions at the same level of meaning, but it is applied to a new circumstance and to a new event.

Herbert Richardson: I would simply say this to you. My interpretation of *Divine Principle* moves us from the time of Jesus up to the present day. It is methodologically exactly the same thing as what the Bible does within itself, from Jesus back to Adam and Eve. You have all these types running through the Bible right up into the New Testament. What *Divine Principle* does is to see the process of providence working in the same way and interpreted in the same way, namely, through types. Things of the same type happen over and over again on the same foundation. Everything that has happened up until the time of Jesus has happened from Jesus to the present day. Therefore the method of interpretation of history that the Unification Church uses is exactly the method that the Bible uses.

Now a good argument might be made from outside that goes something like this. Yes, but God stopped working providentially after Jesus the way he did before Jesus and therefore the method of interpreting the work of God, namely types, is no longer valid. That is what the church usually says, but then it is the church that is inventing the new method for interpreting the Bible. The Unification Church is not inventing a new method because it is using the Bible's method for interpreting the Bible. It is the Christian church that has invented the new method for interpreting the Bible basically on the assertion that the process of providential history and the principle for interpreting providential history have come to an end with Jesus Christ. The new method for interpreting the Bible in the early church was dogma; today it is the historical method. Now I would say, I'm with the "Moonies"

because they have the Bible's own methods for interpreting the Bible. If there is anything that is problematic, it is what the biblical foundation would be for a dogmatic interpretation of the Bible à la the Catholic Church or a historical critical interpretation of the Bible à la the Protestant churches.

Now we Protestants and Catholics can say that we have abandoned the Bible. Basically we believe in human reason and historical criticism. The Bible's method of interpreting the Bible is ridiculous. We wouldn't use it today. Or we could go with the Catholic Church and say that we have abandoned the Bible, that we now use tradition. Let us be honest and say it. The "Moonies" are stuck on the Bible. They haven't come into the modern era; they are not critical people; they don't submit their minds to the Pope. But you can hardly argue that they are not interpreting the Bible in the biblical way.

Kapp Johnson: I didn't argue that.

Herbert Richardson: No, you wanted to know how they did it. (laughter)

Durwood Foster: The point that I wanted to make has at least been ventilated. (laughter) First of all, the matter of meaning is a very complex theme indeed. To contrast meaning and significance is in a sense only to scratch the surface of the issue. I'm sure Kapp realizes that beyond that there is the question of types of meaning and levels of meaning. Classically, of course, the four-fold meaning of scripture is a very important theme that has come into the discussion. That needs to be parsed before one can really deal adequately with this.

Dagfinn Aslid: I can resonate to this whole idea of resignification. At Claremont James Sanders stresses that the Christian tradition has indeed left the biblical foundation which he sees as a dynamic resignification of tradition. Sanders sees hermeneutics as the immediate interaction between text and context. Dr. Richardson's point is very clearly illustrated when we look at the Bible as a canon. What has remained in the Bible as canon is those texts which have original meanings capable of being resignified in different historical situations and able to inform the identity of the community which used these

texts. Jeremiah is a good example as it points up Hananiah as the archetype of the false prophet (Jeremiah 28). Hananiah was consistent in terms of what you might call the Davidic hermeneutic—the view of the providence as something which was always on the side of the Israelites against any invaders. Hananiah said, Well, God will surely lead us out of Babylon, whereas Jeremiah said, No, this is not so, God is strong enough also to keep us in Babylon. Hananiah was in the orthodox Exodus tradition but Jeremiah, the one who resignified the tradition, is canonical and is preserved as the prophet. This is telling us that orthodoxy and canon are very dynamic things and it is very hard to go at it with a fixed probe. Of course our situation is different.

Kapp Johnson: And Dr. Sanders would point out the last thing you said. Because the kind of thing that you are talking about is what Dr. Sanders would call period two and very different from how he would understand what is happening now.

Dagfinn Aslid: But I still think he would tend to resonate with what Dr. Richardson said in terms of having abandoned the midrashic resignification of the text. Look at Paul for instance. In Galatians he radically turns upside down the whole idea of the covenant and makes the traditional heretical.

Kapp Johnson: That is correct as far as Dr. Sanders is concerned and I would even concur with that. But one thing that Dr. Sanders would say is that the process of that resignification starts at a literary critical level and moves forward from there.

Frank Flinn: I think that is where my point becomes most relevant. As Ricoeur shows us, the letter doesn't interpret itself. The letter calls forth interpretation because it says something more than itself. There is a surplus of meaning. You find that in the Bible itself. Literary historical-critical methodology is based on the premise of fixing statements within given time frames and limiting those statements to specific historical contexts. This cuts off what Ricoeur calls the literal surplus of meaning and what Richardson calls the forward thrust of symbols.

Frederick Sontag: Well, I do find it rather amusing that the

“Moonies” turn out to be the only true fundamentalists. (laughter) But I want to comment on Tom Boslooper’s paper and yours too, Frank. Both your conclusions puzzle me a little.

At the end Tom says that the “Moonies” miss the magnificent opportunity of using their doctrine on the sovereignty of God and its corollary, the ultimate kingdom of God on earth. That puzzles me because what seems to me interesting and fascinating is that their notion of God’s sovereignty is not traditional. God can lose because there is human dependency. God is not going to pull off the final restoration by his own action. If there is a failure on the human side, he can keep trying. One of the real issues is that the classical doctrine of the sovereignty of God is not preserved. At the beginning of your paper you said something about the conviction that God will surely save and restore his people and establish his kingdom. I don’t think that is a statement that comes out of *Divine Principle*.

Thomas Boslooper: No, I say that is out of the meaning of apocalyptic literature.

Frederick Sontag: Right, but then you say that the “Moonies” missed it. I say they can’t make it. Theirs is a very different interpretation. It is interesting and fascinating but I think they miss it.

This is similar to Frank’s conclusion. He says that what they have is a “process of restoration” and a “process eschatology.” This is a strange kind of notion. I think you have characterized it rightfully. Still, eschatology has always meant a divine inbreaking and a radical reorganization of the world. You can use a milder form, but this is what we mean by the Second Coming and the coming of the kingdom. You say it is a realistic eschatology, but this surprises me. I don’t understand that.

Frank Flinn: I was tempted to put that in quotes but I didn’t for these reasons. I was speaking there within the context of the American millenarian movements which tended to jump the gun on God and fall into what I call eschatological catastrophism. That is what I call Zap-eschatology. (laughter) The kind you read in the comic books. But *Divine Principle*, I think, is taking a realistic view of the eschatological

time event. First, in 1977 Rev. Moon declared Year One. They have a post-millennial hermeneutic. One reason why we have difficulty in talking to them is that they are post-millennial in their stance and we are not. At the same time, they are realistic in the sense that they focus on the family. The family is the key to restoring individuals, clans, tribes, nations, etc. This is a concrete program and it is realistic. You can do a lot of things that they are setting out to do. The Mormons have already paved the way.

Frederick Sontag: Well, you have a point there. I boggle on the word "realistic," because I hesitate to define what is real. Your point seems to be that Zap-millennialism stresses that God will perform miracles. The problem with this viewpoint is that, if you prejudge God on his dates, you can go wrong. On the other hand, if you see the eschaton as a realistic process, you are totally dependent upon the events of the world and human effort to carry that out.

Frank Flinn: No, I was very careful to avoid the two pitfalls, and Unification is somewhere in between. Put it this way, I think they have struck a median route in between what I call divine catastrophism and humanist gradualism.

Frederick Sontag: But I don't see how you can say that. I want to bring up another point. You say in here that *Divine Principle* is not an addition to the Bible. That seems to me enormously strange. Can you show me at any point in the Bible where the kingdom of God is going to come gradually? And not by divine action? I don't want to prevent them from holding that doctrine. I don't happen to believe that if it is non-canonical, there is something wrong with it. But to state that it is not an addition to the Bible seems to me to be strange.

Klaus Lindner: German liberal Protestantism in the nineteenth century certainly got it out of the Bible that the kingdom was going to come gradually.

Frederick Sontag: I understand that others have done it. It is not really a new doctrine. But I would argue with them too. I really believe we have to admit that is not the biblical intention. If you want to change it, that is all right with me.

Herbert Richardson: What else is the Bible in its entirety other than the record of the fact that God establishes the kingdom through steps, that is by a process that has a certain graded or gradual character? The only people who can believe that the kingdom comes all at once are the people who have totally abandoned the Old Testament. I would suppose, for example, that the gradualness of redemption begins with the calling of Abraham, the several generations of patriarchs, the divine salvation of Israel through the events in Egypt, the deliverance, the bringing them after many years of wandering into the kingdom, the establishment of the monarchy and so forth. It seems to me that the whole teaching of the Bible is that God's redemptive work is precisely by a historically graded process, step by step.

Frederick Sontag: That is an interpretation which I am sure you can give if you want to.

Herbert Richardson: Is that really an interpretation? Or isn't that what the Bible says? I really don't understand your objection. It is intrinsic to the character of story as literary form that meaning and telos is attained gradually, step by step. If we are dealing here with narrative history, if it has anything of story, if there is anything of temporality that is intrinsic to the process, the gradualness is there. It is not an interpretation. Have you done what most people have done? Most Christians have just reduced the Bible to Jesus and the New Testament and have totally abandoned the idea of God saving providential step by providential step. Have you Fred?

Frederick Sontag: Yes, I think I have, but I don't know that that is so terrible. Many Christians have. (laughter) I argue that there is a return to the Old Testament in *Divine Principle*. That is all right with me. Yet one classical way of reading the New Testament and Jesus' words is that he was expected as a traditional Messiah who would lead his people into a historic kingdom. You and I think *Divine Principle* wants to restore that idea. That is why Rev. Moon's being another Messiah is not such a wild claim. I read the New Testament differently. The disciples misunderstood this and so did the Jews of his time. They expected the Old Testament Messiah and they didn't get it. Instead you have the

distress of the crucifixion. Therefore the reason the resurrection event has been given a classical stress in Christianity is precisely the fact that human gradual effort did not work.

Herbert Richardson: What you have done is to abandon the Old Testament as canonical.

Anthony Guerra: I like the term "realistic eschatology" for different reasons than those for which you used it. What is implicit in the *Divine Principle* view of eschatology is that the kingdom in the historical order will continue ad infinitum. The eschatological event is not something which brings about a dissolution of the historical order so that the continuation of the kingdom is something only spiritual, something which we enjoy in heaven.

Frank Flinn: I meant that, too, by the way.

Anthony Guerra: I did want to say something about Tom Boslooper's paper. I learned quite a lot from it. First, I was really intrigued by your notion that the failure of unity between John and Jesus also was a reason why the unity between the northern and southern kingdoms was not established at that time. That is something that I would like to pursue, but in terms of statements with which I have some problems. The notion of Jesus as the second Adam in Pauline literature should be extended. You don't find it in the gospels. The interesting thing about that of course is that we know that the earliest writings are Paul's writings. Further, Irenaeus takes up the notion of second Adam and adds the notion of a second Eve in his biblical typology because he believed in recapitulation. In order to bring about restoration you need to reverse all the significant events in fallen history and therefore you reverse the problem of Adam and Eve. Irenaeus not only believed in the second Adam but he also believed in a second Eve, and that second Eve turned out to be Mary. Of course there are some problems with that because Eve was by no stretch of the imagination ever thought to be the physical mother of Adam. Compared to Irenaeus' extension of this Pauline term, it would seem that *Divine Principle* is more consistent with the Pauline message than Irenaeus who did in any case take up the typology.

Jonathan Wells: I would like to return to a point in Kapp's paper because I think the point is important to our discussion. Concerning *Divine Principle*, you say: "There is no apparent hermeneutical clue indicating when a text is to be interpreted literally or metaphorically outside of the theology itself." Now the context of this remark, of course, is your distinction between meaning and significance, the former being what the text meant in its original context. This is what modern biblical scholarship can tell us. I don't think any of us would be satisfied only with the meaning that the text had in its original context because it is not only a human text. Somehow, God was involved in the events being described and, presumably, in the making of the text itself. Only when we try to interpret God's message, that is, the theological significance of the text for us today, are we doing theology. When you say there is no apparent hermeneutical clue outside of the theology itself, it seems to me that that is always true, no matter who is interpreting what text.

Durwood Foster: When I raised my hand ten minutes ago I wanted to comment briefly on the give-and-take between Herb and Fred on the mode in which the kingdom will come. I also want to comment briefly on this matter that Jonathan just raised.

The first comment would simply be that there has been this very intense discussion of *types* of biblical and New Testament eschatology over the last several decades. I think that the result of that discussion has been a kind of stalemate. There is no way absolutely to settle the debate between two or three main kinds of biblical eschatology. One is more gradualistic and there are some biblical images that support that. The image of the mustard seed, for example, is one that is often cited by liberal theologians who take the view that the kingdom is something that does grow. We are all familiar with this. I just want to say that the situation in theology generally is one in which a pluralism of eschatology is recognized. Theologians have tried to work out some kind of synthetic perspective on the situation. For example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer distinguished between the penultimate and the ultimate. In the dimension of the penultimate, a kind of progression goes on which is a

preparation for the coming of the kingdom. Here human action and human labor enter in, but that is not the whole story. There is also the ultimate which human action does not contrive at all but which is added from above by God as a sort of transcendent culmination to what goes on humanly. This is just a comment from the general theological discussion of the last several decades. I think the upshot of it tends to say that in a sense Fred and Herb are both right *and* both wrong when each denies the other. We have a situation in which both of these dimensions are to be recognized and in some way reckoned with.

The other comment I want to make relates to Kapp's presentation and has been picked up by Jonathan and others too. It has to do with the question of what historical critical method could contribute to the kind of hermeneutical purposes which bring us together here in the Bahamas or which generate dialogue and conflict at any point in the interpretation of the Bible. The result of the discussion of the last hour would seem to be that it is unclear that historical critical method contributes anything decisive at all. And this I suppose would seem to many of us very frustrating. I think that we want to believe—those of us who have expended the energy to go through a doctoral program—that somehow the methods and tools of modern historiography can exercise at least a relevant control over issues of authenticity. Now, Kapp made clear that in his own view historiographical considerations are a necessary but never sufficient condition for the interpretation of biblical texts. But nevertheless the fact remains that we seem, so far at least, not to have been able to state or demonstrate how critical historiography could indeed help us at this point. The hermeneutical circle constituted by Unificationists proceeds in its own way with the material that we are talking about, for example, in its interpretation of Genesis. Other circles of interpretation proceed in different ways. Historiography seems impotent to reconcile the conflicts between these circles of interpretation. Personally, I am somewhat frustrated by this situation. But if what I have stated is, in fact, the case, I think it is important for us to recognize this correlates with something I have observed in teaching theology for a couple of decades. More and more students get

absolutely nothing that is theologically helpful out of their historiographical critical work, in spite of the fact that this takes a very large part of the required units in the curriculum. What do we do about this? This shouldn't be the case; but nevertheless here we are illustrating it, and I just want to point this out. If someone has a different view of where we are with this one I would like to hear it.

Frederick Sontag: A couple of quick points on what Durwood is saying. I'm perfectly willing to accept gradualist interpretations. I don't think that there is one theology that comes up as Christianity, but I do believe historically that gradualist interpretations stem from the nineteenth century and the Enlightenment. I would want to question whether the events of the last two centuries offer any possible hope both for American millennialism and whether the kingdom of heaven really can be expected in this way. In the last analysis, I would only deny that gradualism is a classical position. It has emerged in recent centuries and I think ought to be appraised in that way. I think *Divine Principle* represents an agreement with this kind of gradualism.

Unificationists seem to have enormous confidence that man will eventually respond. I just want you to tell me, what in heaven's name is the evidence for that confidence? The entire history of mankind seems to go in the other direction. Now there were times in America in the nineteenth century when we thought we moved into a different age. You do quote Augustine, but I have always been startled by Augustine's "...and our hearts are restless until they find rest in thee." Looking around I find that very few people seem to have that sort of ultimate divine quest. A handful of people do and I think they are very important, but that the history of mankind can be described as ultimate drama in which humanity is determined to get to God startles me.

Andrew Wilson: First of all I want to really thank you, Frank, for your paper. I like the idea of doing a hermeneutic on completed testaments in the plural. The next step might be to look at the *Book of Mormon* and Mary Baker Eddy's *Science and Health* and the *Koran* (the last might be a completed testament also, but I am not sure about that), and do some comparative analysis with *Divine Principle* to see whether

Divine Principle is in fact a better completed testament or not, i.e., more likely to withstand some of the historical pitfalls that these others have fallen into.

Frank Flinn: It's pretty difficult to withstand historicism.

Dagfinn Aslid: I would like to try to unpack the tension that seems to be present in any hermeneutic approach to scripture—the tension which I in my language call the war between the egghead and the muse. On one side, there is this egghead who focuses on reason, logic, historical critical method. On the surface of it, it seems that *Divine Principle* tends to be very scientific and tries to spell forth a systemology that seems almost positivistic. On the other hand, when you listen to Rev. Moon theologize, what he says is very enchanting, very playful and not at all something that we should subject to any kind of positivistic verification criteria. This tension I find also resonating in our discussion between Frank Flinn and Kapp Johnson. You can guess who is the egghead and who is the muse as far as hermeneutics goes. (laughter) I think it is a challenge for our hermeneutics to find a way to reconcile these two because in the Christian tradition today there is a war between the two. We find for instance that those who want to do the new literary criticism and structuralist analysis of the gospels are named Docetic by those who hold onto the historical critical method. It is symptomatic, I think, that in Kapp's paper the word "sign" was used rather than the word "symbol" which reminds us of concentrated, packed meaning, the richness of meaning. I don't have a solution to this, but I think that *Divine Principle* as it is written is overly rational and discursive in its mode of theologizing and in its hermeneutic. It is not really—I wouldn't use the term—a third testament or gospel in its literary form, as Durwood Foster has pointed out. What we need is something more substantial in terms of its literary form, its imagery, its power of enchantment.

Frank Flinn: I just want to add one little note about the historical critical method. Kapp, you say you are not a positivist. Well, the very distinction between significance and meaning is Rudolph Carnap's distinction between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*. If anybody was a positivist it

was Rudolph Carnap. In fact, he is trying to save positivism just as wise old Nietzsche was destroying it from within. I think Nietzsche destroyed it when he showed that all "facts" come from "valuations."

But let's look at the concept of history. Is the concept of history in the Bible more important to the Bible than the concept of allegory as in Galatians where Paul says, "We said these things allegorically"? I would just like to point out that there is no biblical word for "history." There is not one word in the Bible that translates as "history" per se. There is "generations," there is "events of the days" (that is Chronicles), but the word "history" as we mean it is not in the Bible. There is the word for patterns and we do find that patternizing of history in the Bible. The Fathers called it typologization. One can go overboard with it as in medieval exegesis but I think it is consonant with the Bible. I think the Bible thinks in that way.

Klaus Lindner: My question was triggered by Fred Sontag's problem about the sovereignty of God. I see things precisely the opposite way. The fact that history has been going on for such a long time and we don't have the kingdom of heaven does not call for an affirmation that God will do it. What we need is a reason why God hasn't done it yet. Why hasn't the kingdom of God come about yet? I see the fact that we have such a long history of people not accomplishing the kingdom of heaven on earth. I see that just precisely as an argument against affirming that God is going to do it.

Frederick Sontag: Are you saying that *Divine Principle* does that? Certainly it is not a negative nihilism which says we are going to explain why the whole thing turned out that way. That is not the only thing. In *Divine Principle* you have the reverse: this event is going to happen and here is how it is going to happen. What you are arguing is that our tragedies say that we should explain why God has failed to date. I wouldn't disagree with that, but surely you are not claiming that is what *Divine Principle* does alone.

Klaus Lindner: No, the argument goes the other way. It hasn't happened because people failed to respond to God.

Henry Vander Goot: First of all, a footnote to the concept of history

as related to scripture. It is quite correct that the distinction between the historical, on the one hand, and the metaphysical-cosmological, on the other, is a distinction invented in the nineteenth century. Not only is it falsely superimposed upon the Old Testament but also upon the Greco-Roman literature, as if in that literature there is no sense of process and development within human existence. That is a good point that you made there and worthy of some reflection because it is so dominant in a lot of contemporary literature. It is taken for granted and it is not a concept to be taken for granted.

Now to the question that I have for Frank. I think your paper is really stimulating and very suggestive. I am wondering if you could think out for us the connection between what you describe as the basic motif of Unification theology, that is to say, a First Article, a Third Article and a thrust towards the creation of a third testament beyond the two testaments. Is the relationship between these two things necessary or is it simply accidental? Do you see a logic here between the motif First Article/Third Article, and the thrust toward a third testament?

Frank Flinn: Yes.

Henry Vander Goot: What, for example?

Frank Flinn: It has to do with the fact that Unificationists keep playing around with christology and I just don't think traditional christology is that important to them. It is a two point theology, creation and restoration. Maybe the two article motif is what necessitates a completed testament, which is almost like a new, democratized christology. I've had that thought but I am not all that sure about it. But maybe you can extrapolate what the paper made you think. As I say, I got myself out here on a limb and I just left myself hanging.

Henry Vander Goot: Well, it seems to me that if you give in on the oriental-like basic ontology which conceives God in terms of the bipolarity of positivity and negativity, masculinity and femininity, Father and Holy Spirit, then you are necessarily into a kind of Arian-like subordination of the Son. This means that you are necessarily into a subordination of the work of the Son which is pre-eminently a work of revelation and is connected with scripture. In effect, given this

fundamental ontology of polarity, you have opened the door to the possibility of additional, alternative or quasi-revelational testaments. There is a real inner logic here that is gradually becoming clear. From the conversation, I mean, I think you can add two and two together and see the structure here. At least that is the way my thinking is running on this particular point.

Jonathan Wells: I'm reluctant to say anything because I'm going to be talking about it tomorrow morning. With all due respect I have to strongly object to this whole line of argument. As far as I can tell, christology is the cornerstone of Unification theology in a sense that I will explain tomorrow. Specifically, it is the cornerstone of Unification hermeneutics, and to say that Unification has no christology and ignores the Second Article . . .

Henry Vander Goot: I didn't say that it had no christology.

Jonathan Wells: Almost no christology. I'll deny it is subordinationist and Arian.

Frank Flinn: I say some things to provoke people. (laughter)

Jonathan Wells: I like that.

Henry Vander Goot: That is simply inaccurate because in classical christology Christ is not only mediator; he is sole mediator. If you have got Rev. Moon in there somewhere, I don't know what you do with that. But I don't know quite how Rev. Moon functions.

Herbert Richardson: He functions typologically. I'm going to give Jonathan's argument now. Well, I am going to give an argument which I think is Jonathan's point. The heart of *Divine Principle* is in fact not only christology but a very high christology. I would like to make four points here.

First, I would like to give a definition of typology. We have used it a lot and people think it is very esoteric but it is very simple. I want to give a definition of typology so we will know what we are talking about. When I came in here today, as I am sure you were aware when you came here, there was something very unusual about the experience: we were all getting together again. What is the difference between this and St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands? Well, there is something interesting.

When we got here we weren't just getting here, but we were getting here with the realization that we had been together at St. Thomas. So there is something new about it, namely, we are all here and it is an event in its own right. But there is something about it that is old, and what leads us to recognize this event as a repeat is precisely the element that is ordinarily called a type. There is a certain typological dimension to this meeting and the typological dimension arises out of the fact that when we meet here it is different from when we met the first time because we meet here with a certain experience of having met the first time. Now, that is a very significant dimension of human experience and I might say that it tends to be neglected, for example, in the historical critical method. People ordinarily have not first experiences but repeat experiences and therefore they experience most of what they experience not only as a unique thing but also as a type of something else, because that is what a type is.

My second point is that because experience is temporal all experience is typological, that is, typology relates to temporality, because it relates to the fact that when we have an experience it frequently is an experience that reminds us of another experience that came earlier, so typology or the typological dimension of experience is the ordinary structure of human experience and human language: "Hi, Durwood, it is good to see you again." "Hi, what is your name?" "I didn't remember Gail's name, she is looking so much more holy than she did last summer." (laughter)

My third point is about the interpretation of the Bible. In the Bible it is very clear that when people experience things they frequently experience them feeling that what was going on was like something that had happened earlier. For example, in the prophets there is the experience of certain things that are going on that are like certain things that happened much earlier in the history of the people: a deliverance here like a deliverance earlier. And you see that in the New Testament, too. When people experienced Jesus they felt that things were happening around Jesus that reminded them of types of things that happened in the Old Testament. We find it very easy to see this in ordinary life.

There are people who read the Bible and identify certain things that are happening in the Bible with things in their own life. I had an experience where I felt very close to Abraham when I had to leave Boston to go to Toronto. It was going to a foreign country. We find Blacks who read the story of the Exodus and they read it like the Jews do as a sort of liberation theology Exodus experience, being freed from slavery in Egypt, coming up over the river Jordan. It is very clear that there are people who experience their life today as a repetition and type of something that happened in the Bible. That is very understandable.

My fourth point is that *Divine Principle* experiences what is happening today as a type of what happened in the time of Jesus. The whole New Testament age and the drama of what happened around Jesus is felt to be a type of what is happening right now.

Frank Flinn: It should be John and Jesus, I think.

Herbert Richardson: Well, John and Jesus, but the point is that what is happening today is experienced with a kind of recognition that what happened in the New Testament is very like what happens today. That is typological understanding. That is why I think that what Jonathan is saying on the centrality of christology is so critical. We are living in a New Testament moment of history and the whole drama of what happened around Jesus is happening around us. There is nothing dogmatic about this because the foundation for it is the ordinary human experience, that is, there are people who experience what is happening right now as like that. There are people who are experiencing Moon as like what happened in Jesus' time. I experienced Martin Luther King as Christ, as my Lord and Savior, as a kind of charismatic crusading spirit. It was an ordinary experience, many people's experience. No dogma. It is an ordinary level of experience. This is the way typology works.

Now having said all those things, and having really argued very strongly for the typological character of the *Divine Principle* reading of the Bible which reads our life today as a type of the New Testament times, I might say that very few Christians read their life today as a type of the New Testament. If we were really serious about it, as we pretend to be, we should be very upset at Blacks who want to use all this

identification of their experience with the book of Exodus. It is very interesting that we don't have any trouble at all experiencing contemporary life as a type of the Exodus but we have a lot of trouble with people who want to experience today as a type of Jesus' time. I find that to be inconsistent. Frankly, I think both the Exodus theology and *Divine Principle* display the same type of thing.

What is the ethical application of this? This is for Deotis. I want the Unification people to think about this fact: your theory of indemnity is directly related to your hermeneutics of typology. It works out exactly like this. I'll give you an example from my life. My father had a heart attack at thirty-nine years of age. As I came up to age thirty-nine, I experienced a lot of anxiety that I might have a heart attack, too. My brother three years younger had a heart attack at age thirty-nine and dropped dead within one week of the day that my father had his original heart attack. The experience of reliving the life of your father is a very common experience. As I was coming into thirty-nine approaching forty, I kept saying, Richardson, you have got to find a way to break the pattern of repetition; you have got all these things in you like your father and he ended up with a heart attack. So I consciously set about performing activities to reverse the course of events, that is, actions which in Unification theology would be indemnity actions, actions intended to reverse the course of events. A very critical kind of decision I have also made was at times when my marriage wasn't going so well and I was thinking whether to divorce my wife or not. I thought about the fact that there had been too much divorce in my family and somebody had to try to reverse this destructive pattern. So I tried to change certain patterns of my behavior in order to go on with my marriage by actually performing a kind of indemnity intended to reverse a pattern.

A pattern can only be recognized through the device of typology. An event is seen as a type of another event. It doesn't mean that you have to do the same thing, it means that on the base of that recognition you can perform an act which is intended, by recognizing the type, to reverse the tendency. You can perform an indemnity. You may be successful or you may not be successful. In any case, what I want to say,

then, is the Unification theory of indemnity as an ethic is directly related to their hermeneutic of typology. Critical to their typological theory is the identification of our age as a type of the New Testament age. Now the act of indemnification is that we must not fail Moon as the early disciples failed Jesus. That is to say, can we act in such a way that we can reverse or perform an act of indemnification that will reverse the outcome of events as played out? Do you want to know what Rev. Moon has been struggling desperately to do? Let us even acknowledge that he has made it because today is his sixtieth birthday, and in a sense he has achieved it because in Korean thinking the sixtieth birthday is the end of a life on a certain pattern. Moon has managed to escape, to avoid being crucified. That is, he has managed to lift from the human race the burden of guilt for another crucifixion. That is pretty significant. And we might say those who have gathered around him and protected him have managed to keep that guilt from our shoulders too. Now, of course, I would only talk this way because I believe that, typologically speaking, for Moon to have been killed would have been roughly the equivalent of killing Jesus, in terms of the longer history of guilt of the human race. If any of you find it a little bit strange to talk this way, just think a little bit about the guilt that the human race has acquired for the murder of millions of Jews. And how the hell are we going to reverse that one?

This is how I see that the theory of indemnification is directly related to the hermeneutic of typology and how it gets to the root of the transformation of human history in a restored direction. I don't find anything esoteric about this theory. The reason that I have offered so many psychological and personal analogies is that I have wanted to argue very strongly that there is nothing about this theory that arises because it is an a priori theory. I think that everything about this theory arises because it is true in a very fundamental way to human experience. In that way it is common sense, rather than academic. That is how I see the matter.


Henry Vander Goot: But it is not high christology in any traditional sense of the word. When you talk about typology, you are talking about

the universal element in the experience surrounding Jesus in the New Testament community and comparing it to the experience of the Unification Church surrounding Rev. Moon. But what about the particular element that is characteristic of classical christology? That is to say, there is a sense in which what Christ did and what happened to Christ has a once-for-all characteristic. How are you going to do justice to that?

Jonathan Wells: Can I suggest that we discuss that tomorrow, because that is the topic of my paper.

Lonnie Kliever: Just one comment. If I had a better memory I could cite the source. Much of the discussion this evening triggers the memory of an essay that H. Richard Niebuhr wrote entitled "The Doctrine of the Trinity and the Unity of the Church." Niebuhr argued that church history viewed in proper perspective is best understood as a series of unitarianisms. He sketched out a typology of the unitarianism of the Father, the unitarianism of the Son, and the unitarianism of the Spirit. Each of those unitarianisms handles the problem of creation, redemption and consummation from its own perspective. But he says that the unity of the church is not found in the comprehensiveness of any theology but in the reciprocity and the wholeness of all of the theologies with their own distinctive impetus and their own particular ways of handling these doctrinal loci. This is just a suggestion for when we get back to where books are and libraries are. The article was in *Theology Today* in about 1955, and it is a good essay that might be worth picking up on, particularly as a rejoinder to Frank's notion that Unification theology is First and Third Article theology. Niebuhr would say that every unitarianism involves all three of the articles of the creed but handles them in the light of one of the articles.

Theology and Hermeneutics



The Unification Understanding of God

Lloyd Eby

Divine Principle or Unification theology divides into three sections, the Principle of Creation, the Fall of Man, and the Principle of Restoration. In order to understand how God is understood in Unificationism, we must investigate the understanding of God as it occurs in these three sections.

God in the Principle of Creation

Divine Principle and Unification thought are primarily relational in character, as opposed to individualistic (Greek) or wholistic thought. All entities, including God, are therefore seen as intrinsically related to other entities. In addition, each entity exists as an individual, with its individual need for self-maintenance. Each entity, then, has dual purposes, a purpose for itself and a purpose for interaction with other beings.

In Unificationism, God is seen as intrinsically related with the world. Beings other than people are creations of God ("symbols of God") and the human race is God's children ("images of God"). The fundamental ontological characteristics of God and of beings other than God must therefore be the same. The characteristics of God can be ascertained from studying created beings, or alternately, the characteristics of created beings can be ascertained from knowing the character-

istics of God. This method of investigation may seem circular, but because of the relationship between God and the universe, this mutual relationship occurs, and it can be investigated from either side.

The Unification method of ascertaining the characteristics of God begins, then, with an investigation of the characteristics of observable things, as Paul suggests: "Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse." (Romans 1:20)

Each created being is found to consist of both an internal character and an external form, interacting through a give and take relationship. These two characters are relative aspects of the same existence.¹ The internal character of a being is invisible, and consists of mind, law, or principle. The external form is body, energy, or matter.

In addition to internal character and external form, beings are expressed as, and exist and interact through, a second set of dual characteristics which are called positivity (or masculinity) and negativity (or femininity). In their deepest structure, then, beings are relational, existing through a give and take action between internal character and external form. Beings then assume either positive or negative aspects and interact with beings of the opposite aspects to produce new beings of higher order. An electrical circuit, for example, exists through the give and take between the positive and negative poles. A musical composition consists of the interplay between high notes and low notes, harmony and dissonance, movement and rest, and so on. Human beings are the highest existents in the universe (except for God), so God's nature is both expressed most fully and discovered most fully in people who have both physical and spiritual mind, and physical and spiritual body and who exist as man or woman.

God, then, must be a being of Original Internal Character and Original External Form, and these must be expressed as either Original Positivity or Original Negativity. Through the interactions between these dual characteristics in God, God's activity of creation and generation takes place. God is the creator of beings other than people and the

father/mother of the human race. Through the interactions between the dual characteristics in God, both God himself/herself and all other beings exist. Beings other than God exist through God's will and power, but they are of a different order from God, who is immaterial and without body. The Unification conception of God is, therefore, neither emanationist nor pantheistic.

In every case of interaction between internal character and external form there must be a primal point of origin from which or around which the interaction takes place. In God this is called "heart." This central point is ontologically, but not necessarily temporally, prior to the interaction pair; the central point and the interaction pair exist only in relation to one another. Thus Unificationism is neither a monism (in the Parmenidean sense) nor a dualism, but a unification of the two positions, avoiding the problems of each. Furthermore, the central point and the dual characteristics together make a three-fold entity; this is the deepest meaning of the Christian assertion that God is trinity. In this, Unificationism is quite similar to Confucian *yang* and *yin* thought, and quite different from the kind of Greek-based thought in which an individual is first of all a monistic unit having an essence. In that kind of thought, relations are problematic because it is difficult to derive relations from individuals. In Unification thought, however, even an individual is fundamentally a relation. Unification thought, therefore, does not deny the existence or importance of individuals, but it sees an individual itself as fundamentally composed of an internal relation, and thus Unificationism makes both relations and individuals equally fundamental.

Saying that God has Original External Form does not mean that God contains matter, but saying that God has both Original Internal Character and Original External Form means that God has within his/her own being the principles of the origin of both mind (or law or principle) and matter (or body or energy). The origin of both the spiritual and material worlds is therefore within God, who is the first cause of all beings other than himself/herself. First Cause arguments for God's existence are sometimes employed in Unificationism.

Since God is the ultimate origin of both the spiritual and physical realms, Unification thought completely rejects Manicheanism. The temporary separation of the physical and spiritual realms came about because of the fall, but this separation is neither essential nor eternal. There is in Unificationism, therefore, a foundation for unity between science and theology, between reason and revelation. One can understand Unificationism as either a new revelation or as a new natural theology. A full revelation is completely reasonable, and a theology or philosophy or science which fully satisfies the demands of reason will apprehend divinity and divine purpose. People from an Oriental spiritualist or a confessional tradition tend to take Unificationism as a revelation, whereas those from a rational or natural theology tradition tend to take it as a rational system. The approaches are equally warranted.

God is creator of beings other than people and father-mother to people. In Unification thought the fatherhood-motherhood of God is understood not analogically but univocally. Thus Unificationism often speaks anthropomorphically of God and ascribes to God wants and needs just as people have wants and needs. Whatever characteristics a child has as essential characteristics must be present in the parent. Thus, in the Unification conception of God, God needs an object for his/her love and needs humans to respond to him/her. In this view, creation took place because God recognized that he/she was incomplete in himself/herself, without a being of comparable characteristics with whom he/she could interact. Creatures other than people were made as objects for people, for people's nurture and pleasure. Without people's proper interaction with this created world, it is of no value to God because its only purpose is for its use and appreciation by humankind.

In Unification thought, God is both eternal and temporal, changeless and mutable, transcendent and immanent.² God is eternal, changeless and transcendent in his/her original will, purpose, and love. But in a particular instance or concerning any particular person or group of persons, God is bound by the choices and situations of those people. God's will, purpose, and love are therefore contingent, mutable, and immanent, dependent on the situation or person. God himself/

herself is beyond space and time and hence omnipresent and eternal, but as related to us God operates within our space and time.

This comes about primarily because of God's giving humans the three great blessings, which are to be fruitful, to multiply, and to have dominion over creation. All of these are relational concepts. The first means that each person is to grow from immaturity to maturity through proper give-and-take between his/her internal character (mind) and external form (body), centered on God and God's desire, so that the individual person comes to relate fully with God, thus becoming a divine person. The second is that two such persons, man and woman, become husband and wife under the direction of and in concert with God's will and desire, and thus produce a divine family. The third is that such a divine humankind relate and interact in harmonious give and take with the natural world under the direction and will of God and in accordance with divine purpose, thus completing harmony between humans and all other created beings, according to divine providence. These blessings or tasks have been given to humankind from the beginning, and human beings are responsible for fulfilling them.

Both God and humans must work in concert to fulfill these blessings. God has given humans freedom and responsibility, and this freedom and responsibility remain with people permanently. God cannot interfere with that part of the shared responsibility which belongs uniquely to the human person. Nevertheless God is immanently involved in all these relationships that must be fulfilled in order that the three great blessings be consummated. Their successful consummation requires that a person center all his/her interactions on God and on God's principles and desires. Only through such centering can these interactions be successfully carried out. But carrying out God's will and program requires that a person fulfill that part which is his/her own responsibility. In Unificationism, understood in this way, God's omnipotence is self-limited because God's power is limited by people's choices and actions, and this limitation is inviolable.

Unificationism is thus radically theocentric (Rev. Moon often uses the term "Godism" as a description of the ideology), but it does not

compromise people or human freedom. In giving these blessings to humans, God transmits to people the activity of creation, making humans co-creators with God. God is dependent on the human as much as the human is dependent on God. Just as a person cannot compromise God, God cannot compromise a person. The physical realm has been given to humankind as the locus of human activity, and only through the human person can the divine purpose be realized in the physical realm. The human is unique in being that creature who has both a spiritual and a physical dimension ("spirit being" and "physical being" co-joined). Thus people are uniquely qualified to be co-creators with God in the physical realm. Just as God is Creator and Mother-Father, the human being is also to be creator and mother-father.

Centering human life completely on God, rather than diminishing or compromising the person's humanity, is the prerequisite for realizing human potential or human nature. We could use the term *theocentric humanism* for Unificationism because it asserts fully the status and value of both God and the human, and asserts that human status and value are fully developed only in concert with God. A person *qua* person can attain his/her proper status and value only through complete interaction with God. In this, Unificationism is distinguished from the usual humanism which is more-or-less atheistic; such a humanism actually compromises the human in its efforts to assert the value and status of the human apart from God.³

In order for people to be co-creators with God, people must have freedom. Thus, in fully realizing higher relation with God, man/woman is fully free. In fact a person can be free only as he/she is fully related with God; disruption of this relationship curtails human freedom. Sin comes therefore not from freedom, but from something else. In this view, freedom implies relationship with God. Since freedom is given to the human race by God, God cannot violate human freedom. The realization of God's will and purpose, since it is mediated through people, depends on human action. God is therefore dependent on people in a real way.

Two additional implications of the principle of creation must be

mentioned. The first is that God's activity in creation grounds epistemology. Since the world is created for human interaction and enjoyment, and since the world is known through the process of sensation and cognition, we are assured that the world as known to us is the world as it is. Thus Kant's claim that things in themselves are unknowable is denied in Unificationism. In this view the processes of sensation and cognition apprehend things as they are, and things are guaranteed to really be as they are known to be.

The second implication concerns ethics. From God's activity in creation, most especially in giving the three great blessings, the basis of ethics in Unificationism emerges. That which contributes to realization of these blessings in accordance with the divine will and plan is good; whatever interferes with it is evil. Unification ethics especially emphasizes a person's activity in the family and in relationship to creation, saying that ethics primarily concerns family relationships and their extension to the world at large. Ethics, then, is derived from the principle of creation and concerns the proper realization of this principle.

God and the Fall of Man

In Unification theology, the origin of sin was not God's will, and was contrary to divine providence and intention. The deepest meaning of sin in Unificationism is that through improper love, i.e., an improper give-and-take relationship, a separation in the parent-child relationship between God and humanity is effected. Satan, in seducing Eve, took over the role of God, and became the false father of the human race. Thus Jesus could say, "You are of your father the devil." (Unificationism understands this saying univocally and not analogically.) Satan seduced Eve by misusing the principle of give and take. In this seduction he assumed for himself rights that Eve possessed and thereby came into the position to be able to partially control the spiritual world and the physical world through his control of Eve. Eve's seduction of Adam extended Satan's control. The fall thus resulted in the establishment of the three blessings, but centered on Satan instead of God. Salvation

then is not satisfaction for disobedience, but restoration of humanity to God, i.e., restoration of the three great blessings to their proper centering on God. (Although Adam and Eve did disobey God, their sin was not primarily in the disobedience but in the improper give-and-take relationships, centered on Satan instead of God. In the Unification view, sinful people do not need forgiveness for disobedience as much as liberation from the consequences of sin.) This restoration is the mission of the Messiah. Sin is primarily distortion of lineage, centering give and take on someone other than God or the godly. Salvation is restoration of these give-and-take relations to their proper focus or centering, and the Messiah is the medium for that restoration.

God and the Principle of Restoration.

Because of the fall God lost his/her children. Therefore just as human parents suffer if their children are taken away, God suffers because of human sin. Again, Unification theology speaks univocally of God's suffering, not analogically. God, as well as humanity and all creation, is in need of liberation, and in order to accomplish this God instituted the principle of restoration.

The deepest intention of the principle of restoration is the sending of the Messiah, who is a man not of Satan's lineage but of God's lineage. The Messiah is therefore a second Adam. His mission is to restore the three great blessings, first through growing to maturity himself, second through restoring the rest of the human race by having it be reborn into God's lineage. The messianic function begins, therefore, with the divinely sent messianic man in the position of Adam, but it also essentially involves the Messiah's bride, who takes over the position of Eve. The messianic office cannot be fulfilled apart from the messianic family, and so we can consider the term "Messiah" ultimately to mean "Messianic Family." Finally the Messianic Family must restore harmony between humans and the created world. Sending the Messiah is God's task, but since God gave humanity co-creative responsibility in the beginning, this responsibility remains with humans even after the fall.

Thus, in order that God can send the Messiah, people must accomplish certain conditions (indemnity) that conditionally restore what was lost in the fall. *Divine Principle* calls these conditions a foundation of faith and a foundation of substance, and gives an elaborate historical account of such attempts to establish these foundations as recorded in biblical and post-biblical history.

It is in this connection that *Divine Principle* discusses predestination. In the Unification view, predestination in history means God's activity of calling and setting up an individual or group or situation so that some indemnity condition can be fulfilled. If the attempt succeeds, then both God and humanity are glorified, but if it fails both must suffer and try again. Actual accomplishment always depends on people freely fulfilling their part of the responsibility. Since people are co-creators with God, humanity is also co-creator of its own (and God's) salvation. God's grace is freely given, but its appropriation by humanity requires active human participation. Thus God is Creator and Savior, but fulfillment of both creation and salvation requires people's active participation. Human beings were created to be and to remain co-laborers with God.⁴ When such labors are in fact carried out, both God and humanity receive joy; when they fail both suffer.

All of human history is the history of a fallen human race against the background of God's working for human salvation through the principle of restoration. Unificationism claims, therefore, that human history is not merely random or repetitive or meaningless, but that it is meaningful and that its meaning is found in the success or failure of individuals and groups in carrying out the conditions of restoration. Thus history is understood as being under the direction of God, and God is understood as a historical God.

History is enormously important in Unificationism. Since history is made up of cycles of time—hours, days, years, and so on—which are expressed as numerical units, and since numbers have their origin in God and God works through principles which have a numerical component, the history of restoration is expressed in terms of numerological units. Time periods of particular numerological length and meaning

are required for conditions of indemnity to be carried out. Recurrent historical cycles are therefore not accidental but are expressions of the working of this principle of restoration. It is not an accident that these time-periods are carefully recorded in the scriptures.

Since God's desire is that restoration be accomplished, and since the accomplishment of restoration means re-centering of the three great blessings on proper give and take with God and since it is the Messiah's task to carry out this restoration, it is in no way God's desire that the Messiah be crucified. Crucifixion means the thwarting of the process of restoration, a result of no benefit to either God or mankind, but of benefit only to Satan, who does not want restoration to succeed. God foresaw, however, that it would be possible for people to reject the Messiah, and therefore provided for a providence through crucifixion as a subsidiary (but much lesser in value and only partly effective) course, if the Messiah should be rejected. This is in fact what happened with Jesus, so St. Peter can correctly say, "... this Jesus, delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God."⁵ But it is God's subsidiary plan and foreknowledge, not the primary one. Even after the Messiah arrives, people must co-operate (co-work) with him in order that salvation-restoration be accomplished. God's gift of co-creativity to humankind remains inviolable, and both God and humanity are bound by human activity. This does not mean that God does not work with people to enable and encourage them in fulfilling their co-work, but it does mean that God cannot do it without human cooperation. Since Satan is in a position to control humanity as a result of the fall, people's fulfilling of their part in the cooperative scheme is extraordinarily difficult, requiring them to tear themselves away from Satan's control. This is the inner reason for the struggles and fighting in this world.

Its confident belief in the eternal and unchanging character of God's heart, love, and will for the carrying through of the providence of restoration and the fulfilling of the principle of creation makes Unificationism a theology and philosophy of hope. God's will and purpose will ultimately prevail, and the salvation of all beings (God,

angels, men, women, the created order) and the restoration of the ideal of creation will be accomplished. This does not mean that any particular calamity will be averted, but only that God will persevere until the necessary conditions are fulfilled and the divine program triumphs. God's triumph is humanity's triumph; therefore Unificationism holds to this underlying hope. At the same time it is completely realistic about present and future difficulties, anticipating suffering and (sometimes) defeat. It is an ideology of hope in the midst of a realism about persons, events, and situations.

FOOTNOTES

¹It is Aristotle's complete separation of contraries, e.g., matter and form (*Metaph.*, Lambda, 1075 a 30), that allows him to assert that the highest being, the Unmoved Mover, is pure form or pure act without any potentiality. This, of course, leads him into absurdity. In Unificationism this absurdity does not arise because a pair of contraries, especially internal character and external form, are necessarily correlates of one another, and hence inseparable. They cannot occur apart from one another because they are dual aspects of one existence. Thus Unificationism joins together monism and dualism.

²In this, Unificationism is quite similar to process thought in its account of the primordial and consequent natures of God. But Unificationism is theocentric, and process thought is not. Process thought conceives of God as creator of the world in a univocal way. In process thought, God as primordial has no personality, heart, or mind, but in Unification thought these are all within God, even when God is considered as transcendent.

³This is the ultimate reason why Marxists and Marxist states are so inhumane. Humane treatment of people requires recognition that humanity is essentially related to divinity; denial of this relation will eventually result in inhumane behavior, as happens in Marxism. It does not necessarily follow that religious people or ideologies will be humane; they often are not because they are either mistaken in their basic principles, failing to make God necessarily related to all mankind and dependent for his/her own happiness on human happiness, or else they compromise these principles in practice.

⁴See, for example, St. Paul's accounts of himself as a co-worker with Christ, e.g., II Corinthians 6:1.

⁵Acts 2:23.

Discussion

Darrol Bryant: There are two sets of material that we are covering today, one dealing with the question of God, the other dealing with the whole topic of christology. I did indicate that we were going to group these all together, but we won't do that. This morning we will focus on Lloyd's presentation concerning the Unification understanding of God and after the break we will have Durwood and Jonathan make some remarks about their papers on christology.

Lloyd Eby: What I have tried to do in my paper is present, as best I understand it from my point of view, what I take to be some of the underlying metaphysical, ontological, and philosophical points of the Unification understanding of God and then say something about what some of the implications of these are.

I also wish to comment on a point Fred Sontag made yesterday. I see Unificationism as inherently optimistic but not naively so, because in any given case, one never knows whether that given case is going to turn out the right or felicitous way or not. In the long run one does know that it will, and though one can't specify what the long run is, of course, Unificationism would claim that in the long run the ideal, the kingdom of heaven or whatever one wishes to call it, will be accomplished because the divine intentionality is focused on the accomplishment of that ideal.

Darrol Bryant: I have trouble with the last question. If it is the case

that one has this confidence in the ultimate outcome of things, but all evidence along the way seems to be pointing in the other direction, you even allowed that every sort of particular decision may be the wrong decision or something like that, yet you are still confident of the outcome. That is not a strong argument to say the least. It seems to me to be sheer foolishness to argue that way.

Lloyd Eby: I don't think so, because as a logical principle no finite number of failures shows ultimate failure. So the claim here is that the process will in fact go on until in fact it succeeds—however long it takes.

Andrew Wilson: Pragmatically it is a good concept, because it means that each person will work his hardest. You can't just sit back and wait for God to do it. On the other hand it gives people the confidence that the inevitable historical end will come, somewhat like the Marxist notion.

Durwood Foster: Lloyd's position on this seems to be very much that of Nels Ferré, who holds that God will persist in the effort to redeem us all until, by the law of averages, that effort succeeds. In your last paragraph I suppose that you mean that God will persist rather than prevail.

Lloyd Eby: Right, that is what I mean.

Durwood Foster: Because God has not yet prevailed, at least not in that sense. But one still wonders, in view of the enormous freedom you seem to allow to creaturely rebellion along the way, whether Unification thought does not qualify human freedom in any way. I wonder if you really mean that there is nothing at all like what the traditionists call divine judgment from the Unification perspective. In the traditional view a human being incurs penalty when there is deviation from God's will. This is a way of limiting or controlling in some way the range of rebellious freedom. Also in the tradition it is very clearly taught that in the end God will put Satan under the divine feet. So it isn't left up to human beings necessarily to overcome Satan. Human beings do have responsibility. As I have said in a number of connections, I think that is a very strong point in Unification theology, but nevertheless God is in

there pitching too. It is clear that this happens also in your view; for example, God does send the Messiah, for one. But nevertheless you do seem to allow rebellious creatures an enormous range of freedom. If that is the case, one wonders, in spite of this business of the law of averages predicting that the billionth time around maybe redemption will occur, whether there can be any hope that it will. Given that Satan was clever enough and powerful enough to perpetrate what he did originally, how is such potent ingenuity ever going to be sealed off or how is some kind of ultimate victory going to be achieved that we can rely upon. There seems to be a kind of instability, an uncertainty eschatologically at that point.

James Deotis Roberts: The question that bothers me in Unification thought is about the nature and attributes of God. To talk about what God does and how he acts and so forth at this point ought to stem from some understanding of who or what God is in himself and I don't see that coming forth. This would have something to do with what the providence of God working out in history would be like. For example, Durwood uses the process model of God which is like the agape motif in traditional belief. He combines process and agape so that he knows that God is love. He looks for the ultimate redemption of everyone because that love will not let man go. All will eventually be saved. So we know that this is consistent with what God will do about evil and that redemption is consistent with this understanding of God. Thus the question seems to me to be the foundation of the system.

Lloyd Eby: I think you are right. It is quite correct that I have not stressed that point in what I have written. As I would understand it, the Unification claim would be that the essential nature of God is God's heart, a heart of love. Because of his heart of love God will persist in his salvific work until man makes the necessary response. Persistence is guaranteed by God's nature.

Lonnie Kliever: There were times in the paper where it seemed to me you were arguing for a theory of internal relations between God and the creation and that there are other times in the paper where you are disavowing a theory of internal relations. For example, you seem to be

defending a theory of internal relations when you argue that no separations can be made. However, when you argue for the non-materiality of God you are disavowing a theory of internal relations. The same holds when you affirm the radical freedom of man. But when you affirm the final and radical sovereignty of God you revert to the kind of relational ontology and metaphor that you are working with. Implied is a theory of internal relations. It seems to me that that is a fundamental problem that is not articulated clearly in the paper.

Lloyd Eby: I grant you that the problem is not articulated as clearly as it needs to be. I wish to argue for a theory of internal relations, but I would also wish to say that the nature of God is to be parent and creative; the nature of man is also to be parent and creative. That implies some kind of limitation to what the internal relations are. Namely, you are a parent of your child so therefore there is a kind of internal relation between you and your child, but in the process of maturation the child has to in some sense become a unique individual apart from you.

Durwood Foster: I can appreciate the tension and wanting to work with the tension. This may be a point where the metaphors of parent and child stretch ontologies of internal relationality beyond coherence. But I appreciate the desire to maintain a theory of internal relations and yet do justice to the intuitive experiential tension within that. I commend you in your search for that.

Frank Flinn: The following is a problem for me. On the one hand, there is this tendency in Unification—not necessarily in *Divine Principle* but in Unification—which can be seen as a drive toward a historicist theodicy in the Hegelian sense. Within this mode of thinking one is compelled to explicate the origin of good out of evil. Yet, on the other hand, I have this nagging doubt that one of the problems we have as philosophers but more so as theologians is the inexplicability of radical evil. I don't see any easy resolution of that. One reason why I ultimately reject Hegel is that he could look at evil things happening and see God's providence in them. I myself cannot see through the veil between good and evil or see war as healthy. Hegel says wars are healthy for the internal

union of a nation. The problem with asserting optimism is that you resort to necessity to explain radical evil. I can't do that.

Lloyd Eby: I agree that this is an enormous problem. It is an extremely difficult one to solve. Let me state my faith first of all. I think the problem can be solved. I do have a number of things to say about it. Whether those are a successful solution or not, I don't know. I think this problem will also come up in terms of the discussion about society. Perhaps it is even more appropriate there. It seems to me that the Unification account of the origin of evil would want to say that the set of circumstances and the set of underlying things which make evil possible are inherent in creation. It would want to deny however that evil has to result from that. It would want to say, for example, that the existence of love in an immature man and woman means that love has the potential of being misused. Granted that, it doesn't follow that it necessarily must be misused. Therefore, if that can be rectified, then the claim would be that once you've got a mature parent you are in a better position than if you had no parent at all, roughly speaking.

Frederick Sontag: I really want to come back to the same problem. Maybe we can work on it and get an answer. Let me try one thing and next a little different notion. It seems to me that you are caught because you have limited God's power. You say that God's gift of co-creativity means that man remains inviolable. Therefore you have limited the divine power. Now other theologians would probably point out that process thought has done the same thing, but the tradition, almost to a man, maintained the divine power so that God is able to accomplish his purpose. You have limited this. Most process thought remains relatively optimistic like you, but they are related to modern times and to the enlightenment. They see some kind of optimism tied to the human scene, to the progressive evolutionary view. I don't see that you feel that way.

Two things seem strange here. One, if you do treat the problem as though God can keep trying, it becomes a little like Russian roulette as to when he is going to strike. I don't read *Divine Principle* that way. It seems to me that you are backing off from the specific statements which

indicate that a breakthrough is about to come. You have many statements by Rev. Moon on this subject.

But let me focus on another issue which is more metaphysical. Why is it that, if God gave man the gift of freedom, he is not able to retract it? It would seem to me that the God who gave freedom could also retract it. That is a difficult metaphysical position. Are you going to argue the other way, which some process thought does, namely, that God is simply one part of the process?

Lorine Getz: I want to pursue the question of evil as well. To some degree at least, parts of the theory are not very far from Jung's concept of evil. The psychological model that Jung would use would be to see Jesus and Satan as counter faces and good and evil as the split within the divine. That is not the language that you use but it would be a plausible explanation. It is rather unique that you want to hold that Satan ultimately will be redeemed. That is a reunification kind of thing. My question about that is, exactly what kind of evil is it? A lot of your language seems to say that evil is essentially relational and not a kind of concrete entity. Yet you want to talk about people who are essentially evil which is I think what I heard when you were talking about Cain and Abel. So it seems to me a question of what exactly is evil and where is it located.

David Kelly: I want to make almost exactly the same point but from a different tradition than the Jungian tradition or the Thomistic tradition. I think that Fred Sontag is right. *Divine Principle* is generally an optimistic work, using that term in a loose rather than absolute sense. But it is progressive and your ontology is relational. If you want to tie those two things together you might take a look at the possibility of defining evil as absence of substance, or evil as negation. You can say that evil is a negation of relationship. It would seem more generally in harmony with your approach not to talk about inherent evil or essential evil. You have other languages that would do better than that. That would tie in with your general approach to this.

Lloyd Eby: Let me say something about some of the issues. In terms of Fred's point about the gift of freedom, I have forgotten what I said.

Did I say God gives freedom to man? If so, that is perhaps an infelicitous way of putting it. God shares his creativity and his parenthood with man.

Frederick Sontag: Does he have to?

Lloyd Eby: Yes, in order to be a parent you have to have children, you can't be a parent otherwise.

Frederick Sontag: You can remain celibate.

Lloyd Eby: Then you are not a parent.

Frederick Sontag: True, does he have that power?

Lloyd Eby: Maybe so, but once you are a parent, then you can't rescind it.

Frederick Sontag: Why not? I have the power to give; I have the power to take away. I let Herb speak!

Lloyd Eby: Of course but that is not parentage. You are not Herb's parent. (laughter)

Herbert Richardson: I recently divorced my daughter! (laughter)

Lloyd Eby: This is ridiculous! By saying that Cain and Abel are evil I want to deny the claim which some people make about Unificationism that in the Cain/Abel model we are asserting that one is good and the other evil. That I deny. If you don't like the language of saying that one is inherently or essentially evil, I'll grant the linguistic point. On the question whether sin is a substance or a relationship, clearly Unificationism is claiming that sin is a relationship. It is a distortion of relationship. Cain and Abel and everyone else have that distorted relationship. Evil is the negation of the proper relationship with God.

Jonathan Wells: Regarding "inherent evil." *Divine Principle* claims that no person, not even Lucifer, is essentially evil. By "inherently evil," Lloyd just means that they both had fallen nature. The creation per se is not inherently evil.

On the question of God's power, it seems to me that most Christians would grant that God cannot sin, and yet they would want to say that God is free and omnipotent. Aquinas claimed that God cannot change the past, that God cannot make a square circle or do what is self-contradictory. So mainstream Christianity has always acknowledged

certain limits on God's power. All that is being claimed here is that God became a parent. I am willing to grant the point that God didn't have to become a parent; he wasn't compelled to create the world. But having become a parent and having granted freedom to his children, if he then acts as though they weren't free, he is doing something contradictory; or if he withdraws that without which his children cannot be his children, in effect he is giving up on the effort to accomplish his purpose. *Divine Principle* (following Isaiah) claims that God having once purposed to do something will do it. And so in this sense God is not free to withdraw the freedom he has granted us.

Frederick Sontag: How is he going to do it?

Jonathan Wells: That is a good question, but that is not the one I am addressing. My last point is about the negation concept of evil. I find Augustine's and Aquinas' idea of evil as negation inadequate. Auschwitz is not just a lack of goodness. *Divine Principle* seems to me to have a better concept of evil, in that evil consists not only in the disruption of a relationship with God but also in the establishment of a relationship with Satan. Since relationship is ontological in Unification, the relationship with Satan has a force of its own, it is a misdirected relationship and not just a sort of falling away from God.

Anthony Guerra: I am going to make two points. The first point addresses the basis for optimism in *Divine Principle*. I agree with Fred Sontag that the Principle talks about there being kaironic moments in history—Jacob, Moses, Jesus, these are victories. It is precisely on the basis of those victories that we say we now have hope that the final victory can be accomplished. There has not been just a history of defeats. I refer to the time that Jacob receives the name Israel, that means victory. There have been actual breakthroughs. And secondly, there seems to be uncertainty about the final victory in eschatological time. The way the uncertainty is removed is through the Lord of the Second Advent, who, working in cooperation with Jesus, finally defeats Satan in the world. Once that defeat is accomplished the way is opened for individuals in society to make relationships as brothers and sisters so that finally we can realize the kingdom of heaven.

Andrew Wilson: On the question of theodicy, there are different kinds of evil. Certain kinds of evil are judgments of God and one can see within them a good purpose, for example, the exile of Israel in Babylon as a way of helping them to pay indemnity so that the foundation for the Messiah could be laid. But there are other kinds of evil that have no redeeming value and are just radically evil, such as Auschwitz and the fall of man itself. All they have done is increase the suffering of human beings and the suffering of God. So I don't think *Divine Principle* would assert a Hegelian type of theodicy which saw good in evil action.

Klaus Lindner: I think Fred's point is very well taken. *Divine Principle* is not in agreement with Enlightenment optimism that sees gradual improvement. The optimism of Unification is based on something that historically has happened already. As for Barth, the integral of the new world would be the new man; and for *Divine Principle* transcendence has broken in already in Rev. Moon and in the new family. The image of the new world is the new family, therefore the optimism is based precisely on the fact that there is a model of the new world already. Therefore, in some way God has been victorious already. From that point on, a gradual increase can take place and spread. There is optimism in that it is possible to duplicate the model. The basis of optimism is an actual victory of God.

Durwood Foster: A lot has accrued in the interim since I raised my hand. First a comment on the theme of evil which seems to be so fascinating as to be unavoidable. In particular I am thinking of something Andy just said that perhaps represents a kind of difference from the tradition, although I am not sure. I think the tradition generally says that the power and the love of God are able to bring good out of all things, though this is emphatically not to be understood in the Hegelian sense that God engineers or perpetrates the evil in order to produce the good. It must be seen as the miraculous power of God to rectify a situation that goes awry contrary to God's will. This is somewhat different from what Andy said; though maybe, Andy, you would espouse it. I don't know. Romans 8:28 is a great text in which the idea is asserted.

Now a comment about something that emerged along the way. As far as the mainstream tradition is concerned, there is a lot of importance given to what seems to appear as a slight difference between Lloyd and Jonathan. Lloyd seemed to say that the act of God in creating children was a necessary act in which God fulfills the divine nature, which otherwise would remain unfulfilled. Jonathan expressed himself differently by saying that God was not compelled to become a parent, but did so and once having done so had a situation on the divine hands which had now to be dealt with. The difference between you on that point did not seem to matter much to you, but to the tradition it has made a great deal of difference. The tradition has wanted to say God is not compelled aboriginally to create the world. One very important function of that doctrine is the consciousness of grace. One thing that pervades the Christian spirit historically is this tremendous sense of grace that we have received from God, the gift of our being as an act that was not necessary on God's part but was an act of love freely given. Thus, that seemingly inconsequential difference between you two has played an important role in theology.

Herbert Richardson: I would like to explain where I see the real problem between genuine Christianity and pseudo-Christianity. (I think the Unification people ought to be allowed to choose what they want to be.) I would like to argue with them like this. In a series of propositions, some people would interpret *Divine Principle* as teaching this: Adam and Eve are not created in the image of God but through their growth and through their activities they should gain or achieve the image of God. The image of God means a condition of perfection whose psychological analogue is happiness or beatitude. So we are not created happy. Adam and Eve aren't created happy but they have to grow and exercise their wills and they become happy. Their wills don't possess within them the power of a certain rectitude and happiness. The wills are mutable and unstable and therefore Eve is susceptible to being seduced by Satan. We can say in this sense then what evil is. It is immaturity and being under the power of Satan. That is a whole theory. If you read the very first sentence in *Divine Principle* it says, "Everyone

without exception is struggling to gain happiness." That is in a sense a description of Adam and Eve in at least one account of *Divine Principle*.

Now, what is at stake here is the question about the will. In the platonic setting, happiness is the goal of the will. We are seeking to gain happiness and, as Plato said, once you have attained happiness, you wouldn't want anything anymore. Happiness is understood to be so much the end towards which you were striving that if you ever got it you would never will thereafter. Now, in traditional Christianity Adam and Eve are created in the image of God. They are created perfect and in tune with the will of God. They don't attain the will of God therefore through their willing. This means that they have happiness and rectitude in their nature of perfection right from the very beginning. Because they will and choose out of their happiness and out of their perfection, happiness is not the end towards which they will but it is the foundation of all of their actions. What they will is something else altogether. I might say that in traditional Christianity sin means a falling away, a genuine falling away and loss of the happiness that you had, right? Happiness is actually the capacity, a fully developed capacity, for right action. The fall is throwing away this happiness. That is why the notion of evil being non-being is essentially correct. In traditional Christianity what the gospel says is that God restores happiness to us in Jesus Christ. We can call it righteousness, but God gives us back the gift of the perfection of our wills which is the gift of happiness, beatitude, blessedness, or righteousness. All words that mean the same thing. We have it as the principle of our action rather than the thing that we have to gain. That is the basis for the whole attack on works-righteousness. You don't have through your work to become righteous or get happy because you are given happiness by God. Then there is an ethic that grows out of this. The principle of our action is that we have the happiness that most people are trying to get through their own action. How then should we act? Plato said, one wouldn't act. The Heidelberg Catechism says, no, we act out of gratitude. Because we act out of happiness, we act out of gratitude. It is perfectly clear that people who are happy are not immobilized from action but they are

doubly active and doubly effective. I think Christianity is absolutely right. I think that there is a lot within Unification theology that is confused on this point. It is bad psychology and bad theodicy. The gospel says we are given happiness by God and it is a whole different principle of action. Now the question is, what does *Divine Principle* teach? Well I think it is a little bit unclear. Let me just show you how I think it is unclear. Last summer at the Virgin Islands conference there was a question whether the fall was caused by Satan seducing Eve who was immature. That is what Jonathan said. But Rev. Kwak said, no, Eve was fully responsible; she had the full power to resist Satan.

Jonathan Wells: It is not that simple.

Herbert Richardson: But Eve had the power to say no to Satan. If Unification teaches that Eve possessed a power of rightness in the will so that there is a genuine fall, a misuse of freedom, then that puts the Unification Church in the traditional camp. If in fact the fall rests on immaturity, then the Unification Church falls in the other camp. The question is where it falls.

Now let's look at the doctrine of redemption. Under the doctrine of redemption happiness is given to us by God and the reason for the happiness is important. The question is, do we have that which Plato calls the end of our act, or in the order of works-righteousness in the beginning of our acts so that we act out of happiness out of a gift, or do we have to attain these as the end of our act? This says something about the quality of the human will? We can say, how does God save the world? God saves the world by saving the human will so that the human will can save the world. Where does it stand now? I felt that the most helpful point was made by Klaus. The discussion in the entire group has been about two terms, God and man, what God does and what we do. That framework for discussion is totally wrong both from the point of view of traditional Christianity and from the point of view of the Unification Church. Many traditional Christians say, we can do nothing, God can do all, but it doesn't make any difference because God gives us the grace of forgiveness, happiness, and righteousness in Jesus Christ. It is because it is given to us in Jesus Christ that we now receive it with

certainty. Provided we just cling to him. We receive it from Christ, give it to Christ, we don't get it ourselves. The doctrine about God in traditional Christianity is not a metaphysical notion. It means that God does it all in Jesus Christ and we receive it from Jesus Christ in whom God has done it perfectly. Insofar as there is any five percent at all in traditional Christianity, it is not our five-percent vis-à-vis God but it is the five-percent of Jesus Christ vis-à-vis God. There is a cooperative action in Jesus vis-à-vis God, which he is capable of because of the perfection of his being but which we are not capable of. We receive it from him in the same way the Unification Church says.

I think Klaus said it absolutely rightly. It is my personal belief that by his sixtieth birthday, yesterday, Rev. Moon had accomplished everything that was necessary for our salvation in a certain order of reality. All that it is necessary for us to do is to receive it from him. We can now talk about the establishment of institutions and the family and so forth. How would we understand this, but that we receive it from him? Now, nothing in all this theory is about us and God sharing it fifty-fifty. There is nothing in this theory that functions in a Greek modality where what we are seeking is happiness. Seeking happiness is like putting "take" before "give." Everything in the theory of the Unification Church says God gives it to us and then we receive it from him. Now it is a hundred percent give, and it doesn't even come to us directly. It is a hundred percent give in Rev. Moon. We receive it from him. It seems to me that that whole framework is basically different from the way that we have been talking about it when you put the mediatorship of the messianic office in place. Where do the "Moonies" stand, with me or with Lloyd Eby? (laughter)

Lonnie Kliever: I will try to make my concluding comment brief. It is evoked by much of the discussion this morning. I am a sort of simple-minded person who has trouble following the perorations of theological precedents in history. I like to stay close to images and to stories. Again I am struck by how much of what was said this morning is beside the point. When you explore the image of parenting, the notion that God gives freedom, which he doesn't take away or couldn't

take away, doesn't make any sense. Parents give and take all the time and there are times when I take away the present freedom of my children in the name of their future freedom, in the name of love. It just doesn't make any sense to talk about freedom that way. I have had my exchange with Herb and I won't repeat that except to simply say that the image of parenting reflects a notion of human immaturity or growth. That immaturity and growth is the ontological basis for both human freedom and necessity.

I want to make a final comment that may connect with the session to come. The parenting image is a loaded image that has dark recesses—depths and struggles which lurk beneath the surface of the upper middleclass family where the parent indulges the fantasies and the wishes of the children and where much of what I hear coming through in the conversation this morning is simply not even dreamed of. Maybe a christology which has a cross at its heart—which speaks of struggle and sacrifice and maybe even of the father slaying the son—is a place where we begin to plumb the image of the parent and the child more fully.

Durwood Foster: That is real optimism I would say! (laughter)

Unification Hermeneutics and Christology

Jonathan Wells

Introduction

For many Christians, the focus of the theological controversy generated by *Divine Principle* is christology. Not only are contemporary Christian theologians especially interested in christology per se but many of them also consider Unification christology to be the most troublesome aspect of *Divine Principle*.

What is Unification christology? Is it derived from the Bible? How is it related to traditional christological doctrines? These are just a few of the relevant questions we might ask. Unfortunately, in this short paper I cannot do justice to any of them. Nevertheless, I do offer some preliminary arguments in support of two views. First, *Divine Principle* uses scripture in a way that is hermeneutically justifiable. Second, Unification christology is doctrinally orthodox.

The Hermeneutical Problem

The Bible was a product of its times. As Robert M. Grant points out, not only was the New Testament written for the early church, but it also “reflects the life of the Church.”¹ And as long as scripture is interpreted strictly in its original historical context, biblical scholarship remains on fairly safe ground. In fact, according to Wilckens, “the only

scientifically responsible interpretation" of the New Testament is to "describe the meaning these texts have had in the context of the tradition history of early Christianity."²

However, this does not mean that we are obliged to view the Bible as a merely human document. Although Aquinas' claim that "The author of holy Scripture is God"³ is inadequate for most post-Enlightenment Christians, the Bible's own claim that "the teaching is from God" (John 7:17) still deserves to be taken seriously. But this is a theological claim, and for theological purposes a merely historical interpretation is not sufficient.

Barth maintains that "intelligent and fruitful discussion of the Bible begins when the judgment as to its human, its historical, and psychological character has been made and *put behind* us."⁴ Then we can focus our attention on the "special content" of scripture, the "inner Dialectic of the matter" in the text itself.⁵ For Bultmann, historical research is the only "scientific" method of dealing with the New Testament. But the historical text is "never the central matter itself," so "a genuine interpretation can only be given when the concepts are understood in light of the matter they are intended to convey."⁶ Ironically, despite their different emphases, both Barth and Bultmann have been criticized for doing violence to the text.

Kelsey has analyzed some uses of scripture by seven modern Protestant theologians, ranging from "conservative" (Warfield) to "neo-orthodox" (Barth) and "liberal" (Bultmann). Despite the diversity of their interpretations, all seven claim to be basing their theological proposals on the Bible. Kelsey concludes that each theologian begins with an "imaginative characterization of the mode of God's presence among the faithful" which determines his subsequent use of scripture. According to Kelsey, such an "imaginative construal" ought not to be completely arbitrary: it must be "open to reasoned elaboration." It must fall within "culturally conditioned limits to what is seriously imaginable," and it must be "responsible" to "tradition."⁷ However, within these rather wide limits it seems that Protestant theologians have exercised considerable freedom in construing the text.

Of course, the claim that there is no such thing as a “presuppositionless interpretation” is not new. Schleiermacher and Dilthey considered the “hermeneutical circle” to be an inevitable consequence of the relationship between an interpreter and the text. Although, as Betti insists, any theory of interpretation should affirm the essential autonomy of the text, it seems unlikely that any work is interpreted without the use of some “hermeneutical principle.” Schleiermacher thought that the best way to leap into the “hermeneutical circle” was to reexperience intuitively the mental processes of the author. For Dilthey, the focus was not the author but the disclosure of human experience by the text. Heidegger considered the text to be a disclosure of Being itself, and described hermeneutics as a thinking dialogue with the text which uncovers new meaning in the original event of disclosure.⁸

Following Heidegger, Gadamer’s “philosophical hermeneutics” proposes a dialectical method for understanding the meaning of a text. The first step is an attitude of openness on the part of the interpreter, followed by immersion in the subject matter itself. Once one understands the sort of questions which can be meaningfully asked (the “hermeneutical horizon”), a questioning dialogue with the text can reveal more than is already explicit in it. One must “inevitably ask questions beyond what is said.”⁹

However, Frei maintains that the “subject matter” approach to hermeneutics is inadequate. For Frei, the “hiatus posited between narrative and subject matter is misleading, if not wrong.” Instead, “the narrative itself is the meaning of the text.” It is “not a profound, buried stratum underneath” which constitutes meaning, but “the narrative structure or sequence itself.”¹⁰

Unification Hermeneutics

Divine Principle acknowledges that scripture is historically conditioned. The Bible “is not the truth itself, but a textbook teaching the truth.” The New Testament “was given as a textbook for the teaching of truth to the people of two thousand years ago.” However, since “the

quality of teaching and the method and extent of giving the truth must vary" according to the historical period, "we must not regard the text-book as absolute in every detail."¹¹

Historical critical research is not rejected by *Divine Principle*; but it is of limited value in theological interpretation, which cannot come from "synthetic research in the scriptures, and in literature, or from any human brain," but must come "from God Himself." Therefore, "we must first establish direct rapport with God in spirit through ardent prayer and next, we must understand the truth through correct reading of the Bible." The "correct reading" in *our* context may not be identical with earlier interpretations, since *Divine Principle* takes seriously the biblical claim that "I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now. When the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth." (John 16:12-13). Nevertheless, this does not mean that a new expression of truth will contradict scripture or even take the place of it, but that it will "elucidate the fundamental contents of the Bible."¹²

This approach might possibly be described in Kelsey's terms as follows: God's "mode of presence among the faithful" is characterized as more immediate now than in the past, since divine providence has reached a stage where our communication with God, lost through the fall, is now being restored. *Divine Principle* provides a "reasoned elaboration" of this claim: a providential timetable, citing biblical chronology and church history as its basis, points to the present century as the time for the fulfillment of eschatological predictions; those predictions are explained in terms of a coherent picture of how the fall is to be restored; and various modern phenomena are cited as evidence that those predictions are in fact being fulfilled.¹³ Of course, one might not agree with this "reasoned elaboration," but it meets Kelsey's criterion. Whether the "imaginative construal" of God's accessibility falls within "culturally conditioned limits to what is seriously imaginable" is an open question, which might best be answered by observing the growth of the Unification movement in various cultures. Finally the *Divine Principle* approach is responsible to a tradition that goes back more than fifteen hundred years. As Augustine wrote in his *Confessions*: "Provided, therefore, that

each of us tries as best he can to understand in the Holy Scriptures what each writer meant by them, what harm is there if a reader believes what you, the Light of all truthful minds, show him to be the true meaning? It may not even be the meaning which the writer had in mind, and yet he too saw in them a true meaning, different though it may have been from this."¹⁴

This gives us some insight into Unification hermeneutics, but it is not enough. If there were no more to be said about the *Divine Principle* approach, then it could be accused of allegorizing scripture in an arbitrary and subjective manner. But Unification hermeneutics is more precise than that. In Gadamer's terms, it might possibly be described as follows: the "subject matter" disclosed by the Bible is the story of God's relationship with humanity. Anyone who wants to understand that relationship must not be "attached to conventional ideas," but must immerse oneself in the subject matter "through humble prayer." Then, one can formulate the sorts of questions that lead to a fruitful dialogue with the text. It seems to me that two such questions, though not explicitly stated in *Divine Principle*, are nonetheless implied, and that they play an important role in Unification hermeneutics.

One implied question is: "What should be the proper relationship between God and us?" And the answer is: "parent-child relationship."¹⁵ This answer is consistent with the New Testament teachings of Jesus, who called God "Father" and directed us to do likewise (Matthew 6:6-14). Of course, other answers are also possible: for example, "a subject-object relationship," or "a creator-creature relationship;"¹⁶ but the fact that *Divine Principle* gives pre-eminence to the parent-child relationship has several important consequences. First, it suggests a loving, suffering God who is more genuinely related to us than the abstract God of classical theism. *Divine Principle* is more concerned with understanding "God's heart" than with speculating about his perfections. Second, it means that in some respects we can grow up to become very much like God. According to *Divine Principle*, we were created "in His image, after the pattern of His own character, with tremendous potential." This does not justify a naively anthropomorphic view of God, nor does

it minimize the gulf between *fallen* mankind and God. But it does affirm the fundamental intelligibility of his motives.¹⁷

Another implied question is: "How can we find the best answers to fundamental questions?" And the answer is: "By viewing them from God's standpoint."¹⁸ This is not a blasphemous claim that we can literally take God's place; instead, it relies on the familiar human ability to imagine a situation from several different perspectives. The parables of Jesus made good use of this ability: for example, the Parable of the Vineyard (Matthew 21:33-44) communicates God's viewpoint concerning the crucifixion.

This sort of imaginative "perspective shift" might also be compared to the Copernican Revolution in astronomy. When people began viewing the solar system from the standpoint of the sun, the movements of the stars and planets became more intelligible than when they were viewed from the standpoint of the earth. Astronomers did not literally go to the sun to make observations; instead, they shifted their perspective by an act of imagination. Analogously, *Divine Principle* claims that viewing creation and history from God's standpoint renders them more intelligible than viewing them from our human standpoint. Of course, we must not confuse theology with natural science; but we may have here a theological analogue of what Kuhn calls a "paradigm shift" in science.¹⁹ This is better than arbitrary allegorizing, but we have not yet pinpointed the distinctive hermeneutical perspective of *Divine Principle*. To do that, we might possibly try describing Unification hermeneutics in Frei's terms. Like Frei, *Divine Principle* interprets Genesis as a "realistic narrative," and considers "the narrative structure or sequence itself" to be fundamentally important. The Bible begins with creation, and so does Unification theology. but the biblical creation story is immediately followed by the fall story. It is clear from the narrative itself that something which should *not* have happened at the beginning did happen, and that it was contrary to God's will. It is only natural for the reader to wonder what *should* have happened—or in other words, to ask what God originally intended. *Divine Principle* poses the question in the form: "What is the purpose of creation?"

According to Genesis 1:31, God saw that the creation was “very good.” *Divine Principle* reasons that “God’s joy is produced in the same manner” as ours. Since we feel the deepest joy when we are stimulated by an object “in which our own character and form are reflected and developed,” God presumably felt joy when he saw his goodness reflected in the creation. *Divine Principle* concludes that the purpose of creation is “to return joy to God.”²⁰

Judging from Genesis 1:28, God expected his joy to be most fully realized when Adam and Eve fulfilled his blessing to “be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion . . . over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” However, if this verse were to be interpreted apart from God’s purpose, it could easily be seen as a warrant for over-population and ecological destruction. The key, according to *Divine Principle*, is individual perfection. Only after achieving the “first blessing” (God-centered individual perfection) does it make sense to proceed to the “second blessing” (God-centered families and societies) and the “third blessing” (God-centered stewardship). Therefore, our first human ancestors should have developed to perfection, fulfilling the purpose of creation by reflecting God’s own character and returning joy to him.

This conclusion is fundamental to Unification theology, and especially to Unification christology. *Divine Principle* introduces all of its major theological topics by referring to it.²¹ It could be called the “hermeneutical principle” which guides the Unification interpretation of scripture.

How can we evaluate Unification hermeneutics? Kelsey’s criteria are not normative for Christian uses of scripture, but when we apply them, *Divine Principle* at least seems to be in the right ball park. Likewise, the hermeneutical approaches of Gadamer and Frei are not normative. Describing the Unification approach in their terms does not prove anything; but it does seem to indicate that *Divine Principle* treats the text in as thoughtful and responsible a manner as do some other modern hermeneutical options. Although I would not necessarily claim that every single use of scripture by *Divine Principle* is above criticism, it

seems to me that the Unification approach is hermeneutically justifiable. Of course, whether the resulting interpretation is theologically adequate is another question, which might best be answered through comparing it with Christian doctrine.

The Christological Problem

Since there are so many different christologies in the New Testament, trinitarian and christological issues have generated endless debates among Christian theologians. Pelikan points out that the two issues, though related, are distinct: the Trinity concerns the relationship of the divine in Christ to the divine in the Father, while christology concerns the relationship of the divine in Christ to the human in Christ.²²

According to Pelikan, the specifically trinitarian question is whether Christ was "equal in his divine essence with the Creator and Lord of heaven and earth."²³ Arius, in his concern to protect God's unity and impassibility, argued that the Logos was a creature. This meant that Christ's "divinity" was something less than fully divine. The Ebionites and adoptionist Monarchians argued that Jesus was a man endowed with special powers. This meant that there was basically no difference between Christ and the prophets. However, in order for salvation to be complete, Christ had to be fully divine: "He who has seen me has seen the Father" (John 14:9).

On the other hand, Jesus Christ was also a man. The Docetists and some Monophysites, in their concern to protect Christ's divinity, argued that he could not have had a real human body. This meant that Christ's suffering and death were illusory. Apollinarius argued that Christ had a human body which was inhabited by the divine Logos instead of a human soul. This meant that Jesus lacked the most important aspect of human nature. Yet in order for salvation to be accessible, Christ had to be fully human: "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience many will be made righteous" (Romans 5:19).

The Council of Nicaea (325) attempted to safeguard the full

divinity of Christ by its “homoousion” formula, though this unscriptural and metaphysically questionable terminology has never been completely satisfactory. The Council of Chalcedon (451) confessed “the one and only Son,” who was “actually God and actually man, with a rational soul and a body.” In his divinity, Christ was “of the same reality as God” (*homoousios*). In his humanity, Christ was “like us in all respects, sin only excepted.” The “two natures” (divine and human) “concur in one person and in one hypostasis,” without confusion or separation.²⁴ Although it did not put an end to christological disputes, the Definition of Chalcedon has served ever since (at least in the West) as the norm of orthodox christology.

Despite the Chalcedonian emphasis on Christ’s full humanity as well as his divinity, Christian piety has often tended toward monophysitism and docetism. Taken by itself, the popular statement that “Jesus is God” verges on heresy. Rahner points out that not everyone is heterodox who “has problems with the statement.” Like many other modern theologians, Rahner tries to restore the balance by stressing the humanity of Jesus. This often entails reinterpreting ancient doctrinal formulations. According to Rahner, “anyone who thinks that he is able to express what is meant in the classical christology of the Incarnation in another way without doing violence to what is meant...may express it differently.”²⁵

In Rahner’s reinterpretation, the “permanent validity” of classical christology lies first in its insistence that Jesus was not just another prophet or reformer and, second, in its affirmation that in Christ “God has turned to us in such a unique and unsurpassable way that in him He has given Himself absolutely.” Rahner emphasizes the absoluteness of this “eschatological act of salvation” by calling it “final.” Nevertheless, the history of salvation “is in itself always open towards the future.”²⁶

Unification Christology

According to *Divine Principle*, our first human ancestors were supposed to attain individual perfection, reflecting God’s own character. Because of their failure, it became necessary for Christ to come,

fulfilling God's purpose by attaining the perfection intended for all of us. *Divine Principle* thus echoes not only the Sermon on the Mount (Matthew 5:48) and St. Paul (Romans 5:12-19; I Corinthians 15:45), but also Irenaeus, who claimed that Adam should have become "like God," and that Christ came to "recapitulate" the same man "who was at the beginning made after the likeness of God."²⁷

What is the nature of "individual perfection"? According to *Divine Principle*, human beings are supposed to grow to perfection through "three orderly stages of growth." During these stages, God's dominion is "indirect," leaving individuals to accomplish their own "portion of responsibility" by their obedience. This is necessary in order for them to become like God by "inheriting God's creatorship." However, a person who passes the "perfection" state "enters the direct dominion of God," which is a dominion of love rather than compulsion. Since love is the strongest force in the universe, the bond of love between God and a perfected individual can never be broken.²⁸

Upon entering God's direct dominion, a person lives "in perfect union with God's heart," "feels all that God feels," and "cannot do anything which would cause God grief." Therefore, such a person "could never fall." According to *Divine Principle*, the relationship between God and a perfected man or woman may be compared to the relationship between a mind and a body. Just as the body is "the substantial object to the invisible mind, which it resembles," so a perfected individual is "the substantial object to the invisible God, taking after His image." Such a person becomes the "temple" of God, "assuming deity." Therefore, someone who attains the purpose of creation "would assume the divine value of God."²⁹

Divine Principle affirms that "Jesus was a man who had attained the purpose of creation." This "does not in the least diminish his value." Rather, Jesus was a man of divine value, and "in light of his deity, he may well be called God." *Divine Principle* "does not deny the attitude of faith held by many Christians that Jesus is God, since it is true that a perfected man is one body with God." However, Jesus "can by no means be God Himself" since "the Bible demonstrates most plainly that Jesus

is a man." The relationship between God and Jesus "can be compared to that between mind and body," but "the body can by no means be the mind itself."³⁰

Divine Principle justifies all of these claims by referring to standard christological passages in the New Testament. It also relies on Unification ontology which, like the now-archaic Greek metaphysics of the creeds, does not claim to be derived from the Bible. Unification ontology maintains that a subject-object relationship, such as the one between internal character (mind) and external form (body), is the basis for all "existence, multiplication and action."³¹ This strong relational emphasis indicates that the unity between God and Jesus, like that between mind and body, is ontological and not merely moral. The result is a christology that is consistent not only with scripture, but also with the Definition of Chalcedon.

Like Chalcedon, Unification christology affirms that Christ in his divinity is one body with the Father. Like Chalcedon, Unification christology maintains that the divine and human natures are united ontologically in one person, unconfused and unseparated, just as a person's mind and body are distinct but united. However, God does not take the place of the human mind in Jesus, so Unification christology is not Apollinarian. *Divine Principle* echoes Chalcedon in claiming that the man Jesus was "no different from us except for the fact that he was without original sin."³² Therefore, like Chalcedon, Unification christology affirms the true humanity of Christ.

One interesting consequence of this approach is that it allows for genuine growth. Although Jesus was born sinless, he had to pass through stages of growth before reaching perfection. Therefore, unlike christologies which assert that Jesus was perfect from his conception, Unification christology allows for genuine *temptation*. However, it does not lead to a heretically adoptionistic view of Christ. Unlike mere prophets and reformers, Jesus was born sinless and achieved perfect unity with God. And, unlike them, he came as the savior of the whole world.

How was Christ supposed to save the world? Unification soteriology,

like Unification ontology, is fundamentally relational. Those who believe in Jesus are united to him, and he is united to God: "I am in the Father, and you in me, and I in you" (John 14:20). Therefore, people should have united fully with Jesus: "This is the work of God, that you believe in him whom he has sent" (John 6:29). It was through disbelief, contrary to God's will, that Jesus was crucified. Furthermore, from the standpoint of God, Jesus was supposed to fulfill all three of the original blessings, and not just the first one. Although *Divine Principle* affirms that the crucifixion had redemptive value, it concludes that God did not originally intend for Jesus to be crucified.³³ This conclusion, though controversial, seems to have as much scriptural support as its opposite. In any case, it does not violate basic Christian doctrine, as defined by the seven ecumenical councils.

Divine Principle maintains that all people should be "reborn through Christ," becoming children of goodness, "cleansed of original sin." They should then grow to perfection, fulfilling the purpose of creation. Christ is the "first fruits" (I Corinthians 15:20-33), but there should be many more like him. This does not jeopardize Christ's "unsurpassability," since no one can assume "a value greater than that of a man who has attained the purpose of creation." However, *Divine Principle* claims that other perfected individuals would have a value "equal to that of Jesus," differing from him only in "time and order."³⁴

Does that jeopardize Christ's "uniqueness?" *Divine Principle* explicitly affirms Jesus' uniqueness, in the sense that every perfected individual is unique and unlike any other. This claim is stronger than it sounds at first, because every perfected individual plays a unique and irreplaceable role in returning joy to God. Furthermore, Jesus will always be unique as the "first fruits."³⁵ Nevertheless, there does seem to be a problem here. It concerns the issue of "finality."

Of course, "finality" per se is not a Christian doctrine, and therefore does not define orthodoxy. Although many Christians tend to equate "orthodox" with "conventional" or "traditional" it really means adherence to right doctrine. Since the East-West schism and the Protestant Reformation, the proliferation of denominational confessions

has enormously complicated the doctrinal situation, but in the most basic sense of "Christian," Christian doctrine is limited to scripture and the creeds of the seven ecumenical councils. To be orthodox, a Christian must affirm, in essence, what scripture and the creeds affirm, and refrain from asserting what they prohibit. So although we need not affirm "finality" to be orthodox, we must affirm whatever it is in Christian doctrine that "finality" is attempting to describe.

There are at least two senses of "finality" which are affirmed by *Divine Principle*. The first is that Jesus Christ can be called the "final cause" of the world in the sense that the purpose of creation was fulfilled in him. The second is that Jesus' position is "final" in the sense that no one can ever replace him as the "first fruits."³⁶ But there is clearly something more at stake here, and it runs on the interpretation of "only-begotten Son."

As a *trinitarian* phrase, "only-begotten Son" refers to the divine nature of Christ, which is "true God from true God, begotten not created" (Nicaea). Christ's divinity is the "only-begotten Logos of God," and "before time began, he [i.e., Christ] was begotten of the Father, in respect of his deity" (Chalcedon).³⁷ The purpose of these phrases is to affirm that Christ's divine nature, as the second person of the Trinity, is God himself. Since God's basic nature is unchangeable, He always had and always will have only one Logos. In this affirmation, *Divine Principle* concurs.³⁸ Although it could be argued that *Divine Principle* uses the word "trinity" in unconventional ways, it seems to me that Unification theology and Christian doctrine basically agree on the trinitarian meaning of "only-begotten Son."

However, as a christological phrase, "only-begotten Son" necessarily has different implications, since Christ's human nature was begotten *in time*. If Christ is called "only-begotten" in "respect of his human-ness," the description is a temporal one. In human terms, the claim that a father has only one begotten son describes the present (and possibly the past), but says nothing about the *future*. It seems that the "finality" claim is attempting to say what the creeds do not: "There is only one begotten (human) son, and *there can never be another*."

Many Christians might think that the creeds intended to make this claim, even though it is not explicit. For example, someone might argue that the hypostatic union insures that the Logos is so fundamentally united to the man Jesus that the two can never be separated. But this argument misses the point. Of course it is true that Jesus and the Logos can never be separated. But the creeds could *not* be implying that the Logos is *limited* to Jesus. Since the Logos is "true God from true God," it is (like God) eternal and omnipresent. The man Jesus, on the other hand, is (like us) temporally and spatially limited. To say that there is *no more* to the Logos than Jesus is to say that God has lost some of his attributes. Then Christ would not be fully divine, and that is certainly *not* what the creeds intend to say.

Therefore, when *Divine Principle* affirms that we are intended to be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect (Matthew 5:48) and concludes that God is not limited to a single incarnation, it is not contradicting basic Christian doctrine. To be sure, Unification christology is unconventional and (at the moment) unpopular. But it is neither un-Christian nor heretical. It affirms, in essence, what scripture and the creeds affirm, and it refrains from asserting what they prohibit. Doctrinally, Unification christology is orthodox.

Nevertheless, it could conceivably be declared heretical, if the Protestant, Catholic, and Eastern Orthodox churches could settle their differences long enough to convene another ecumenical council. If that were to happen, Unification christology could be anathematized and another creed could be promulgated. All it would have to say is: "God must *never* have any more sons. Nor, for that matter, any daughters."

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Robert M. Grant, *A Historical Introduction to the New Testament* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), p. 60.
- ²Ulrich Wilckens, "Über die Bedeutung historischer Kritik in der modernen Bibelexegese," in his *Was heisst Auslegung der Heiligen Schrift?* (Regensburg: Pustet, 1966), p. 133, translated and quoted in Edgar Krentz, *The Historical-Critical Method* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), p. 33.
- ³Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Ia,1,10, Blackfriar's translation (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1969), p. 60.
- ⁴Karl Barth, *The Word of God and the Word of Man*, trans. Douglas Horton (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 60-61.
- ⁵Warner Georg Kümmel, *The New Testament*, trans. S. MacLean Gilmour and Howard C. Kee (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972), p. 367.
- ⁶Kümmel, pp. 372-73, 378.
- ⁷David H. Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), pp. 170-75.
- ⁸Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 36, 57, 86-89, 113-21, 130, 147-49.
- ⁹Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury, 1975), pp. 325-41.
- ¹⁰Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 269-70, 280.
- ¹¹*Divine Principle* (Washington: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), pp. 9, 131; hereafter cited as *DP*.
- ¹²*DP*, pp. 15-16, 132, 152.
- ¹³*DP*, pp. 103-14, 120, 125, 128, 403.
- ¹⁴Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1961), p. 296.
- ¹⁵*DP*, pp. 12, 39, 77.
- ¹⁶*DP*, pp. 25-28, 35, 55.
- ¹⁷*DP*, pp. 10, 41, 43, 212-13.
- ¹⁸*DP*, p. 13.
- ¹⁹Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
- ²⁰*DP*, pp. 41-42.
- ²¹*DP*, pp. 19, 68, 100, 140, 168, 195, 206, 222.
- ²²Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition*, Vol. 1 of *The Christian Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 175.
- ²³Pelikan, pp. 176, 226.
- ²⁴John H. Leith, ed., *Creeds of the Churches*, rev. ed. (Atlanta: Knox, 1973), pp. 30-36.
- ²⁵Karl Rahner, *Foundations of Christian Faith*, trans. William V. Dych (New York: Seabury, 1978), pp. 288-91.
- ²⁶Rahner, pp. 299-301.

²⁷Irenaeus, *Against Heresies*, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, eds. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1975), I, 522, 538.

²⁸*DP*, pp. 52-57, 80-81.

²⁹*DP*, pp. 43, 206.

³⁰*DP*, pp. 209-11.

³¹*DP*, pp. 20-29.

³²*DP*, p. 212.

³³*DP*, pp. 142-47.

³⁴*DP*, pp. 206-9, 213.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Rahner, pp. 300, 318. These are two of the several ways in which Rahner seems to be using the word, "final."

³⁷Leith, pp. 30-31, 35-36.

³⁸*DP*, pp. 196, 215.

Notes on Christology and Hermeneutics: Especially Regarding Dialogue with Unification Theology

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This paper consists of propositions that might appear in the christological part of a regular course in Christian systematic theology, interwoven with comments prompted by the prospect of dialogue about and with Unification treatment of the same themes. It is essentially a first draft, tentative and anticipatory in mood.

Introduction

1. The notion of a “christ,” broadly taken, has many parallels in human experience, e.g., the *avatars* of Vishnu, the Jain *tirthankaras*, the *bodhisattvas* and *buddhas*, the Jewish messiahs such as Shabbatai Zebi, the Muslim *mahdis*, modern figures like Baha’u’llah and Meher Baba, and political saviors like Che or Khomeini. The list could go on and on. Wherever a decisive historical instrument of providence (of the liberation and fulfillment of history) is awaited or affirmed, there we have messianic thinking, at least in a general sense.

Comment. In this wide perspective, clearly the Unification movement would invite christological analysis, even if no explicit messianic title had been associated, definitely or contingently, with the Rev. Moon.

2. Thus the functional meaning of “christ” is not something freakish or rare. Humans have—or they are expecting—their christs and their lords. To communicate Jesus, or someone else, as Christ and Lord is not so much a matter of addressing an empty space in human

existence as it is a matter of claiming a prepared space, or contesting a preempted one.

Comment. Insofar as the claim that is or might be made for the Rev. Moon that he is the Lord or Christ who previously came in Jesus, Unification christology would take the form of both claiming a prepared space and—overagainst an already “realized” eschatology—contesting a preempted one. It would figure that such a christology (as indeed any christology) might be welcomed by some as yearned-for glad tidings and hostilely resisted by others as a threat.

3. The center of historic Christian faith is the conviction, amid the rivalry of many gods and lords (I Corinthians 8:5), that “Jesus is Lord” (Romans 10:9, I Corinthians 12:3) or that the Christ is Jesus (normatively, definitively) or that God (our Ultimate Concern, the Primordial Creator, the foundational power of being) is specifically the God who loves and calls us to love as Jesus loved.

Comment. A basic question would be whether Unificationism shares this axial conviction. Somewhat different attitudes toward it seem to exist in the church. Ostensibly Unificationism does share the conviction, so far as it affirms Jesus as the Christ and accepts his authority. Ostensibly it does not, so far as it relativizes Jesus’ authority by positing a more definitive subsequent revelation—*unless* this subsequent revelation should really be what mainstream Christianity has envisaged as the return of Christ. In terms of what we have so far said, this issue does not yet readily “compute.” Parsing it and construing how theology might deal with it is the overall problem before us.

4. In the course of Christian thought there have arisen three main themes or problem areas in the interpretation of Christ: (i) how Christ is known, (ii) who Christ is, and (iii) what Christ does.

Comment. This threefold division, which as formal schema would apply to any messianically structured faith, is, of course, also to be found in Unification thought.

Christic Epistemology

5. The first theme has generated particularly acute problems since

the development of critical historiography and its application to the biblical record. A popular way of posing these problems has been to ask about the relation of the "Christ of faith" and the "Jesus of history." More recently, many of the same problems have been refocused within the framework of hermeneutics, the theory of interpretation. In the earlier Christian centuries, the continuity of Christ with a putatively reconstructible Jesus was not so explicitly problematic, though from its beginnings Christianity did struggle with the relation between the "living Christ" and the witness to Jesus that came to be preserved in the canonical scriptures.

Comment. The beginnings of Unificationism were unsophisticated regarding the problems posed by modern historiography and hermeneutics. Though exegetically bold and insightful—and sometimes pointedly responding to the "modern intellect"—*Divine Principle* is largely oblivious to the technical literature in which such problems have been defined and redefined by generations of liberal scholarship. However, the Unification movement has entered an extremely interesting phase of encountering modern critical theology. This began with Dr. Young Oon Kim and has greatly expanded through the Barrytown Seminary and its graduates. While the results of the encounter are not strictly predictable, it would not be surprising to see a recapitulation of what has happened in modern theology *überhaupt*: polarization into "fundamentalist" and "modernistic" wings, with a mediating center.

This may be delayed, however, since under the impact of the "living Christ" (or Holy Spirit) reflective issues tend to remain dormant. As long as Unificationism is dominated by such an experience—concentrated in the person of the founder and mediated through a coterie of apostolic leaders—direct divine authority may obviate historical and hermeneutical methodology. Meanwhile, depending on the perceived status of Rev. Moon and *Divine Principle*, the movement may become more and more detached from the Christian mainstream, as have Mormonism and Christian Science.

But is it clear what kind and degree of authority the Unification Church actually attributes to Rev. Moon and *Divine Principle*? An

apodictic plenary authority? Obviously not, so far as the printed book *Divine Principle* is concerned. It is clearly subject to both revision and supplementation. And it is said to be as yet unresolved (for many followers at least) whether Rev. Moon is in fact Lord of the Second Advent. Is this to say it is yet unsettled whether his authority is certain?

6. For purposes of analysis three Christs may be distinguished: (i) the original Jesus, (ii) the biblical picture of this original Jesus, and (iii) the living contemporary presence of this Jesus as the Christ. It is the upshot of the theological tradition—in, through, and with continual tension among these three moments or elements—to insist that all three belong to the wholeness of Jesus as the Christ, or of the Christ whom we know, or knew, as Jesus.

Comment. The fact that Unification theology also posits these three elements and their consistency establishes with mainstream Christianity, notwithstanding all differences, crucial rudiments of a common hermeneutical arena. In spite of the absence of critical apparatus, *Divine Principle*, in inferentially constructing its view of various passages, posits the actual biblical history behind the record. While not “afraid to remove old traditional concepts,” it assumes both the veracity of the text (sometimes literally, sometimes symbolically, as is reasonable) and the factual referentiality of the text—that is to say, it assumes both the biblical and the real historical Christ, without a sense of any hiatus between them. And, of course, in the third place, it adduces the living Christ or Holy Spirit, this third element being for it the hermeneutical fulcrum.

The third element—the living Christ—seems clearly decisive for Unificationism inasmuch as the latter has made its way so far, not primarily by critical erudition, but by virtue of fresh religious inspiration. It has been the *Holy Spirit* Association for the Unification of World Christianity (*italics added*). Rev. Moon, even if not yet fully certified as Christ *redivivus*, is supposed to have been in direct touch with the ascended Jesus. It would be germane in this connection for Unification thought to thematize precisely how it does understand the cognitive processes of Rev. Moon. Is his knowledge believed to be grounded at

least partly in prodigious study or in a continuous special bond with God? In sporadic supervention of the Spirit over otherwise normally human mental operations? In impartations through seance-like experiences from Jesus and others in the heavenly world? Or, as seems inferable from the variety of data, in a medley of such ways? Phenomenologists of religion must very much hope that someday Rev. Moon himself will give us a careful publicly accessible deposition on this matter.

In any event, with the living Christ element so hermeneutically pivotal, it is surprising how much detailed attention is given in *Divine Principle* to biblical-historical argumentation. One might think the Rev. Moon would reveal everything by edict, or like the authors of the occult lives of Jesus. Instead there is a massive (albeit critically undocumented) effort at historical persuasion, by a persuader who purports to reason for the most part inductively from the exegetical data. The patent care to have the Bible agree with *Divine Principle* expresses an apparent commitment to the integrity—in some sense—of the three Christs: original, biblical, and living. But in what sense?

7. So far as concerns the Christian mainstream one might, on the one hand, state the relation between the three Christs thus: that the original Jesus becomes decisive for faith insofar as he is *witnessed to* as the biblical Christ, and the biblical Christ becomes decisive insofar as he is *manifest to* the community of faith as our contemporary and coming Savior and Lord.

Comment. Unificationism is clearly in accord with this formulation, which amounts in fact to the decisive hermeneutical principle that the present epiphany of Christ is determinative for the other two Christs. "To know Christ is to know his benefits" (Melanchthon)—that is, to experience his saving reality here and now. "Christ" means the agency, the process or the person in and through which or whom the divine realm is established as fulfillment of history. Thus, whoever becomes manifest as the unifier of humankind under God is *ipso facto* Christ. The contemporary christic epiphany thus involved becomes the interpretive key to assessing scripture and its underlying history. Luther's principle, *was Christum treibet*, with Christ now understood as contemporaneous,

selects and illuminates the data. This resonates with (indeed, it sparks) that trend of general hermeneutics, from Schleiermacher and Dilthey to Heidegger and Ricouer, in which *Geschichte* annuls *Historie*, the textual-factual submits as material cause to the finality of present existence which comprehends and validates it. This is what Barth attempted to repudiate as "Cartesianism" and Gogarten called the "triumph of subjectivism" in modern thought.

8. On the other hand, in the Christian mainstream, the obverse of the foregoing proposition (#7) has also obtained, viz., the manifestation of Christ in the present (i.e., the claim to be such, to be the instrument of the Holy Spirit) has been tested by conformation to the biblical, and the biblical (were any hiatus between the two acknowledged) by conformation to the original historical Christ. "No one speaking by the Spirit of God ever says 'Jesus be cursed!' " (I Corinthians 12:3)

Comment. From the earliest times there was insistence upon the conformability of the *testimonium internum spiritus sancti* (as this erupted, e.g., with great dynamism in such phenomena as Montanism and later the *Schwärmer*) to the apostolic witness and then to the biblical picture of Christ which became its repository. Only with the rise of modern historiography was it feasible to envisage the original Jesus as offering, in principle, another touchstone, *alongside* or prior to the biblical witness—a development which inevitably relativized the latter, opening the way for what Barth wanted to oppose as "Cartesianism" or "subjectivism." Over the feasibility and application of this other touchstone, christendom has tended to bifurcate into fundamentalism, which refused to submit the biblical norm to "higher criticism," and liberalism, which affirmed such criticism without limitation. Such was the state of affairs two generations ago. Since then the historiographical-hermeneutical discussion has greatly complexified, with fundamentalism (while eschewing its old nametag in favor of "evangelicalism") increasingly accepting modes of higher criticism—as did also Roman Catholicism—and liberalism increasingly recognizing in and under such criticism profound methodological problems. The situation today, in foundational theory, is volatile, with old alignments in extensive

disarray. Even so, one may still say that for mainstream Christianity generally it is a salient principle that the living Christ (or the coming Christ or the Holy Spirit) is to be tested by the biblical and historical Christ(s), whether or not these be regarded as structurally homogeneous, as in fundamentalism, or as critically disparate, as in liberalism. A paramount recent enactment of this principle was the emergence of the Barmen Declaration to oppose the Nazi christ—the appeal to what Tillich called the “great *Kairos*” (Jesus as the Christ) over against the seductive power of the present *kairos*. But is there any established protocol by which testing of current christic candidates by the biblical-historical Christ must or might be systematically carried out? Obviously the dividedness of christendom severely beclouds and impedes the very idea of such a program in general. In any event, theologians today seem quite unresolved about such matters, not just among but within themselves. Nonetheless, such testing presumably would involve comparing the newly claimed messianic epiphany with the concrete features of the historical-biblical Christ, e.g., his righteous love, his humility and poverty, his healing forgiveness, his unreserved trust in God and zeal for God’s realm, his being for others, especially for the sick, deprived, oppressed, and lost, his open-hearted universalism, his *via crucis*, and the liberating, whole-making grace manifest in the power of his resurrection. In such comparison a merely quantitative calculus would be as unsuitable as it would be in the act of falling in love. Nor could it be forgotten that one of the striking features of the historical-biblical Christ is his contrariety to messianic expectations. There is a sense in which the Christ is, by definition, not the one whom the preexisting definitions expect.

As already said, it is clear that the Unification Church proposes in some sense to accord not only with Proposition 7 but also with Proposition 8; hence the energetic attempt to demonstrate that Rev. Moon’s emergence fulfills biblical predictions. *Divine Principle’s* apologetic attention to the letter of scriptural apocalyptic is more pertinent to the evangelical (or older fundamentalist) than to the liberal sphere of discourse. On the other hand, the description of the crisis of modernity

is relevant to the liberal as well as evangelical mentality and also to vast numbers alienated from traditional churches. The historical-biblical Christ is or is supposed to be the one who breaks down the dividing walls of hostility and unifies world history under God, judging and transforming in the process the failures (among others) of his own would-be followers. This idea or normative affirmation, one view of the sorely felt disunities of our world—within christendom, among religions, among sciences and between science and religion, between the secular and the spiritual, between races and sexes, between communism and democracy—becomes eschatological. The biblical Christ who came as Jesus, construes as a role, a pledge, the mystery of God's purpose through the ages, calls out for fulfillment, grasping the consciousness of Sun Myung Moon as his ownmost vocation. Correspondingly, the program of Rev. Moon essays to explain and thus confirm itself in the format of biblical history.

Regarding the actual or potential conformation of the Rev. Moon to Jesus as the Christ, a mixed impression emerges *prima facie*. There is in the founder of Unificationism an inspiring forcefulness of heart and mind dedicated with seemingly unswerving confidence and sagacious practical insight to uniting humanity under God. This may, in principle, plausibly be construed as continuous with, or the reinstantiation of, the biblical-historical Christ. On the other hand, what about the disparities that seem to exist in poverty and opulence, in the figure of the lonely suffering servant over against the acclaimed leader of a flourishing movement? To be sure, Unification theology cites great mental and physical suffering *earlier* endured by Rev. Moon for his mission's sake, while biblical imagery depicts the once-humiliated Christ *returning* in glory. So the matter is more complex than many take it at first blush. How about the special concern of Jesus for the poor and the oppressed? It has been doubted whether Rev. Moon was notably aware of, or his message very relevant to, the plight of the third world or, in general, the concerns of liberation theology including its feminist version. This is an open question. Some have the same doubts about Jesus! At any rate, Unification thought is very biblical in not separating the religious from

the socio-political (though to identify them would also be extremely dubious); and there are impressive evidences of response to the "wretched of the earth." Moreover, the protean nature of the Unification movement is such that if liberation theology, for example, expresses an as yet unincorporated element that might be valid, steps are taken to arrange dialogue and enable assimilation. Is this kind of absorbent openness messianically undignified? There is a strand of christological sensibility that feels so, as witness the efforts to bedeck the historical Jesus with *a priori* omniscience. Certainly a superficial syncretism will sink in its own confusion. But on the other hand there are unmistakable indications that Jesus was a receptive person whose vision even of his own mission was enlarged by others (cf. the exchange with the Syro-Phoenician woman, Matthew 15:21-28). Again in such respects we see that the comparative issue is far from simple, especially if on guard against a priggish absolutizing of one's own conception of how Christ would return.

For the outsider, comparison with Jesus is all the more difficult because there is not yet what we might call a Unification "New Testament" that would present a canonical personal image of Rev. Moon. *Divine Principle* is a kind of Unification "Old Testament" (granted that in a further sense the Christian Bible is also this), leading up to the Second Advent but breaking off there. Elements of a "Moonie" gospel tradition are forming inchoately (the anecdotes, the "Master Speaks" teachings, etc.), but these have not yet coalesced on anything parallel to the biblical picture of Jesus as the Christ. Perhaps they could not yet have done so. At least it is difficult to imagine the conclusion of such a process during the earthly lifetime of its subject. There is a sense in which only death can render us whole in history's eye.

In any event our considerations so far are *qualitative*. Supposing they *should* indicate significant conformation between Rev. Moon (as the living, returning Christ) and the predecessor Christ who was Jesus, what about the *quantitative* dimension? Has the Rev. Moon, any more than Jesus in the first century, impacted the world *extensively* in an eschatologically transformative way? Will he? It may have been easier to

think so in the movement's earlier phases, and becomes more problematic as years elapse. Ironically, it was because Jesus, who was personally an unambiguous exemplar of God's reign, failed to change history in the large that his second coming became necessary. Will Unificationism conceive a return for Rev. Moon as the culminating moment if a gradual permeation is not achieved during his lifetime? Or will some hold, as Christian "realized eschatology" does now of Jesus, that he has already accomplished for history all that is required of the Christ and that he remains in spiritual communion with us as the Living Lord? This kind of question does, to be sure, jump the gun. For clearly, even though he is sixty years old, Rev. Moon and his church are working today very hopefully and industriously to bring off the eschaton soon, God willing. My intuition, based on the last section of *Divine Principle*, was that the public epiphany of the Advent was foreseen for Korea, 1980; but this has now been postponed. Who knows what dramatic developments the next few years will offer, or how much closer the pattern of Sun Myung Moon's life may come to that of Jesus?

Whatever substantive considerations might be broached in comparing Rev. Moon with Jesus, modern philosophy of religion makes us aware that any such undertaking confronts a great thicket of *ideological* issues. We are snagged on the thorns of this thicket in all the various dialogues going on today—Jewish-Christian, Christian-Buddhist, Christian-Marxist, etc. To come to believe, or to disbelieve, in a christ, or in a decisive new revelation, or in a governing perspective of any kind, is a matter of *conversion*, a leap of faith, a determinative "blik." It is not simply or merely or even mainly a linear rational process like deductive and inductive argument, though most of us would probably maintain that reasoning may and ought to play a significant role within it. We must acknowledge that a methodology of comparative christology—the inner core of comparative theology—in spite of anticipations throughout history remains extremely inchoate. The fact that we come to the Bahamas to join in conversation shows, I trust, that we do not regard the methodological challenge as hopeless. Indeed, it is the experience of some of us at least that, however lacking the theory of it

may be and even if prestigious hermeneuts tell us it cannot be happening, significant comparative insights do occur and people are changed by such meetings as ours here.

What can one say, then, about the hermeneutics of conversion—of comparative christological suasion? Let me venture some ancillary observations.

i. Christological hermeneutics presupposes some measure of radical openness or receptivity, since it questions, by definition, the most axiomatic principles of one's faith or world view, including, of course, one's own hermeneutic.

ii. It presupposes and employs diverse conceptional filters and ratiocinative behaviors, a web of pre-understanding and procedural habit which both facilitates and hampers and is variously malleable.

iii. It is implemented (one hopes) by dialogue, which is potentiated by being together in more than merely intellectual ways.

iv. It involves personal witness, which is enhanced by "life stories."

v. It is mediated by affective states dependent usually (as in iii.) on social contextualization.

vi. Given a field of force generated by such conditions, it seems to work somewhat like quantum mechanics: *not* by exactly traceable linear causation (= logical progression) but by serendipitous jumps ("aha" experiences, Ramsey's "penny dropping," etc.) unpredictable for the discrete individual. But unlike quantum mechanics (which is statistically verifiable) christological hermeneutics does not seem to produce, even in retrospect, a result that is publicly demonstrable. It is not even clear that this would change if everyone alive were converted to one single christ. Thus, so long as history lasts, christology rests on faith, though it does characteristically envisage an ultimate corroboration.

The Unification Church is doing a great deal to promote the dynamics of dialogue, including dialogical christology. It would be disappointing if the rudimentary science of christological hermeneutics should not be considerably informed by the experience.

9. In mainstream Christian tradition the interaction of Propositions 7 and 8 produces a reciprocating hermeneutics in which, with shifts of

emphasis from time to time and theologian to theologian, the main interpretive thrust is now forward from the biblical-historical to the present-future, and then again backward from the present-future to the biblical-historical Christ(s). However, the "game" of orthodox christological interpretation calls for play to be always concurrently underway *both up and down* the field.

Comment. While Unification thought cannot *a priori* be said to break the rules of this game, since it ostensibly intends to read the present from the past as well as *vice versa*, nevertheless the weight of Unification interpretation appears to be inordinately determined by the present. Its appeal to and construction of biblical history has been launched by and large without either the apparatus of critical scholarship or *Auseinandersetzung* with the collegium of mainstream theology. Because it is emphatically a "theology of the Holy Spirit" (as Barth used this phrase to describe Schleiermacher and then American theology), there is now a burden of proof upon Unificationism to demonstrate its biblical-historical credibility. Perhaps the crucial way this demonstration can be mounted is the successful assimilation by Unification scholar-theologians of the most sophisticated biblical erudition and theology of the day. As we know, this is now being undertaken. Needless to say, the outcome will not be evident for a while.

As for would-be Christian orthodoxy, the question is equally pertinent whether *it* is authentically open to the present-future incursion of Christ. Is its hermeneutics a genuinely Christian *Zirkel des Verstehens* (Gadamer)? Or is it looking only backward and inward, and not outward and forward? Far too much so according to recent radical assessments from *within* the Christian household (theology of hope, liberation, etc.). Therefore the Unification Church and the "new religious movements" in general at least raise pressing questions about the credibility of any kind of Christian confessionalism that would simply rest upon the Bible and the creeds. What makes Unificationism particularly interesting in this respect is that it presses its case with a provocative use of the elementals of Christian tradition itself.

10. The original Jesus is not to be identified with the figure of Jesus

reconstructible by critical historiography. Here we must notice an ambiguity in the phrase "the historical Jesus." It can mean the actual reality of Jesus as he originally was in his life on earth. But it can also mean the reality of Jesus *as this can be ascertained by* critical historiography. These two meanings would be the same only if historiography possessed *data* adequate for reconstructing Jesus' life and its objectifying *method* could cope with those aspects of Jesus that are uniquely decisive for faith. But it is the consensus of contemporary scholarship that neither of these conditions obtains. Therefore the "historical Jesus" of historiographical reconstruction is not to be equated with the original Jesus whom faith affirms.

Comment. Unification theology would presumably have no quarrel with this. On the contrary, one might think the state of affairs so described could be used to defend approaches to history and to Jesus that ignore, as *Divine Principle* largely does, the apparatus of critical scholarship. Certainly we have had in mainstream seminaries in recent decades many students who were inclined to ignore biblical criticism because they felt its objectifying methodology could not yield decisive theological help. They have listened more eagerly to what Swami Muktananda or Ram Dass might have to say about Jesus.

11. Nevertheless, neither can the original Jesus whom faith affirms be separated from the work of critical historiography. For the affirmation of Christ's historical reality implies, though it cannot be derived from, the historiographical plausibility of *those aspects* of the biblical picture which may in principle, i.e., in terms of adequate data and valid method, become objects of research. Thus, for instance, the current discussion of Jesus' probable attitude toward revolutionary violence is not a matter of indifference to faith. In keeping with its radical historicity, Christianity regards historiography not merely as a discipline to which it must stand open, but as one from which it expects and receives clarification of its most essential concern.

Comment. For Christian tradition in general it has been a test of inestimable importance whether it could withstand the corrosive acids of modernity with intellectual openness and honesty. Schleiermacher,

the father of liberal theology and of modern Christian hermeneutics, pledged his lifework to the compatibility of objective science and Christian faith. Hermeneutically this meant for him that the unique insights of faith are always to be appropriated and interpreted in and through the universals of reason. Faith—and centrally faith in the historical Christ—transcends the deliverances of rational method, but without violating its structure. Thus the Christian hermeneut (ideally) masters all the philological and historical data according to the modes of publicly accessible science, and then, using these as categorically respected media, interprets the singular miracle of Christ which is never reducible to them. In other words, the Christ of faith is both immanent within and also transcends the Jesus who is the rightful object of historical research.

As already remarked, in its initial phase Unification theology did not participate in the forum of modern critical historiography. Now, however, it has begun to, as young Unificationists pursue doctorates in Old and New Testament at leading academic centers. The boldness of the movement in promulgating this entry into the milieu of modern academia is remarkable (paralleled on a wider scale by the annual International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences). In principle, it obviously tends to confirm the universal intentionality of the movement, while at the same time it may precipitate severe strains in Unification self-understanding.

The Person of Christ

12. Besides epistemology the other two major thematic areas generated in historical christology (who Christ is and what he does) have generally been referred to under the rubrics *Person* and *Work* of Christ. It is a commonplace of modern theology to stress the interdependence of these two. By definition, who Christ is is inseparable from what he (or she) does. Notwithstanding this, however, a relative distinction in line with theological tradition is useful for purposes of analysis; it exposes certain issues that the Christian mainstream has deemed vital.

Comment. Unification theology seems not to make systematic use

of this distinction. Rather, Christ's person is subsumed under or into his work or office, i.e., his historical role as unifier of humankind under God. This is the kind of christology that is generally called "low," as contrasted with a "high" christology that magnifies Christ's person. A low christology correlates with the feasibility of construing different human individuals as the bearer of the christ-role or christ-identity.

13. Turning next, then, to the doctrine of Christ's person, we note initially that there are in the Bible many representations of who Jesus is: rabbi, prophet, shepherd, priest, king, lamb of God, Son of God, Son of man, and so on. All of these contribute nuances of the whole meaning. Among such titles or designations, that of "Christ" (messiah, God's anointed) is, of course, pre-eminent. It expresses the historical agent through whom God's reign or realm (the aim of history) is being decisively prepared, announced, and realized. It stands for the decisive conjoint action of God and humanity in history.

Comment. Unification theology agrees generally that "Christ" stands for the decisive conjoint action of God and humanity in history. However, it sees (at least) two principal individuals as comprising the human side of the formula: Jesus and Rev. Moon.

In Christian tradition there is considerable precedent for envisaging various instantiations of Christ other than the supreme one that occurs in Jesus. Isaiah 45:1, for example, ascribes a messianic role to Cyrus; and I Corinthians 10:4 envisages as Christ the rock that gave forth water in the wilderness. Later, and especially in recent theology, the notion is increasingly widely adopted of fragmentary anticipations of Jesus as the Christ. To be sure, the otherness of such instantiations of Christ is thought of as very much a qualified otherness, as is posited in the idea of anticipation. But there is in the very concept of Christ a basic two-foldness: the uniting of two ontologically distinct realities. There is on the one hand a universal meaning (or value or reality—let us say simply one's climactic universal referent or symbol), and on the other hand a particular finite agent through whom this universal is concretely instantiated. The first element, the universal, is variously named: "logos," "way," "truth," "life," "righteousness," "love," and finally "God."

The central Christian conviction has been that this universal, however best named, is *supremely* instantiated in the particular human life of Jesus. This is not to say it is instantiated *only* in him, though a few Christian theologians may at points have appeared to assert this, engendering a kind of christological exclusivism that is not consistent with the thrust of the Christian mainstream. Today a rising chorus of theological utterance increasingly vindicates the authentic biblical-Christian view that Jesus is the decisive and normative but not by any means the only enactment of the Christ reality in human history (not to speak of cosmic history).

Thus the Christian theological tradition could readily entertain the view the Rev. Moon might be an instantiation of the christic process.

However, as already considered above (Part I), traditional Christianity proposes to test other christic instantiations by the norm of Jesus. This is true of the "little christs" Luther saw all followers of Jesus summoned to be, of the outstanding exemplars of christness that we have in such persons as Mother Teresa and anonymously, in Gandhi, and also, as we discussed, in the Second Advent of Christ himself (or herself, for "Christ," strictly speaking, is not *per se* a male designation anymore than "God" is). Now, as we said, this has not meant that other christic instantiations will be xerox copies of Jesus. On the contrary, since part of Jesus' very normativeness is his openness to creativity in truth and love, it figures that other christ figures throughout history will enrich in their unique ways the whole saving economy of God. The "Lord of the Second Advent" would, to be sure, stand on a higher plane than the "little christs" of whom Luther spoke as well as (to stay for the moment with this semantics) the "bigger" ones, the special saints like Martin Luther King, Jr., or, among the anonymous, Gautama. The returning Christ would be, by definition, commensurate with Jesus himself. In authority, in fact, he (or she) would supersede Jesus *if*, first of all, validated as identical in christness with Jesus.

In the theological tradition the issues involved here have never, so far as I know, been thoroughly unpacked, at least not in a way that gained wide prevalence. However, it is clear that Christian faith has

intended to affirm, in spite of recognizing other (anticipatory and fragmentary) christic instantiations, a unique bond between the christic process and the person of Jesus. This is the so-called "finality of Jesus Christ." To take a recent expository example, for Tillich in the axial moment of the Resurrection "the concrete picture of Jesus of Nazareth became indissolubly united with the reality of the New Being [= salvation] . . . so that he is present wherever the New Being is present" (*Systematic Theology*, II, 157). Functionally the same point was achieved by the traditional position that the hypostatic union fulfilled in the incarnation constitutes a *permanent* assumption by God the Son of the humanity of Jesus, not just humanity per se. This is also the patent intentionality of the creedal affirmation that the ascended *Jesus* Christ sits at God's right hand and shall come to judge the quick and the dead. Accordingly, Christian pious language may address Jesus in prayer as though he is God and paraphrase the Holy Spirit's indwelling as Jesus in one's heart, while theological conceptualization has struggled, never totally successfully, with such themes as the *communicatio idiomatum* and the ubiquity of Jesus as implied in his definitive christness.

In Unification theology it appears that the bond between Jesus and Christ may be severely loosened—as it would need to be, of course, to make room for a *different* human personage as Lord of the Second Advent. The bond is not totally abrogated since, as seen above, historical continuity is posited between the first and the second advent. Also the ascended Jesus in some way commissions Rev. Moon and through seance-like experiences remains in close touch with him. But such connections are patently weaker than the ontic (or, as we might more strongly put it, synthetic ontological) bond with which, as Tillich says, Jesus and the power of New Being were "indissolubly united" in the mainstream Christian conception.

14. In the development of Christian doctrine, the intuition of Jesus' significance is elaborated through the dual emphasis upon the reality of God in him and the unimpaired reality of his historical humanness. Rooted in the New Testament witness, this fundamental double affirmation about Jesus reaches climactic articulation in the fourth and

fifth centuries (Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, Chalcedonian Definition). This articulation, although conditioned, as modern theology well knows, by the conceptual limits of Greek antiquity, has held its place through the centuries as a revered symbol of Christian orthodoxy. It continues to be a common standard of the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Ecumenical Protestant (WCC), and Evangelical communities.

Comment—or Question: What is the posture of the Unification Church toward Nicaea and Chalcedon? Dr. Young Oon Kim likens them to “moss covered gravestones over a very dead past.” But is this the view of all Unificationists? One would gather not.

15. Thus it is the faith of the Christian church that Jesus the Christ is both fully human and fully God. The task of grasping, proclaiming, and serving this revolutionary redemptive truth is the unending challenge and reward of Christian existence. Let it be acknowledged that till now it has not been grasped, it has not been proclaimed, it has not been served with that fullness which it promises and to which it summons. The “omega point” (Teilhard) is ahead of us, the word is “press on” (Philippians 3:12), and the prayer “Come, Lord Jesus!” (Revelation 22:20).

Comment. Thus the authentic Christian attitude is proceptive, futural, eschatologically charged, as Moltmann *et al.*, have stressed. But its hope and prayer are for the return of Jesus. The Unification Church, on the other hand, does not pray, does it, that *Jesus* return?

16. The presence or being or act of God in Jesus Christ is of one substance of essential identity (*homoousios*) with the parental God of primordial transcendence, as well as with God immanent and active as Holy Spirit, God as the Word (Logos) is eternally intent (Philo's *logos endiathetos*) on the creative-redemptive deed of grace and truth that comes to temporal fruition in Jesus as the Christ (Philo's *logos prophorikos*). Thus Jesus, while not “analytically” (Whitehead: “primordially”) God, becomes *as the normative Christ* “synthetically” (Whitehead: “consequently”) united with God. Jesus as the Christ is co-opted or “essentialized” (Tillich) into union with the ownmost being of the triune God, so that God becomes and remains indefeasibly the God we know in Jesus Christ.

Comment. It is not clear that in Unification theology *either* Jesus or the Lord of the Second Advent becomes or remains essential to the parental God. The connections are not thought ontologically but rather in terms of divine plan or providence and human success in cooperating therewith. The sensibility of the classical christological mainstream found such connections, as in Ebionism and Nestorianism, too loose.

However, the Unification slant in these matters, recalling as it does the *historical* mentality of the Bible, would (other things being equal) presumably deserve the approval of that rather large company in modern theology who distrust the ontologization of biblical narrative. Moreover, as I have remarked elsewhere (in the Virgin Islands' colloquy), the Unification envisagement of providence as subtending a genuinely free human cooperation is theologically highly commendable. It has been difficult for classical theological ontologization to allow for human responsibility. Only rather belatedly has there been undertaken (notably in process thought) a thoroughgoing revision, for the sake of history and freedom, of fundamental ontology itself. Conceivably Unification christology could participate constructively in the ferment now evolving along these lines in the general theological forum. There may thus emerge an increasing ontological thematization to undergird the moral-historical schema that presently characterizes Unification christology.

17. In struggling with and against heresy to formulate its classical dogma, mainstream Christianity:

i. rejected any version of the faith that would (like Arianism) make God in Christ less than the ultimate God.

Comment. So far Unificationism seems to have an even lower christology than Arianism.

ii. rejected any version that would (like Apollinarianism) compartmentalize and thus restrict the enhumanization of God.

Comment. Unification christology would, I judge, at present be quite unsympathetic to Apollinarianism. Tentatively at least one of its strengths appears to be an uncompromising envisagement of the humanity of the christ figure. Perhaps this is because Rev. Moon is still among us as patently human—and no superior degree of ontological deity could

fittingly be attributed to his forerunner Jesus. Do the quasi-supernatural powers that sometimes one hears attributed to Rev. Moon point toward a path along which, at a certain stage, compromises like Apollinarianism emerge as options? At any rate, so far, the *public* image of Rev. Moon has—compared, say, to a contemporary like Sai Baba—been strikingly devoid of the supernaturalistic. One wonders: are there in the esoteric tradition accounts of healings, nature miracles, supernatural cognitive manifestations, etc.?

iii. rejected any version that would (like Nestorianism) posit a second (human) personal center alongside the one divine-human person.

Comment. As already noted, Unification theology apparently does not ontologically unify the Christ role with its human enactment—at least not in the case of Jesus. This would recapitulate what was seen, by the classical mainstream, as the failing of Nestorianism. Ironically, modern liberal christology in general might be indicted for the same failing (as Küng and Schillebeeckx seem lately to have been).

iv. rejected any version that (like Eutychianism and *anhypostasia*) would threaten to annul the reality of the humanity within the christic union.

Comment. What was said under “ii” would also apply here. Unification theology definitely ascribes to the Christ a human hypostasis, but in a way that differs—in a Nestorian direction—from the mainstream principally informed by Leontius’ *enhypostasia*. In the latter the *real* human individuality of Christ is constituted in and through the union with God, so that, as Chalcedon says, the distinction of the natures is not annulled by the union but eternally preserved “without division” or “separation” as well as also “without confusion” and “without change” of one into the other.

As mainstream christology took centuries to evolve its rather baroque structure, Unification christology, as it moves beyond its initial phases, may or may not recapitulate various patterns in the classical development, since some of these were preponderantly influenced by antique conceptuality and some more so by the subject itself.

18. In the more recent efforts to formulate Christ’s deity, and

with it a concept of his person, there is a pervasive shift from “substantive thinking” to dynamic conceptual images, to “process modes of thought” (Loomer).

Comment. For example, as in Cobb and many Whiteheadians, Christ is the creative transformation engendered by the freely appropriated ingression of the divine telos. This trend is seriously resisted, as is shown by the official impeachment of Küng’s (not fundamentally dissimilar) view. A situation results in which future directions in christology generally are very much “up for grabs,” and in which at some points Unification theology and Protestant-Catholic liberalism may be more (modally or abstractly) congenial to each other than either is to the classical Christian standpoint. The next years and decades, christologically speaking, should be very engrossing.

The Work of Christ

19. Among the ways that the saving activity of Christ may be represented, the traditional distinction of the three “offices”—prophet, priest, king—is still useful.

Comment. Unification theology broadly exemplifies these distinctions. Christ (i) reveals, (ii) accomplishes expiation and purification (takes away guilt and sin), and (iii) in some sense at least, is intended to rule. Each of these is a genus under which Unification interpretation of Christ may be construed.

20. The prophetic activity centers in the communication of God’s will, which is accomplished not only by verbal utterances of the Christ, but by deeds and attitudes of the *enfleshed* Word.

Comment. Unificationism unmistakably finds this congenial. At such points, as noted in Part I, the outside commentator feels the need for a Unification “New Testament” creating a publicly fixed canonical image of Rev. Moon.

21. The content of Christ’s teaching and communicative action forms an ellipse determined by two foci (Ritschl): (a) God’s reconciling love for the sinner, and (b) responsible vocation in the arriving realm of God.

Comment. Unification theology agrees. Characteristically, though, it does not seem aware of how definitely and adequately this content is, for normal Christian faith, made available through Jesus—so that, for Unificationism, the latter focus particularly (vocation in the kingdom) has to be provided by the returning Christ. This corresponds to a grievously widespread failure of empirical Christianity to be normal Christianity. *Ecclesia semper reformanda!* In particular, the imperative summons of Jesus to transforming ethical action in the world has been obscured and compromised—indeed by a misuse of the reconciling indicative, generating the ethos of what Bonhoeffer called “cheap grace,” which, however, leads in turn to the cynicism and emptiness and then to the renewed fanaticisms of modern Western society. In this situation Unificationism, seen as a reform movement, clearly possesses corrective vitamins. But, of course, its self-image goes well beyond that of a reform movement.

22. The priestly activity of Christ centers in his representation of humanity before God whereby is established the fundamental condition upon which reconciliation takes place. This happens in that through his active and passive obedience Christ fulfills (decisively and intensively, though not yet extensively) and thus vindicates the divine intention for the world, achieving an objective atonement for sin through his costly obedience (beheld supremely in the Cross) which makes good, in principle, humankind’s moral deficit—though what Christ does *for us* does not cancel God’s claim on our own obedience.

Comment. Unification theology resonates generally with these themes. One of its conspicuous strengths is the emphasis upon the necessity, in a moral universe, of what it calls “indemnity” and the establishment of ethical-covenantal foundations (both in “faith” and in “substance”) within the providential concourse of history.

However, within these kinds of resonances with theological tradition, a decisive difference seems to occur in the estimate accorded Jesus’ sacrifice, as further discussed below under atonement theory.

23. The ruling activity of Christ is his enduring agency in love’s judgment and transformation of all creation now and at history’s end. It

is one of the principal meanings of his Resurrection/Ascension. "All authority in heaven and earth has been given to me." (Matthew 28: 18b)

Comment. Because Unification theology emphasizes, concerning the First Advent, what it *failed* to accomplish, there is bound to be a conspicuous difference from mainstream Christianity's sense of Christ's kingship. For Unification theology the king has not yet been crowned. Does this manifest itself, as one might suppose, in diminishment or total lapse of the mood of *Easter triumph*—from the beginning the most characteristic festival expression of Christianity? (Christmas, too, which in our era tends to rival or surpass Easter as a Christian festival, one would surmise is preserved in Unification praxis only *diminuendo*, for reasons already suggested.)

Of course, according to the Unification message, it is God's plan that the Lord *shall* reign, and that his dominion is imminent. Indeed, with the church it may already have begun. Does this sense of messianic expectancy and dawning realization supplant the (relative) loss of Christmas and Easter?

It is true, of course, that the New Testament and Christian mainstream—at least for the most part—does not understand Christ's victory to be completed in every sense by his death, resurrection, and ascension. In decisive respects his work *is* "finished" (John 19:30), his sacrifice *is* a "full, perfect, and sufficient oblation for the sins of the whole world." Nevertheless, to consummate God's reign he will come again. There is, in the consciousness expressed by this thought (granted even in most versions of "realized" eschatology) a sense in the mainstream tradition, too, of something still lacking. But, in contrast to Unification theology, the lack is not seen as a qualitative or intensive one; it does not pertain to Jesus' life per se. It is quantitative or extensive, pertaining to the appropriation of Jesus' saving work by the world at large. Accordingly, when the Christ returns, it will not be to mount a fresh attempt or repair previous failure but to judge the quick and the dead and to usher in the kingdom. The notion of Armageddon does register a different note, but even here the final battle is not fought by *Christ*. There is irreducible variety in the kaleidoscope of Christian eschatologies, but

the prevailing view of the interim between the first and second advents is that of a grace period, in which the new covenant in Christ is offered to all creation for responsible appropriation. The christic process continues, but it is the setting free and making whole of the world according to the paradigm normatively enacted in Jesus as the Christ.

In the millennial stream of Christian thought Christ's coming again has been conceived as initiating an extended intra-historical period ("1000 years") prior to the end of history. In non-millennial tradition the final return of Christ occurs simply as the abrogation of time and/or its transition into eternity. Various mediating conceptions have evolved, showing by and large (though eschatology remains always a volatile theological theme) that the Christian mainstream affirms Jesus' rule *both* as already inaugurated in some decisive ways *and* as yet to come in others. It is inaugurated in that *he* is at God's right hand, the victor in principle (= in beginning and with power) over Satan, and Lord in fact, if still ambiguously and fragmentarily, of his confessing and anonymous flock. It is yet to come in unambiguous fullness throughout time and space.

Millennialism, within whose spectrum Unification eschatology seems clearly to fall, is an antidote to quietism. It energizes Christian expectancy with its sense of imminence. Demythologized, it represents the truth that decisive change in the circumstances of history is integral to the Christian hope and program. It opposes the static view that every historical moment is equidistant from eternity, as well as the gradualism that subsides into monotony. On the other hand, as a form of utopianism, it is apt (so far as it gains power) to perpetrate the abuses of absolutism as well as be the forerunner of cynical disappointment.

24. Parallel to and partly interwoven with the scheme of the three offices, interpretation of Christ's work has taken the form of certain "types of atonement theory," of which it has become customary to distinguish principally three: the classical (or mixed), the Anselmic (or objective), and the Abelardian (or subjective).

Comment. Unification theology seems to have adopted, or to have

developed parallels to, the various established thematizations of the work of Christ.

25. The “classical” theory is “mixed” in that it cannot be construed simply as either objective or subjective in mode. It includes two main subtypes:

i. the *physical* theory, in which the problem is that human *nature* (*physis*) has been vitiated by the fall, whence it must be restored, which Christ accomplishes by assuming it, infusing it with new being, and thus providing it with a fresh uncorrupted start in lieu of the deviance and pollution inherited from our human progenitors.

Comment. Unification theology makes pivotal use of this theme. The shortcoming in the work of Christ Jesus is seen as the failure, occasioned by his untimely death, to marry and generate sinless progeny. Mainstream theology, on the other hand, does not construe Jesus’ crucifixion as untimely but rather as (even though abhorrent to divine love) envisaged by redemptive providence. Nor does it perceive his not marrying and not producing physical progeny as precluding or limiting his restoration of human nature by the infusion of new being.

On the other hand, the Unification view that the Lord of the Second Advent should marry and bring forth a new unpolluted progeny appears intrinsically problematical and in fact to be undergoing erosion. Is it still, or was it ever, envisaged that the literal (conjugal) family of the Rev. Moon will be the seminal source of the new humanity? This motif, though chords of it may linger peripherally, does not now appear to be decisive for Unification self-understanding. Is it not rather the unified family of those who are blessed by their moral and spiritual incorporation into the movement (which includes, to be sure, at the apex the union of Rev. and Mrs. Moon) who are expected to overcome the poisonous influences of the old Adam (and old Eve!) and turn the tide of history toward purity under God?

This is not to deny that there is strength in the Unification endorsement of undefiled marriage, sex, and procreation under God. Such a posture is highly compatible with biblical tradition—especially the Old Testament, but also with Jesus’ patent affirmation of marriage.

It helps counteract the negative attitude toward the body and sex that infiltrated Christianity from Gnosticism. However, to *absolutize* marriage and procreation conflicts with Jesus as well as the ethos of Hebraism. With Kierkegaard one might say that if indeed marriage is the “universal,” nevertheless the possibility is biblically very clearly posited of the “teleological suspension” of the universal. One may forego marriage for various innocent reasons, including commitment to a spiritual vocation. In this light, was Jesus’ remaining unmarried a flaw in his full “recapitulation” (Irenaeus) of human nature? Or, given his blessing of marriage in general, was it an exemplification of the viability of sacrificial vocation, and a particular provision for those who, for various innocent reasons do not marry and procreate—showing that they too may enter without shame into the realm of love and righteousness? In any event, Jesus’ model has not prevented, but has fully undergirded the beautiful Christian heritage of the home and family. It would be difficult indeed to show that Jesus is to blame for the alarming deterioration of marriage in modern society, though this should not prevent us, either, from appreciating the positive inspiration imparted to many by the marriage of Rev. and Mrs. Moon.

Psychodynamically, it seems likely that a powerful component in the appeal of Rev. Moon is his promise to those who are haplessly adrift in isolated meaninglessness, not only of a communal identity and vocation, but of a stable conjugal union.

ii. The second subtype of the classical atonement theory is the defeat of Satan by Christ, or the breaking of the demonic powers.

Comment. As far as concerns Jesus, Unification theology appears to teach rather that he was partially *defeated* by Satan, whose demise (or, as we latterly hear, conversion back into the essentially good Lucifer) is thus left over to the Second Advent. From a mainstream perspective, there is a failure here to appreciate the dialectic of the crucifixion, wherein evil, at its worst, is yet taken captive by good. This intuition is graphically expressed in the mythology of the so-called “ransom” theory as well as in the classical tradition of Christian theodicy.

26. The Anselmic or objective theory, seeing the problem as

humanity's grievous violation of God's loving intention for the world, perceives the atoning work to consist in Christ's unreserved offering of himself to "satisfy" or fulfill that violated intention (the divine "honor"). This sacrifice, consummated in the Cross but prepared by the whole life of perfect obedience, establishes the condition whereby God's intention for the world (the blessed community which shall inhabit the Divine Realm) is "justified" or vindicated—i.e., known by God, and hence proclaimed as good news to all who will hear and be part of it, as viable, acceptable and assured in spite of sin. The so-called "penal substitutionary" theory is a readily misinterpreted variable of the objective type which stresses that the suffering of Christ is a *punishment* for the world's guilt; which it is, but only in the sense that the satisfaction of God's loving intention for the world, because of sin, is terribly costly.

Comment. Unification theology, as already remarked, employs a theory of "indemnification" which appears to be equivalent, at least functionally, to the Anselmic atonement. It is notable too that not only Jesus and the Lord of the Second Advent render indemnity through suffering, but so do all believers. This seems a commendable envisagement of how all are called to share in the saving of the world that is decisively refigured and grounded in Christ.

On the other hand, let us note here again, in representing the crucifixion as a tragic defeat for Jesus which must be made good by the further work of the Second Advent, Unification theology apparently overlooks the dialectic of the Cross according to which evil itself, borne in utterly obedient faith, becomes the instrument of the saving process. "*O felix culpa,*" expostulated Augustine, "to have merited so great a redemption!" Ignoring this profound dialectic of classical Christianity exposes theology to moralistic dualism. Is there in *Divine Principle* a tendency toward such dualism? If there were such, a symbol of the intention to overcome it would indeed be the thematization (of which we heard in the Virgin Islands) of Satan's ultimate redemption (rehypostatizing as Lucifer) or *apokatastasis*.

27. The Abelardian or subjective theory, seeing the problem as guilty humanity's fearful estrangement from God, perceives Christ's

work as the manifestation of God's will and heart of forgiving love, which when truly apprehended will transform self-deceiving enmity into responding love and service. This theory, although proposed by Abelard over against Anselm, does not logically exclude the objective theory anymore than Anselm's (as Anselm apparently thought) excludes the classical theory. The three main types rather complement each other, and form a thematic ensemble of enduring worth and stimulus in Christian theology.

Comment. The Cross, which Abelard saw as the supreme manifestation of God's love, is importantly regarded in *Divine Principle* as an undialectical defeat. Perhaps for this reason it is not so much in that book (which I likened to the "Old Testament" of Unification theology) but rather in what one hears (in occasional snatches!) recounted about Rev. Moon's incandescently suasive "heart of love" (the as yet unwritten Unification "New Testament") that one is most reminded of the Abelardian theory.

Discussion

Jonathan Wells: My argument is that Unification hermeneutics is legitimate and falls within the range of options of Christian hermeneutics in general. Unification christology may or may not be the best christology, but it is within the limits of Christian doctrine. That is the extent of my argument.

One crucial issue which I haven't mentioned is the question of Rev. Moon. Although it is actually a separate question, I would like to address it very briefly. Salvation cannot be accomplished apart from the work of Jesus of Nazareth. That seems to me to be essential to the Christian tradition and Christian orthodoxy. Unification affirms that claim in this sense: when Jesus appeared to Rev. Moon in 1936, the commission he received from Jesus was not "Take my place," but rather "Finish what I have started." When Buddhist members in Japan convert to the Unification Church they must first become believers in Jesus. It is fundamentally important to *Divine Principle* that the work of Rev. Moon comes on the foundation of Jesus Christ, and there is no other foundation on which it can come. For this reason we are constantly exhorted to establish and maintain unity with other Christians and the Christian tradition. The purpose is actually soteriological because there is no salvation apart from Jesus Christ. The claim of Unification christology that there can be more than one incarnation of the logos is grounded on the notion that the logos is infinite and the physical Jesus

was finite. However, further incarnations follow the first fruits and salvation must occur on the foundation of Jesus of Nazareth.

Durwood Foster: I really appreciate this earnest constructive statement by Jonathan Wells and am tempted to simply respond directly to his paper. On the other hand I do want to speak to a few things in his paper which relate to my own. We were asked to deal with christology and hermeneutics. This gave us at least three subthemes, any one of which is formidable: a) the hermeneutical issue and then, as far as Christ directly is concerned, b) the person of Christ and c) the work of Christ. In my paper I have touched on all three of those points as I think Jonathan has in his paper.

To me the first of these themes is very important to the conference. I have gotten here a lot of insight and my consciousness has been raised (or depressed!) in some salient ways. I would call attention to Propositions 10 and 11 of my paper as pointing up one of the areas which I find myself struggling to think my way through. That effort has been complexified and enriched by what has happened here. Relating to what was said yesterday, I think I could take Proposition 10 in my paper and replace the words "the original Jesus" with the words "the biblical message" or "the biblical revelation." This is not to be identified with the reconstruction of biblical history that is accomplished by critical historiography. This was the point being made at a number of junctures yesterday and last evening with respect to Kapp Johnson's proposals. The principle that the scripture is its own interpreter means here that the revelatory deliverance of scripture is not crucially or essentially dependent upon what occurs outside of its own hermeneutical circle. It cannot be vitiated or undercut by some external hermeneutical framework.

There has been considerable consensus in modern theology to that effect particularly with respect to the figure of Jesus. I think one can also infer that from last evening's discussion vis-à-vis Genesis. But in Proposition 11 I state the other side as well of an integral dialectic that obtains at this point. The original Jesus affirmed by faith (and here I could substitute for "Jesus" the biblical revelation "or" the essential biblical "message") cannot be separated from the work of critical

historiography. While the Christ of faith does transcend the competence of critical historiography, nevertheless this Christ becomes partly immanent within the lineaments of that competence. I was saying last night, in a depressed mood, that it had not been clear to me in our discussion yesterday just how to make this concern with scientific criticism operative. I still believe deeply that the process of critical historiography does exercise control over what we do here. Although that may not be demonstrable at any particular point at the moment, I believe it has a long term cumulative effect. I am watching with real interest to see what happens down the pike some years from now as our Unification scholars continue their in-depth historical critical work.

Let me come to a point that I think maybe is the main one to be a failure in his paper and perhaps in Unification christological analysis up till now to appreciate what Christian orthodoxy is concerned with on the specific point of the eternal assumption and preservation of the hypostatic or personal union between the second person of the trinity or the logos and the specific human identity of Jesus. In Jonathan's analysis of the history of Christian thought he has apparently missed that point. It seems to me to be patently clear that while the Christian tradition, especially in our own time, does allow for the instantiation of the christic process in other instances than Jesus of Nazareth, nevertheless there is a very decisive sense in which Jesus remains for orthodoxy irremovably normative. Here I cite Paul Tillich who, other things being equal, might be rather suspect in this whole connection because he is not thought of as being particularly orthodox christologically. Nevertheless Tillich makes very clear that the personal identity of Jesus becomes *indissolubly* united with the power of the new being. The confession that "Jesus is Lord," which appears already in the New Testament means that the infinite logos is indissolubly united with the finite humanity of Jesus. Even the sixteenth and seventeenth century Calvinists, despite the so-called *extra-Calvinisticum*, in their analysis of this asserted very clearly that the finite human nature of Jesus, once the incarnate union occurs, is indissolubly bonded with the second person of the trinity. Other christic instantiations are conceivable and are very

much affirmed in contemporary theology. Some theologians are hesitant, but a lot are doing this, including myself. Nevertheless Jesus remains *primus inter pares*, if you will, or the normative and decisive instantiation of the logos or the second person of the trinity. This has a status that exceeds and surpasses that which is envisaged in *Divine Principle* and in Unification christology.

Now, in my paper I did what Jonathan didn't do. I brought the Rev. Moon centrally into the scope of my analysis because I think that is the nitty gritty of our discussion. I lament here that we so far do not have what I call "the Unification New Testament." In biblical analogy *Divine Principle* comes up, so to speak, to the book of Malachi where we are looking forward to the New Testament. But the "gospel," the concrete saving figure of Rev. Moon, is still for Unificationism in the inchoate oral tradition. It hasn't yet crystallized into anything corresponding to the New Testament. We really need that to carry through the kind of analysis that I incipiently have undertaken.

Donald Deffner: Two quick comments before a brief response to Jonathan's paper. First we are halfway through our conference now. Will we have time—even today—to break down into smaller groups so that some might be moved to speak who have not yet done so? Second, I know this is an advanced hermeneutics seminar, but will we here at this conference—or who will—*translate* what we are saying to the rank and file of our several churches? Indeed, do *we* all understand each other?

Now, to Jonathan. I have come to know and love you people of the Unification Church in the four conferences I have been to. And so what I say, I say out of concern for our continued progress in dialogue—bringing us both closer to God's truth beyond where we are now. I agree on many of the points Jonathan made with respect to the *nature* of Christ (both God and man, etc.). But for me—and many classically-oriented Christians—the point is not only Christ's *nature* but the issue of God's work of salvation in him being *completed*. Granted, the struggle is not over. As Durwood Foster aptly noted at the Virgin Islands conference: "... the whole creation still groans and travails." Especially in terms of what Herb and James Deotis said yesterday... this is where my

theology still needs stretching. For me, it's not a "got it made" Christianity. I "follow after" And we can still lose our faith by denying Christ. But I submit our *salvation*—the *atonement*—and God's *plan* in Christ *was completed* at Calvary and the empty tomb.

As I have noted in an earlier conference, Christ Jesus said of himself in Matthew 5:17-18: "Do not think that I came to abolish the Law or the prophets. I did not come to abolish but to *fulfill*. . . . For truly I say to you, until heaven and earth pass away, not the smallest letter or stroke shall pass from the Law, until all is accomplished." In other words, all prophecy is to be *accomplished*. And it was: Hebrews 7:27 reads, "He is not like other high priests; he does not need to offer sacrifices every day—for His own sins first, and then for the sins of the people. He offered *one sacrifice once and for all* [ONCE AND FOR ALL!] when He offered Himself." Again, Hebrews 9:11-12, "But Christ has already come as the High Priest of the good things that *are already here*. . . . He took His own blood and *obtained eternal salvation for us*."

I believe Christ is the *LAST ADAM*. *Divine Principle* refers to Christ as the *second* Adam. But Paul wrote in Corinthians 15:45, "So also it is written, ' . . . the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.' " And then in verse 57 the denouement of the whole section clearly wraps up the *last* Adam as being Jesus Christ Himself: "But thanks be to God Who gives us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ!" *No one else*. Not the "messiah" referred to in Lloyd Eby's paper. There is no need for a "Lord of the Second Advent" who again must "be born on earth in the flesh" in order to accomplish man's physical salvation. The *once for all* act of redemption through Jesus Christ's death on Calvary, His resurrection and ascension, has finished the work of salvation. So, for me the *benefit* of Christ's work is the crux of the issue. A closing codicil: again I have learned much in the conference you have planned for us. But I believe there is a limit to the progress we can make together if our dialogue is only going to consist in—at least for some of us—rational argument and logical debate. And, as Luther said, "Councils can err!" I also recall Durwood Foster's comment about the frustrations and limitations of theological students who are still coldly academic and dialectical—but

in whom *faith and spirituality* are missing. And what did our Lord say about “except one become as a little child . . . ?” Not *childish* but *childlike* in faith.

Maybe we will leave here continuing to have a hundred and one different points of view. But since *God* is always calling us to *his* truth—and not our own minds’ devisings of it—would we not progress even further here by sharing our *faiths*—not just our systems of theology—sharing our *faiths* with each other . . . and letting the *Holy Spirit* do that *in* us and *between* us which we are unable to do?

Frederick Sontag: Jonathan, it seems to me that you are involved in a work of apologetics by trying to show the points of similarity between Unification christology and the traditions. That is fine and I wouldn’t deny it as important. I would do something different from what you do because I am not a “great council” man. I think all are Christian who answer the question of Jesus when he said, “Whom do you say that I am?” You answer that question, and that is all I ask. I don’t like theological definitions and dogmas, but others do and that is fine. (laughter)

You gloss over what I call the novelties in the doctrine. My real question to you is why do you do that? These are the real issues. You say Jesus was supposed to fulfill all the three original blessings, not just the first one. That is a very considerable novelty. I haven’t read every document in the history of Christianity, but I really cannot think of one which indicates that Jesus was supposed to marry and establish a family. There may be some, but I can’t think of any. The other novelty which is quite interesting is that originally God did not intend Jesus to be crucified. There again I have trouble finding anything that comes close to that in biblical text. I am interested in novelties. I think these two are rather interesting suggestions, although I am less interested in the first than the second. What the second suggestion indicates is a certain kind of contingency and openness in God’s nature. On the whole the tradition moves against speculation as to how much Jesus knew and so on. The traditional views all indicate that Jesus knew the whole story and kept it secret from the disciples because they weren’t strong enough to take it.

The third novelty involves the question of whether the work was complete. That seems to me a moot point, because I think that traditional Christianity does believe in the necessity for a second coming and that the physical kingdom was not established by Jesus. Some doctrines of the 'church' often see it as being the establishment of the kingdom. I don't happen to believe in that. My own view of the nature of institutional churches is not such that I see them as the embodiment of God's kingdom. They don't seem to me to have acted in that way, but still it is a moot point. All I see indicates that the work of Jesus still remains to be completed, but the issue comes over how it will be completed. Here you depart from the tradition in that you assert it will not be Jesus who will return. That is a very clear statement, it seems to me. At any rate, these seem to me to be the real points of novelty. Aren't these what inform Unification christology? And isn't this what needs a great deal more explanation?

Frank Flinn: I have been trying to collect the christological models present and I see three on the table. First, there is Herb's kind of typological christic model. Yesterday he was arguing, as I understood it, on a model like *analogia situationis*, an analogy of situation. The relationship between the Baptist and Jesus and Rev. Moon, Herb suggested, needs to be seen in a much more complex way than a "Jesus-and-me" personal relation. Hence, Old Testament typical situations illumine the Baptist/Jesus situation as well as ours.

Then Durwood adds the notion of instantiation which is like a christianization of Eastern thought, while maintaining the exclusivity of the hypostatic union, the model of christic instantiation incorporates aspects of reincarnation or avatarism. Third, we have the Eastern modality in *Divine Principle* which, conversely to Durwood's model, could be seen as an orientalizing of certain Christian aspects. It has always amazed me, by the way, that Christianity has always flirted with reincarnation and then wound up backing off from it. I've never really fathomed why that has happened that way. Anyway I see these three models operating. I am asking Durwood to respond to this and then Jonathan to face up to the need for "Moonology."

James Deotis Roberts: I will try to make my comments rather concise because I will have an opportunity later on to lay out some of my own perspectives. I have a tendency to see everything going on in theology in the North Atlantic community with a certain amount of suspicion. I have a real identity and affinity with what is going on theologically in the southern hemisphere and especially in the whole worldwide liberation movement. I see two things happening. On the one hand, there is the contextualization of theology in various cultures and various religions and, on the other, there is the motif of liberation from oppression. By the latter I am concerned with what is often called the crimes of history. When I approach christology, the doctrine of God or anything else, even exegesis, those two things are always with me.

What I would like to ask Durwood and Jonathan is how they would handle this contemporary situation where no exclusive christological model is adequate to deal with some of the issues of the saving revelation of God on a grand worldwide scale. For example, Pannikar is attempting to develop a christic model out of interaction between Christianity and Hinduism. Then there are the Muslim nations where the impact of Christianity is not as great as it has been in Asia. You have a renaissance of very powerful major religions that are deeply rooted in the culture of the people. My questions are, how do you deal with the liberation of the oppressed with respect to Jesus as liberator and how do you develop a christic perspective that is inclusive rather than exclusive so that you can have some meaning applying the gospel on a worldwide scale?

Kapp Johnson: What about the *monogenès* theme and Mark 14:61 with Acts 1:11?

Durwood Foster: In some ways the questions from Frank and Deotis overlap. Kapp's question is really in the same ball park too. The theological enterprise of Unificationism as I have come to know it from these kinds of contacts is in a period of laborious gestation with respect to the issues that Frank and Deotis posed, that is to say, how to relate the decisive norm of Jesus as the Christ to the pluralism of God's redemptive action throughout history. In the general theological community we have become much more deeply and penitently aware of this, and under

the impact of the holocaust, many have experienced an end of triumphalism in the Christian spirit. This is one of the frontier issues of decisive importance for the future of Christian theology and spirituality. I would say to Don that I also have always found it impossible to separate theology from piety or the personal religious life.

My own view of the main issue here converges with that of Schleiermacher. I have learned a very great deal from Schleiermacher theologically. One of his great hermeneutical principles which applies not only to his biblical work but to all of his work is the "principle of the middle," the *Prinzip der Mitte*. He always envisages the whole spectrum of theological discussion and struggle and then attempts dialectically to identify the center of it in a way that will do justice at least relatively to the wings and hold the whole thing together. As to the issue that you posed, Frank, it does seem to me that the second model you mentioned is in the middle. It is a model that does affirm, I would like to think, the whole Bible. One of the great virtues of Unificationism—and here I agree with Tom Boslooper's paper—is its insistence on working with and for the whole Bible. Its wholistic hermeneutics is very good. I try to work that way myself. Yet the upshot of the Bible and of Christian orthodoxy is that Jesus is Lord. As the incipient World Council of Churches said at the Jerusalem Conference in a way that even goes beyond historic orthodoxy, Jesus is God and savior. This concerns not simply the relation of the divine nature of Christ to the human nature of Christ, but is a question of the relation of the divine nature of Christ to the nature of God the Father or the parental God. I affirm in my paper, all too briefly no doubt but nevertheless I think quite clearly, that in God's saving outreach and downreach to creation there is a union of God's being with the specific person of Jesus Christ. The resurrection and the ascension in terms of the dynamics of biblical history, as Tillich clearly sees, play a very important role at this point. To me that is an affirmation on which things stand or fall. I find this being said by the community of Christian theologians generally.

At the same time there is an effort to find a way of affirming that the "christic process," that is, the liberating and wholemaking process

which comes to normative enactment in Jesus as the Christ, is also anticipated fragmentarily throughout history, both in the pre-Christian and the post-Christian aeon. So that we can speak broadly of "christ figures." We can call Martin Luther King, Jr., "a christ figure," and I do so unstintingly. I am quite prepared to call the Rev. Moon one in principle, though of course this is subject to an investigation and critical comparison of Rev. Moon with the Jesus-as-christ norm. And that I have undertaken in a very elementary way in my paper. I would deal further with that if I had the "Unification New Testament." So I say, Frank, you have done a real service to describe that spectrum of models. I see the middle model as the one that is struggling to be born, and it has not been wholly and satisfactorily born yet. Whether it can be without all kinds of distortions is the question over which a lot of us in theology are holding our breath.

Let me pass very quickly to Deotis' issue which weighs very heavily on my spirit. I know Deotis has raised this one way or another a number of times and others have too. Here we need to reclaim and re-emphasize along with some of the hermeneutical principles that we have mentioned in this conference—I'm thinking of the one yesterday that was walked about a good deal, scripture being its own interpreter—the principle that Jesus Christ is king and lord of scripture, *rex et dominus scripturae*. This is a salient and powerful hermeneutical principle from the Christian tradition along with the third principle which Frank called the pneumatological principle, the principle that along with the biblical word as such there is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, as it is called in a kind of technical phrase. Also there is the principle that "the letter (alone) killeth, the spirit giveth life." We can not rightly interpret the scripture apart from the illumination and the leading of the Spirit. The spelling out of the meaning of that pneumatological principle is attested in John 14 and 16 where we are promised that we shall be led forward into all the truth by the Spirit that is to come. In the dimensions of the total package we have received from our Christian heritage we do have a radical kind of force at work that opens us to the present and the future if we apply to the whole Bible the christo-

logical norm of Jesus Christ as king and lord of scripture. This is a virtue of Unification hermeneutics, as has been said by Thomas Boslooper and others.

We see in the figure of Christ the one who identified with the poor, the lonely, and the oppressed; and we can thus see that in some special and decisive way the christic process focuses and centers there. Hence this special concern for the oppressed becomes a hermeneutical principle. Whatever we say or do that does not in some way reflect it and appear in obedience to it is false or distorted. The pneumatological principle tells us that we are to be led beyond the first century or the first two or three centuries by the spirit of Christ who indwells the community of faith and who is radically opening us to the future as the domain from which God's realm is to manifest itself. So to me that does open us, Deotis, to the kind of thing you are asking for, at least in principle. Working out the details, of course, is a tremendous challenge indeed.

Jonathan Wells: I will try to touch on something from everybody. I would like to repeat my original statement about what I am doing in this paper. My goal is to establish that the Unification christology is a possible Christian position. Of course, there are questions of novelty which are extremely interesting. I am happy to talk about them, but my only claim in the paper is that those novelties do not contradict basic Christian doctrine. In fact, among the novelties we might bring up is the notion of Jesus as liberator. It could be argued that the Unification position is more congenial to liberation theology than some traditional Christian positions, but that is not what I am arguing here. Nor am I arguing that *Divine Principle* is the only possible Christian position. I am merely claiming that Unification christology cannot be excluded from the arena of Christian discussion.

As far as the hypostatic union goes, I point out that of course it can be argued that the hypostatic union ensures that the logos is so fundamentally united to the man Jesus, that the two can never be separated. The *Divine Principle* affirms that God and perfected humanity can never be separated. But the issue here is whether there can be another incarnation in addition to Jesus Christ, and I'm claiming that

the hypostatic union does not and cannot exclude this possibility.

Frederick Sontag: I don't agree with Kapp either. "Only-begotten" does not refer to uniqueness but to begottenness: this is the only divine begetting that there is or ever will be.

Kapp Johnson: But isn't that unique though, isn't that the definition of unique?

Frederick Sontag: No. I am unique too, but I am not the only-begotten son of God.

Durwood Foster: May I have the floor for just a few minutes to footnote this particular point. I think it is an interesting one and a somewhat obscure one today in theology. Historically I don't think it is obscure. If you read a book like Reinhold Seeberg's *History of Doctrine* you will see that it was fully discussed. The orthodox view was that primordially the second person of the trinity, the logos, is eternal and, as it were, a mode of God's ownmost being from the very beginning without Jesus yet being in the picture. But in the center of history at the climactic moment of the incarnation the second person of the trinity in this conceptualization assumes to itself the specific human identity of Jesus and thenceforth and thereafter retains the union with that specific identity. Thus, Jonathan, you are partly right primordially. Eternally, from the beginning, the human nature of Jesus is *not* part of God, so to speak, but *after* the decisive union of the divine and human natures in the incarnation it is. Tillich puts the fusion at the point of the resurrection. This is a little bit heretical, but not as heretical as you are, Jonathan, if I may say so. The tradition switched from the moment of the resurrection to the moment of birth, as we all know, in the development of New Testament christology. In any event, it comes to be held that a kind of ontological synthesis of the divine and the human occurs in Jesus. This is, by the way, a point of contact between Christian orthodoxy and process theology, which has not been very much noticed. God in a sense takes on an increment in and through the hypostatic union with the historic human nature of Jesus as Christ within history. That, it seems to me, is very clearly the orthodox position.

Jonathan Wells: I agree with it and I affirm it. However, the divine

nature is by its nature infinite, and human nature is finite. Despite the incarnation, the ontological unity or *communicatio idiomatum*, the divine infinity cannot be reduced to finite humanness. The thrust of my argument is that the logos cannot by its very nature be confined to a single finite incarnation.

I want to say a few more things about the work. Anyone who has studied the history of Christian doctrine knows that there are three or four major competing theories of the atonement because it has never been satisfactorily established just how Jesus completed his work. We have seen, yesterday and today, that there is considerable disagreement even here over whether Jesus completed his work. What is the point of liberation theology if the work is completed? Now, Unification does affirm that the foundation Jesus laid is a permanent, solid foundation, and there is no other; but whether the work is completed is, I think, a wide open question and always has been in Christian doctrine. Unification is well within Christian tradition when it takes the stance on the atonement that it does.

Now, my last point deals with the return of Jesus. Fred, you say that we claim that it will not be Jesus who returns. I disagree. Unification affirms that Jesus will return in a spiritual body. You are correct that Jesus will not return on the earth in the same sense that the Lord of the Second Advent will be on the earth. But Jesus will return in a spiritual body, and without that return there is no salvation. The whole question is not *whether* Jesus will return, but *how* he will, and there again the history of Christian doctrine presents us with several competing positions.

Andrew Wilson: I have two points. First, I think we need to appreciate what Jesus completed by his death and resurrection. He did the work of salvation if we understand rightly what salvation means. *Divine Principle* asserts that through the death and resurrection of Jesus we as Christians have rebirth, and as a result of that rebirth we become brothers and sisters under God as parent. Without that rebirth we are not brothers and sisters, we do not know God's parental love, we are under Satan's dominion. *Divine Principle* asserts that Christianity is a

unique religion on a higher plane than Buddhism or other religions that have christic-type founders or avatar-type founders because of the grace of rebirth which we have through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.

Second, in agreement with orthodox Christianity, *Divine Principle* asserts that the kingdom of God is not yet established in its fullness. However, it may already be anticipated in terms of the relationship between the work of Jesus and the work of the Lord of the Second Advent. *Divine Principle* describes this relationship by the typology of Moses and Joshua. Joshua was the person who finally brought the Israelites into the promised land after Moses died in the wilderness. Nevertheless, Moses is the person who has the priority in the tradition, because it was Moses' faith and Moses' foundation that made possible the Israelites' entry into Canaan. The reason that Joshua was more successful in the external sense was not due to himself but due to the people's response to him to make the foundation of substance, whereas they hadn't made such a response to Moses. Although Joshua is actually the liberator in the external sense in bringing the people into Canaan, it is to Moses that Joshua owes all his success, and therefore in the Jewish tradition very rightly Moses is given priority. I think there is a great similarity between that situation and the relationship between Jesus and the Lord of the Second Advent. It lies within God's power to bring about the final kingdom of God on earth in our time not because the Lord of the Second Advent is greater or has priority over Jesus, but because our response to him is more complete than the response of the disciples and the other people of Jesus' day. Jesus has priority who as the Son of God laid the foundation and created the condition of salvation so that the completion of the work can be possible today. This typology in *Divine Principle* is relevant to our discussion.

Henry Vander Goot: There are so many points that are all related to one another. I am just going to take one out of completed or incompleted work. You can only make a judgment on that depending on how you conceive the task of Jesus Christ. Now if you in a very novel way conceive the task as the fulfillment of the cultural mandate, which is what you are doing, then of course Jesus is a failure. Of course his

work is incomplete, but I don't think that the task should be conceived in that way. Jesus is not sanctifier. Jesus Christ is redeemer and the mediator of reconciliation. Here I am with Don. In that aspect there is a once-for-all character about the work of Christ. And therefore the doctrine is *sola gratia, sola scriptura*. The problem seems to be that there isn't an adequate distinction being made between the Second and the Third Article. You have a continuum here; you are not distinguishing properly between the work of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit.

Herbert Richardson: That is magnificent; either I learned all my theology from Henry, or he learned all his from me. (laughter) I wanted precisely to say something about the Holy Spirit. I want to use Jonathan's diagram, because it is so easy to show you what he has done. There is a trinitarian problem, a christological problem, and a pneumatological problem. Now you will notice that divine Father, the first term, will be put under pneumatology. The human Christ, i.e., Christ Jesus, is the second term that you put down underneath that. What you put down here is human, and this is a part of creation. So let's say "human-plus." It doesn't have to be all of us, it could be Mary, for example. Let us use Mary, because in theology there is a lot of discussion here.

Now what links God in heaven with the earth? It is the principle of hypostatic union. Well, that is what christology talks about, how heaven is related to earth. We can use the word *avatar*. Here we get an appearance of God on earth so we will just call that a theophany. Now if you think about this, in the Christian tradition there is a lot of awareness that the appearance of God on earth in Jesus Christ takes place again and again, not by another theophany or another incarnation in this sense, but by a christophany whereby God who appeared in Jesus Christ in a full way now appears again in a full way in the present time through the spiritual union of some part of the world today with Jesus Christ. This is what we call the doctrine of sacramental union. Here I am thinking of the Catholic Church teaching on the Eucharist. In the bread and wine which are here today we are sacramentally united with the human Jesus Christ of Nazareth.

Now here is where Jonathan seems to have confused rather than clarified the issue. It is not clear but it seems that he is arguing that there can be all kinds of further theophanies and all kinds of further incarnations. I don't think that that is at all what *Divine Principle* teaches. I think that what *Divine Principle* is teaching is that there can be all kinds of further christophanies and that that which makes Rev. Moon significant is that he is a fully adequate presentation in our time not of God on earth in this sense but of Jesus Christ on earth, who is himself the full presentation of God on earth. The problem of explaining Rev. Moon is not christology but pneumatology. The interesting thing is that the whole issue is taken up under the *filioque* issue, right? Is the Spirit another manifestation of God on earth? Admittedly the issue wasn't totally settled, but in the West at least it was said that there can be no other theophany, no other incarnation. What you get, which is by the way just as good, are other full presentations of God on earth always mediated through Jesus Christ. I personally believe that this is the position of the Unification Church. The Principle again and again argues the solely-begotten character of Jesus as the single theophany of God and then wants to argue very strongly for the idea of further christophanies, that is, presentations of Jesus in the world. For example, take the union when Jesus comes to talk with Moon. That union between the two is precisely a christophany. It isn't God who speaks to Moon, that is the interesting thing, it is Jesus who speaks to Moon. And I might say it is Jesus in his historical human form who says, complete my earthly ministry. It is the human Jesus who speaks to Moon. My feeling about your problem, Jonathan, is that you don't have an adequate distinction between the christophanic and theophanic sides in your doctrine of the Spirit. It is not developed adequately to account for what the church really wants to say.

Jonathan Wells: I disagree, Herb. I find your interpretation interesting, but I think mine more accurately represents *Divine Principle*.

Herbert Richardson: I would like to know what your compatriots in the church think.

Jonathan Wells: Show of hands. (laughter)

Durwood Foster: This is a very good exchange that we have just had. However, it isn't clear to me that Herb is right about *Divine Principle*, because it appears quite clearly there that Jesus is an ontologically distinct entity preserved in the kingdom of heaven—waiting there, if you will—and also in touch with us on earth, as Jonathan said. He has been in touch particularly with Rev. Moon. Thus it is clear that the *persona* of Jesus is construed as at least a relatively distinct *persona* in differentiation from which the Christ or the logos or the second person of the Trinity acts independently. From my point of view, *too*, independently as far as historic Christian confessions are concerned.

But I want to speak mainly to this question of the completeness of the work of Christ because that has come up here quite sanguinely and I did try to deal with this in my paper. I feel that you can't separate the person and the work ultimately. The Melanchthonian principle: to know Christ is to know his benefits, means that there is always reciprocity. Indeed the affirmation of the normativeness of Jesus as Lord implies clearly that the work of Christ is in some decisive ways complete, full, not needing to be continued or perfected.

I would have liked to listen in on the lifestyle discussion about what Unificationists do with Christmas and Easter and what they maybe have introduced in the place of Christmas and Easter which historically have been such great festival occasions for Christians. It is true that the New Testament and the Christian mainstream for the most part do not understand Christ's victory to be completed in every sense by his death, resurrection, and ascension. In decisive respects, however, his work *is* finished. Here I want to echo what Henry was saying a few minutes ago about John 19:30: Christ's sacrifice is a full, perfect, and sufficient oblation for the sins of the whole world. This had been categorically affirmed by the Christian community of faith. Nevertheless, to consummate God's reign he will come again. In the interim, of course, there is the work of the Spirit. Herb is absolutely right about this. Although my paper doesn't speak of this work in this specific context, it should be spoken of. I go on to say that the thought is granted even in most versions of realized eschatology, by C.H. Dodd for

example, that something is still lacking. Herb was expressing this very poignantly yesterday. But in contrast to Unification theology, the lack is not seen by the tradition as a qualitative or intensive one. It does not pertain to Jesus' life per se. Rather it is quantitative or extensive.


Here I am going to add parenthetically that in the most recent expressions here by Andy and Jonathan the point has been skirted somewhat. It has been affirmed that Jesus laid a necessary foundation but it has not been brought to light in those statements that in *Divine Principle* this is only one third of the total foundation that needs to be laid. *Divine Principle* does acknowledge that Jesus did one-third of the work, but only one-third. Whereas the Christian tradition claims that Jesus' work was complete in its own order, according to its own species or genus, if you will, though this has not yet been fully extended through the world. What is lacking is the appropriation of Christ's saving work by the world at large in which, of course, the work of the Spirit also plays a decisive role. Accordingly, when the Christ returns it will not be to mount a fresh attempt or repair previous failure but to judge the quick and the dead and, if you will, to usher in the kingdom. That is the way it is often represented. Now it is also true in the welter of Christian imagery that is part of our heritage that we likewise have the notion of the battle of Armageddon. This does register a different note—a terrific combat at the end with Satan. Yet note that in the imagery, the metaphors which, as Lonnie always reminds us, have more truth than the rest of the theology, the final battle is not fought by Christ. Christ has done his work, and Armageddon is fought by angels or by God. My paper goes on to say finally that there is an irreducible variety in the kaleidoscope of Christian eschatology. But the prevailing view of the interim between the first and second advent is that of a grace period in which the covenant in Christ is offered to all creation for responsible appropriation. Again Herb's point about the Spirit comes in here, but in any case the christic process continues as the setting free and making whole of the world according to the paradigm normatively enacted—already victoriously enacted—in Jesus as the Christ. That is the deliverance of the main thrust of the tradition on this issue we are

talking about.

Frederick Sontag: I just want to say a word in defense of the Unification graduate students and a word about Durwood's call for a Unification New Testament. To say we don't have the Unification New Testament is not quite accurate, because *Divine Principle* claims to be neither. It claims to be 'the principle' for understanding God's action in relation to the world, a principle which clarifies both the Old and the New Testaments. Thus, it has a slightly different status. I also want to say that Unificationists are already ahead of the writers of the New Testament, because the record is fairly clear that the writers of the New Testament didn't know what was going on at the time. Things got a little clearer but only much later in the game. In that sense *Divine Principle* is much clearer. It has a sense of forecast which is different from the Old Testament. The Old Testament cannot be considered a scenario for *Divine Principle*. There is a phrase of Kierkegaard's which says that, although we understand in retrospect, we must live forward. This attempt to understand the present day is a very considerable claim. People have not been successful at it in the past. If you remember "Jesus Christ Superstar," just as the events of the crucifixion are about to unfold the disciples traipse around the stage singing a lament. Their lament is that things are going wrong. What they thought would happen is that they would retire and write the gospels. I really feel that the demand on the Unificationists to give an account of the scenario is too extreme. No one has really done it in the past. Jonathan can retire and write the gospels much later on, but the demand for it now is a little extreme.

Durwood Foster: My desideration was not a demand in any sense, but simply an observation that there is something more to come. Incidentally, in the same context, I did say that it is obvious that the Christian Bible, Old and New Testaments, *is* the Old Testament for the Unification movement, so that is another accurate way of speaking about it. But my point, which Fred seems to miss, was that, *like* the Old Testament, *Divine Principle* builds up to a predicted fulfillment, without then actually portraying that fulfillment concretely as, in the case of the Bible, the New Testament does.

Hermeneutics of History



Unification Theology as History

Dagfinn Aslid

The greater part—about four-fifths—of *Divine Principle* is devoted to history. Although it is true that history should never be understood apart and in isolation from the doctrines of creation and the fall, we nevertheless understand God historically rather than metaphysically.¹

In an age of pluralism, it is not without surprise that we read this bold proposal: “In our lecture we will prove the existence of God by studying facts and historical phenomena and systematically explaining them.”² If nothing else, this shows a lot of theological nerve.

Where history is concerned, the grand speculative schemes of a Hegel or a Toynbee have become, for many, paradigms of how not to theorize about the past.³ Toynbee, although praised for his tremendous erudition, is often excused as a poet, a prophet, a mystic.⁴ It may be in order, therefore, to consider the hermeneutic principles that serve as a foundation for the Unification view of history, and also to attempt to locate these in the scholarly landscape.

First, as regards the emphasis on history as a vehicle for divine revelation, the Hegelian heritage is prominent. Among contemporary theologians this theme is found thematized in the most detail by Wolfhart Pannenberg, a German theologian who also may be said to share the Unification view that biblical history is a paradigm for understanding universal history, thus refusing to sustain the segregation of *Heilsgeschichte* and *Historie*.⁵

At the core of both Unification theology and Pannenberg's theological program we find the conviction that God is the all-determining ground of reality, and consequently that any reflective account of our experience with reality that ignores the presence of God will be exposed as inadequate.⁶ Both take up the challenge of coming to terms with secularity, rather than turning to "ivory-tower theology." Furthermore, Christianity can only come to terms with its historical challenges by successfully widening its own horizon to include ever changing situations. Any perennial expression of truth is thus doomed to be left behind as outdated and irrelevant when it rigidifies as dogma rather than embracing and absorbing new ideological currents and political power-flows. The challenge is thus not only one of rationally interpreting history, but, even more importantly, of acting as a host for history, creatively transforming it from within. Hermeneutics here becomes the mediating factor between stability and adaptability.

The theme of constancy and change is central in this evolutionary scheme. On one hand we have a metaphysics of creation including certain "inviolable" principles that are integral to God's unchanging purpose. On the other hand an ever-changing providence where we, "sharing the benefit of the age in God's providence of restoration, are gradually being elevated in our spiritual and intellectual standard as history progresses."⁷ In terms of hermeneutics, this tension is reflected in a tension between "the overwhelming conviction that this is the conclusive insight into divinity,"⁸ and the open concession that "the Divine Principle revealed in this book is only part of the new truth. . . . We believe with happy expectation that, as time goes on, deeper parts of the truth will be continually revealed."⁹ It would thus appear that there is both an ever changing and self-relativizing "Principle," as well as a perennial and absolutized "Principle within the Principle."

This raises the further question of tradition and supersession. From one point of view it would appear that any emergent interpretation of history is necessarily an appearance of "the vertical in the horizontal," a resignification of the past in a new context of meaning, and that the human way of being in the world therefore is intrinsically historical.

This viewpoint would share Pannenberg's appropriation of von Rad's notion of *Überlieferungsgeschichte* (history of the transmission of traditions). Here the past cannot be kept at arm's length, but is always at work in the present, "perhaps even in the work of the historian himself."¹⁰ From a supersessionist viewpoint, however, the advent of a new age renders the old aeon outmoded in light of the providential division of the ages that avowedly progress inexorably toward truth and goodness.¹¹ The task of the Messiah in both cases is peculiarly hermeneutic: it is the Messiah's role to fully grasp and indemnify the whole of human history in the context of the present. This is the *sine qua non* of the consummation of human history. I would suggest that a distinction may be made here between the ignorance caused by the fall, which is fully overcome at the "end of time," and a perpetual and open-ended revelation extending beyond the eschaton. Perfection of knowledge is therefore not the end of knowledge. Whereas the church, even the Unification Church, is doomed to wither away at the advent of the kingdom of heaven on earth, science and art will still continue to progress. Theologians, however, will not be much in demand, at least not as practitioners of a parochial discipline.

It is relevant here to note that both attitudes, both that of supersession and that of "midrashic" resignification of tradition, may be evidenced in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The newer canonical criticism has thrown some interesting new light on the prophetic literature in particular.¹² The emphasis here is on hermeneutics as the mediating principle between text and context. The main consequence is that canonization can only be understood as an ongoing and open process: what remains canonical is that which has the symbolic power to preserve the integrity of reality for the people that find themselves threatened at the roots of their identity by the power-flows of history. The book of Jeremiah is a particularly pertinent example of this, as an example of radical monotheizing. Whereas the earlier Davidic theology was exclusivist in its affirmation of the nation of Israel, Jeremiah dares ask the exiles to serve Nebuchadnezzar, "the king of Babylon, my servant" (Jeremiah 27:6). Hananiah, who stuck rigidly to a Davidic hermeneutic, arguing

that the God of Israel would break the yoke of the king of Babylon (Jeremiah 28:2) has become a paradigm of the false prophet, unable to keep up with God's changing agenda.¹³ Jeremiah, however, who has survived as the canonical prophet, was able to affirm a monotheizing pluralism and a move towards universal history. His was a timely theology that dared to find new richness of meaning in the traditions, and to grant God the freedom to work a new providence, detecting providence in the current power-flows instead of closing it up in a Davidic narrowness. It is a similar canonical hermeneutic that the Principle argues in the case of John the Baptist and Jesus.

The other attitude, that of supersession, may be seen most clearly in the Pauline literature. It is particularly evident in the Letter to the Galatians. Spurred by his Judaizing opponents, Paul here repeatedly argues that to turn back to existence under the law of Moses is like giving up sonship for slavery (Galatians 4:6-9; 5:1; 3:10-14). In his heuristic allegory (4:24-31) Paul dramatically resignifies the ancient covenant: now it means only slavery, whereas the "Jerusalem above," the liberated existence in Christ, means inheritance of the Abrahamic promise. It is interesting to see how Paul has modified and toned down his arguments against the law by the time he writes the letter to the Romans; already he is less exclusivistic.

As to Unification theology, it might well seem unrealistic to expect an attitude other than of supersession given the young age and eschatological fervor of the Unification Church. But it is my contention that both the theology and the ecclesiology of the movement are able and apt to self-relativize as time goes by. It would seem that neither providence nor God is likely to run out of surprises, and anyone who wants to do the work of the Lord in the "heavenly war" needs to get used to an undomesticated God. When it comes to hermeneutics, persistency is more likely to be vicious than virtuous. Similarly, I would argue that the Principle in its present literary shape might tend a bit too far towards identifying the rational and the real. In his mode of theologizing I find Rev. Moon to be less an egghead than a muse. His is an enchanted way of theologizing, playful, imaginative, and pragmatic. He is not the

man to "eff the ineffable" with rigid logic; truth is in the heart rather than in the head. The study of history, then, is done less out of intellectual curiosity than out of a need to "find the way of life."¹⁴ The past is dead unless it can be brought to bear upon our present situation, or, more dramatically, unless we get it, it will get us! Ours is the challenge not only of interpreting, but also transforming history, the perplexing existence of being both a product of, and a host for history.

In this polarity between rationalism and praxis the Unification view of history balances between Pannenberg's theology of world history and Moltmann's theology of hope. With Pannenberg we propose to make God the all-determining reality revealed in history in a manner clear "for all who have eyes to see." History is the most comprehensive horizon of Christian theology, and the totality of history is taken as a frame of reference for both historical and theological work. Pannenberg has had to contend with severe charges from the kerygmatic camp, in the heat of the debate finding his theology labeled as "historical fetishism."¹⁵ It would seem that Unification historiography is more bent on biblical "archetypes" and "typologies" as heuristic and analytical tools for grasping the inner thread of history, and less insistent on the verification of these paradigms by the historical-critical method.¹⁶ In this it is able to see revelation both as history and cosmology. The affinities with the Moltmannian theology of hope are evidenced mostly in Rev. Moon's style which is that of a passionate prophet, a preacher, and a poet. Sociologically, this quote from *Theology of Hope* may well characterize the Unification movement:

From the first to the last, and not merely in epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and transforming the present. . . . Eschatology is the passionate suffering and passionate longing kindled by the Messiah.¹⁷

Needless to say, however, Unificationists do not share Moltmann's anti-rational bias, nor his Marxist affinities.¹⁸ Similarly, we would share Pannenberg's opposition to existentialist theology in its tendency to dissolve history into the historicity of existence, while nevertheless

espousing a historical existentialism, as it were. I am thinking here of the inevitable resurgence of the past into the present, thematized as “The Vertical Condition of Indemnity and Horizontal Restoration through Indemnity.”¹⁹

Having discussed this inherent epistemological polarity between a Hegelian rationalism and existential praxis as we see it in the Unification philosophy of history, let us go on to another polarity, that of promise and fulfillment. Time and again, as we tread the stepping stones of the providential history of restoration, we notice that the stones are not what they “were supposed to be.” There seems to be a perennial discrepancy between the “will of God,” and the “fulfillment of the will of God.” With Pannenberg we are thus brought to bid farewell to the classical biblical notion of history as that which takes place between promise and fulfillment,²⁰ and venture on a providence where “history has overtaken promises.”²¹ Instead of interpreting history in light of the Word of God, we find history honing our hermeneutics.

The God of the coming kingdom is thereby understood not only as the author of historical change—as was already the case in ancient Israel—but also the power for altering his own previous manifestations.²²

God is here understood as the author of constant newness, not only in the present and in the future, but even in the past! The challenge of responding to God’s unpredictable ways of fulfilling God’s promises demands an adaptable hermeneutics. Face to face with the contingencies of salvation history our religious texts and our religious traditions are challenged to the core. Pannenberg has expressed this dialectically:

Political and social changes can hardly ever automatically produce religious transformation; rather, they signify a challenge, whose mastery or non-mastery remains a matter of the inner strength, the inner health, and the adaptability of the religious tradition itself at that time.²³

It is here, in its tenacious determination to make the whole human drama, in all its aspects, “transparent to the divine intention,”²⁴ that the Unification Principle deserves to be taken seriously and watched carefully

as it enters the challenge of secularity. The outcome of this challenge largely depends on whether Unification hermeneutics is strong enough and flexible enough to absorb the perplexities of our confused age, to render them intelligible in light of divine providence, to transform them and refine them from pseudo-expressions to substantial expressions of the divine ideal, to usher in an age where God's promises finally catch up with history. It is only in the light of the end of history that history can ultimately be grasped.

In the assimilation of *Historie* to *Heilsgeschichte* Unification historiography faces the subtly dichotomous twins of secularity and secularism.²⁵ We find that our historical hermeneutics permits us to see secularity as the legitimate child of God's history of restoration, whereas secularism, in denying religion by stern materialism, is that which represents the most serious challenge to theistic ideology in its effort to maintain the integrity of reality. Pannenberg has worded the challenge thus:

In our present world, Christianity can no longer be taken for granted. Many people nowadays feel that the Christian churches are the relics of a past which has otherwise vanished without a trace. Has the modern age broken away again from Christianity, or is the Christian heritage in some hidden way constituent in the way of life, which seems so completely secular . . . either as the hidden capital on which it is living in spite of all the secularization it puts on display, or as the factor which makes this secular life a possibility?²⁶

In the sense that the history of Christianity may be seen as a precursor to and as a prolepsis of developments in secular history (politics and economics), Unification theory of history joins with Pannenberg in seeing Christianity as the legitimation of the modern age.²⁷ However, the dichotomy of secularity and secularism in Unification thought is ontologically rooted and explained as sung-sang culture and hyung-sang culture that remain in disharmony due to the fall.²⁸ It is noteworthy, however, that the chapter ends with a vision of a "New Renaissance" in which these quarrelsome twins, the cultural Cain and Abel, are reconciled in a "wonderful new cultural age which is beyond our imagination."²⁹ It

is just this vision of the fusion of new horizons that brings strength and joy to Unification people.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Cf. Frederick Sontag, "The God of Principle: A Critical Evaluation," in *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church*, ed. Herbert Richardson (Barrytown, N.Y.: Unification Theological Seminary, distributed by The Rose of Sharon Press, Inc., 1981), pp. 111-12.
- ²Young Whi Kim, *The Divine Principle Study Guide, Part I* (Tarrytown, N.Y.: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), p. 2.
- ³William R. Dray, *Philosophy of History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 2.
- ⁴Whereas some historians admire Toynbee for his daring and brilliance, others see his *Study of History* as a "blasphemy against Western Culture." Dray, p. 83.
- ⁵This theme pervades most of Pannenberg's writings, but is found in its clearest and most uncompromising form in the programmatic book of the Pannenberg circle, Wolhart Pannenberg, et al., eds., *Revelation as History*, (London: Macmillan, 1968), especially pp. 125-58.
- ⁶Ted Peters, "Truth in History: Gadamer's Hermeneutics and Pannenberg's Apologetic Method," *Journal of Religion*, LV (1975), p. 37.
- ⁷*Divine Principle*, pp. 130-31; hereafter cited as *DP*.
- ⁸Sontag, p. 114.
- ⁹*DP*, p. 16.
- ¹⁰Peters, p. 47.
- ¹¹*DP*, pp. 232-37.
- ¹²The newer canonical hermeneutics is discussed in James A. Sanders, *Torah and Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972).
- ¹³God is portrayed as being freelance, as being innovative. That is what bothered Hananiah so. God is constantly changing the agenda. William L. Holladay, *Jeremiah, Spokesman Out of Time* (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1974), p. 146.
- ¹⁴*DP*, p. 238.
- ¹⁵Pannenberg responds to these charges in an appendix to the German *Offenbarung als Geschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1970). Unfortunately, these helpful remarks are missing in the English translation.
- ¹⁶M. Darrol Bryant, "Unification Eschatology and American Millennial Traditions" in *A Time for Consideration*, eds. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson, (Toronto: Mellen, 1978), p. 266.
- ¹⁷Jürgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 16.
- ¹⁸"We find that the definition, comprehension, and understanding of history inevitably brings about at the same time an abrogation, a negation, and an annihilation of history." Moltmann, p. 258.
- ¹⁹*DP*, p. 378. See *DP*, p. 237: "'I' must stand for the will of history. In order to do this, 'I' must set up horizontally, centering on 'myself,' all the conditions of indemnity which are demanded by the history of the providence of restoration through a long period."

²⁰Moltmann, p. 78.

²¹"Because as a rule the promises do not enter so literally into a fulfillment as one would assume that they would if they were the word of God affecting history, in accord with the Old Testament self-understanding. Rather, history has 'overtaken' promises understood in this sense." James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., *Theology as History* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967) p. 259.

²²Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology* (London: SCM, 1970), I, 114.

²³Pannenberg, *Basic Questions*, p. 111.

²⁴Bryant, p. 265.

²⁵This theme is further developed in Schubert M. Ogden, *The Reality of God* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 6-12, 14-16, 25, 40ff, 44ff.

²⁶Wolfhart Pannenberg, *The Idea of God and Human Freedom* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), p. 178.

²⁷See *Unification Thought*, (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1973), pp. 431-44.

²⁸*Unification Thought*, pp. 297-300.

²⁹*Unification Thought*, p. 300.

The Periods of Christian History in Unification Theology

Klaus M. Lindner

In contemporary historiography, historical periods are often viewed as *conceptus in mente* that do not have their foundation *in re*, i.e., in any distinctive content of the period itself. As Heiko A. Oberman argues, it is the historian who has to create periods and give meaning to historical concepts, realizing, however, that it is his own focus that creates them and that there is no "really objective periodization."¹ One's ideological preferences or simply one's academic focus may lead to the appearance of quite different periodizations. While the church historians may stress that history was made in 1517, the Marxist historian would rather stress the importance of the beginning of the early bourgeois revolution in 1476.² For a historian who focuses on the Renaissance as the moving force of the period from 1300 to 1600, the Reformation is nothing but an epilogue of the Renaissance.³ Because of the justifiable claims of conflicting positions, Oberman and other historians have adopted a nominalist understanding of historical periods. According to this view, any period cannot be more than a construct of meaning created by the human mind.

This contemporary notion is fundamentally opposed to the *Divine Principle* concept of providential time periods, according to which periods are not only opened and ended by epochal events, but have also a very specific content and purpose. Thus, the Unification understanding of historical periods is extremely realist.

The purpose of this essay is mainly of a descriptive and historical nature. In the first part I intend to describe some general characteristics of the Unification concept of history and historical time parallels and indicate comparable views or historical antecedents, whenever possible. In the second part I want to trace the historical development of traditional periodizations of the history of Christianity and discuss the position that most closely resembles the *Divine Principle* view. I hope to be able to show whether it is possible to refute the objection that *Divine Principle* does not really offer a periodization of Christian history but a superimposition of an alien periodization based on the Old Testament and the history of Christianity. The objection is, in other words, that the hermeneutical principle which Unificationists use in exegeting the history of Christianity is alien to this history and distorts it. Thus, I want to investigate what kinds of presuppositions have been made, and have to be made, in order to arrive at the same epochs of Christian history as *Divine Principle*.

Providential Time Parallels

According to *Divine Principle*, history is teleological and its goal is the restoration, i. e., the recreation of God's original ideal of the human being and of the world.⁴ Since the goal of history is the same as the goal of religion, history is "made" in the history of religions. History *is* salvation history by definition. This is true especially in the case of the history of the "chosen people" of God, i. e., of the first and second Israel. The Old Testament is understood to be the normative history of the first Israel, i. e., the record of the acts of God intended to bring about the salvation of Israel. In the case of the second Israel, however, Christian history itself has to become "a source of reference, in addition to 'Acts' of the New Testament."⁵ Thus, "the providential history of restoration after Jesus" is essentially the history of Christianity.⁶

The purpose of restoration history can be fulfilled only if the Messiah who is "anointed" by God is also received by the people. This means that the goal of the providence of restoration is first of all the

establishment of an adequate "foundation to receive the Messiah." Thus, the "Providential Age for the Foundation of Restoration" that included Adam's as well as Abraham's family, had already the same goal as the "Providence of Restoration Centering on Moses," in which the foundation was established and the Messiah could come. According to Unification theology, the response of the people at the time of Jesus was not adequate, causing the providence to be prolonged. Thus, the providential time period by which the foundation had been established had to be repeated.⁷ In order to understand the importance of time periods in the Unification view of history, one needs to take into consideration the notion that the history of restoration is essentially a history of re-creating people who reach spiritual maturity, i.e., who have a "perfect" relationship with God. Unlike some Eastern traditions, according to which the individual has to pass through a whole new round of rebirth if he or she does not achieve the goal of life in the present life, Unification theology projects this rebirth onto the historical plane, because the ultimate release from the history of restoration has to be a communal historical event. This view of history is extremely organic. In a sense, in terms of mission, the second Israel can be considered to be a "reincarnation" of the first Israel, John the Baptist a "reincarnation" of Elijah, and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob only one single person. As I said already, this is true only in terms of mission, not of individuality. Rev. Moon himself usually refers to Christianity as the "younger brother" of Judaism. This means that a historical time period can and in fact has to "mature" in a similar way as a human being. As contemporary Westerners, we prefer abstractions and are uncomfortable with such analogies from nature. Christian thinkers from Justin, Irenaeus, and Augustine to Luther, however, often compared historical periods not only to the six days of creation, but also to the six periods of the human life.⁸ In a similar way as *Divine Principle*, they thought of history as a process of creation, the six periods of which are followed by the Messianic kingdom. Inspired by Melanchthon and Johan Carion's *Chronicon*, Luther proceeded even to divide his own eschatological timetable into six periods of a thousand years each. Melanchthon's

calculation, based on the biblical chronology, led him to expect the completion of the sixth millennium, and thus the return of Christ, in 1892. Luther arrived at the date 2040,⁹ but both did not take this calculation literally because they were convinced that in the last days the days would be shortened and the return of Christ very soon. Carion's *Chronicon*, which inspired Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon, was based on a rediscovery of the chronology of Tanna debe Eliyyahu in the Babylonian Talmud, according to which, "the world is to exist six thousand years. The first two thousand years are to be void (i.e., without law), the next two thousand years are the period of the Torah, and the following two thousand years are the period of the Messiah."¹⁰

Although Luther's periodization of the history that is recorded in the Old Testament is very similar to the periodization used in *Divine Principle*, Luther did not think of those periods as periods that had distinctive purposes. Consequently, he also did not attempt to compare them to periods within Christian history.

The Periods of Christian History

The division of Christian history into periods came relatively late. The *Magdeburger Zenturien*, began in 1559, recounted history century by century, but without implying that these periods were concepts that had a foundation *in re*, i.e., in the periods themselves, or that each turn of a century constituted an epochal event that gave a new direction to the course of events.

Humanist circles, however, developed a model for the understanding of the same history by affixing distinct labels of meaning to three periods. The terms Antiquity, Middle Ages, and Modernity initially referred respectively to the period of classical learning, the mediocre time in between, and the Renaissance as the period of the revival of classical learning.¹¹ The first humanist history using this model was written already towards the end of the seventeenth century, but church historians continued for a long time to follow the example of the *Magdeburger Zenturien*.¹² The first church historian to abandon the

division according to centuries, was Johann Matthias Schröckh, who regarded Constantine, the year 800, and Martin Luther as the major turning points of the history of Christianity.¹³ In the nineteenth century, church historians also began to adopt the division of church history into the history of the ancient church, the medieval church, and the modern church. For the Protestants Karl Hase and Bernhard Lindner, who were both influenced by Hegel, the years 800 and 1517 remain the most important turning points, because they saw the significance of the crowning of Charlemagne in "the transfer of the historical movement to the Germanic peoples." This movement was completed by Luther and the Reformation.¹⁴ Possibly in reaction to this nationalist Protestant position, Catholic church historians, beginning with Johann Adam Möhler of Tübingen, generally began the Middle Ages around the year 700 and disputed also the year 1517 as the beginning of the modern church.¹⁵ Secular historians on the other hand, usually regard the time of transition, beginning with the migration of nations around 370 A.D. and ending with the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 480 A.D. as the beginning of the Middle Ages and the discovery of America and Luther's Ninety-Five Theses as their end.¹⁶

As was to be expected, the periodization of nineteenth century liberal Protestant church historians, who were influenced by Hegelianism and were convinced of the gradual upward development of Christianity and expected an earthly kingdom of heaven at the conclusion of Christian history, comes closest to the periodization in *Divine Principle*. This becomes even clearer if we go into more detail. The most influential German periodization at the beginning of this century was Herman Weingarten's work *Zeittafeln und Überblicke zur Kirchengeschichte*, which was published in many editions from 1870 onwards. According to this work, the major historical turning-points in the history of Christianity are the years 325, 800, 1250, 1517, and 1648 A.D. Even Weingarten's choice of the year 1250 A.D. as a major point of transition is based partly on the fact that "French influence" in the church began already a few decades before the exile to Avignon.¹⁷ "The 'Babylonian Exile' of the Papacy" from 1305 to 1377 A.D. is one of the major subdivisions of

Weingarten's period that lasts from 1250 to 1517.¹⁸ Also the year "ca. 900" is one of the major subdivisions of Weingarten's periodization and signifies the "Collapse of the Carolingian Creation" and "nationalist" strife.¹⁹ Even 325 A. D. seems to have been chosen as a final point of the first major period of church history only for lack of a better solution. The heading "The Victory of the Church over the Pagan World" does not seem to connect logically with the Council of Nicaea as an ending point of that period. Consequently, Weingarten ends the outline of this period with the observation that after Constantine the church achieved primacy and not only toleration.²⁰ This means that all the essential dates of Unification chronology are important also in the traditional Protestant view of church history. This means further that it is possible to defend the Unification chronology of Christian history as a consistent reading of this history from a Protestant perspective. The Unification periodization is present in the history of Church and not merely "imported" from the history of Israel as portrayed in the Bible. Even in the case of the first period of Christian history, a strong historical argument can be made for choosing a later date than 313 A. D. as the "end" of the period, although there is no epochal event that could provide traditional periodization with a fixed date. Theodosius' edict against pagan worship of 392 A. D. that is mentioned in *Divine Principle* along with Augustine's literary activities is apparently quite obscure and is not even mentioned among thousands of important dates and data in Heinrich Bornkamm's widely used *Zeittafeln zur Kirchengeschichte*.²¹ Nevertheless, it is true that the major break with classical culture and religion falls into precisely this time.

One example, which seems particularly interesting at present is the fact that the 1200-year-old tradition of the Olympic Games was discontinued in 393 A. D. for religious reasons. Even if one wants to focus on the theological development of Christianity, the beginning of the fifth century seems more appropriate as a historical divide than 325 A. D. At the Council of Nicaea neither the canonical nor the creedal or theological developments were essentially fixed yet, but they were at the time of Augustine. This means that the turn from the fourth to the fifth

century should be regarded as a more important historical divide on strictly historical grounds and *not* because of the parallels in the Old Testament. On this point Unificationists will also find themselves in agreement with secular historians, who find the beginning of the Middle Ages either at the end of the fourth, or in the fifth century. This is not to deny the fact that *Divine Principle* does in fact use the Old Testament parallels as a hermeneutical device for interpreting Christian history, but to argue that the results of this procedure do not contradict historical scholarship.

The *Divine Principle* interpretation corrects, however, the results of a periodization that orients itself exclusively on important dates, like the Council of Nicaea. Its realist understanding of historical periods, i.e., the fact that periods have actual, distinctive content, leads it to pay attention rather to events that lead to major transformations in the history of Christianity. In this context, Unificationists have to welcome the results of social history as applied to Christian history. This cannot serve as an exclusive tool, however, because sociologically observable transformations are considered to be a result, but not the cause of the beginnings of new periods in church history. Comparative social history would be particularly difficult because of the lack of data, especially of the Old Testament period, and the fact that the "second Israel," as a "spiritual kingdom," should differ fundamentally from the first Israel.²²

Divine Principle does, however, make the claim that numerous events and facts in respective periods of the histories of the first and second Israel are comparable. Although it is difficult to verify this claim objectively, I have found such comparisons an amazing and useful tool. I will only mention in this context the relationship between Saul and Samuel and the relationship between Charlemagne and Leo III, and the fact that the exile of the papacy in Avignon has been called the "Babylonian captivity of the Church" and can, in fact, be compared with the captivity of a large part of the "chosen people" in Babylon. Even the fact that many of them preferred to stay longer in Babylon can be compared to the fact that a rival pope remained in Avignon even after Gregory XI decided to return to Rome.

This is not the place and time, however, to attempt to adduce an infinite number of strange historical "coincidences," and I do not want to suggest that there is any simple way of using history as a proof text. What I want to say is that given the *Divine Principle* presupposition that Christian history, like Old Testament history, has to be viewed as a history of human responses to God's activity, and that this history has a possible goal that lies within this world, the *Divine Principle* periodization of Christian history does not have to be "imported" from the Old Testament. This is the reason why the Christian tradition that comes closest to these presuppositions, namely nineteenth and early twentieth century Protestant liberalism can arrive independently at almost the same epochs of Christian history. What the *Divine Principle* interpretation adds is only an attempt to explain these historical periods. I tend to agree with Oberman that the historian's results are influenced by his focus and by his ideological convictions. I do not think, however, that the nominalist presupposition that historical constructs of meaning are created by the historian and not found *in* history itself is useful for doing religious history and Christian history in particular. The God of creation has to be consistent with the God of history. If there is meaning in life, there has to be also meaning in history. Objective historiography of the type Oberman suggests can be a useful tool.

The *Divine Principle* interpretation, however, wants to offer much more. It presents a history of strife and suffering and an explanation of the main successes and failures in the course of this history that is consistent with the Christian God of love. And it may be that this *is* the most adequate account of Christian history.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Heiko A. Oberman, "Reformation: Epoche oder Episode," *Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*, 68 (1977), 87.
- ²See Max Steinmetz, "Die frühbürgerliche Revolution in Deutschland (1476-1535)," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 8 (1960), 113ff.
- ³See Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Studies on Renaissance Humanism during the Last Twenty Years," *Studies in the Renaissance*, 9 (1962), 22.
- ⁴*Divine Principle* (Washington: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), p. 222; hereafter cited as *DP*.
- ⁵*DP*, p. 407.
- ⁶*DP*, p. 407.
- ⁷*DP*, p. 405.
- ⁸Gerhard Ruhbach, *Kirchengeschichte* (Gütersloh, Germany: Gütersloher, 1974), p. 78. See also Karl Heussi, *Altertum, Mittelalter und Neuzeit in der Kirchengeschichte* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921), pp. 7, 11; and Emil Menke-Glückert, *Die Geschichtsschreibung der Reformation und Gegenreformation* (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1912), pp. 26f., 44f., 114.
- ⁹Martin Luther, *Werke* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1964), LIII, 171.
- ¹⁰*Babylonian Talmud*, Aboda Zara 9a.
- ¹¹Heussi, p. 9.
- ¹²Heussi, p. 12.
- ¹³Johann Matthias Schröckh, *Christliche Kirchengeschichte* (Leipzig: Schwickert, 1768 ff.). See also Heussi, p. 15.
- ¹⁴Wilhelm B. Lindner, *Lehrbuch der christlichen Kirchengeschichte*, 3 vols., (Leipzig: C. B. Schwickert, 1848-1852).
- ¹⁵See Heussi, pp. 19-21, 25. In 680-81 A.D. was held the Sixth Ecumenical Council in Constantinople (Trullanum).
- ¹⁶See Ruhbach, pp. 78-79.
- ¹⁷Herman Weingarten, *Zeittafeln und Überblicke zur Kirchengeschichte*, fünfte verbesserte Auflage (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1897), p. 86.
- ¹⁸Weingarten, pp. 92ff.
- ¹⁹Weingarten, p. 60.
- ²⁰Weingarten, p. 1.
- ²¹Heinrich Bornkamm, *Zeittafeln zur Kirchengeschichte* (Gütersloh, Germany: Gütersloher, 1971).
- ²²*DP*, p. 410.

Discussion

Dagfinn Aslid: I see, then, the strength of our hermeneutic more in its flexibility and in its ability to transform tradition and adapt it to today. I would like to make a remark by way of response to Lorine Getz who brought up Jung. Jung was my John the Baptist, so to speak. I came as a Jungian to the Unification Church in Sweden. On the level of content or dogma we would not agree with the Jungian dualism, but in method and approach I think we have much in common with Jung. And, like Jung, we are, I wouldn't say unorthodox, but a-orthodox in the sense that the true Unificationist would be open to an open-ended canon.

Klaus Lindner: In Dagfinn's categories I would qualify more as an egghead. This means that I have to try to come to terms more with the hard realities of historical scholarship and deal for example with the specific points of *Divine Principle* historiography.

Frederick Sontag: Klaus, I am trying to figure out who your enemy is. You are accused of taking an Old Testament typology or whatever word you want to use and imposing it on the New Testament. Who accuses you of that?

Klaus Lindner: Some professors at Harvard.

Frederick Sontag: I don't. It is all right with me if you want to divide history that way. (laughter) I think you give the most telling example when you say that this fits in well with liberal Protestant historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This is the milieu in which the thought grew up and that seems to me to be quite

acceptable. But it seems to me that the key issue in your paper is when you say that the purpose of restoration history can be fulfilled only if the Messiah who is anointed by God is also received by the people. That seems to me a novelty. It seems to me important and absolutely central to Unification thought, but I don't quite see where that occurs in any other historical tradition. I can't think of another instance where the periods would be divided in this way because of the rejection by the people. At least it is not so in Christianity. There is the faithlessness of the people in the Old Testament. In that sense I can see that perhaps this idea draws on slightly more Old Testament notions, but I cannot really see that Christianity has ever said that Jesus' purpose was dependent on his reception. He was despised and rejected. We all sing that and it is true, but I think the reversal at that point is absolutely central to what you are trying to say and actually informs the total reading of history which you do.

Klaus Lindner: I totally agree with you, but that point has to do more with eschatology than with the objective facts of history that I was interested in in this paper.

Frederick Sontag: What are the objective facts of history?

Klaus Lindner: Important dates and things like that. It is very nice of you to agree that the dates that *Divine Principle* uses are the important ones in church history but there is not universal agreement about that.

Frederick Sontag: You do use the graduate student poise and you are an egghead (laughter), but you really can't get off the hook quite that easily to say that it is a question of eschatology. Because the whole reading of history that you give is occasioned by acceptance or rejection of God's entrance into history. I think that is crucial. It leads to an eschatology because of your reading of history. If it were not that way, had the people received him, had the entrance into Jerusalem remained triumphal, you would have a different history. I don't see why you separate those two; this seems to me absolutely crucial to your periodization of history. Would you agree that if it weren't for the crucial notion of being received by the people you would not view history the way you do?

Klaus Lindner: Sure, there would be no history of Christianity either, but that is precisely what I said. One of the ideas that I injected in that paper was the idea that in some way Unification historiography is similar to certain ideas of reincarnation, that if you don't fulfill the goal of life in this earthly life then you repeat this life over again and you have to make the decision over again at the important parts of your life. Therefore the history of Christianity repeats the important decisions that have been made in the history of Judaism.

Frank Flinn: I have two comments. I really liked your paper, Klaus. I would like to see you go back to the tree of life imagery, the Joachimite version of the tree of life and rhetoric and early Christian historiography and see if one can uncover fully this motif of periodizing history. What is the status of that motif in post-canonical context and how did people perceive themselves in relation to the canon when they were doing this type of periodization? That is a totally unexamined question. You have demonstrated clearly, too, that this happened as late as our own time.

My answer to the nominalists is that the nominalists make a distinction between facts and values. The nominalists say that it is only serial facts that constitute history. Yet the nominalists are imposing this as a value judgment. It is a normative value judgment to say that there are only facts and it is only the values that establish what the facts are. Nominalism is waiting for this great construct of history to happen that they claim by methodology can't happen. Nominalism always falls into their own historicism, which exempts itself from the criteria it applies to every other kind of interpretation of history.

Anthony Guerra: I wanted to take up the question that Fred Sontag just raised, whether or not the periodization of history which Klaus has outlined is based upon our particular reading of the mission of Jesus. Klaus' assertion (with which Fred agreed) that these kinds of periodizations were like something going on in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would indicate that it isn't. At least that it is not necessary to have that particular reading of the mission of Jesus in order to have these particular periods. That seems to me rather obvious and therefore I

would agree with Klaus in looking at the periods themselves. If we want to talk about the rejection of Jesus, I think we should do that, but that is perhaps for tonight when we get back to the question of christology.

Frederick Sontag: I have a question for Dagfinn. Dagfinn, you have been close to process theology and so on at Claremont. You say that God is here understood as the author of constant newness. Now that is language right out of process theology. There are certain interesting parallels. I said this a long time ago and John Cobb nearly fell off his chair, but there are really rather interesting parallels between you and process thought, though I think here you are changing it a little. Personally, I happen to like it for allowing the novelty of change into the process, but I confess I don't think I really see that much of it in *Divine Principle*. Now there is the contingency that the history doesn't have to come out a certain way, but I get much more the feeling of a kind of constant purpose reasserting itself than I do of the creative newness which the process people like to stress.

Dagfinn Aslid: It is a different kind of newness because the process people don't have the concept of evil that we do. They don't have a view of radical evil. Our concept of newness is God's innovation, God's portion of responsibility, in our language, in initiating new dispensations when old ones wear out so to speak. That is often where we see the inability of humans to change their hermeneutics. I think there are very clear traces of this when you consider how the Old Testament, and to a lesser extent the New, came to be canonized. You see the text reapplied to new situations, the Babylonian exile for instance, and the new type of theology that evolved in that situation which isn't the same but a parallel.

Frank Flinn: I see the typologization in *Divine Principle* as a brake against what I call the fanaticism of the future. You have to read the typologies both forward *and* backward. Typologization puts a brake on any radical futurism. Perhaps one can talk about a normative type of typology.

Darrol Bryant: I would just like to put another question on the

table, one that is related to the question that Professor Sontag raised and also that Frank raised. Frank said it in terms of the motif and Fred in terms of the telos. Why is it crucial in *Divine Principle* to organize history in this way? In other words what is at stake in the periodization? It is not simply the disagreement between the nominalists and realists about this question. Why would you argue even beyond that debate that it is critical to understand history as a history of periods or, to say it in more theological language, why is it critical to understand history as a history of dispensations?

Andrew Wilson: In relation to what Dagfinn said, I feel that in *Divine Principle* there has to be a limit to the playfulness of God.

Dagfinn Aslid: An egghead!

Andrew Wilson: I mean we don't go around changing our numbers from 21 to 13 for example, and we can't conceive of a principle with equivocal meanings or historical periods. One of the best things in Dagfinn's paper is where he says that history has a purpose to help show us a way of life, which I agree with a hundred percent. I think that is something that is missing in both these presentations, namely, that we understand history so that we can understand our own way of life because there is a correspondence between one's personal life history and the life histories of family, society, nation, and world. That is why there is that wonderful chapter in *Divine Principle* on the history of the providence and "I." That to me is one of the most inspiring and critical little sections of *Divine Principle*. If I want to understand my life course in terms of history, or if Rev. Moon wants to understand how he is going to work in the providence, then there have to be some kind of criteria by which he can understand what that providence is. I don't think that either of you have said what the hermeneutic is and I think that is a very similar question to the one which Darrol just raised.

Dagfinn Aslid: First of all I think you are perfectly right in pointing out the precaution. It is not my intention to use the muse for academic license. We often see what happens with those who get disenchanted with the rigorous Apollonian type of education that percolates through in graduate school. What happens is a complete

abandonment of that for a more Dionysian type and that is not what I am advocating.

That brings me to the second point, the motif, the telos for why we do make typologies. I treat this in my paper somewhat. I call this historical existentialism, very close to your concern. It is treated in *Divine Principle* in the history and "I" section. It is a history which is less concerned with explicating history for its own sake and more concerned to have history inform our daily life. Now that is not the full answer.

Klaus Lindner: I hinted at your question, Darrol, already in the last part of my paper, namely, that the *Divine Principle* explanation of history wants to explain successes and failures of God's providence in history, and part of Unification historiography, as Andy said, is that you learn from successes and failures in history. In my paper I didn't stress that too much because I don't think that you really read history with that hermeneutic to come up objectively with those parallels. You have raised another question. I think it is important to understand those periods in order to understand, for one thing, why we don't have the kingdom of heaven, why the purpose of Christianity is not fulfilled, precisely because at different periods of history mistakes have been made and mistakes have been repeated. This shows that God is active in history but also that human beings have to respond.

Anthony Guerra: One of the reasons for taking these parallels seriously and seeing if there is in fact some kind of historical grounds for asserting them is this: the periods are telling us when the end-time is and how to know what period of history we are in. If it is an end-time, then it is very important that we as the children of God fulfill our responsibilities. Periodization gives the notion, which Fred rightly pointed out, that one has to respond to the will of God and that the will of God gets expressed in particular forms in given times of history. Then it is important to know what time of history we are in. That is the whole argument of Herb Richardson, that if we know that we are in the time of Jesus, for instance, then we know the type of what was wrong there so we can reverse it in order to accomplish restoration. If the process of restoration is the reversal of past failures we need to know for which

failures we are responsible.

Now in terms of expanding what Andy was saying, there is another dimension in which *Divine Principle* tries to explicate the meaning of history. If you look at *Divine Principle* closely, at the end of each section you find a concluding section which is entitled the lesson to be learned from the course of Adam, etc. The sections are moralistic. It seems to me that Dagfinn is concentrating in his paper on those lessons. That would be more appropriate to him, whereas what Klaus is doing is concentrating on the objective facticity of these parallels. They are doing two things which I think are complementary but need to be brought together in order to get at the significance of doing this at all.

Darrol Bryant: Well, the point of my question is to encourage you in the task of articulating what *Divine Principle* is about in these sections because I myself think that these are among the most important sections of *Divine Principle*. My parallel here is the kind of work that you find in a person like Rosenstock-Huessy—for whom some of you know I have a great deal of affection—in his great work *Out of Revolution: The Autobiography of Western Man*. Certainly this is a historical work that contemporary historians would reject out of hand just as I think contemporary historians would reject *Divine Principle* out of hand. But it is an instructive parallel in that in Rosenstock-Huessy it is fairly clear what he is doing in rewriting the whole history of western culture in this eight hundred page book. He tells us explicitly that he is a man who served in the first world war and had in the trenches of Verdun a certain vision. That vision was a vision of the unity of the human race. There is a parallel to what you have in Unification. Rosenstock-Huessy said that in order for us to move into the third millennium in which the project of that millennium is to attain the unity of the human race it is necessary for us to re-signify or re-understand the entire preceding two millennia so we can overcome the kind of divisiveness that comes from thinking about our own, in this case national, histories which are pitted against one another. He recommends seeing them as contributing streams to the creation of a more unified race in which different nations, different types, and different peoples make their unique contribution.

When I read *Divine Principle*, I was inclined to see something like what you find in St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei* and more recently in the work of Jonathan Edward's *History of the Work of Redemption*. It is a type of theology that is very much out of fashion. Just recognize and acknowledge that. Yet I don't think it is possible to give an account of *Divine Principle* in terms of contemporary historiography or even process theology. Not that that is the only thing in your paper. They are both traditions which are essentially hostile to the kind of history of God that *Divine Principle* is interested in writing.

Andrew Wilson: For me one of the chief didactic functions of the parallels in particular is to demonstrate that God indeed acts according to a plan in history. The fact that Klaus has been able to make some kind of a case for the reality of the historical periods within Christianity without reference to the Old Testament and that they have an independent validity strengthens the case of *Divine Principle*. These historical parallels are some kind of evidence that God is indeed working in this way. When I met the church and I heard the lecture on the providential periods the effect it had on me was that it told me that we have a God who acts according to a plan in history. As Tony said, we are oriented in a particular point in history which is the last days and we can understand in history the working out of these various relationships between nations and so on.

Frederick Sontag: Andy, I think that is a two-edged sword. You had better be careful when you grab it because Klaus' premise is that history does not have to be split in any particular way. What Klaus is saying and what you are agreeing to is nothing that we can object to. These historical periods aren't a total invention of yours but the mere fact that they are conceivable certainly doesn't give them great validity. They don't get great validity unless you get the other notion that this is in fact the way God has acted. That is absolutely crucial. Therefore you can't treat it as a kind of matter of convenience as does Oberman. If you do that you have got yourself cut the other way because you are saying that there isn't any decisive way that history has to be done and you don't want to say that. The whole meaning of *Divine Principle*, as I understand

it, is that you have discovered the principle upon which God has been operating in relation to mankind to achieve his purpose. Either this is the way he operated or you had better get yourself a new book.

Frank Flinn: For the benefit of those who haven't had Oberman's course, he comes in and makes an announcement about the arbitrariness of the periods and then he proceeds to periodize like mad, insisting all the while that his periods are the right ones. If you are going to speak in terms of history you are going to commit yourself to a kind of rhetoric. That is inevitable. Furthermore, you are going to commit yourself to history as story and stories necessarily have parts, so that there is no such thing as "factual" history, i. e., one thing after another ad infinitum. We are talking as if we can live in hermeneutical vacuums and we can't if we want to tell the story. I think that periodization will fall out of any person's way of telling the story. The real question is, are there better periodizations or worse periodizations? I have to think that *Divine Principle* is rather exciting here.

Historical Narration in *Divine Principle*: The Ideology of Religious Story

Stanley Johannesen

When one considers with what intensity and exclusiveness not only Christ's teaching, but the doctrines of the Church in the following centuries down to the present day, have emphasized the goodness of the loving Father in heaven, the deliverance from fear, the Summum Bonum, and the privatio boni, one can form some conception of the incompatibility which the figure of Yahweh presents, and see how intolerable such a paradox must appear to the religious consciousness. And this has probably been so ever since the days of Job.

—C.G. Jung, Answer to Job¹

This essay* is addressed to Jung's paradox, to the psychic and narrative tension that must always be present in stories about God: the line of tension that runs between the account of his nature and the account of his acts. However, we want to deal with the God-story—the historical narrative of God's doings in the world—in *Divine Principle*, not in connection with the archetypes, or with the conventions of religious symbology, or with the psychology of religious states as mirrored in religious narrative, but rather, with its ideology, with its character as an incentive and rationale for human acts. This is clearly not the only way, or even the best way, to approach a story of this kind, but it has the advantage of permitting us to begin with the naive questions of the chronicler,

*The present paper is substantially different from the one delivered at the Bahamas' conference. Discussion of the paper as it was presented has been dropped from the proceedings.

or the hearer of a report, or the reader of a fiction: What kind of story is this? Why does the main character behave the way he does? What sort of person would tell a story like this one? What does he expect me to do?

The method is that of comparative literature rather than sociology. We are not interested in whether or not anyone actually behaves in a certain way from reading *Divine Principle*. What we want to know is whether by discovering the type of story it is, we may identify some quality of moral experience implicit in the telling of it, and not accessible in any other way. It is necessary to say this, because raising the banner of ideology may signify to some that what we are about to do is relate recommended actions to tangible ends. But telling a story may be a means not related to such ends at all, but rather to the identification of basic values, and to the orientation of people in time by means of the story. The recommended action is in this case symbolic action. But such acts are real acts, and have moral value. I should say that the ideological meaning of a religious story is its tendency to make people interpret the data of the world in terms provided by the story, to a greater or lesser exclusion of other interpretations.

It is not easy, however, to say what the terms of a story are that are peculiar to it. Religious stories not only contain explicit claims to privileged understanding but also contain narrative materials and moral preferences drawn from non-religious cultural systems, and from the unique psychological and moral situation of the storyteller. The man who says his God has a certain character, or acts out of a certain necessity, or is constrained in particular ways, declares a collective and personal sense of ideal action, of perfect rulership, of fatherhood, of admirable use of power, and so forth. It is not clear what is specifically religious in such judgements, or whether or not they serve purposes that are ideological in the usual sense. The religiously inspired history is an account of (divine) motivation in the ordering of time that directly expresses a sense of how historical time *ought* to be ordered. It is not a matter of indifference, therefore, whether or not a society of men is dominated by a particular historical myth. Belief is what divides men.

The unresolved, and unresolvable, problem of *Divine Principle* is the problem posed by the existence of a revealed history: To discourse of human societies in time is to invoke the essential moral ambiguity of all stories that are unfinished and incomplete. To discourse thus in the context of revealed religion is to deny the ambiguity, to pretend to see the end, and therefore to know what being in the present *really means*.

The time of *Divine Principle* is not the passive medium of the chronicler and the historian—that mere metronome-beat on which the artist hangs his phrase. Time is rather an expressive mode, an active medium in which certain intentional structures of the world are displayed. Time, above all, is not civic time—neither the temporal dimension of human action, nor the mode in which political society visualizes its origins and continuance. Time is disposed rather to satisfy intrinsic criteria of balance and rhythm.

The accompanying charts (figs. 1 & 2) conveniently summarize the teaching of *Divine Principle* respecting world history to the present. They each cover six thousand years of world history: two thousand years from Adam to Abraham, two thousand years from Abraham to Jesus, and the last two thousand years from Jesus to the Lord of the Second Advent. The first chart (fig. 1) emphasizes the durational structure of time according to a system of repetitions of numbers in sequences called time-identities. The second chart (fig. 2) stresses simultaneity of phenomena in time rather than durational structure. It shows the conflation of traditional-religious and modern-secular historical categories. The two thousand year dispensational sequences are here called providential ages, and are linked to political and economic cycles of a decidedly positivistic and Marxist-Leninist cast.

The rigidity and naivety of this scheme are obvious features. The numerology, based on twelve, four, twenty-one, forty, and their multiples, is explained in *Divine Principle* as a kind of code, a key to perfection implicit in the tripartite and quadripartite natural divisions of the world.² All fresh movements towards completion must begin at the beginning of the sequence of numbers, which was determined by the first cycle. The completion of each sequence satisfies a temporal

Fig. 1 Chart of the Age of Providential Time-Identity





Fig. 2 Chart of the Development of History from the Standpoint of the Providence of Restoration



requirement for the resolution of the mission or problem of an age. The completion of a required sequence is not sufficient for the state of perfection sought by the system, but it does formally set the stage for the heroic surge of energy at the end of each two thousand year age, in which the next age is born.

The object of the system as a whole is restoration. History proper is the time between the fall of man and the restoration of man (and of creation) to the perfection which had been the birthright of Adam, and lost in the fall. There is an ambivalence in the system as a whole, in that it seems in some moods to point to a plan of growth in history towards consummation in which all the stages contribute cumulatively to the desired end, and in other moods to depict time looping back on itself in repetitive cycles. This distinction is manifest in the charts. The time-identity chart (fig. 1) has time unfolding from the figurative toward the substantial. *Divine Principle* (pp. 374-75) explicitly identifies the three stages "symbolic," "image" and "substantial," with formation, growth, and perfection. The chart from the "Standpoint of the Providence of Restoration" (fig. 2), on the other hand, reflects an understanding of time as flawed in its progress. The first age is "Foundation," the second is characterized as a direct movement to restoration, and the third is a "prolongation of restoration"—more accurately characterizing the repetitions of forms, both social and chronological, visible in the third stage in both charts, and introducing a note of defeat and anxiety of great psychological interest. The death of Jesus is here understood as a species of tragic failure, and not, as one might infer from the time-identity chart, a mere hinge in the fold of time.

What these charts do not in themselves reveal is the motive force that propels this tragic spiral movement, at once Polybian and Hegelian, towards the same endings over and over again, yet somehow towards a final ending. That force is indemnity, a principle of moral action and reaction in time. The idea is central to Unification thought and contains elements of both a juridical concept of retribution and the Christian concept of redemption. Indemnity is necessary because every evil act in the universe is an invasion by Satan of a position defined by God, and a

perversion of that position into something of identical form but negative rather than positive in respect to restoration. An indemnity restores the original position. It removes a formal blockage in the dialectic of the divine economy. Indemnity is accomplished by re-assuming the position at the moment of transgression and doing it over again, doing it right. One person or group may do this for another, and at points far removed in time. The transaction, however, is not to be understood as involving transfers of personal merit; it is rather a question of initiating and completing a virtuous process.

This doctrine has many interesting consequences for Unificationist ethical teaching, but we should particularly notice two features that are related to a view of time and of history. The first has to do with the durational aspect of indemnification. This is the true significance of the numerological scheme of repetitions outlined above. One of the systems of restoration that Satan invades and perverts is the temporal aspect of the world and the sequential forms of time. To indemnify for this trespass is to re-do time. A retributive element is attached to Christian redemption which requires sacrifice but is not frequently thought of as possessing a durational requirement in this sense.

The other thing that is crucial for the Unification conception of history is that the next cycle, to bring around once more the appropriate conditions for restoration, must fulfill the failed portion of the mission of indemnification of the previous cycle, as well as its own mission. The job gets harder each time, and these heroic labors fall especially on the central figure of the end times, on the bearers of messiahship. Hence Jesus' intense sufferings, and hence the claim of *Divine Principle* that Sun Myung Moon, as putative Lord of the Second Advent, "endured suffering unimagined by anyone in human history."³

Structurally speaking, therefore, the time in which the world moves is neither altogether linear and progressive, nor is it altogether cyclical and stagnant. Each major age moves in an appointed arc forward to the grand consummation of all history, yet because of human failure each age falls short of the potential of its own internal structure and leaves to the next age a double chore of indemnity. This grand

Sisyphian spiral suggests the clear possibility of new failures, fresh starts, and other *longues durées* towards an elusive restoration.

Divine Principle is not the first occasion in the history of Christian thought in which extraordinary imaginative energy has been spent on eschatological speculation. It will be useful to dwell for a moment on the distinctive elements in this scheme that separate it to a degree from popular Protestant dispensationalism. That tradition is characterized by its very close attention to the prophetic books of scripture—and consequently to the spectacular events of the coming end—and relative indifference to the stages of world history since Christ. This latter age is The Dispensation of Grace, or something like it, and is punctuated by more or less unsuccessful revivals of the gospel. *Divine Principle* structures time partly in accordance with this scheme, but superimposes on it another one quite different in substance. In this other scheme, a wide variety of secular “events”—the Renaissance, for example, or the two world wars of this century—play an equally determinative role in the temporal economy, along with biblical events and the prophesied events of the last times. All events play a part in the cyclical return of spiritually and historically significant conditions.

What this conflation of religious and secular narratives does is prepare us for the magnitude of God’s lordship in time. We shall want to return to that and develop it fully. But we want to notice here briefly the effect of this conflation, not only of forms of narrative, but of rhetorical modes, on the authority of the narrative as a whole. There is a considerable gain in being able to speak in the same narrative voice about the beginning and the end, and the middle, but the price is very high. A coherent narrative is purchased at the cost of an incoherent doctrine of revelation. That is, while *Divine Principle* adds to sacred history by an implicit claim of privileged understanding, it does not explicitly claim to be scripture. Its claim is that it has discovered a principle by which significance can be ascribed to events in history. Yet by imposing a plan on sacred and secular history alike it would seem to require more than a narrative voice, but also an authenticating voice.

This is more than a matter of rhetoric in the common meaning of

the word. Without a secure doctrine of revelation these powerful instruments are unsecured either in the canon, i.e., in the prescriptive immemoriality of traditional historiography; or to the rigors of systematic doubt, i.e., to perpetual revisionism. By having it both ways, *Divine Principle* has it neither way. The believer is not quite free to revise the scheme of European and world history given in *Divine Principle*, because the given scheme is connected by a rigorous mythic-mathematical logic with revealed history, with the beginning and with the end. On the other hand not even the elements of traditional sacred history are altogether secure from revision, because critical method is let in the door by the inclusion in the general scheme of such notions as "Renaissance," or "Industrial Revolution"—notions which are not events, but constructions applied to history by the application of critical method.

To summarize these remarks, we may say that the historical sections of *Divine Principle* are patched up of historiographical traditions that arose to serve distinct and quite different types of societies. While the bringing together of these elements is designed to create a new orientation in time for a new human community, the attempted synthesis does not produce a clear critical principle for that community's understanding of itself in time that is either fully Christian or fully scientific. There is no requirement that a system be either of these things—much less that it be both—but *Divine Principle* asserts as a fundamental achievement of the Principle the unification of Western science and Western religion.⁴

We have anticipated a conclusion that this essay will reach in respect to the Unification system generally. It is a system that seems to place a great deal of psychic stress on its adherents in the form of demands for the resolution of cultural dilemmas, and the reconciliation of cultural contradictions—problems that are given in the complex fabric of Western culture but have ceased to sustain anxiety in Western populations. So insistent is the pressure of the Unification system that these resolutions and reconciliations be made, one must be led to ask whether the sustaining anxiety about cultural totality is not a primary feature of the personal commitment to Unificationism.

Surely here the medium is the message, the implacable and unitary structure of time is a mirror of the ideal soul. *Divine Principle* says that the structure of time flows from the nature of God himself! "God's form is . . . mathematical." Adam has therefore a "mathematical period of growth." And finally, man too is a prisoner of number: "Since the world of creation, as such, fell into Satan's dominion, man, in order to restore it, must restore through indemnity the foundation of faith, by . . . setting up the mathematical period of indemnity to restore the number invaded by Satan."⁵ All history is the manifest pattern of God's nature.

But there is another side to the character of God, and we must here quote the relevant passage in its entirety: "God, with a parental heart, full of sorrow over the loss of his children, has wandered in the sinful world to save the children of corruption. In order to save mankind, who had rebelled against him, God had his loving children sacrificed by Satan, finally suffering the sorrow of having to give his son, Jesus, to the cross. Therefore, since the fall of man up to the present day, God has grieved day after day, while any individual, home, or nation which has struggled against the satanic world for the will of God, has not been able to avoid the way of blood, sweat, and tears."⁶

Here is, if not a contradiction, certainly one of those dissonances of tone that, if we may liken imagery to music, demand resolution. It is not merely the commonplace irony of any soteriological scheme: the problem of God's power and the existence of evil. It is that the Unification system intensifies the irony. It positively savors the contradiction of image and action. God grieves in time—he "wandered in the sinful world"—because a principle of his nature requires time, the time in which evil persists.

Time in *Divine Principle* is thus profoundly psychological. God's acts in history are a struggle against Satan, in time, but also an inner struggle, beyond time, with defeat, loss, and irresolution, and of which time is itself the expression. We should dwell on the highly significant phrase "age of the prolongation of restoration" which is the designation given in *Divine Principle* to the whole of the Christian era until the

present. God's will, which is to restore the conditions of love and obedience centered on himself in the Garden of Eden, is stymied in his own elaborate preconditions for satisfaction.

This interest in the psychology of God, in God's *feelings*, is rich in social meaning. Feeling commonly authenticates social action; feeling gives moral meaning to social behavior. At a certain level we might say that the fatherly caring of God is postulated to subvert the evidence that he does not care for people at all.

The figure of Yahweh—an archaic Semitic king like an image of Rouault's, unconscious of moral and psychological distinctions, yet deeply conscious of an obscure self-interest—this figure which was for Jung a fact of the human soul, a property of the collective unconscious, lurks about this self-consciously optimistic text. Yahweh is Freud's id, the raging ancestor of consciousness. Yahweh is the profound symbol of the beginning of man's creation of himself in culture! The original motive is forgotten, the end is unclear, but the pursuit of means is obsessive and inescapable. This primitive Yahweh does not enter directly into the present text. *Divine Principle* is a rationalized and tidied God-story in a long tradition of such glosses. It is the Father-God that smiles from these pages, but the berserker is not far behind. The reconciliation of these images is the normal function of stories about God.

The story of God in *Divine Principle* does not take place in the common-sense time of critical history, or in the legendary time of tribal history—although the text invokes and conflates these—but rather in the privileged time of indemnity-restoration, a time created especially to contain a character like God. It is the time that makes plausible just such an ideal figure. We may say that God makes time, or God is the prisoner of time, but in truth the storyteller makes both God and time, and fits them each for the other. We may only say about God what the story confers on him. First of all, the most extraordinary power that people can imagine, the power to create the time that others wait in. Next to this, the material creation, or the restoration of that creation, are bagatelles. Because the creation of dispensation time, of time that marks time, of waiting-time, is the creation of expectation, of hope, of

disappointment, of *feeling*. Secondly, the story wants to convey that the creator of time binds himself to it, that the outcome of time has consequences for himself, that he takes risks. Absolute power and personal risk are in a certain sense illogically joined, but they are dramatically psychologically appropriate. Let us say that the story is about authority and responsibility, about *rulership*.

* * *

I should like here to adduce two examples from European literature for comparison—not because they are in any way influences on the present text, or comparable in any usual literary or historical sense, but because they illuminate the question of narrative form, and because they are about rulers and about time.

The first of these is *Measure for Measure*. The tale Shakespeare appropriated and developed in his play is the popular legend of the good ruler who, in order to inquire into the true state of justice in his realm, travels for a time *incognito*, mingling with his subjects and learning of their sorrows at first hand.

We need not insist on the archetypal character of this story; it is the inevitable projection into narrative of the reasonable wish that the forces which have power over us, should be both informed of our situation and our feelings, and if possible experience them. True justice is felt to rest in sympathetic feeling, and in these stories the solution is realized by reducing the distance between the actor and the judge of action.

At the opening of the play, the Duke of Vienna, ostensibly on a foreign mission, leaves his city in the care of a trusted, but rigidly legalistic subordinate, Angelo. Secretly he plans to move unrecognized among his people in order to test them. The duke has determined that his people need to feel the whip-hand of a stricter regime for a time, since they have grown slack in virtue. However since their love of himself is essential to the welfare of the state, it were better that another take the odium of harsh government. The Duke disguises himself as a friar to see what will happen when Angelo takes command.

The source of disorder in Vienna is sexual, and the case that is to supply the test of magistracy is a young and innocent man caught technically in fornication with his betrothed. Angelo condemns him to die and sets in motion a train of events that soon plunges the city into moral chaos. Now we should notice here the curious parallel with the account of beginnings in *Divine Principle*. There is in both stories a premature sexual act which brings calamity both to the principals and to others. According to *Divine Principle*, the fall of Adam and Eve was sexual, and passed sin into the human race until the fulfillment of the conditions of restoration. In both these stories—and this is the critical feature from our present perspective—there is an observer to these transactions in the peculiar position of having in one sense the power to intervene at any moment and set things right, and in another sense deprived himself of all power by a self-determined principle. That is, the observer is morally implicated in what he observes by virtue of a free choice which he possesses in a degree peculiar to himself.

The Duke's active involvement in the story is precipitated by an act of hypocrisy. When the condemned man's sister, a nun, Isabella, comes to plead for her brother's life, Angelo offers to strike a corrupt bargain: a life in exchange for sexual surrender to himself. Isabella refuses to bargain, and her brother faces certain execution. It is at this point that the disguised Duke takes charge, not by revealing himself, but by directing the action toward a particular sort of ending.

This middle movement in the story, the complications that hinge on secrecy, manipulation, and, to use a phrase of *Divine Principle*, the "prolongation of restoration," the numerous knots which the Duke ties and unties, is the *peripeteia* of classical drama. This is the part that occurs after the characters are introduced and the central dilemma or irony of the drama is discovered. It is already apparent where the resolution of things must be sought, what the terms of conflict are that must be brought to a conclusion. But in the *peripeteia* complications arise, hopes of early resolution are dashed, character takes on unforeseen complexity, seemingly minor impediments grow to fill the horizon of the plot. In tragedy, this is the section where the final catastrophe is seen to form

itself out of chance, small errors, and flaws of character that would be unnoticed or trivial in other circumstances. In comedy, however, since the ending must be more or less a happy one, the *peripeteia* is highly formal. We do not shudder at growing doom, but rather marvel at the sheer virtuosity of the ravelling of the knot. How will the playwright pull all these threads out and bring them back neatly tied? Here the *peripeteia* must be briskly paced, it must flirt with chaos, and then in a burst of energy deposit its characters safely in an orderly world once again.

Measure for Measure is a "problem play." It is not really comic, in our ordinary sense of the word, but it is structurally a comedy. We cannot here even hint at the rich ambiguity of this play—all of which would be pertinent to our present inquiry were we prepared to draw it out to a very fine point—but we should observe that the entire moral coloration of the play is effected by the ending, and by our awareness of the ending as a saving convention: saving in two senses, that it saves the characters from a terrible fate, that they do not, as characters, have the gravity to sustain as tragic; and it saves our moral universe as spectators, from the spectacle of a ruler who cannot rule. And these are very real dangers in *Measure for Measure*. For example: In leading Angelo on to his final exposure, the hidden Duke arranges an assignation between Angelo and Isabella. But he substitutes for Isabella another girl, Mariana, whom Angelo had promised to marry and then abandoned. In this act the Duke himself is an accessory to fornication, the crime which has already been the occasion for moral disaster. Or consider the Duke's allowing Isabella to believe her brother is already dead, to prepare her to seek a full revenge on Angelo in pursuit of the Duke's design. We might add here, what is revealed only in the last lines of the play, that the Duke is himself drawn sexually to Isabella, although she is a nun of the strictest order, and he had worn the privileged guise of a priest to be near her and obtain her confessions. In this moral twilight-world, the only solution formally satisfactory is marriage. At the last disclosure, Angelo must marry Mariana; Isabella's brother, now discovered to be alive and reprieved, is married to his mistress; Lucio—a minor character—is

made to marry the whore he has with child, on evidence he gave to the disguised Duke; and the Duke himself proposes to Isabella.

Here at work is a dramatic convention of great durability—one that has governed modern popular fiction from *Pamela* to Hollywood romantic comedy. The premise is that there is no sexual corruption so vile it cannot be redeemed by marriage vows. Marriage vows put an end to the comedic *peripeteia*. Such “endings” are happy endings, because they are really new beginnings, of plots that run on invisibly, beyond the edges of the work of art. We don’t know whether it will work out for the married couples, but because we can hope it will, all that was morally and psychologically problematical in the prenuptial plot is transformed retrospectively. If we acquiesce in the last link of the chain—as surely as wedding guests we must—we cannot object to the links that led us there.

Now consider the structural elements of the narrative in *Divine Principle*. The fall of man sets up the condition of dramatic irony, a problem to be resolved whose terms for resolution are at once clear. That is, a sexual crime must be expiated, and its effects reversed by a process of restoration of innocence. But between fall and restoration there lies the *peripeteia*, which is the whole of human history. Dispensational turns are the knots of the plot, now carrying us teasingly close to resolution, now in giddy tumult towards chaos. God, whose intentions are encompassed in an ideal Garden, sees his world transformed into an obscene caricature of his visions. And he is in this movement of the plot transformed from author to spectator, from the center of creative energy to grieving wayfarer. The image of God as keening parent serves structurally the function of Shakespeare’s Duke as a pious friar. It makes him emotionally connected with events, but supplies a procedural evasion, so that he seems not to be responsible for events. His power is forgotten by a shift of costume.⁷

But there are two elements in the narrative that point the way to the cancellation of moral judgement on this procedural evasion. The first is the numerological character of *Divine Principle* dispensationalism. Here is the clue that triggers the expectation of comedy: the formality

of *peripeteia*. When the knots are purely formal ones, matters of space and time, of elegant variations on predictable sequences, we know we are not in the presence of tragedy. Nothing quite like real life is at stake; we need only wait for the marvelous machine to come to the end of its trajectory.

Secondly, there is the extraordinary intuition of the happy ending. All the world, all creation, is said finally to be restored, even the devil. And the sacramental sign of restoration, the event that signals the end of *peripeteia*, is the blessed marriage! Of the Lord of the Second Advent, and of everybody. Marriages that create perfect children and thus end history.⁸ But history is only *peripeteia*, not the entire plot. We do not know what will happen beyond the imagined happy end, but because it is a happy continuation, history is a comedy. God's secrets are not the sadistic secrets of a torturer, but are the secrets of a cornucopia, whose wealth spills out only at the end. *Divine Principle* is a divine comedy.

The flaw here, of course, is that we have papered over an evasion with another evasion. The story wants us to accept that God is a grieving father, while he keeps the saving secret to his breast; our solution is to call the story a comedy. The reason our criticism is fundamentally evasive is that the story is not a deliberate fiction, but a religious teaching, and we have only labelled the problem away.

The Prince is not a fiction, but a book of political advice. It is not addressed to "us," but to the ruler. Machiavelli got a very bad reputation over this book, but he was an intelligent and clear-sighted man. Impermanence, mutability, uncertainty were for Machiavelli, the enemies of civic life. Civic life depends on order. Like the Romans, Machiavelli personified the greatest danger to order in the state as the goddess Fortuna, who presides over chance fluctuations in the fortunes of men. Many things may happen to men for good or ill, over which they have no control, but prudent men wrest from Fortuna her power over them to the degree they can, by calculation and knowledge.⁹

The happiness of men who live in principalities is best guaranteed by a prince whose rule is secure. Such a man is one who understands the moods of Fortuna, who knows the hearts of men, and bends opportunity

to his own purposes. If the prince is secure, the state will be secure. The rules that govern security in a principality are different from those that govern a republic since the former is dependent on the life of one man and on his personal skill. The premise, therefore, of *The Prince* is simple: Since the collective welfare of men in the civic life of a principality depends on the prince, the prince is not like other men. The consequences of his actions are different from other men's. The springs of his action must be different. He must not be guided by ordinary morality or workaday wisdom. He must shape all his mental powers rather to the single end of getting, sustaining, and prolonging his rule.

The irony that Machiavelli was too intelligent to evade is that while the prince's pursuit of unlimited power works for civic ends, he is most effective when he thinks only of his own ends. Therefore, Machiavelli's advice is entirely practical, in the morally repugnant vein that made him notorious. The prince's arsenal is an intimate knowledge of other men: their fears, their cupidities, their hopes, the span of their memories, the length of their gratitudes, the exact weight of their loyalties, the various shapes of their ambitions. Some men may be bought, some must be killed. Some must be killed, and their families must be as well, lest they seek revenge. The prince must understand his own situation with unsentimental clarity. He must seek to be loved, but not cloud his judgement by loving or by wanting to be loved for its own sake. He must understand what he must do if he is a usurper, or a conqueror, or an hereditary prince. To each situation there is a rule by which time may work against the interests of the prince, and by which it can be made to work for him.¹⁰

The character of these specific recommendations is not germane to our purposes, but the implication for a narrative structure in history is. The great intellectual work Machiavelli and some of his contemporaries set themselves we have already alluded to: to describe political life in time in such a way as to understand the mechanism of change, and having understood it, to control it. In the revival of classical culture they discerned a problem that the ancients had left unsatisfactorily resolved: that whatever men do to arrest change, political societies seem

to obey an inner law of cyclical transformation. They begin in virtue, proceed to success and the planting of seeds of complacency and corruption, only to harvest the final collapse of polity in decadence and tyranny. The prolongation of stability in time was the task they set themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that Machiavelli and Guicciardini, as the leading spirits in the revival of classical republican ideology, were also pioneering modern historians. It is the art of historical narrative which above all other arts establishes images of political continuity in time. It plants in civic consciousness an idea of men as actors whose performances may be judged and therefore improved. Statecraft is the subject matter of historical narrative, and a mastery of statecraft is impossible without historical narrative.¹¹

The consciousness of the prince is shaped by a narrative that is always incomplete, always latent. The part of the story the prince does not know is the ending. Or rather, what he knows from the character of historical narratives generally, is that there are several possible endings for the story in which he finds himself. He is always in the *peripeteia*, always in the middle of the story. A book of political advice, like *The Prince*, is a set of materials for alternative narratives. If you wish the end to be like this, the narrating voice says, the middle must perform like this. Put differently, the man who is acquainted with the possible endings of a story has a certain power over the middle. In fiction this power belongs to the storyteller whose power over the middle parts is determined by his secret knowledge of the end. But *The Prince* is not a fiction. It is the *character* in the story who is to actualize a possible story in time by having a secret. A man of power, unlike a storyteller, keeps the complete narrative in his imagination. He makes it "happen" by keeping the end to himself. He is the sole spectator to his own acts and therefore by definition amoral.

The kind of discourse *The Prince* is, is nearer to religious narrative than is *Measure for Measure*. The God of *Divine Principle* is, like Machiavelli's prince, in the middle of things when we discover him. There are possible endings, and there have been projected endings which have been revised. Above all, it is revealed in this text that God keeps secrets.

We know that God keeps secrets in history because he has revealed some of them to other characters in the story, and may reveal or withhold at will. This is the way, incidentally, in which religious stories resist criticism of the kind appropriate to fiction. In a fiction we can criticize the story because the storyteller has power over all of it. He *must* tell us all his secrets in the end, because the end is the only secret he can hold, and the story must have an end. The teller of a religious story evades the criticism of his story because the end is not his secret, nor must it be revealed in the story. The story of the storyteller is only a part, even if an authorized part, of a story not only unfinished, but of one with secrets about the beginning and middle that are not yet uncovered.¹²

Machiavelli is able to make explicit in *The Prince*, what the storyteller in *Divine Principle* cannot acknowledge, although it belongs equally to the structure of his story, that is, that the ruler of time must have secrets buried in the beginning and the middle if he is to control the end. Those secrets are secrets about himself. The ruler is the man who knows others but is not known by them. He is the only disinterested spectator of the actions of others and the only informed spectator of his own actions. Here the Western idea of God and the Western idea of the prince move into congruence. Since the secrets of God make him the only witness of his own acts, he is, like the prince, removed from ordinary judgement on his behavior. The essential subjective quality Machiavelli was able to delineate was perfect cynicism. Cynicism is the appropriate psychological correlative of narrative structured in this way. Cynicism is not of course a quality attributed to God in *Divine Principle*. Yet the essential narrative elements for that understanding of him are present. God is said to reveal himself as a loving father and a grieving father, yet his mastery of the essential elements of power—control of self-disclosure and control of the time in which others wait—suggests that his love and his grief are means toward an end, the masks of the Machiavellian ruler.¹³

How are we to interpret the story then? If we may assume that all secrets are not revealed, the narrative discloses itself as comedy—that is, whatever the moral significance of the story as a whole, it is at least

reassuring about the world in the way that comedic closure of a plot always is. In this case the morally operative feature of the story is not responsible character but formal development. Things *must* come out right, because this is that sort of narrative. On the other hand, if not all secrets are revealed—and it is the text that raises this possibility by virtue of its not being a fiction, but a history of secrets hidden and revealed—an intense light is thrown on the element of will in the structure of the world. Reassurance in this case can only take the form of an invitation to identification with that will (which is the pose of Machiavelli in *The Prince*). At a certain level, the pleasure in reading the story as comedy is the pleasure of believing in a good outcome, and the pleasure of reading it as an account of vast, arbitrary, and willful power, is the pleasure of tasting that power vicariously.

To stop there is to assume that belief, the belief of the teller of a religious story, and the belief of a reader of that story, is a unitary, simple, and unproblematic experience, connected only with the anticipations predicated by sequence, by the imaginary cause and effect of narration. Not only is belief itself not a single discriminable state of mind or feeling, the plot of a religious story, like all narrations, contains normative propositions, moral judgements, ideological and metaphysical structures that are known or knowable apart from plot. What is predicated by the existence of a religious story is that some facts about the world are not *tellable*—which is to say, in religious language, believable—other than in narrative. What Hayden White has said of the master plots of philosophies of history, we may say of religious master plots, that they are really “images of that authority which summons us to participation in a moral universe that, but for its story form, would have no appeal at all.”¹⁴

Authority, authoritativeness, is at the heart of the religious narrative. The voice of narration is not the voice of the maker of fictions, nor the voice of the wise man and courtier. It is a voiceless voice, speaking in the authority of what is simply true, of what accredits itself in the telling. It presses its claims not by argument, but by telling, telling what has been and what is and what is to come. But the invoking of authority is *for*

something. It "summons us to participation." Coercive or non-coercive in style, the teaching of the authoritative narrative is not an offering of pleasures, but the pulling of powerful cultural levers, summoning us either to do something or be something.

* * *

Let us consider our response, as readers receptive to the summoning power of the text, to the historical material in *Divine Principle*. The choices seem to me to be four:

1. The storyteller is, in the fullest sense, unconscious of contradiction. It is a confused and inept story whose images fail to do their work. We judge it a bad story.

2. The story summons us to a relationship with God. That is, its ideological motive remains religious. Narration and sequence make God "real," as real as historical events. Elements of the story, because it is a story, suggest that ambiguous moral response may be appropriate to God as a character. But since he is "real," ambiguity is not tolerable. And so the story becomes myth, in the over-arching vision that swallows the story, the myth of the Father-God. "Father" establishes the nature of the relationship, and suggests the gestures appropriate to it.

3. The story summons us to a relationship with history, with the whole of it, with time itself. God is, in this reading, an image of dominion over time. Machiavelli gives us the clue to this reading in his understanding of this dominion as having moral value in itself. In this mode, story speaks to collective identity, to conceptions of good which are realized only in public life, in time.

4. The story has no essential religious or public meaning, but is a summoning to a type of individual existence which would be unattractive except for the narrative.

Now the first of these possibilities we list in order to acknowledge that in the authority of stories much depends on taste, but also as an occasion to note that "bad" stories are as theoretically interesting as "good" ones.¹⁵

The second deals with the mysterious persuasiveness of religious

metaphors and religious imperatives. It is a topic that invites psychoanalytic translation, but getting to know God is in any case what the story is most obviously meant to encourage, and scarcely needs demonstration.

The last two possibilities are concerned with political and personal ideology.

The most obvious collective myth for which the narrative of *Divine Principle* is meant to prepare us is the myth of the national destiny of Korea to lead the nations in the last days. The fascinating point about Korea, in the light of all the foregoing discussion, is that Korea is said to be chosen of God for an Israelitic, or priestly, role among the nations, because Korea has been *long-suffering*! Korea, it is said, has not once attacked its neighbors.¹⁶ If we may put this into the language of our reading of the God-myth in *Divine Principle*, Korea is the ideal subject of the God-ruler, because Korea has waited patiently in the *aevum* of God's dominion in time. If dominion in time is a moral virtue for itself in the powerful, then waiting is a virtue for itself in the weak.

We should notice two things about this doctrine respecting Korea. The first is that the story does not preach the ethical superiority of the meek and mild. Far from it. Long-suffering has dispensational implications rather than ethical ones. The long-suffering are elevated when the time is come. Waiting is to be understood in relation to a significant sequence rather than to a non-temporal value. On the other hand—this is the second thing to notice—*Divine Principle* does not project into the future an apocalyptic fantasy of Korean world-hegemony. Rather Korea is to ally herself with the ascendant Western democracies, and particularly with the United States in a great chiliastic dream of the defeat of Satan at the national level of world organization.

Insofar as the story reflects a political style, it is what we might call one of tough realism. Survival power is real power. It is clear that as political beliefs these ideas can only be told in the form of narrative. By what set of political or ethical propositions could the preeminence of Korea be established, or for that matter the preeminence of the United States in the divine economy, unless it is by telling the history of the

world in just this way? That is, by a system of formal correspondences rather than by networks of causality, and by the celebration of power rather than by the criticism of power. If we may speak further here of political style, if somewhat less securely, we may say that the projection of the God of *Divine Principle* into the rulership of the world is a celebration of a style of rulership as such, of a rulership that subordinates means to ends and exhibits its power by the keeping of secrets.

The political culture refracted in this story is a culture weak in civic sense, with a conception of law as a series of symmetrically disposed movements—rather than as a connected system of ethical norms—and as a species of trial by ordeal. (The devil counterfeits every one of God's moves. How do we discriminate in our allegiance? God is the one who wins in the end. The principle of evil is such because it is *formally* opposite but otherwise like the good.)

The storyteller in *Divine Principle* perceives very little *saintliness* in human beings. People are said to be central figures, but not saints. There is no discernible doctrine of the church—as the company of the saints—in *Divine Principle*. Sanctity in the Unification system is located in concentration only in the *unborn*, that is, in the perfected children of blessed couples, and in the future existence of spirits now dead or still alive.¹⁷ There are, in short, few exemplars of supreme ethical behavior in the system. Nor are there the company of critical witnesses to individual human acts presumed by all advanced legal systems and by the classical doctrine of saints. Since saintliness lies in the future, we may only judge the dead and the living by dispensational criteria, by the *position* they occupy in the sequences of the story. *Divine Principle* is quite clear about this, and it enters the structure of the story precisely where *Divine Principle* is most inventive. Jesus, for example, is not to be understood as establishing an ethical ideal in the specific mode of his life, because had he lived longer he would have lived a very different kind of life. He failed to occupy certain *positions* in relation to the human life cycle and in relation to the history of his time, which, as we have seen, throws the dispensational clock back to the beginning. Quite consistently, Rev. Moon is not that exemplar either, because his experience, especially his

sufferings, are said to be unique, and because his importance lies in his office as Lord of the Second Advent, another "central figure" marking dispensational time.

We may now see the ethical paradox of the Unificationist, ecumenical, and universalist thrust of the Moon movement. While these positions are, in the language of twentieth-century secular chiliasm, progressive, they may flow from a disability to perceive evil communities, or actions that are unredeemable. There are, in the *apocatastasis* of unification and restoration, no societies or persons with whom we do not wish to share the world. The system is not concerned with evil exemplars any more than it is with saintly ones, except to the extent that *positions* are identified with the evil side in the cosmic dialectic. Thus, anti-communism is rationalized as opposition to a recurring "Cain-position." It is not generalized into a law of response to specific kinds of behavior, enjoined upon civilized men as individuals.

Histories are the images political societies have of themselves in time. This is true of both of the historical traditions conflated in *Divine Principle*: The tribal historical literature of the ancient Hebrews, and the account of Western civilization and the European state system created by humanist historians since the Renaissance. Each of these narrative traditions, by different means, conserves a prized political style, a political ascendancy, and feelings of collective identity. Narratives do this by identifying sequences of events that lead to a particular present. Narratives, because they give the status of unalterable fact to all events in the past leading to the present moment, give to the present moment great solidity, inevitability, and impressiveness. They tie populations to a time that is longer than any one of them individually. Narrative supplies a place, a territory, a homeland, a *locus* for events. This is a conservative function of history.

One of the ways a historical narrative tradition can be a civilizing agent is that it is a witness to behavior otherwise lost. Past behavior is held to the judgement of posterity. The moral significance of present behavior becomes an issue in society to the degree there will be witnesses in the future. A narrative anticipates that witness, since it is

the present witness of other acts now past. The linking of these acts of witness and judgement, past, present, and future, into a code of behavior binding all people who are party to the collective identity, is the meaning of a rule of law. We may personify this witnessing of human acts as God. We may say that society collectively, in the persons of judges or revolutionary tribunals or other vested agents, is witness to our acts. We may say that every man must possess within him the witness of his own conscience. The essence of moral law, in any event, is the existence of an impartial observer separate from the interested actor and the comparison, retrospectively or prospectively, of specific acts with a notion of ideal action. A moral law to which we can hold others liable must be one that arises in collective experience, because a binding notion of ideal action must be seen to be linked with a possible action, with something men can do because other men have done it or must do because the collective witness to individual acts in society reserves a special honor for such action. It is in the narrative of collective experience that moral expectation of others appears. The narrating voice is perhaps the first intimation of impartial witness in any human society, from which derive all ethically relevant conceptions of divine and human judgement.

A problem, therefore, with narrative on the scale of *Divine Principle*, is that it is a solute of the local narratives it appropriates. Masterplots of this kind are not reflections of any particular human community in which ethical obligation has ever arisen in the past or that can be said to be operative in the present. The narrative structure of this theology creates the presumption of a collectivity of all created men in lineage from Adam and Eve. Indeed, it is one of the special inventions of this version of an ancient myth that the biological linking of all men in sexual reproduction is the carrier of the moral characteristics of humanity—subsumed in the idea of the fall. The narrative is not the record of any actual human society. Now the problem with this is not that the narrative is false. All narratives are more or less false. The problem is that when society is conceived as made up of all men, in all times, society and time are stripped of ordinary moral significance. Is it

possible, to turn the issue around, to create any tolerable human society out of a generalized account of human experience? Is it possible to be a good man without being a good Greek or a good Englishman or a good Navaho? It is curious that this religious teaching should find itself in these respects arguing the priority of biology over culture in the organization not of the lowest human faculties, but of the very highest ones, where moral life and collective identity intersect. The sense of men united in the common condition of fallenness, transmitted in the one act without which no man would exist, is a powerful remission of obligation to local culture. When local culture can be identified with ethnic or religious particularism or tribal taboo or racism, these remissions are perceived as liberating. But we should wish to be very cautious if the alternative is a universal pseudo-species and a universal meta-culture. Not only does the schematic of the *Divine Principle* understanding of history place us all in the same plot, it removes all possibility of adequate human judgement or human action in history, first by saying that no one until Rev. Moon has understood the meaning of history and, secondly, by placing the only society worthy to judge us in the future. That is, the society of the perfected children of blessed parents.

If no local human culture is able adequately to account for and transmit a fully human identity or destiny, then God alone may be the witness to moral or immoral acts. But an idea of God can plainly not be more than the sum of moral insights men have already achieved. And if men are in despair of their *real* cultures, they can only construct their fantasy cultures out of a condition of demoralization. God, in *Divine Principle*, is a figure that embodies the specific shape of demoralization in the twentieth century. He is the epitome of dislocated and deracinated sentiment. Like modern society he inhabits a world whose chief visible coherence is mathematical. He is alienated from his children, but can only sorrow impotently. His grandest projects come close to fulfillment but remain aborted, incomplete. What he craved is a restoration of innocent affection and the centering of the activities of others on his own needs and demands. He is a victim of the "ideology of intimacy," in Richard Sennett's phrase.¹⁸

The element of the parental metaphor that is missing, or weak, is the element of judgement, the element of disinterested adjudication. The form of the narrative has weakened the Hebrew idea of God as lawgiver and judge, and has weakened the Christian idea of the church as the visible agent in culture of God the ruler. There is no hell in *Divine Principle*, because there is no competent authority for sending anyone there. And the reason there is none is that the story is not the myth of any human society, but a myth limited in its imaginative capacity by the absence of particular society. An idea of hellishness, an idea of inclusion and exclusion, and an idea of judgement can only arise in a particular society out of images of social experience in particular places and times. The *loss* of society, on the other hand, can only produce vague longings for intimacy and an incapacity for difficult ethical discriminations that require the recognition of radical difference in the human capacity for moral imagination. God is unwittingly portrayed as the model of an immature parent, even as the story, by a powerfully poignant and unintended irony, tells us that the sin of Adam and Eve was an act of precocity. *They* were immature. The doctrine that the condition of fallen man is a condition of immaturity and an incomplete capacity for intimacy is a sharp denial of the secular ideal of civilization, which is the capacity to form limited but real attachments to other people at a moral distance. The damage that the story does, in short, is the diversion of attention from just those saving evolutions of mature ethical disposition in particular human histories, in favor of an expectation of apocalyptic restoration of familial intimacy.

No account of the ideology of this religious story would be complete if we stopped with its public dimension or even with those dimensions of the economy of time that flow from the nature of God. The most simple, the most immediately felt meaning of the historical myth of *Divine Principle* lies in its character as an allegory of a man's life in its passage to maturity.¹⁹ This is transparent in the Adamic theology and in the christological and messianic speculations of the Unification system. The first Adam was a boy; the second Adam a young man; the third Adam, or Lord of the Second Advent, is in his apotheosis a

middle-aged man. Each of these stages is marked by a paradigmatic episode, or crisis, that defines the sexual and social nature of a man in that time of life. Adam discovers his sexuality with a woman, but irresponsibly before he knows what he is doing. Jesus is discovered in the prime of early manhood, the master of random sexual urges, but in deep struggle with the issues of comradeship and the love of men for one another in the work of the world. It is the tragic break with John the Baptist in the richly intuitive account of *Divine Principle*, that seals the final shape of this young man's disappointment and failure.²⁰ Finally, in the Lord of the Second Advent, in the life of Rev. Moon, lies the key to closure of the unresolved plots of the incomplete life. The solitary sufferings of this figure take up where Gethsemane was insufficient and form the rite of passage to middle-age. The experience of mature love between a man and a woman blessed with children is the end of the crisis.

We should then understand the long, arc swings of dispensational time allegorically as the arid stretches of the time in which nothing happens. We live and work, we love and procreate, but spiritual life is stopped dead, waiting for conditions that seem never to come. How exhilarating then it would be to read the historical analysis of *Divine Principle* for the present age—an age of impending transformation and resolution, of the dawning of the final apocatastasis—as a promise of personal transformation? The providential ages of the story, read literally, land us, the lucky mortals now living, at just the right time to be alive, but also suggest, by a deep phenomenological correspondence with our personal life-historical fantasies, that stretches of nothingness are indeed preparations for beatitude, the psychological correlatives of which are happiness, well-being, feelings of personal competence, and feelings of love. These are of course precisely the personal qualities every observer of Moonie personality comments on and which particularly trouble those critics who feel the manifestation of these qualities as feelings amounts to an aberrant denial of reality.

It seems to me that both the friends and the enemies of the Moon movement may err profoundly in taking as the central issue of personal

conversion and personality transformation these feelings of love and well-being. If we read the meaning of this historical myth consistently as an allegory of human personality development, it is clear that these psychological correlatives of beatitude are the properties of middle age, and the products of the experience of failure and great suffering. It would be surprising if a system that placed so much stress on the prolongation of closure, and the moral value of maturation, would hold out an unconditional happiness to the young. Nor does it.

The precise quality of suffering that is uniquely Unificationist is contained, first, in the idea of indemnity, which is in a sense the obverse of the Christian penitential system. The penitential system rested on the appropriation and distribution of a reservoir of merit, accumulated by the worthy dead, and available to the penitent through the institutions and rituals of the church. Indemnity, on the other hand, accumulates the failures of the dead as a moral responsibility of the living. The Unificationist pilgrim is not assured of remissive passages on the way toward maturity, but rather of accumulating responsibility. Secondly, in the dispensational system we find another principle that amounts to a principle of motivation by psychic stress: the repeated doctrine in *Divine Principle* of God's portion of responsibility and man's portion of responsibility, allocated as ninety-five percent and five percent.

Now these proportions are very interesting from a psychological point of view. All traditional Western theologies have in their poetic and devotional flights strained to capture images of extreme disparity of size and strength adequate enough, or grotesque enough, to illuminate the disparity between God and man. Man is dust and God is a mighty wind. Man is as grass and God is a mountain. These images are anxiety-producing in their own way, but they are also reassuring. Weakness can get no weaker. To contend with God may be to risk life, but not to risk dignity. It is quite otherwise in the notion of ninety-five percent and five percent, a metaphor devoid of allusive complexity or suggestive interest. Five percent is, under the circumstances, an inhuman responsibility, a crushing and devastating burden.²¹ And the system applies this apportionment of responsibility precisely at the points in

the dispensational scheme where, as we have seen, the greatest surge of cosmic energy is required to shift time decisively toward restoration. God, it is said, always performs his share of responsibility; the relative failure of the end-time in each age is due to man's failure to make up his bit. It is asserted in the system that this is a reasonable arrangement. But it is not. God, as we have seen, holds the secret of the end and is therefore one hundred percent responsible. The justice of Job's case against God, from the ground of his utter nothingness, restored Job's dignity, while, according to Jung, teaching God something about himself.

The meaning for human personality in the dispensational parable of *Divine Principle* is the imputation of a vast, and swiftly accumulating, burden of anxious responsibility. In a collective sense this is a responsibility to sustain the conditions for the successful mission of the Lord of the Second Advent. What the narrative teaches, however, is that the negotiation of these dispensational passages is highly problematic. If we read the history of these incompleting and frustrated passages as parables of personal development, life becomes a pattern of enormous external demands which must be met by supreme efforts of will and concentration. The stakes in human dignity and the potential for unforgivable and catastrophic failure are extremely high.

Unification Church members are frequently identified as people who seem to be very happy. They are also people who expect of themselves unusual capacities for work, for successful motivation, and for precocious feats of concentration and will. This will to conquer entropy of feeling and action, together and at once, is an assumption of personal responsibility for the impersonal totality of culture. These people, furthermore, are a minority population of "seekers," that is, people who identify the quality of deracination in modern culture as oppressive.²² Since there is not a local culture to which such people truly belong (if there were they would not be seekers), there is no choice but to assume responsibility for the whole of culture, for all cultures, to be at home in the whole world. The narrative of the whole world in *Divine Principle*, which every prospective convert receives in carefully expli-

cated lectures, is shaped to induce precisely this commitment to totality, and the commitment would be neither attractive nor sustainable without the narrative.²³

Yet there is in the narrative itself sufficient evidence of contradiction and a sufficient quantity of phenomenological data concerning the dreadfulness of cosmic time, the untrustworthiness of God, and the injustice of the system's demands on personality, that the scheme is ideologically unstable. Of course elements of this narrative, as of the system as a whole, will be reinterpreted in accordance with the changing institutional character of the Moon movement. It seems likely, however, that the lineaments of individual character and temperament desired by the system will remain, and the pressures that sustain the personality type will continue. These are easily discernible in these extraordinary demands on personality, the potential for either the narcotizing of temperament in self-defense or the radical internalizing of cosmic mission in the form of compulsive, megalomaniacal work-obsession with fantasies of super-human personal significance and authority.²⁴ On the other hand, the orientation of this narrative toward maturity as a positive goal in life and its curious capacity to touch central existential and ethical issues even while elaborately evading them, suggest that those people who will work through and out of the system, or at least through and out of its fundamentalist formulations, may be more whole and balanced persons than they would have been otherwise. The conditions of demoralization and deracination refracted in the text were not invented by it. And if disillusionment is one of the terms for survival and growth under these conditions, we cannot despise the illusion that precedes it and gives it its specific shape. Disillusion is a feature of the life history of an illusion, and—if we may contribute a tenet to a future liberal Moonism—one that belongs appropriately to middle-age.²⁵

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Carl Jung, *The Portable Jung*, ed. Joseph Campbell (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), pp. 599-600.
- ²*Divine Principle* (Washington: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), pp. 381, 392; hereafter cited as *DP*.
- ³*DP*, p. 16.
- ⁴*DP*, p. 9.
- ⁵*DP*, p. 381.
- ⁶*DP*, pp. 525-26.
- ⁷Cf. *Measure for Measure*, I.iii. 40-43: "I have on Angelo imposed the office,/Who may, in th' ambush of my name, strike home,/And yet my nature never in the fight/To do it slander."
- ⁸It is curious that *Divine Principle*, which has so much to say about the end of history, has so little directly to say about the ritual and sacramental role of marriage in the life of the movement, and in forming the end of previous human history. Nevertheless, it is implicit in all discussions of restoration. Cf. *DP*, p. 101: "If Adam and Eve . . . had established a home and society without sin by multiplying children of goodness according to God's blessing (Genesis 1:28), this would have been the Kingdom of Heaven, which would have been realized as a huge family centered on the same parents."
- ⁹"How far human affairs are governed by fortune, and how far fortune can be opposed." Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. 25, trans. George Bull (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), pp. 130-33.
- ¹⁰The most developed modern argument for the old-fashioned view of Machiavelli as a teacher of evil and corrupter, is by Leo Strauss. See his *Thoughts of Machiavelli* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), esp. pp. 9-14. I am not persuaded of the utility of this perspective in the present connection, but an analysis of *Divine Principle* fully informed by it would be forced, it seems to me, to notice the very similar, and sinister, wedding of tradition and technology in the Moon system that Strauss complains of in Machiavelli.
- ¹¹J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), has resurrected, with an extraordinary virtuosity, the complex of ideas referred to.
- ¹²A full discussion of the narrative voice in fiction is in Wayne C. Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). See also Frank Kermode, "Secrets and Narrative Sequence," *Critical Inquiry*, 7 (1980), 89-90. Kermode means something different by secrets than I mean here. It should be noted that *Divine Principle* itself naively intimates the importance of secrets in understanding the character of narrative. Cf. *DP*, p. 285: "The Scriptures contain countless secrets concerning God's providence of salvation."
- ¹³A startling example of cynicism applied systematically to the practice of rulership is discussed in J. G. A. Pocock, "Ritual, Language, Power: An Essay on the Apparent Political Meanings of Ancient Chinese Philosophy," *Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), esp. pp. 66-71.
- ¹⁴Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *Critical Inquiry*, 7 (1980), 24. On belief, see the extraordinary essay by Rodney Needham, *Belief, Language, and Experience* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972).

¹⁵White, pp. 18-19.

¹⁶DP, p. 526.

¹⁷Lionel Rothkrug, in "Religious Practices and Collective Perceptions: Hidden Homologies in the Renaissance and Reformation," *Historical Reflections/Reflexions historiques*, 7, No.1(1980), 134, says, respecting the Protestant reformers: "Only a people who had nothing to remember in common felt impelled to relive in one way or another biblical life *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*." This is in the context of an argument about the absence of native saints, or sanctity, in Protestant confessional lands before the Reformation. Numerologically derived, dispensationalist historical-narrative is of course one way to "relive biblical life" in a culture of deracination.

¹⁸Richard Sennett, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York: Knopf, 1977), p. 259. Sennett defines the ideology of intimacy thus: "Social relationships of all kinds are real, believable, and authentic the closer they approach the inner psychological concerns of each person . . . the humanitarian spirit of a society without gods: warmth is our god." The political culture of *Divine Principle* has a God, but God's god is warmth.

¹⁹Cf. John S. Dunne, *Time and Myth* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1973), p. 50: "There is some profound link, it seems, between the story of a man's life and the story of his world. The story of his world is his myth, the story in which he lives, the greater story that encompasses the story of his life. To discover his myth he must go deeper into his life than he would if he were going to tell only his life story."

²⁰DP, pp. 157-62.

²¹DP, p. 284: "The providence of restoration must necessarily be prolonged when man fails to accomplish his own portion of responsibility, and, at the same time, a greater condition of indemnity must be set up in order to restore the failure."

²²A definition of seekers is given in John Lofland and Rodney Stark, "Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 862-75. To these writers, people define themselves as religious seekers by interpreting acutely-felt tension "within a religious problem-solving perspective. In their scheme, this is the stage before encountering the converting text. What this misses is the way a religious text like *Divine Principle* supplies both the answer and the problem. Its world-history rewrites life-history, retrospectively, in terms of its own myth of closure.

²³Cf. the concluding sections of *Divine Principle*: Part II, chapter 6, particularly sub-section III.3.(5) called "All Aspects of Culture and Civilization Must Bear Fruit In This Nation," [i.e., Korea]; and sub-section V, "The Cause of the Confusion of Language and the Necessity for Its Unification." DP, pp. 530-32, 535-36. It should be said that lectures on *Divine Principle*, that follow the text with fidelity and are arranged much like the introductory college course in North America, seem to have a far more significant role in the morphology of the conversion experience than some accounts suggest. See previous note, and Flo Conway and Jim Siegelman, *Snapping: America's Epidemic of Sudden Personality Change* (New York: Delta, 1979). Rather than "snapping" people out of normal cultural expectations of behavior, the lectures supply a means by which converts may apparently fulfill one of these expectations, the one created by the general education requirements of early college education, that the totality of culture be grasped as an interrelated sum of topical surveys at an early point in life.

²⁴Cf. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Messianism in Medieval and*

Reformation Europe and Its Bearing on Modern Totalitarian Movements (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 185: "It can happen that a mystic emerges from his or her experience of introversion—like a patient from a successful psychoanalysis—as a more integrated personality, with a widened range of sympathy and freer from illusions about himself and his fellow human beings. But it can also happen that the mystic introjects the gigantic parental images in their omnipotent, most aggressive and wanton aspects and emerges as a nihilistic megalomaniac."

²⁵I am suggesting what Frank Kermode calls the "sceptical modification of a paradigmatic fiction." *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 24, 25.

Hermeneutics: History and Providence

James Deotis Roberts

The writer is a systematic theologian who happens to be Black. The perspective of this essay, in keeping with a process of contextualization, will reflect the history and sociology of the Black religious heritage. The reader should be prepared, therefore, for major deviations from the general mind-set of Western theological interpretation.

Hermeneutics, the process of interpretation, is the means by which the meaning of theological affirmations are described and unfolded. Exegesis is concrete and mainly applicable to the biblical field of interpretation. Hermeneutics is more the area of interest of philosophical and systematic theologians who are concerned with definitions and principles of interpretation. We are mainly concerned in this discussion with how theologians work as interpreters of the faith.

Entering The Hermeneutic Circle

The idea of "a hermeneutic circle" is well known in Western theology. Rudolph Bultmann made good use of the concept. The New Testament faith was filtered through the historical critical method and existential philosophy. After the faith was "de-mythologized" and subjected to the fundamental ontology of Heideggerian existentialism, Bultmann calls our attention back to the New Testament. In a word, Bultmann's New Testament exegesis is determined by the existential

hermeneutics of Heidegger. It is not surprising that many theologians take exception to such a limited approach.

Bultmann's program has been seriously questioned by Latin American liberation theologians with a different set of presuppositions. The latter are more attuned to Marxist social analysis than to existential introspection. Juan Luis Segundo is representative as he writes about the "liberation of theology." Segundo looks upon Bultmann's "hermeneutic circle" with suspicion. His goal is to filter the biblical faith through the experiences of the poor by means of a Marxist analysis.

Segundo is correct, I believe, when he writes that most of the history of Christianity has been in favor of the rich and powerful and that theology itself has been the preoccupation of privileged classes. Indeed, theology needs to be liberated from its "Constantinian captivity." While I view Segundo's reconstituted hermeneutical circle as a decided gain, I find it inadequate. His circle is not holistic and falters on the side of personal spirituality. In several ways it does not reach out to the entire human family. Segundo notes that the Black theologian James Cone completes the hermeneutic circle along with several other candidates (e.g., M. Weber, H. Cox, *et al.*). In my view if Cone accepts the limits prescribed by Segundo's hermeneutical circle, he will not be true to the African roots of Black theology.

Most theologies, according to Segundo, take the past seriously, but they neglect the present. Liberation theology starts from the present and looks backwards. The Christian religion he maintains, is biblical—it begins and ends with the Bible reinterpreted. He writes: ". . . It is the continuing change in our present-day reality, both individual and societal The circular nature of this interpretation stems from the fact that each new reality obliges us to interpret the word of God afresh, to change reality accordingly, and then to go back and reinterpret the word of God again and again."¹

There are preconditions for completing the hermeneutical circle. First, there must be a precondition that the questions rising out of the present be critical enough to force us to change our customary conceptions of life, death, knowledge, society, politics, and the world in general.

Second, there must be a theological assumption that a response to new questions is possible and that the scriptures are to be reexamined in light of this new situation.

Against this background Segundo outlines his methodological perspectives: First, there is our way of experiencing reality, which leads us to ideological suspicion. Secondly, there is the whole ideological superstructure in general and the theological structure in particular. Thirdly, there comes a new way of experiencing theological reality that leads us to exegetical suspicion, that is, to the suspicion that the prevailing interpretation of the Bible has not taken important pieces of the data into account. Fourthly, we have our new hermeneutic, that is, our way of interpreting the fountainhead of faith (i.e., scripture) with the new elements at our disposal.²

Segundo runs the thought of Harvey Cox, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and James Cone through his hermeneutic circle. Only the theology of James Cone, in his estimation, completes the circle. The discussion is based upon Cone's book entitled *A Black Theology of Liberation*. (Cone's *God of the Oppressed*, based upon an encounter with the sociology of knowledge, would have served Segundo's purpose even better. The latter work was perhaps not yet in print.) Segundo summarizes Cone's views as follows: First, Cone's position begins in personal experience and in an act of will. Second, Cone finds the next stage by focusing on the use of racial oppression. Here Cone finds a general theory which enables him to unmask the reality of oppression. This is put in theological discourse. Third, Cone seizes upon sources and norms that determine the questions asked and the answers given. Black theology is rooted, according to Cone, in the experience, history, and culture of Black people. Not scripture, but Black experience is the source of Black theology. Jesus Christ is the norm, but even christology is determined by the Black community's experience of Jesus Christ. Fourth, Jesus Christ, according to Cone, as well as God's revelation, are seen as participating in the struggle for liberation.³

Segundo has good intentions in his use of Cone's thought. He does not ignore Black theology—it is obviously akin to liberation theology.

Segundo desires to overcome a devastating criticism faced by Black and liberation theologies. Western theologians charge that they cannot pass the methodological test. But Black theology has to be aware of its African roots as well. Cone is caught in the crossfire. In lifting up Cone's program, Segundo may unwittingly have done a disservice to Cone. It would have been better if Segundo had selected the writings of some Latin American or a Christian-Marxist in Europe—these would have shared a common set of problems and a common mission.

Segundo's circle does not meet the needs of Black theology. It does not meet the challenge of the African and the Afro-American religious experience. It does not pass the holistic test of person-in-community. It emphasizes the "political" dimensions of the life of faith, but it does not do justice to the "healing" aspects of faith. Its focus is upon written biblical texts, but it does not allow for a considerable oral tradition. Segundo's circle places an undue restriction on the dialogue between African and Black theologians. This dialogue has already reached into the Caribbean and it will surely involve people of African descent in Latin America. Thus it turns out to be a disservice to Cone, a key representative of Black theology, that he has been used to illustrate a hermeneutic circle that is inadequate for a *Theologia Africana*.

A Hermeneutical Trajectory

A circle is whole, but is likewise closed. A trajectory is open, it "conveys across," impels, transmits, and is therefore a dynamic type of image. It is not a perfect way to convey what needs to be said and expressed, but it adds something vital to the circle figure. This is not an occasion to spell out a viable Black hermeneutic. I will merely provide a brief summary of what I view as its bare outline. The purpose is to indicate that we are not merely critics—we are builders as well. A Black hermeneutic has much in common with perspectives around the globe, especially in Asia and Africa.

A basic characteristic of Black hermeneutics is a universal vision. In speaking of "universal" here, we wish to avoid the Western "totalized" usage. In most cases a particular culture in the West totalizes or

universalizes itself. But in actuality the provincial is substituted for the universal. Enrique Dussel has indicated that when we set ourselves up as a norm and then expect humankind to accept this as a supreme worth, we are guilty of "totalization."⁴ Universal, as used here, would allow for contextualization of theology in each and every culture, whether European, African, Asian, or other. Universal includes all cultures, all ethnicities—all peoples and all religions.

Secondly, human rights will be central to a Black hermeneutical perspective. It will include Jürgen Moltmann's contribution to individual and social rights, the rights of the living and the unborn based upon the *imago Dei* in each and every person. But it must reach beyond the Reform theology's range of vision. It must somehow embrace the spirit of cosmopolitanism one finds in Stoic literature when they speak of a spark of the Divine Fire in every human. Human rights must in nowise be limited to those who are in a state of grace within the Christian Covenant. The hermeneutics must be seen in the light of God's creation in all humans, of all cultures, and of all religions. A Black hermeneutic cannot be hemmed in by a circle too small to include the entire human family. Hegel in his *Philosophy of History*, writes eloquently concerning universal history. But world history for Hegel does not include the religions and cultures of Africa, the ancestral home of Black Americans. Adding insult to injury, he treats Egypt as if it were a part of the Orient.⁵

Finally, we must include the holistic nature of thought and reality. A Black hermeneutic must be able to mediate between extremes in thought and life. Howard Thurman recently expressed to me his interest in "mysticism and social change." His entire career has been based upon the relationship between spirituality and social activism, mainly within the Black religious tradition. Other Black religionists may stress a different option, as did Martin Luther King, Jr., but not to the neglect of a powerful spiritual and evangelical thrust. This is the genius of Black religion. The theologian of the Black experience is charged with the responsibility of providing a suitable interpretation of this experience. The secular and the sacred, the national and the

mystical, the individual and the social, interact and are held in dynamic tension in one continuum of experience.

Hermeneutics: History and Providence

It is understood that we will examine *history* and *providence* as stated in Unification theology. In this section I will attempt to state to my best understanding the beliefs held by religionists of this persuasion on this subject. The final section will provide an evaluation of what is presented here from the hermeneutical perspective of the writer.

According to *Divine Principle*, the purpose of God's creation is the establishment of a world family in which all people would live together in harmony and peace. Just as body and mind are intended to be one, even so God and man are to be one. The body is the temple of the mind and its means of expression. In the same manner, God and perfect man become one. When human nature is perfected, it is deified:⁶ "If perfected Adam and Eve had become husband and wife and had given birth to their children under the blessing of God, their children would also have become men of deity, inheriting the good nature of their parents. By the multiplication of these people, there would have been established a God-centered, sinless family, society, nation, and world in which all people would live together as one huge family."⁷

This would be the kingdom of heaven on earth. It is assumed that those who live in the kingdom of heaven on earth will go to the kingdom of heaven in the spirit world when they leave the physical body. The kingdom of heaven on earth and the kingdom of heaven in the spirit world make up the good world of God's sovereignty.

Human nature is, however, fallen. Man and Satan are united. Man has assumed an evil nature. Man as fallen has reversed the order of God's intention: "Fallen Adam and Eve became husband and wife centering on Satan and gave birth to their children. Their children inherited evil nature from their fallen parents, and became men of original sin and evil nature. By the multiplication of these people, a Satan-centered family, society, nation, and world was established."⁸ Now, this world of evil is

cut off from God's love and is controlled by Satan. This fallen world was established on earth and is called hell. Upon leaving their physical bodies, fallen men inhabited a hell in the spirit world. Physical and spiritual hells make up the evil world of Satan's sovereignty.

It is obvious that Unification theology views heaven and hell, perfected human nature and fallen human nature as opposites. Against this backdrop, the only way from a fallen state to a "redeemed" condition is by means of "restoration." Salvation is "restoration." It implies a reclaiming of the original purpose of God's creation of humans. The *providence* of salvation is the providence of restoration. The evil world of Satan's sovereignty must be replaced by the good world of God's sovereignty. As a result of man's fall, God lost his ideal world. God never changes his purpose. He is carrying out the work of salvation to destroy the evil world and to establish his ideal world.⁹

The purpose of salvation providence is to restore fallen man to a state of perfection. It is to replace hell with heaven on the physical and spiritual levels and to establish God as sovereign. God is almighty and cannot fail in this task. He created humans as his children. He is their father. He feels the sorrows and pain of his fallen children. His purpose to redeem them is motivated by love. Humans have a spiritual nature and destiny. As an eternal being, man cannot be destroyed, even by God. God, therefore, works to "restore" fallen man. This is the area of God's work of restoration. Throughout history, God has been working to save man. His goal should be viewed, therefore, as the providential history of salvation.

Man has an original mind. In spite of the fall, man desires to leave evil and follow the good. God, the subject of goodness, created man as a substantial object of goodness in order to achieve the purpose of goodness. Man, even though prevented by Satan from living a good life, due to the fall, still pursues the good. The goal of human history is a world of goodness. Religion is the means by which humans revert to their original minds. The original mind seeks goodness in the world transcendent of fallen time and space, since it cannot be found in the world of reality under Satan's control.

As religion appeared, new cultural spheres were formed. There have been twenty-one to twenty-six cultural spheres which are now absorbed into four: the Judeo-Christian, the Muslim, the Hindu, and the Far Eastern cultural spheres. In order to have a peaceful and harmonious world, we must be united into one culture. This is the world of God's ideal. Cultures have progressed in history from rudimentary stages to superior stages. The purpose of religion is to lead humans to an ideal world of one culture. Science contributes to this development. Science brings about a highly developed civilization and can provide man with ideal living conditions. Since science has developed to a high degree, mankind is, externally, on the verge of the ideal world. It follows that when religion and science are united by a new religious movement, the ideal world will be realized. We can observe from the direction of religion and science that human history is the providential history of restoration.¹⁰

History is filled with struggle. All is directed towards goodness by the original mind. Conflict of views and selfish attitudes keep tension alive. Individuals, families, clans, and nations are at war. We are still in the stage of world struggle.¹¹ There are two worlds: the free world and the communist world. This division is prior to the realization of the one world—the ideal world. What we need now is a religious truth which will enable us to overcome materialism and usher in this one ideal world. The time is at hand for the emergence of this new religious truth. Thus the history of struggle points to the providential history of restoration.

God's purpose of salvation is to restore the tree of life (Genesis 2:9) lost through the fall (Genesis 3:24) by the tree of life (Revelation 22:14). The purpose of history is to restore the Eden of the original creation through the Lord of the Second Advent, who comes as the tree of life.

History must come to an end because God's purpose of creation was originally good. Evil cannot be eternal. During the last days, evil will end and goodness will begin. The Messiah will come in the last days to destroy evil and to establish goodness on behalf of God. Judgment and reformation will be carried out by the Lord of the Second

Advent. The last days must be ushered in by the Lord of the Second Advent because the world is not redeemed. The reason for this is that man has not fulfilled his portion of responsibility for the restoration of creation to the Creator's intention. Apart from man, all creation reached perfection. Human history, therefore, must be restored, the Garden of Eden must be reclaimed.¹²

Critique and Conclusion

You will recall that we promised to do our study from a Black hermeneutical perspective. Furthermore, we found that this outlook upon interpretation has at least three basic characteristics which we have outlined: It is universal, it is humane, and it is holistic. Using these characteristics as criteria, how do we evaluate providence and history as discussed in *Divine Principle*?

First, we apply the principle of the universal. It is clear that the intention of the discussion on providence and history in *Divine Principle* is that all humans and all of history be understood by its formulations. In fact, however, because the vision is East-West, the African-Afro religious experience does not come in for consideration. Thus we have a situation of "totalization" more comprehensive than that of most Euro-American religious visions, but not sufficiently comprehensive to be designated as universal—including all humankind, their cultures, and religions. It depends upon the extent to which the revelation in *Divine Principle* is seen as final as to whether this vision can be expanded without doing damage to the entire religious development based upon it. This is a challenge which must be considered by the theologians of the Unification Church.

Secondly, humanization is a Black hermeneutical principle. It seems to me that the discussion on providence and history in *Divine Principle* does make an important contribution to a theological approach to human rights. God's intention is for a perfected humanity. This was to be established through fulfilled families—a loving relationship between husband, wife, and children. This family idea is conceived as

the earthly component of a redeemed relationship between humans and God as creator, provider, and sanctifier. Unfortunately, the fall and Satan have intervened and frustrated God's purpose in the history of salvation. It is the hope of Unification theology that a restoration will take place which will, indeed, bring about the kingdom of God on earth.

It is on the pragmatic level that the thesis begins to raise serious doubts. I am not happy about much of the theology either—e.g., conservative evangelical assumptions and the absence of a sound historical critical approach to biblical interpretation. When we are told that the four world cultures (the Judeo-Christian, the Hindu, the Muslim, and the Far Eastern cultures) will be united into one religio-cultural sphere, I become gravely concerned. Africa is left out. Need I say more! Then, we are told that science has a special role at this point. The association of the development of science and technology with religious advancement will be questioned by most astute religious observers in the West. Science, in our experience, has so often worked in reverse order to the quest for meaning, spirituality, and human concerns. Science is a god that has failed. We simply do not believe that advancement in science *necessarily* leads to fulfillment in God's providential history. The fortunes of science and the redemption of the world in God's purpose are not associated in our world view or theology. Should they be? Where is the evidence?

On this same point, the division of the world between the free world and communist world seems arbitrary. We Blacks and other minorities do not have a rosy view of the so-called free world. It in no way resembles the approaching kingdom of God. Conversely, we are not enchanted with any form of Marxism. Satanic or evil manifestations are too evident on both sides for us to see the kingdom of God emerging in either. There is from our perspective a transcendent judgment of the gospel upon any and all human economic or political systems. All human systems need to be examined carefully to determine what can or cannot be used to fulfill the goal of the most wholesome human values for all. Only in this direction will they point to God's providence and redemption in human history. Establishment of healthy families we

embrace as a positive good. But even here, we must be concerned about how this is to be done and for what purpose.

Finally, we have spoken about a holistic perspective. It seems to me that much of the *Divine Principle* is seen in terms of dualisms: creation and fall, God and Satan, evil and good, this world and the spiritual world. I see this hermeneutical device as more Western than Eastern. It is on this point that Orientals are much closer to Africans than they are to, say the Greeks and the Germans. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to find a *holy book* from East Asia with this mind-set.

There is an attempt to overcome this, somewhat, by asserting that humans retain an original mind in spite of the fall. This original mind retains a propensity in human nature toward goodness and can become a means whereby there is hope in "overcoming the world." It would be interesting to compare this outlook to Zoroastrianism which has a dualism and yet a positive view of creation. In the case of the latter group, this leads to a quest for social justice through human agency. But where does this blend of pessimism-optimism concerning human nature stem from? Calvin and Confucius seem equally involved.

It is just at this point that the traditional understanding of the incarnation should be introduced. *Divine Principle*, by asserting that Jesus failed his mission, dismisses the central affirmation of the Christian confession. If Jesus failed, the Messiah has not yet come and the world is unredeemed. Christians agree that the world is unredeemed, but the One who has come is the Returning One. He who has come is to come. Unificationists hold that the Lord of the Second Advent is to come to restore the fallen creation. God has done his part, but man has not assumed his responsibility. If this is the case, what assurance is there that the Lord of the Second Advent will find "faith upon the earth?"

We believe that the incarnation represents a serious attempt to deal with God's positive and redemptive concern for creation and humanity. God respects creation and human life. He was embodied in flesh for this salvific purpose. He entered history and gave it new meaning and direction. The cross demonstrates God's identification

with our fallenness and suffering. The resurrection assures us that God redeems history. Thus between incarnation and eschaton there is a period during which God works in history, especially through the church, the redeemed community, to carry out his mission in the world. Eternal life, therefore, is a new quality of life *in Christ*. The world is being redeemed because of what God has done *in* and *through* Christ. This continues in the church, the extension of the incarnation. The Holy Spirit is the agent of God's redeeming work in the believer, the fellowship, the world. In the end, God and kingdom.

FOOTNOTES

¹Juan Luis Segundo, *The Liberation of Theology*, trans., John Drury (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1976), p. 8.

²Segundo, p. 9.

³Segundo, pp. 7-25.

⁴Enrique Dussel, *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation*, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis, 1978), pp. 17-21.

⁵Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Willey Books, 1944), pp. 198-219.

⁶Young Whi Kim, *The Divine Principle Study Guide, Part I* (Tarrytown, New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), p. 101.

⁷Kim, p. 102.

⁸Kim, p. 102.

⁹Kim, pp. 103-104.

¹⁰Kim, p. 105.

¹¹Kim, p. 106.

¹²Kim, pp. 105-107.

Discussion

James Deotis Roberts: What I will do is try to lift out the highlights of my paper. Some time ago I was visiting with the ambassador from one of the Islamic African countries. They had heard on the radio that within a few days the world would come to an end. They asked me what I thought about it. I said that would be the easy way out. (laughter) I am afraid that we will be around to deal with a lot of human problems for a long time to come and we have to use the circle of influence which we have to try to deal with those problems.

In the Miami newspaper I noticed today that they are dealing with the problem of Haitian boat people and also that the Pope will be going to Brazil where a large percentage of the people are practicing voodooism. Those two articles tend to pinpoint the focus of my paper and of my whole emphasis in theology: the need to have the social-political implications of the gospel spelled out and also the need to contextualize theology into various cultures. A Black theologian is involved in both of those tasks. In terms of our roots in Africa and the continuity of our religious traditions and heritage we necessarily have to keep that in mind and also the similarity of the Black condition in the major cities across the country with the economic and social conditions of third world peoples. We have to keep the liberation thrust alive so the pattern is set for this kind of focus in theology.

In my paper I tried to lift that up and say what we are trying to do

and also to be critical of some things that are happening in Latin American liberation theologies which we do not feel that we can buy into because we have our own agenda, our own perspective which comes out of our own experience of oppression, which is different from the model of oppression in Latin American theology. But I can say from my encounter with Latin American theologians that when Black theologians and Latin American theologians get together it is serious business, because we are both concerned about a wide scale of human suffering and how the gospel relates to that. When they say, for example, that they are interested in non-persons as well as in non-believers—perhaps the emphasis is on the non-person people who have lost their humanity in a form of oppression—and try to relate the gospel to that, we resonate because we are dealing with that. When I first began working at theology from a Black perspective more than a decade ago, one of the things which I perceived almost immediately was that my own classical theological upbringing had not equipped me to deal with the new consciousness of the suffering of the people. I began to see that the real theological issue was centered more around the providence of God than around the existence of God. The real issue was: does God really care? Some of my colleagues like Bill Jones began to deal with that in a very serious way and he wrote his book *Is God A White Racist?* and dealt very seriously with the question of theodicy in the Black heritage. Even though I am not necessarily in agreement with his solution I think he has raised the right question. The question is whether or not the more deductive approach to theology is the proper direction for our main emphasis or whether induction would be more appropriate, that is, starting with some target situation of oppression as do women and Latin American theologians and then looking at the affirmation of the Christian creed with that particular form of experience clearly in focus.

I was influenced by existentialism earlier, for example, by Macquarrie's approach of looking at the human predicament, and was theologizing from that vantage point. Now, the Latin Americans, as you know, use Marxism as a means of social analysis and with that focal point in mind, they do exegesis and theological interpretations from

that point of view. My critique makes several points concerning the lack of universal perception in *Divine Principle* in terms of the situation in the third world and at home. Also a more realistic approach to humanization needs to be considered. More serious consideration should be given to the actual socio-economic problems and how to deal with those. The hermeneutical principle seems to be too pro-Western for my satisfaction.

Lloyd Eby: I am a white Western male. For all I know I may be a racist. I may be a sexist. I don't know. It does seem to me, however, that there is in Unificationism something that strikes me as enormously and profoundly liberationist, not just of this or that particular whatever, but for everybody. If this claim is indeed true, *Divine Principle* is claiming that the three great blessings, when spelled out in practice and when properly fulfilled, contain and represent the fulfillment of all by all. I mean all human desires, needs, and aspirations. It is also making the claim that only the Messiah can open up these three great blessings to all of mankind. Furthermore it is claiming that the coming and the work of the Messiah rest on the whole foundation of the historical development leading up to Jesus of Nazareth and, since then, leading up to the coming of the Lord of the Second Advent. That history is primarily expressed in terms of Western christendom. When that gets worked out in the proper way, then indeed the liberation of everybody and the blessings for everybody will indeed be realized. If that claim is true, then that does represent the liberation of everybody. If we pay close attention, the problems of everyone are addressed at least implicitly. I agree with you that in terms of what so far has been written about political and societal issues, the problems of South America, the problems of Africa, there has been neglect. That is true. I agree that it is true that it tends to be represented primarily in terms of Western history. Yet it is indeed also true that christological events are expressed primarily in terms of the outworking of christendom. When that is worked out properly it does expand more. Although I agree that that is not sufficient, it is certainly going in some direction towards solving that problem as liberation thought.

Jonathan Wells: It seems to me that we can do nothing but grant

Deotis' point that the African-American religious experience does not come in for consideration in *Divine Principle*. As to your point that science is a God that failed, I think that is debatable (though science may be in imminent danger of failing). *Divine Principle* can offer a constructive critique of science and the misuse of technology but I am not going to dwell on that point. As to the division of the world between the free world and communist world, this is susceptible to a lot of misinterpretation. *Divine Principle* claims that the kingdom of God emerges as Cain and Abel are reconciled centered on God's purpose. Abel is not the kingdom of heaven, Cain is not the kingdom of hell. The kingdom of hell is this world as we have it now, both free and communist. The kingdom of heaven emerges as Cain and Abel are reconciled, so I don't see *Divine Principle* equating the kingdom of heaven with the free world.

Lastly, I am probably starting to sound like a broken record, but I don't think that *Divine Principle* asserts that Jesus failed his mission. If we were to say that Jesus failed his mission, we would also have to say that God failed when Adam and Eve fell. The first human ancestors fell by their free will, and Jesus was rejected, through misuse of free will, by the people who were supposed to receive him. One can't say that Jesus failed any more than one can say that God failed.

Durwood Foster: Does it say that there was a failure of his mission?

Jonathan Wells: As I said earlier today, his mission was not completed. The failure was with the people who rejected him.

Lorine Getz: Deotis, I get lost when we identify Black and liberation theologies as one version for humanization and compare this to the vision in *Divine Principle*. I always understood liberation theology and Black theology to have different premises, primarily related to their specific ends. As soon as you get past simple statements about humanization, there are big differences between these two ideologies. Everybody would agree to a quality of value in human beings, but Black and liberation theologies take up very different directions in terms of goals, relating to socio-economic conditions, and so on. Perhaps I am muddying the issue there. I am not sure how, given either of those

highly specified historical concerns, one would directly relate these to *Divine Principle*.

James Deotis Roberts: Since we met as a group in Detroit that included women theologians, Black theologians, and Latin American theologians, we established some kind of common ground. Perhaps it is humanization. These theologies began with some analysis of a target: oppression. Very often these oppressions have a common infrastructure. Often the issues overlap. For example, Black women relate both to the women's movement and Black theology. The different issues have in common the fact that they begin with a concern for some form of collective sin or evil, and the theological reflection is generated from that rather than developing from some abstract formula which is imposed in a deductive way. This differs from existentialism in that it is dealing with collective forms of oppression rather than personal anxiety and meaninglessness. One area where Black theology differs with the Latin American liberationist is that we have not used Marxist analysis because we have our own tradition of dealing with oppression over periods of hundreds of years. We have a heritage that comes from Africa rather than Europe or some other place. That is the context in which the theologizing takes place. Those are the fundamental differences, but the ground is sufficiently common for us to say that we now have a liberation movement that includes these various cross fertilizations and exchanges which have enriched the whole movement. If I can understand my oppression it helps me to understand yours. You understanding yours helps you to understand mine. For example, I spoke at one of the colleges in the Midwest. When I got through, the same kind of statement was made: I am a white straight male; what does your statement of theology have to do with my experience? It just happened that a perfect illustration came out of a recent tragedy in the suburbs of Washington where a white straight male had killed his wife, his mother-in-law, and all of his children and carried the bodies to North Carolina. Behind all of that was the fact that he felt oppressed in his own house because he was supposed to make it in the system and other people had been promoted over him. This triggered a pathological state


of neurosis and so he struck out at people who had been putting pressure on him. I can think of many white males who may feel some form of oppression from their wives, from their children, from their parents, and so forth. They wanted to be themselves and follow their own career, but someone else determined or tried to determine what their life should be and that is a form of oppression.

Durwood Foster: A quick comment on the issues that Deotis raises and which I take very seriously. In some way—and I think I have said this in my paper at some point—it would appear that *prima facie* there is a kind of obliviousness in Unification consciousness to the plight of the third world or to Black people and so on. I think this is true. I want to say, however, that I have been impressed by some positive factors. Maybe these have already been stated clearly enough, but it doesn't hurt to repeat them. Something that has affinity with the cry for liberation in Unification theology is that it is posing a very radical indictment of the ecclesiastical, cultural, and social status quo. This is a general indictment and doesn't deal with the particular plight of Black people or third world people. Nevertheless, it is there and is contributing to the positive firmament which calls into question the concordat between the Christian tradition and the establishment, where change is needed. Further than that, it is impressive how willing Unification consciousness is to acknowledge the point that Deotis is raising. More than just verbally acknowledging this, there have been those conferences that have been held at Barrytown where liberation theologians were brought into give and take, into dialogue. This is also impressive for someone who is a part of a theological institution which has not done that, which drags its feet. These are impressive actions, but they haven't gone the whole way yet.

James Deotis Roberts: I want to respond to Jonathan's query. I have no definitive answers. My concern is that the dialogues are going on but the input from scholars in Asia and so on doesn't seem to be really making an impact. That seems to me significant. The other thing that I wanted to say is that if we looked at the epistemological richness of metaphysics in ancient China it would enrich the discussion over

against relying primarily on the hermeneutics of the Germans, American theology, and the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. This movement has its anchor and its initiating center in the third world. That gives it an unusual chance to have a breakthrough whereas most of the other traditional theologies are locked up in Western metaphysics. I don't think that Unification theology takes enough advantage of the East-West possibilities, to say nothing of the southern hemisphere. The Asian interpretations that might come out of the natural development of the movement would be a tremendous breakthrough and would open the door for a universal vision. The interpersonal emphasis in *Divine Principle* and the lack of a social analysis program does not really get to collective evils in a structural sense. The structural question is not simply about people in intimate relationships and families, but about what an oppressive economic system like the one in South Africa does to a whole population of people. I don't see the apparatus for the analysis of evil in that form or for the problems of sexism and racism in *Divine Principle*. The real issue is how will they be completed in terms of implementation, in terms of expanding the conception of what is the problem.

Hermeneutics of Society



***Divine Principle* and Natural Law**

Stephen Post

In this paper, *Divine Principle* is interpreted as a theologically grounded social ethic in consonance with the neo-Thomist natural law perspective and which at least resonates with Emil Brunner's notion of the orders of creation. Like neo-Thomism and Brunner's Protestant alternative, *Divine Principle* is a twentieth century theological response to totalitarianism. Brunner and the neo-Thomists were confronted with National Socialism in Germany during the 1930s, while *Divine Principle* represents a response to the threat of communist totalitarianism on the Korean peninsula. Of course these three perspectives are all engaged in the polemic against totalitarianism in all its forms.

The following discussion proposes to underscore the natural law basis of *Divine Principle* society by analyzing it in the light of modern Catholic and Protestant appeals to the created orders of nature as a source for normative ethical consensus.

The Neo-Thomist Alternative

Catholic theologians, such as Heinrich Rommen and Jacques Maritain, sought to revive the Thomistic tradition. In sum, Thomas had argued that man can, through the use of natural reason, discern the essential nature of things. With the fundamental precept of practical reason, "do good and avoid evil," and the definition of the good as the

teleological end of human being, Thomas could claim self-preservation, sexual relationships within the family structure, the rearing of children, and action for the good of society as among the precepts of natural law. Because man is a social creature by virtue of essential nature, "society" can be distinguished from the "state." The state has the authority to enforce positive human laws which do not interfere with man's flourishing, i.e., fulfilling his essence. The institution of the family, for instance, has an eternal value and dignity which is prior to the state. Were the state to disrupt the family structure, it would be acting unjustly and could be resisted. Man's obligation to educate offspring is also a law of nature, and as such is a social function which ought not to be controlled by state. The neo-Thomists, following the position of Thomas in his *Summa Theologiae*, also held that it was natural for man to seek his final or "last" end in relationship with God. Therefore, the person ought to be allowed freedom of conscience and religion. The person and society are, then, autonomous in the sense that they cannot be violated by government. This argument, emphasizing traditional natural law, is still the basis of the Catholic polemic against violations of human dignity by the state. The state acts justly only when it fosters human fulfillment and the common good. When the state oversteps its bounds, as it did in Germany during the Nazi reign and continues to do in many communist countries, then in the name of the dignity of the person and essential social structures it can be and ought to be resisted. Heinrich Rommen reminds us that when society is subjected to arbitrary legal positivism, "the natural law always buries its undertakers."¹

Brunner and the Significance of Barth's Objection

During the 1930s, both Barth and Brunner were opposed to the rise of National Socialism. Brunner, in his *Divine Imperative*, maintained that the orders of creation such as the family, the church, the state, and the economic sphere, were distinct and autonomous. The locus of authority in the family, for instance, is the father (Brunner was conservative and patriarchal), and for the state to step into the order of the

family is a violation of the will of God as revealed in creation. Similarly, the state has no authority in the religious order, the church being outside its legitimate scope.

Although there are distinctions to be made between Brunner and the neo-Thomists, his definition of justice as related to the autonomy of the created orders is essentially Catholic in its appreciation for the moral significance of creation and man's natural ends. This, of course, aroused Barth, who proclaimed that Brunner was really a Catholic and ought to knock on the doors of the Vatican.

Barth was, for all intents and purposes, a meta-ethical positivist. He argued that we cannot derive normative ethics from the orders of creation—indeed, nature tells us nothing about God's Word for us in the specific situation. This was a radical claim which reflected a strong sectarian and eschatological stance. God is completely free to require whatever he wills in our lives. Later on, in his *Church Dogmatics*, Barth described certain "prominent lines" which gave some general indication of God's command, and often entailed a complete suspension of common morality. Abraham, for example, was commanded to sacrifice his son, a clear violation of natural law, although the Jewish tradition generally interprets this as God showing the Jews that human sacrifice is evil, and thus preventing Abraham from so acting.

The Barth-Brunner debate is important, because it confronts Protestant ethics with a choice: either God does communicate his will for man through the natural orders, or else natural morality is meaningless. Barth, representing the latter alternative, has provided a basis for ethical relativism, sectarianism, and Christian particularism. Brunner, however, more in tune with both neo-Thomism and *Divine Principle* stresses on creation and immutable essential human nature as the ground of morality, represents what to my view is the more reasonable alternative.

Divine Principle and Natural Law

Before considering the material content of natural law in *Divine*

Principle as a basic social ethic, there are two issues which need to be discussed.

First, is *Divine Principle* in actuality ideological? Natural law theology does not purport to be ideology for obvious reasons. Ideology is defined as an ideal construct designed to further political ends through mobilization of the masses; thus, it is instrumental or utilitarian truth, but not objective truth. Natural law theories always have some ideological tint. For example, it is the case that Thomistic thought reflects the interest of a feudal society to some extent; but there is a primary claim to ontological truth on a more basic level. If *Divine Principle* were simply an ideology to counter other current ideologies, then it could not be construed as philosophically true. My position is that while there are some ideological elements, particularly in the second part on the subject of restoration history regarding Korea, the primary elements of the text are clearly non-ideological and would stand the test of time even if eschatological expectations were not met, i. e., the natural law center.

Secondly, is there a more Barthian reading of *Divine Principle*? Surely there is. Those who hold this view would probably stress the stories in Part II which describe the tests through which the great Old Testament patriarchs had to pass in order to prove their faith in God. In the interest of God's ultimate historical goal of restoration, there must be an interim ethic which demands stringent obedience to the will of God even if that entails the "teleological suspension of the ethical," to use Kierkegaard's expression. However, for the Unification Church in practice, there is no systematic teleological suspension of the ethical but, rather, a heightened sense of the love of God to complement, not contradict, natural relationships.

The despisers of Unificationism might continue the polemic, arguing that there is a systematic deception in Unification praxis which finds justification in the text of *Divine Principle*. After all, if Jacob could deceive his father Isaac, stealing the birthright and the blessing, then we ought to be able to get away with anything. If so, then *Divine Principle* creates a serious rub with common morality or natural law.

Let me remind the despiser, by way of response, that during the 1750s the Jews were ghettoized in Berlin, and certain anti-Semites, among them the illustrious Voltaire, held that because the Mishnah comments on stories such as those of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc., individuals who acted in violation of the commonly acknowledged precepts of practical reason, then the Jews were necessarily devious people and thoroughly corrupt. The late Jewish scholar Samuel Sandmel argued, in a class which I had the privilege to attend, that it was only due to the fact that the Jews were ghettoized that on some occasions they acted contrary to common moral standards. He held that though there are "peculiar" stories in the tradition, the basic thrust of Judaism is in the direction of natural law as evidenced by the Decalogue. Faith stories do not imply systematic deception.² To conclude this digression, let me only state that while there may be some eschatological reservations placed upon the basic natural law principles in *Divine Principle* text, they refer only to an interim period, and in no way displace the primary morality of Unification life in any historical period whatsoever.

Having engaged in some initial apologetics, let us now turn to the actual content of natural law in *Divine Principle*. What is the perspective on the ends of the human person? What is the image of human fulfillment with which we are dealing? For anyone who wants to know what Unificationism is, these are central questions. To answer them, reference must be made to chapter 1 of *Divine Principle*, "Principle of Creation."

Divine Principle stresses the purpose of creation and thus shares a teleological view of human nature with the natural law tradition, ultimately derivative from Aristotle's notion of becoming. Each person has an end or purpose of existence. This purpose is not determined by the being itself, but by the creator, God, whose logos contains the image of human fulfillment. God began to create out of love, i.e., seeking an object of love who could respond freely. Man is created to be God's child and exists as the image of God. This confirms the traditional Christian basis of human dignity grounded in the *imago Dei*. Each person, in order to fulfill the three great blessings so central to *Divine*

Principle (Genesis 1:28, to be fruitful, multiply, and have dominion) requires the freedom to perfect his character in a relationship of give-and-take action with God. When a person completely unites with God's heart, he comes to an individual level of fulfillment. From the first blessing of individual fruitfulness it can be inferred that the person has the right to the freedom and opportunity to develop this crucial relationship with God. Thus there is a sphere of inviolable freedom surrounding each person which exists prior to the state and is an integral aspect of social justice.

A second aspect of man's essential nature has to do with the ability to form a family. Because God is both masculine and feminine according to *Divine Principle*, no one single individual can be the full *imago Dei*. Through forming a family, the second great blessing, God finds a perfect and complete object of love. By having children, men and women can learn to feel the love which God has toward mankind and thus become the manifestation of God on earth. The family is then the cornerstone of the kingdom of God. Certainly it can be easily inferred that the family unit is inviolable, integral to justice, and part of the natural law.

Finally, by essential nature man desires to relate to the things of creation. This is the third great blessing. From it can be inferred the higher law background for man's involvement with the natural world.

Though this outline of the image of human fulfillment in *Divine Principle* is brief, it does provide the reader with a general view on man's essential nature and the natural law precepts which are entailed, e. g., the law of self-preservation, preservation of the family unit, preservation of freedom of conscience in relation to the love of God, etc. To miss these images contained in the principle of creation is to miss the meaning of life in the Unification Church.

In conclusion, I have attempted to show the consensus which exists between neo-Thomism, Brunner, and *Divine Principle* as to a teleological notion of human flourishing based on essential human nature. In all three systems, human nature as individual and social cannot be violated by the arbitrary will of man or state.

FOOTNOTES

¹Heinrich Rommen, *The Natural Law* (London: Herder, 1947).

²Professor Sandmel gave this lecture in 1978 at the University of Chicago.

Society and Ethics in Unificationism

Lloyd Eby

This paper has two parts: The first part is a brief presentation of the Unification view of society. The second is an exploration of the implications of that view for a theory of ethics.

Part I. The Unification View of Society

In order to understand the concept of society in Unificationism, we should see how it is expressed in the three sections of *Divine Principle*: the Principle of Creation, the Fall of Man, and the Principle of Restoration.

A. Society and the Principle of Creation

According to the Unification Principle of Creation, both entities and the relationships which allow them to exist are foundational. The basic notions in which the structure of Creation are expressed, such as bi-polarity, give and take, origin-division-union, and the four position foundation¹ are notions which simultaneously describe entities and the relationships between them. Therefore, in Unificationism, relationships are not derived from entities and entities are not derived from relationships. Both are foundational.

By *society* I mean the relationships between entities. In Unification thought even an individual is made up of a relationship between

interacting dual characteristics of internal character and external form, along with a central or originating point which centers and directs the activity. Internal character and external form are inseparable, and their relationship is necessary for the existence of the individual. In Unification thought, then, an individual is a kind of society.

Unification theory holds that God created in order to have an object for his/her love and in order to have that object respond to God and share co-creativity with God. The relationship of God to mankind is the relationship of father-and-mother to children. The first human society was composed of GóD and Adam and Eve. Man and woman together form an essential and necessarily interacting social unit. An individual person is incomplete alone: human characteristics are fully expressed in man and woman together. This unit is the encapsulation of the Divine image.

God's will and desire for mankind and creation is expressed in the *Three Great Blessings* (Gen. 1:28, to be fruitful, to multiply and fill the earth, and to subdue it and have dominion). The fulfillment of each of these Blessings requires a social interaction.

The First Blessing deals with social interaction between individual persons and God. This involves growth to maturity through proper interaction between internal character (mind) and external form (body), centered on God and God's ideal, so that the individual forms a completed or mature relationship with God. Such an individual becomes a divine person, the visible temple of God.

The Second Blessing involves a marriage relationship between a mature woman and a mature man, giving birth to children. Such a family perpetuates the divine lineage. Love, centered on the Divine heart, is the basis of all family and human relationships. In such a divine family, the basic love relationships can be learned and expressed, and these can form a basis for other relationships outside the family. If the Second Blessing were carried out, it would result, in successive generations, in the creation of a divine worldwide society.

The Third Blessing concerns the interaction between the human race and the rest of the created order. Harmony between humankind

and the natural order requires that the interaction be centered on God's will and purpose. The creation exists for the benefit and enjoyment of mankind. Hunger, poverty, waste, physical misery, pollution and all the other economic and ecological woes are the result of sin, and would not exist if the Third Blessing were realized, centered on God's heart and ideal. Rewarding work, occupation, and creativity are necessary parts of the divine plan for fulfilling the Third Blessing. This fulfillment must be a social one. Only through harmonious give and take among people and between people and the natural order can greed, selfishness, misappropriation, unemployment, misemployment and other such ills be avoided.

In the Unification view, since the Three Blessings existed from the beginning, society is natural and organic, existing from the beginning. It is not a contract, but something each person is naturally born into, and something that must be fulfilled and developed. It exists for each person's benefit. There is not individual fulfillment apart from society and social fulfillment, but also there is no society apart from the individuals that constitute it and no social fulfillment apart from the fulfillment of each individual.

B. Society and the Fall of Man

In the Unification view, give-and-take relations naturally lead to the creation of new being of higher order; some of these new creations are trivial but others are not. The most important give-and-take relation is the sexual one. Since the original Adam and Eve were immature, God foresaw that they would be susceptible to improper love relationships, with the natural consequences of such relations. The warning against eating the fruit meant specifically that they were not to enter into any sexual relation until they were perfected enough to do so. Sex changes things between people; although this is often denied it is nevertheless true. Sex is the sign and mechanism whereby parentage is transmitted. The original sin, therefore, was not an individual act; only a couple can perform this act.

God's desire is that his/her perfect parentage be passed on perfectly to human children, and that this continue from parents to children for endless generations. If the sexual union were set up immaturely, apart from God's Blessing, then the perfect parentage could not be passed on and the union with God would be lost. In a sexual union with God's Blessing, the interchange between the partners would enrich each one, but without God's Blessing there is diminishment. The commandment was therefore a warning against the possibility of improper sex and its consequences. Nevertheless the original couple ignored the warning (largely because of the action of the angel), and suffered the predicted consequences. To be sure, they disobeyed God, but the important factor is not so much the disobedience, but the improper relationships and what those relationships produced. In the Unification view, therefore, fallen man does not so much need forgiveness for disobedience as he/she needs liberation from the consequences of improper relationships, or sin.

The original sin was a social act. As *Divine Principle* explains, Satan seduced Eve who in turn seduced Adam. In these acts, Satan took over part of the position of father for the human race. This false fatherhood has disrupted the fulfillment of the Three Great Blessings. Proper give-and-take between mind and body in individuals, between husband and wife and parents and children in the family, between segments of the larger society, and between mankind and the natural order has been lost.

Because of the fall, there have been no historical examples of perfection of any of the Three Great Blessings (except that Jesus fulfilled the First Blessing). Existing families will not serve as satisfactory models of the divine ideal, nor will any existing human social, economic, political, or ecological arrangement serve as a paradigm for the divine order. These can only be properly constituted when the process of solving sin, called the *Principle of Restoration* in Unification terminology, has been completed. This process requires the coming of the Messiah.

Sin, in its essence, is social. This does not mean that there is no individual sin, but it does trace the root of sin to improper social

interaction. Even if we say sin originated in improper desire, this would not have been consequential without the improper social interaction. So a social act is at the root of sin, and the solution of sin must necessarily be social, that is it must involve interaction *between*, and not just within, individuals.

C. Society and the Principle of Restoration

Because of the fall, all the ideals embodied in the Three Great Blessings were lost. Instead, a spurious approximation of the relationships contained in the Three Great Blessings has been established, centering at least partly on Satan. In order that restoration be accomplished it is necessary that the Messiah come. The Messiah is a new man, born of the Godly, and not of the Satanic lineage. His task is to carry out what Adam and Eve failed to accomplish. To do this, he must fulfill the Three Great Blessings, which means that he must grow to maturity (First Blessing), and then restore a bride in the position of Eve. The Messiah and his bride must together then establish a divine family, and their family then will become the messianic unit (Second Blessing). This family must provide a model for both harmonious inter-human relations and harmonious human interactions with the natural order (Third Blessing). Finally, the messianic family must provide salvation for all people by uniting all of humankind with the messianic family (i.e., rebirth into the divine lineage).

It is God's task to send the Messiah. But it is the task of fallen people to restore conditionally what was lost in the fall by making amends through indemnification. In order to do this, two fundamental indemnity conditions or processes must be carried out. *Divine Principle* calls them the *Foundation of Faith* and the *Foundation of Substance*.

The foundation of faith represents restoration of faith in God and the give-and-take relationship with God. To accomplish this, the central individual (or family, tribe, nation) must have some object or rite or belief in which he/she holds faith for some period of time. During this period of time the faith will be tested to ascertain whether it

is genuine. The foundation of faith is a relational concept. It requires that the relation between the central figure and the object of faith, and the central figure and God be maintained. This foundation of faith is a sign of restoration of the human race's relation with God (restoring the first consequence of the fall), and it is a prerequisite of restoration.

The foundation of substance represents a restoration of a second consequence of the fall. This is the disruption of human relationships. In addition to struggles with others, we also have a struggle within ourselves between our good and evil natures. Conditional restoration of these relationships requires the conditional separation into a relatively good side (Abel side) and a relatively evil side (Cain side), and the winning of the more evil side to the better side. Accomplishment of this division and reunification is called the foundation of substance. In Unification theory, this is often called the Cain/Abel problem because those individuals represented the first attempt by God to erect a foundation of substance.

It is necessary to note that although Abel represented the relatively good side and Cain the relatively evil side, both were fallen men (hence evil), but both were putative sons of God (hence good). Both sides are mixed. In Unification theory, no one is wholly right or wholly wrong, but only relatively more right or wrong. When a unification is made after a Cain/Abel division, with the good prevailing, then a foundation of substance is laid and a divine blessing can be given. If there is no unification, or if the relatively evil side prevails, then there is no foundation of substance and the divine blessing is lost, until a new attempt at proper unification succeeds.

Society, in all the possible meanings of that term, is an arena of restoration in Unificationism. Restoration encompasses the individual, the family, the larger society, the nation, international relationships, and ultimately the whole world. Salvation is a societal affair. There is no salvation of the individual apart from the larger society, and no social salvation without the salvation of all individuals.

Part II. Towards a New Paradigm for Ethics and Social Theory

In this part of my paper I want to propose a new paradigm for normative ethics, a paradigm based on Unification theory. Along the way to the new paradigm, I will examine two important received paradigms, one from Western social theory and the other from the Orient. I will try to show that neither of these received theories by itself will serve as an adequate paradigm for normative ethics.

Before addressing the question of a new ethical paradigm, we must address the deeper and more fundamental question of whether any normative ethical theory is at all possible, and on what basis. This question arises because twentieth-century writers on ethics in the Anglo-American world have attacked the very foundations of normative ethics, and many of them have concluded that some form of relativism is inescapable.

The claim that relativism is inescapable has its roots in ontological and epistemological questions or problems. Ever since David Hume showed that there is (or seems to be anyway) a gap between saying "X *is* such and such" and "I (or you or all of us) *ought* to do (or not do) X" people have remarked that there is a gap between *is* and *ought*. For example, suppose it is true that adultery is injurious to social order. How does it follow from that that I (or you or anyone) ought not commit adultery? It does not follow logically unless there is something that joins together the claim that something is the case and the claim that one therefore ought or ought not do it.

This question is too complex to be answered here or answered simply, but there is, I believe, a basis in Unificationism for answering these foundational questions. It is in the Unification claim that human beings indeed have an essence and purpose *qua* human, and that they are inherently related to God and to other people. These relations are not derived but are natural and inherent; they are part of basic human ontology. Because of this, humans have responsibility--for themselves, for other people, for the natural world, and for God. If this is so, then

factual claims *do* entail normative judgments; from the fact that such and such *is* the case, it follows that I ought to do so and so, because of my inherent nature and purpose and responsibility, as a being related to God, to others, and to the natural world.

Much more needs to be said on this question, and in particular the details need to be made explicit. But let this be sufficient for now.

In the history of Western thought, numerous ethical theories have been proposed, and these theories could be classified in various ways: teleological vs. deontological theories, individual vs. collectivist theories, theistic vs. atheistic theories, normative vs. non-normative theories, and so on. For my purposes here, it will be useful to take the paramount Western theory to be the social-contract view or paradigm. This view or paradigm is the one I take to be most embodied in American public social and political life and affairs. This does not mean that there are no other ethical views that are operative in Western thought or in American affairs, but that this contractual view is dominant, at least in theory. In addition, this contractual view operates in business relations between employers and employees, buyers and sellers, and so on.

In the Western democratic-contract paradigm the underlying ontology is individualistic. The basic units are individuals (substances) having an essence. Relations are derived entities; they are not ontologically basic. We might call this the telephone-line theory of relations; relations are like the wires connecting telephone poles together; the wires depend on the poles for subsistence, but the poles do not depend on the wires. If the poles are taken, the wires cannot be suspended, but take away the wires and nothing happens to the poles.

In the Western contract-view, a person is primarily an individual, and society is a derived entity. For Socrates, the first question was a person's knowing himself and possessing the virtues; society followed as something made up of people. For Aristotle, although a person is inherently part of a *polis*, virtue is primarily a property of individuals. In Hobbes and Machiavelli, man's standing over against or apart from other men is explicit; in Machiavelli the Prince stands against the people and in Hobbes everyone stands against everyone else. Democratic

theory sees people as individuals who contract with each other to make a state or *polis*. This contract may be either explicit (as in the Jamestown or Mayflower Compacts or the U.S. Constitution) or implicit, as in English Common Law.

We can contrast this contract view with a paradigm that operates in Oriental, Confucian-influenced cultures. The Oriental paradigm is a hierarchical, family-based one, derived from or allied with Confucianism. In this paradigm, hierarchy is seen as natural and normal, and relations between a person and other people, especially family and ancestral relations, are often considered to be more important or more real than individuals. Ancestral and familial tradition is paramount.

In this view other social relations are similar to or modeled on the familial paradigm. For example, in a school the teacher is respected as having a parental role and authority. In a business, a president is regarded as a father; the company, as a family; co-workers, as brothers and sisters; and the department head, as an older brother. A similar principle applies in politics: "A ruler should govern his people like a father cares for his children. Ruler and ruled must be bound together by unbreakable ties of paternal love and filial respect if the nation is to remain strong and healthy."²

When we consider the Western social-contract paradigm and the Oriental hierarchical paradigm each from the point of view of the other, we discover that each has certain implicit criticisms and even perhaps a refutation of the other.

From the Oriental view one could criticize the Western contract-view in this fashion. It is too individualistic because people are in fact not isolated units. Western ethical theories almost never give any satisfactory account of the birth and maturation process; they speak instead as if each person were an isolated adult, able to get along more or less by himself or herself. The Western rejection of innate relationship in favor of unrestricted individualism has encouraged people to feel that their first responsibility is to themselves rather than to others. This has led to the breakdown of families, and to disrespect for other kinds of social obligations. The Western contract paradigm can have negative

implications for economic life: if each person is primarily an isolated individual, then there is no reason for each person not to want for himself/herself whatever economic benefits are available rather than being concerned with the economic situation of the society as a whole. The Western social-contract paradigm tends toward political and economic anarchy.

From the Western point of view one could offer criticisms of the Oriental paradigm as well. The Oriental view keeps people in a perpetual state of dependence on the parent or superior, so that people do not become individuals capable of operating on their own. Loyalty and honor are such important virtues in Oriental society that people are highly motivated to be untruthful in order to remain loyal or to "save face." Because of "face," a superior cannot admit weakness or wrongdoing to an inferior. The Oriental model tends toward totalitarianism because there is nothing to keep the superior from misusing power and influence. It is not an accident that few significant natural science or agricultural or technological innovations have come from the Orient (except since WWII as a result of westernization). In order for those innovations to take place, persons must have ideas and plans that they are willing to pursue against ancestors and tradition; the Orient puts so much emphasis on family and societal and ancestral tradition, however, that people are prevented from breaking out of tradition for purposes of innovation. Oriental societies tend to have a low regard for the lives and rights of individual persons. Most of these societies also devalue women and, as a result, tend to mistreat them.

More could be said about the defects of each model, but perhaps this is sufficient. From what has been said, it is clear, I hope, that each of these paradigms has significant defects and cannot serve without substantial modification as an adequate paradigm for ethics or social theory.

It is my contention, however, that it is possible to derive from Unificationism a foundation for an adequate ethics, an ethics that incorporates the best parts of the Oriental-Confucian and the Western-contract paradigms, without falling into the problems to which either leads by itself.

In my view, an adequate ethics must attend to all three of the Three Great Blessings, so that we can say that whatever promotes fulfillment of the Three Great Blessings is ethically good, and whatever detracts from this is ethically bad. In order to do this, we need to go beyond the existing Unification thought texts,³ because the discussion of ethics in those texts confines itself almost exclusively to family ethics. In this, these texts are too closely tied to the Oriental paradigm. Discussions of the First and Third Blessings are not sufficiently developed, and business, social and public ethics are treated as simple extensions of family ethics.

The Oriental paradigm itself is primarily a paradigm for familial and social life. It neglects the First Blessing, i.e., proper individuation and individual maturation, so that the individual can be an embodiment of God. The Western-contract paradigm is correct in maintaining that mature persons must be individuated and must be distinct from other individuals and their families and ancestors, and must find themselves and operate in society and with other persons as mature individuals.

When we consider the roles of nation-states in their relationships with one another, the most useful model is a democratic one; nations are sovereign entities and relate with one another on that basis. Today it is primarily the Communist nations that retain colonial powers. The non-communist states relate to one another more or less as mature individuals relate with one another. Insofar as they fail to do so, it is a sign of immaturity and insufficient (ideological) development.

Mature individuals also exist, however, in natural relationships with one another. The Western-contract view is deficient because it fails to recognize this point. Therefore the Oriental insistence on relationship is an important reminder that even mature individuals are not *isolated* individuals: they are members of families, societies, and so on. The Western-contract view, then, does not sufficiently stress the importance of the Second Blessing.

Both the Oriental and Western paradigms neglect crucial aspects of the question of humankind's relationship with the natural order. Nowadays many people would want to argue that issues such as

environmental pollution, misappropriation of natural resources, the treatment of animals, and so on, are ethical issues. If we include the Third Blessing, then these issues do indeed become ethical issues.

In summary, I suggest that aspects of both the Oriental-Confucian and Western-contract paradigms need to be adopted in order to arrive at an adequate paradigm for ethics and social theory, and that the way to do this is to see the fulfillment of all three of the Three Great Blessings as the foundation of ethics. Existing Unification thought texts do not in my view sufficiently address this question because they are too much wedded to the Confucian paradigm, but Unification theory contains a foundation for a more adequate ethical view. What I have said here by no means exhausts this question, but I offer it as a step toward an adequate paradigm.

FOOTNOTES

¹For an explanation of these concepts see *Divine Principle* (New York: The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973).

²Young Oon Kim, *Faiths of the Far East*, Vol. III of her *World Religions* (New York: Golden Gate, 1976), p. 128.

³The standard texts in Unification thought are *Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1978) and *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981). Both of these books were primarily written by Mr. Sang Hun Lee. The treatment of ethics in the second volume does not go beyond the first volume in such a way as to alleviate the problems I am dealing with in this essay.

Religion and Society in Unificationism

David F. Kelly

The hermeneutics of religion and society in Unificationism can be understood in two ways. First, in the more obvious sense, there is the way in which Unificationism, as religion, interprets society. The second sense is more subtle, and is the process by which Unificationism uses society as an internal principle of interpretation for its own theological self-creation. The following remarks are intended as starting points for the dialogue needed to develop these issues.

I

According to Unificationism, at the time of the final restoration, the physical world and temporal society will not end (*DP*, pp. 111-12).^{*} Unificationism sees society as an essential dimension of God's providence, and proposes characteristics for a perfect, restored society. From a study of this "perfect society" (we might prefer to call it a "just society" or a "better society" if we reject the possibility of a perfect society in finite time and space), we can sense the direction of societal change envisioned

^{*}DP is *Divine Principle* (New York, The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973); UT is *Unification Thought* (New York, Unification Thought Institute, 1978); NW is *New World: Toward Our Third Century* (Barrytown, N.Y.: Unification Theological Seminary, 1976).

and desired by Unification theology.

Formally, the perfect society is loving and just according to the Principle. Persons are unable to harm their neighbors because of a mutual societal feeling among them (*DP*, pp. 101-12). Equality will be a feature of this society (*DP*, pp. 121, 443-46; *UT*, p. 296), though there is some question as to the desirability of perfect economic equality (*UT*, p. 232).

The most important unit in the restored society is the family (*DP*, p. 39). Here the man stands in the subject position of giving love, the woman in the object position of returning beauty (*DP*, pp. 48-49), thus enabling the establishment of the four position foundation beyond the perfected individual, the first blessing, outward to society and ultimately to creation as a whole, the third blessing, through the physical and spiritual generation of blessed children under the power of God, the second blessing (*DP*, pp. 43-46). For this reason there is an emphasis on sexual sins in the present fallen world. Sexual expression is limited to monogamous marriage; procreation is central; adultery is the greatest sin (*DP*, pp. 7, 75; *NW*, p. 115).

The restored society is highly technological; science is respected and advanced (*DP*, pp. 102, 108-09, 127-29). Human ambitions and desires are in themselves good and a part of the original Principle (*DP*, p. 86), since humankind is intended by God to dominate all creation (*DP*, pp. 44-46). Thus human "nature" includes *technē* which enables the human. Restoration is to God's plan, not to man's original primitive condition in Eden, from which he would quickly have advanced himself had he not fallen (*DP*, pp. 101-2, 128). It is true that in our present state we may lose our sense of direction through overemphasis on technology and science (*UT*, p. xiii), but this critical theme is less stressed than is the optimistic vision of technology.

God intends society to be comfortable, not ascetic; rich, not poor (*DP*, p. 102; *NW* generally). Though asceticism is necessary for indemnification (*DP*, pp. 180, 185-86, Part Two generally), poverty is not a value in itself. Jesus would have preferred to make disciples of the educated and influential rather than of poor fishermen to build up his

kingdom (*DP*, p. 160). Material wealth is good, not evil, provided it is used for the building of the perfect (just) society (*NW*, esp. pp. 79, 90, 104, 118). Korea and America play central roles in this (*DP*, pp. 516-32; *NW*, pp. 118-120).

The just society is socialist (*DP*, pp. 443-46; *UT*, pp. 292-96). This is neither communist (*UT*, p. 293) nor Marxist (not explicit in *DP* or *UT*, but clear from Unificationism's general approach). Socialism resembles what is usually called reformed capitalism. It explicitly includes "democratic socialism, Catholic socialism, Protestant socialism, neo-capitalism, nationalistic capitalism and the welfare state" (*UT*, p. 292) and, specifically, "Keyne's *{sic}* revised capitalism" (*UT*, p. 295). Though it is stated that these forms of socialism are not the final form (*UT*, p. 296), an openness to "free enterprise" (*NW*, p. 118) and approval of Ford, IBM, and the Marshall Plan as improving prosperity for all (*NW*, pp. 70, 79, 90) indicate that socialism resembles reformed capitalism more than a Marxist approach to capital and labor (*UT*, p. 254). Individuals are called to sacrifice themselves for the common good (*NW*, p. 118 generally), but the Marxist emphasis on classes and groups is denied in favor of a stress on individual leaders (*UT*, pp. 256-57).

The just society is democratic (*DP*, pp. 490-93 and generally in Part Two, Chapters Four and Five; *UT*, pp. 284-88), though there is some indication that democracy, like socialism, will be replaced by the "tricoistic society of co-life, co-prosperity and co-justice" (*UT*, p. 285), the details of which are not yet determined (*UT*, p. 296).

Unificationism's interpretation of contemporary society is generally optimistic. This is consistent with its description of the kingdom of God on earth. Contemporary society is moving from lower stages of political and economic organization to higher ones: from monarchy to democracy, from imperialistic to advanced technological prosperity (*DP*, pp. 119-29, 443-44, 474). Even the World Wars have been part of God's providence in laying the foundation necessary for the restoration (*DP*, pp. 475-90). History is progressive; its movement is spiral (*UT*, pp. 99-107, 247). God's plan can be thwarted by man's refusal to fulfill his portion of responsibility, but contemporary developments suggest

that the moment is at hand for the restoration. One final struggle is needed between the Abel-type forces of democracy and the Cain-type forces of communism, a struggle which can be carried out by weapons or by ideology (*DP*, pp. 490-96). Victory of the Third World War and the establishment of the four position foundation on the basis of the family will prepare for the coming of the Lord of the Second Advent. By revealing truth in scientific language meaningful to modern intellects, Unificationism will help in accomplishing the individual and societal foundation needed for the restoration (*DP*, pp. 9-16, 19, 131; *UT*, pp. xiv-xv).

Since Unificationism does not determine precisely the meaning of much of its language, a serious hermeneutical problem arises at the outset. There is a sense in which Unification language is slippery. It may mean what it says—then again it may not. One example of this is Unificationism's failure to describe adequately if and how the ultimate society of perfected man would differ from the democratic and socialistic societies envisioned as progressive. Are they the same? Similar? The kingdom of God on earth is perfect, yet finite in time and space. It is completed, yet it develops. Does it need a government? Does it need an economic system? Is it automatically just? Is technology immediately perfect in the kingdom, or will we have to work at it? If we have to work at it, then is there a failure of perfect co-prosperity? These definitional problems—these confusions in the mode and form of language—are not limited to Unificationism among religions or among social theories. But Unificationism explicitly intends to reveal hidden truth in scientific language understandable to modern intellects. This demands greater clarity and logic. Despite the difficulties posed by this hermeneutical problem, a few points of evaluation of Unificationism's views of society will be helpful.

At first glance, Unification thought does not seem to emphasize structural societal change. There are no critiques of the governmental and economic structures of contemporary society similar to those found in certain schools of Christian social ethics, particularly in liberation theology. There is a strong emphasis on the family unit, and at least the implication that by multiplying perfect children at the family level,

restoration on the global level will be automatically achieved.

A more careful study, however, suggests that Unificationism does have a social theology, though it is as yet not fully developed. The problem may be more that this social theology differs from contemporary liberation approaches than that it is lacking. Unificationism's view of society is, as we have seen, pro-technological, pro-"progress," optimistic, anti-communist, non-Marxist, and growth-oriented. In contrast, much of contemporary Christian writing on social justice can correctly, if somewhat superficially, be characterized as "no-growth redistributionism." The not-poor must lower their material standards in order that the poor may raise theirs. Unificationism suggests the possibility of a "growth-redistributionism" which resembles the older Keynesian-Roosevelt vision of a growing economic prosperity for the people in general rather than the liberationist view of class struggle within a more or less limited economic future. In its positive, even optimistic, evaluation of technology as enabling the human under God's original providence, Unificationism's social theology resembles Gabriel Vahanian's radical eschaton and rejects Jacques Ellul's pessimistic radical critique.

There are problems with both of these approaches. The debate among economists and among people of good will and social conscience is not ended. Though I am thoroughly persuaded that liberation theology is right in decrying social injustice and human poverty, and in insisting that social and structural issues are central theological concerns, I am not persuaded that the direction it suggests for solution will benefit the people. Anti-technological redistribution may well result in equal poverty rather than equal prosperity. Perhaps it is for this reason, together with the fact that Roman Catholicism has a tradition of social ethics compatible with the Keynesian vision of reformed capitalism, that I do not object to these aspects of Unificationism's approach to social ethics. I do think, though, that it brings with it the all too universal danger of assuming that what benefits oneself also benefits other races, nations, and classes.

The strongest objection I have concerning Unificationism's

interpretation of society is that it tends too quickly to identify the heavenly side and the satanic side. Though there are indeed struggles between forces of relative good and forces of relative evil, human history does not admit of easy separations of absolute good and absolute evil incarnate in social systems or political divisions. The simplistic division of human wars and of political and social controversies into Cain and Abel types, culminating in the war to end all wars between absolutely good democracy (us) and absolutely evil communism (them) is unacceptable ethics and simply false history. I agree with Unificationism's abhorrence of modern communism and praise for political and economic democracy. But its dichotomous view of history tends too much toward a sense of manifest destiny for Korea and America, a kind of grand plan which could easily trample people in its ideological crusade. Unification's view of the three world wars as inevitable and even progressive parts of God's providence is particularly objectionable.

The emphasis on the family, together with the implication never made explicit in *DP*, that the perfect society will be created by the physical generation of blessed children, is apt to lead to the relative disvaluing of other modes of human generativity and creativity. The sterile and the unmarried may find themselves victims of discrimination. Unificationism's exaggerated emphasis on sins of sex, when coupled with the central value of procreation, will almost inevitably lead to prejudice against homosexuals. Structural racism may be insufficiently considered or thought to be eliminated merely by interracial marriage.

One final criticism concerns sexism in Unificationist theory. Though there may be some question as to the specific policies needed for achieving social justice, justice precludes any theoretical discrimination which might form an anthropological or a divine-will basis for the exclusion of a particular race or nation or sex from human equality. This theoretical basis is present in Unification thought for the repression of women. *Divine Principle* is by no means consistently sexist. Often it argues for participational, equal give-and-take relationships between women and men. Nonetheless, the identification of subject with God and object with man (human being) on the one hand, and of subject

with male and object with female on the other introduces into the very structure of Unification thought a theme which implies the essential inferiority of the female to the male. This may well be carried over into the ecclesiological and lifestyle aspects of Unificationism, and members ought to guard against its practical implications. And to the extent that it is part of the central ontology and anthropology of Unificationism, a re-interpretation or re-translation or even a re-creation may be necessary in this regard.

Unificationism explicitly envisions a society which reconciles science and religion, which harmonizes Eastern and Western traditions, which invites the co-participation of female and male, and which seeks to eliminate social injustice. I do not believe that Unificationism either as a theological system or as ecclesiological or societal movement will accomplish this goal, and I find, especially in its thematic rejection of female equality, structural elements which actually oppose these unifications. But I believe that Unificationism has correctly identified the central dimensions which must characterize the religious and societal mythos and ethos of the twenty-first century, and has attempted, however inadequately, to weave them explicitly into its own complex structure. The result is a flawed, but fascinating, religious and societal vision.

II

In addition to Unification's interpretation of society, there is a second hermeneutical dimension, less obvious but essential for an understanding of Unification theology. Not only does Unificationism see society as something which it must interpret, criticize, and change, but Unificationism has made of society something essential to its own internal creation as religion. Unificationism depends on its vision and version of society for its own structure, and this to a degree not usually found in theologies. "Society," within the Unificationist system, becomes an operative principle for the furthering of Unificationism itself, for its self-creation as religion.

Society is thus intrinsic to Unificationism in an explicit way. Not only is society related to Unificationism ideologically, as a Marxian/Mannheimian analysis would disclose—its ideational superstructure rests on and comes from and tends to defend a specific set of economic and cultural infrastructures (probably Western and mainly middle class)—but society is related to this religion structurally. In some ways this suggests parallels with liberation theology, despite their important differences, since both see societal issues as essential to proper theology. But Unificationism has actually woven specific societal forms, structures, systems, and events into its core in a cryptic, structurally complex manner.

This is most apparent in *DP* Part II, especially in chapters 3, 4, and 5. The non-Unificationist will find this section unintelligible, even silly, and will doubtless be bored with its detail. But the idea is fascinating: a complex interweaving of societal developments and mathematics and historical events in a supposedly scientific (modern? logical?) but actually arcane and mystagogic mosaic which forms the theoretical core of Unificationist thought. Unificationism has based its own self-creation on its view of societal interrelationships to a degree not found in traditional Christian theologies. An understanding of how this works will be essential to an understanding of Unification thought. This is primarily a hermeneutical task.

Unification Social Hermeneutics: Theocratic or Bureaucratic

Lonnie D. Kliever

H. Richard Niebuhr, one of the great moral and cultural theologians of our century, argues that ethical action does not rest on specific moral rules or goals governing typical situations. Formalized systems of rules and casuistry are at best assessments of ethical actions rather than descriptions of moral decisions. Moral behavior issues from and answers to an *ethos*—a context in which persons act and interact on the basis of certain underlying images or models of that situation. Moral action is always interpreted action that is imaginatively and historically funded. Moral reasoning is not so much deliberately applying moral principles to situations as it is interpreting situations in the light of events and experiences from the past or the future which decisively shape personal and communal life. These events and experiences are distilled into impressions and images which the reasoning heart employs to fashion moral understanding and guidance. Morality then requires responsive action in accordance with an interpretation of what is going on and of what is fitting. As Niebuhr puts it, “We respond as we interpret the meaning of action upon us” (Niebuhr, 63).^{*} In short, ethics *is* hermeneutics of society.

Following Niebuhr’s lead, what is the social hermeneutics of the Unification Church? How do Unificationists interpret and respond to

^{*}See bibliographical references at the end of this article.

what is going on and what is fitting? On the face of it, Unification interpretations of society are theocratic. In any social situation, the primary actor is God and the primary ethos is the kingdom of God. More precisely, Unification social hermeneutics is *eschatologically* theocratic. The actions of persons and events of history are seen under the aspect of God striving for the kingdom coming (*DP*, 68-71). The images and models of this expectation are drawn directly from the Bible. Biblical history is the hermeneutical type of all history and, within the biblical materials, *marriage* with its implied unification of opposites is the central eschatological type (Flinn, 157). Thus construed, the coming reign of God over a kingdom on earth will see the restoration of the original unity of the body and the mind, the male and the female, the external and the internal, the horizontal and the vertical dimensions of human existence. Accordingly, Unificationist ethics centers in bringing in this God-centered, family mediated kingdom.

On closer inspection, however, this theocratic hermeneutics differs in one crucial way from its ostensibly biblical and Calvinistic roots (Richardson, 133-40). As we shall see, this difference comes to dramatic focus in the determinative role that marriage plays in their eschatological ethics. Stated negatively, Unification hermeneutics of society invokes no overarching structural embodiment of the rule of God over the affairs of earth—neither the structure of a divine kingship so typical of biblical messianism nor of an authoritative church so central to theocratic Calvinism. Stated positively, for Unificationists the coming kingdom centers in and emerges from the godly individual and the godly family. Neither church nor state as such will mediate the coming kingdom but rather dedicated individuals living in intimate communities of faith and love.

What then is the significance of this structural shift from *public* (state, church) to *private* (persons, families) bearers of the coming kingdom? Unificationists might answer in two very different ways. On the one hand, they might argue that this shift represents a “purification” of Christianity. The rejection of “Constantinian Christianity,” with its pope and emperor, promises a theocracy free of the political entanglements

and idolatrous confusions between church and state in the past. On the other hand, Unificationists might parlay this shift as a "primitivization" of Christianity. This focus on the individual and the family represents a return to a time when religion so permeated the whole of society that *special* religious roles and institutions were unnecessary. But the notion of a "purified" Christianity free of institutional entanglements is sociologically naive. No religion can survive without institutional embodiments. Moreover, the idea of a "primitivized" Christianity is historically unlikely. No religion is likely to gain a consensus in modern societies. Put another way, the theological pretensions and sociological realities of Unificationism are at odds with one another. In bluntest terms, a theocracy in a bureaucracy is impossible!

But why has Unificationism taken a social form that undercuts its theological vision and what problems does this contradiction generate for the movement? Answers to these questions can only be found by comparing Unificationism to other religions in modern society. Empirically considered, religious world views have had historical and social "binding power" only when they were embodied in and mediated through the primary institutions of a society. These institutional forms have, of course, varied from time and place depending on a number of structural and ideological factors (Bellah). In primitive and archaic societies, religion permeates the whole of society. Religious roles and organizations are essentially coterminous with other institutions. But, as the sociological and historical study of religion makes clear, in more advanced societies "sacral" roles and organizations have become increasingly specialized and segmented from "profane" roles and organizations. Of course, for over two thousand years the structural and ideological differentiation of the religious from the non-religious did not weaken religion. Indeed, in Western societies this "separation from the world" gave the great historic religions immense social leverage as well as existential power. But this power, in turn, hinged on two factors: (1) religious institutions enjoyed parity if not priority over their non-religious counterparts and (2) religious representations enjoyed a monopoly over reality definition and personality formation within the society.

Special religious beliefs and organizations shaped and sanctioned the whole of social and personal life so long as they remained the *primary* determinants of society.

But this primacy has been dissolved in modern societies. Religious institutions have lost their political parity and their ideological monopoly (Luckmann). This loss, which began with the break-up of all hierarchical legal and sacramental systems in the Protestant Reformation, is the outcome of certain far-reaching ideological and structural changes in modern societies. Briefly reviewed, the traditional preeminence of religious roles and organizations became increasingly problematic in the modern era as the forces of industrialization and urbanization spawned new tasks and new institutions. As social structures became increasingly specialized, religious institutions became decreasingly authoritative. New political, economic, educational, military and labor organizations appeared, each such specialized group generating its own goals of endeavor and ways of proceeding and each pressing its own autonomous rationale on its own membership. As a consequence, life in the modern world became increasingly organized in segmented ways that neither require nor permit overarching religious institutionalization. Religious representations increasingly have become one among other fragmented ideologies covering limited domains of experience. Religious organizations have become one among many specialized institutions catering to a specialized clientele.

The structural differentiations and ideological autonomy of modern social institutions have conspired to limit religion's sphere to the personal and interpersonal. Modern society's primary institutions (political, economic, educational, military, and labor) care nothing for the *whole* person. They only require individual compliance with their own particular institutional norms. But these segmented "performance demands" leave wide areas of personal thought and life untouched and undetermined. These interstices form a "private realm" of relatively autonomous individuals who are left to their own devices in choosing goods and services, careers and pastimes, friends and mates, even morals and religion. In point of fact, within this private realm individuals are

free to construct their own personal identity so long as that identity does not encroach unduly on the freedom of others or disrupt the performance of public duties. Seen in this light, the widespread toleration and equivocation of modern religion is fully understandable. Since individuals are free to choose their own religion, differing choices between individuals or changing choices by individuals are to be expected and respected. Rather than internalizing any official or permanent religious system, modern individuals build their own private systems of ultimate significance out of the varied biographical and cultural resources that are available.

Thus, religion in the modern era unlike religion in earlier eras receives only marginal support and confirmation from primary public institutions. Modern religion depends on the more ephemeral support of autonomous individuals. In the private sphere, interpersonal sharing and even joint construction of systems of ultimate significance are possible without conflicting with the functionally rational norms of primary institutions. For many, the nuclear family provides a structural basis for the production of these systems of "ultimate" relevance. The upsurge of "partnership marriage" in industrial societies (with its extraordinary expectations of personal fulfillment and its resulting vulnerability to break-up when those expectations are not realized) reveals the importance of marriage in modern society. Indeed, for many the family affords the only possibility for extending the autonomous individual into a social world. Religious support may come from persons and cliques outside the family within the private sphere. If the religious outlooks of individuals coalesce to some degree, the ad hoc groups formed may develop into cults or sects in the sociological sense of these terms. But even such stabilized groups remain "secondary" institutions serving and conserving individual and interpersonal religion.

Seen in the context of our modern day segmented and rationalized society, Unification seems very much a modern religion. Like other modern religions, it trades on the privatization of religion. Its search for inner peace and self-realization bears the stamp of the modern celebration of individual autonomy. Its aggressive evangelism and theological

syncretism mirrors the modern fluidity of personal identity. Its unmarried constituency and nomadic mobility echoes the modern preoccupation with perpetual youth. Its sexual chastity and tribal mentality reflects the modern hallowing of intimate relationships. All of these themes come to focus in Unification *familism*—in the family as religious cult and the religious cult as family. Not surprisingly, Unificationism's greatest appeal is its promise of a new family—a perfect family that will radiate outward from one home to one church to one earth.

Sociologically, this focus on the family is quite consistent with modernity's restriction of the moral and the religious to the private realm of personal existence and family life. But this structural compatibility stands in tension with the ideological incompatibility of Unificationism and modernity. Indeed, Unificationism's *theocratic* ideology of family life creates problems for those within and for those outside the movement. For those inside the movement, the ideal of a perfectly God-centered family where loving mates beget sinless children is a counsel to despair. In a time of inflated expectations of the family, extending these expectations to the perfection of the home and through that to the perfection of the earth is a burden no individual, marriage, or community can bear. Perfectionist movements have always foundered on the stubborn imperfections of their members. For those outside the movement, the fact of a blatantly patriarchal family where father figures rule is a cause for alarm. Unificationism's hierarchical structuring of home and cult stands in sharpest contradiction to modernity's celebration of democracy and autonomy. No doubt, this perceived contradiction lies behind the oft-repeated charges of brainwashing and fears of subversion that surround the movement. In summary, Unification social hermeneutics reveals a deep ambiguity between ideological and structural programs of social action. While that ambiguity is what makes Unificationism such a fascinatingly complex and controversial movement, it also stands in the way of the Unification Church taking its place among other modern religious ideologies and institutions.

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Discussion

David Kelly: I am going to talk about the paper by Lloyd Eby, more specifically Part II, and then the paper by Steve Post. I think that the common element I find here is an attempt to suggest that Western individualism and Eastern or Oriental relationism ought to be seen as counterbalances to each other. There is also the implication that the two traditions can be harmonized. There is a difference between arguing, as Charles Frankel has argued, that these kinds of value concepts or general approaches to life ought to be used as correctives to each other, which I find myself in thorough agreement with, and suggesting that somehow the two approaches can be harmonized in a totally unified 'ism.' Given the notion that these counterbalancing approaches, value systems or structures are mutually corrective, I have to wonder at the claim that various questions which Western metaethics and Western normative ethics have been posing for so many decades are solved when one is able to counterbalance or use these approaches as correctives. By all means, balance and correct. I think that is good. But don't imply then that questions are definitely solved by this process. Do realize that what you end up with is at least to some extent a trade-off, and in my notion of ethics that is not altogether bad. That is not ideal, in the sense of eschatological idealism, but it is not bad.

The other thing that I want to say is that this is part of what I have been calling the slipperiness of Unification language and Unification theology. I have had a lot of discussion about that with individuals and

each time I am told Unification theology is not slippery; it is merely that I don't understand it. I find that as one moves in one direction one reaches a certain point and the response is: well, the answer to your question is over here in this other direction. That may very well be correct, but the notion that total harmony can be developed by two approaches to living which can validly be used as correctives to one another is something that I am not convinced of.

With respect to Lloyd's paper, I want first to do some of the general theory. Lloyd runs very quickly through the metaethical problems of relativism and absolutism and then moves immediately into the whole problem of the naturalist fallacy which he picks up from Hume and G.E. Moore. When I first read it myself, I decided that this was really a very quick kind of transition. But when I looked at it again I decided that what Lloyd is doing is precisely what I would do with the metaethical problem. Lloyd has opted for a kind of empirical absolutism on the metaethical level. That is all very technical stuff. Having arrived at that, he finds himself in the problem of the naturalist fallacy. If you opt for other metaethical solutions like relativism or non-cognitivism, or even if you opt for other absolutist metaethical positions like intuitionism or supernaturalism, you don't have to worry about the empirical. Is that right?

Lloyd Eby: Yes, you have got it right.

David Kelly: Then you don't have to worry about the naturalist fallacy at all. You have made a very quick option for empirical metaethical absolutism which is precisely the same option that I have made in my own work.

Lloyd Eby: I agree.

David Kelly: Once one has refuted relativism, at what level is relationism still to some degree a relativism? There are Karl Mannheim's questions still to face. I am very slow to say that somehow or other the relativist question has been answered in this process nor has the G.E. Moore question as such been answered. You still have to find out which basic question you are working from.

Steve's paper makes the argument that I try to make in my

paper—namely that Unification does have some kind of social ethic—quite impossible. If he is right, my attempt at a defense of Unificationism as having a social ethic can no longer be sustained. Steve tends to suggest that the most radical transformation of Western society is on the level of family life and that existing political structures are largely unchanged. Maybe that can be interpreted in a sense that still allows for a structural critique. There is a sense in this paper that political and economic structures are not really important, that somehow or other by having perfect families with blessed children the structures of our society will take care of themselves. If that is true, then my attempt at a defense on this issue doesn't work.

Of course if everyone did love God, we wouldn't be sitting around here worrying about the problem that they don't or that we don't. (laughter) And that is precisely the point. I have jotted down a number of bald statements. I'll just quickly read them because they are addressed to both Lloyd and Steve. Certainly those of you who know me will detect a now familiar skeptical, sociological, and perhaps perverse slant to my comments. (laughter) I think there are some powerful images at work in both of these papers and some distinctive emphases. To Lloyd's and Steve's credit they stress, celebrate and worry about those images and those ideas. I like that.

A second comment: the times select the religion that survives and thrives. This is one of the bottom lines of the paper that I wrote. To me, one of the remarkable ironies of history (a "Moonie" would say, one of the miraculous providences of God) is that a religion born in an Eastern traditional society is so right for today. The image of the family and the idea of the perfect family as the beginning and end of religion, it seems to me, is a perfect match for the possibilities of religiosity within the modern world.

A third comment which touches on the family. Loving parents and siblings involve, as the saying goes, some good news and some bad news. There are some trade-offs when this metaphor is chosen and when this metaphor is projected on the cosmos. I think the fundamental trade-off in its barest terms is the security of having parents for the

bondage of remaining children. I know that is an oversimplification, but it seems to be a problem for Unificationism that stubbornly remains no matter how we hedge it around.

Social contract theory or mythology is not nearly as individualistic as Eby and perhaps by extension Post, implies. The social contract is a myth that becomes necessary for founding the polis when other mythologies—household gods, tribal deities, or monotheistic lords—fail. I think we have to see social contract mythology as an effort to found the polis. To attribute individualism in a crass and unqualified way to social contract theory is to misunderstand the profound social impulse in that mythology. Surely, latent individualism is an enemy of social contract theory, as both Eby and Post point out, and this is why the family becomes the powerful and primary locus of identity and meaning within the rationalized and bureaucratized structures of modern society.

Western paradigms do not deny that human beings and societies exist in hierarchies. Rather they insist that these hierarchies are man-made and hence open to human change and subject to human control. The hierarchies are not natural; they are human and hence “accidental” in a sense.

Post’s analysis draws on the contrast between classical consensual societies and contemporary adversarial societies. That is the crucial nub of the issue in all of the papers on the topic today. The question is simply whether inspirations, images and models drawn from simpler, less complex consensual communities (whether those be families, tribes or civilizations) are really applicable in modern urbanized industrial societies whose bureaucracies, like Hobbe’s natural man, are each laws unto themselves. The notion of a series of checks and balances maintained by contract, though understood in an adversarial way, may be the only glue that holds situations together, and may be the only basis for society. I am astonished by Steve’s comment that the individual good and the common good do not conflict.

Stephen Post: That is a very naive comment but I am saying that it is the ideal.

Lonnie Kliever: Oh, indeed, and I understand that this is an ideal. The problem in my paper that I was trying to flag is how the ideal is reached—ideologically or structurally or institutionally? What I see in Unificationism is an ideology that envisions an ideal without a structure to achieve that ideal.

I am not sure how Steve is using the word *theocracy*. It seems to me that it is too narrow a definition of theocracy. There are other models. A God-centered democracy sounds like a version of theocracy to me even though it may not be sociologically possible. A very interesting point that Steve raised was to point out the inherent limitations in Troeltsch's typology. It is a limitation carried over in Niebuhr's reworking of that typology in *Christ and Culture*. There is certainly a remarkable post-Niebuhrian literature on the church-sect typology. I think of Bryan Wilson's work, for example, where he analyzes eight types of sects, and within that scheme there is certainly room for politically concerned and politically aspiring sectarian movements. But those sectarian movements can only change society by exemplary and strategic withdrawal.

Finally a comment which is an indirect response to one of Steve's question's to me. The model of the family as the model for society is certainly the reading of *Divine Principle* which I have assumed in my own exposition. The form of government envisioned as the ideal family is a consensual democracy where a perfect harmony between individual good and common good prevails. My problem with that ideal is that the means of achieving consensual democracy institutionally and structurally is simply not there. Appealing to the family as the means by which we will all love God and love one another and hence share common goals and common concerns seems to me to be sociologically naive. Now I remember from my childhood a timely phrase--man's extremity is God's opportunity. For such a theology, the sociological impossibility of perfect families being the means by which consensual democracy is established poses no problem. But for a person like myself, the problem does not go away by the confession of that kind of faith. But that would not surprise you at all. Your underlining of the ideal family as the model of the democratic society is a terribly helpful and important point in

your paper and it is consistent with how I have read the Principle. If I have implied that I saw the sinful family as the model for society in the paper, then that is my fault for not communicating that point clearly.

Lloyd Eby: Let me say a little about the process of genesis of the paper that I brought to this session. Part I was written first. Then as I thought some more, I realized that to take the family model in a simple way won't do. So I began to think about it some more and on that basis then I wrote Part II.

On David Kelly's paper, let me say at the outset that I agree with a lot in this paper. My comments on it are small, nitpicking ones. There is a lot here that I agree with. Unificationism's tendency to identify all too quickly the heavenly side and the satanic side is a problem, but I don't think Unificationism is quite as naive as this suggests. In my paper I try to suggest some of the subtlety in Unificationism. Human history does not admit of an easy separation of absolute good and absolute evil. We never claim that it does. We don't claim there is any such thing as absolute good and absolute evil in human history.

On the question of the oppression of women, I claim that this simply is not there and is a misreading of Unificationism. There is no theoretical basis for the accusation. There may be a basis in terms of practice but there is no theoretical basis in Unificationism for the repression of women. Subject/object language in Unificationism is not a basis for repression of one by the other, because the claim is that in a give-and-take relationship, even though one is subject and one is object, that those are necessary correlates of one another. One doesn't have the relationship without the two parts and the two parts are absolutely essential for the relationship. They are of equal value and of equal necessity.

I object to the phrase "thoroughly gnostic." It seems to me that Klaus was arguing yesterday that Unification historical typology is not gnostic but realistic in some fashion. Now whether Klaus' arguments succeed or not is another thing. But just to say straight out that it is gnostic is a false understanding.

As to Lonnie's paper, last night Lonnie and I agreed that I was

going to be Lonnie's spiritual father, so I don't know whether to spank him (laughter) or take him by the hand and try to get this little boy to get his lesson right one more time. (laughter) There are just so many things in here that . . . why can't you get this right, Lonnie? (laughter)

Darrol Bryant: You just lost your role as spiritual father! (laughter)

Lonnie Kliever: We are going to have an Oedipus scene right here! (laughter)

Lloyd Eby: The basic misunderstanding that occurs in this paper is precisely the point that I was mentioning in terms of the problem of whether or not Unificationism has a theoretical foundation for the repression of mistreatment of women. Lonnie fails to recognize and take seriously the fact that Unificationism has within its metaphysic a series of bipolar give-and-take relationships which occur between the individual and the group, between private and public, between the particular and the general and so on. Neither of those two poles can be denied or neither can be subsumed into the other.

Lonnie is accurate, I think, in his analysis of religious institutions as they do in fact exist in modern Western society. Steve says the same thing. But I think this doesn't fit Unificationism because it does not see itself as fitting that type. I think that Unificationism does care for the whole person. One of the reasons that Unificationism comes in for so much criticism at the popular level is that it does in fact do that. At the popular level there is this feeling that religion somehow ought not to have anything to do with the personal role and the personal life of its adherents. Unificationism claims that it ought to perform that role and therefore we get the problem.

One other thing that I object to is the term *theocratic*. I think that what Unificationism is is not theocratic but *theocentric*. That makes a difference, so the answer to the question that Lonnie raises in his title is: neither of those.

Frank Flinn: I want to raise two topics. One has to do with Weber's notions of bureaucracy. The second one has to do with the notion of family in Unification.

Pertaining to the first one, my question is shaped by George

Grant's recent book *English-speaking Justice* which is a critique of contractual liberalism. The Weberian notion of bureaucracy is not tenable. As a Roman Catholic living with the Roman Catholic tradition I do not look upon my church as a bureaucracy. The typology that comes out of the Troeltschian and Weberian mode of analysis is saying: the gospel is kerygma, the church is bureaucracy. I claim that that is a labelling, a value judgment which is not a factual description in any sense of the term. The notion of bureaucracy that we tend to sling around—is that an adequate concept? We Roman Catholics see the church as a house for the tradition—a creative thing, not necessarily a limiting thing. I am not saying there are no problems in Roman Catholicism; I am simply saying that I am questioning the notion of bureaucracy fundamentally as a value judgment laid on institutions that is not necessarily descriptive of the real phenomenon.

Second, Unificationists are becoming very aware that the family is a carrier of structures of domination. There is a realization within Unification that the ideal family is not there yet. The notion of the ideal family in Unification is not a description of what is there but a critique of what we are all facing, including those within Unification. We need to get more sophisticated about that notion. I would suggest that Lonnie take consideration of that.

Andrew Wilson: Frank, thank you for your remark about the family.

Both Stanley Johannesen and David Kelly have made snide remarks about our use of numbers as arcane or obscure. I think our use of numbers is not at all arcane. It is derived from the Bible but also from philosophy. The view that nature has a mathematical basis extends from Pythagoras and Plato all the way through modern science. We are asserting that since the God of nature is also the God of history, logically history should show mathematical regularity and structure just as does nature. Scholars ought to take the mathematics of Divine Principle more seriously and try to understand what it means instead of dismissing it with terms such as arcane.

As to the alleged “slipperiness” of Unification theology I would reply that we do not have a propositional view of truth. We do not

believe that theology ought to lay down a dogmatic system to which we must conform our lives or our social institutions. Rather Unification theology speaks of subject-object interaction. The subject and the object each have a form and individuality which can be described, but their interaction leads to a growing, developing newness which is more than the sum of its parts. This is why the Unification view of society and the Unification view of the future are open-ended. When we Unificationists envision the uniting of East and West we do not describe exactly the nature of that unity, but rather we enter into their living encounter, into a process of give and take. Then it is up to us to practically work out in the world exactly what that new society will be. This so-called slipperiness is essential for a praxis that allows full expression of human creativity.

Neil Duddy: Just two questions of clarification. We hear a lot about the term yin/yang, the kind of a taoist symbol of give-and-take and position of mutual relationship. My understanding of those symbols and how they work out in the Orient is that the ultimate intention is to eliminate the distinction that creates individuality, that it is a statement that all is one. I hear that a lot, but I don't get the feeling that the Principle is speaking about erasure of values and value judgments as to whether things are helpful or unhelpful or translated into a wheel or karma or anything along that line. When you make a statement such as "sets up a real union between people in which spiritual characteristics are interchanged, thus each individual is changed by it," that conjures up for me a notion of tantric yoga. People like Rash Nish. who is a really powerful guru in India who uses sexual union as a spiritual technique to erase the polarities between male and female. Differences of personalities are erased through a sexual technique that is considered to be a spiritual technology and I am really interested to see how you would distinguish yourself from that type of tantric use of sexuality and still have identity. What is the spiritual exchange that is taking place there?

Durwood Foster: Concerning Andrew's response to David Kelly, it seems to me that David is calling in his last paragraph for exactly the same thing Andrew recommends. We should seek to understand more precisely, deeply, and adequately the arcane conceptuality that is involved

in that part of *Divine Principle*. Perhaps there is more agreement between you and David than might appear from your comment, Andrew.

Also, a passing word on Reinhold Niebuhr and Niebuhrianism—Reinhold and Richard together but Reinhold particularly, because he was my teacher. It saddens me greatly whenever his name becomes a symbol for the baptism of the status quo or the simple acceptance of the givenness of society. For one thing, one has to take into account the developmental dimension in both the Niebuhrs. Earlier on they had a more conspicuously prophetic impact upon society. Later this becomes more ambiguous, but the situation is rather complex. It is bound up with the destiny of theology in America over the last generation. I would say in general that Reinhold and Richard both exemplify the Protestant principle, if I can use that phrase, as a principle of transcendent criticism which stands over both the social status quo and also over the pretensions and illusions of utopian groups which would prematurely transform the status quo according to their own preconceived images of the ideal society, overlooking death and human sinfulness. Now the pathos of the Protestant principle is that in adopting its critical stance toward utopian groups one tends inevitably to support by inaction the prevailing concordat between the different elements of society. This is an unresolved problem in the Niebuhrs. But it still is very wrong and very sad to identify them with simply the acceptance of society as it is.

The main thing that I want to say has to do with the discussion about the conflict between freedom and order or the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy if I may use the Tillichian terms. I think Tillich in the social dimensions of his thought was profoundly concerned with the same issues. The image that Tillich used to express the social ideal was *theonomy*. I haven't heard that used yet but to me it is a better word than *theocracy*. It has deep affinities with some of the other phrases that we have been using, like consensual democracy as over against adversarial democracy and so on. One of the deepest unresolved questions of modern life and maybe of all human life is whether the theonomous

ideal is really possible and particularly whether it is possible within history. The later Tillich and the later Niebuhr gravely doubted that the theonomous ideal was possible within history. This is the equivalent of their critique of utopianism. It bears profoundly upon the issue to what extent a resolution of the conflict between liberty and order or between individual freedom and the common good of social unity is possible. Many instances of analysis come to mind that suggest that a resolution isn't possible. Freud for example is a salient example of someone who sees the malaise of civilization in terms of the conflict between the id and the superego as an inevitable and irresolvable conflict.

But Tillich saw in Jesus a symbol of the ideal resolution of the conflict whereby the individual will would gratify the universal will. This is the sense in which for Tillich the picture of Jesus as the Christ is the theonomous norm. Now one of the matrices of the Unification movement challenges precisely this point. Jesus is an individual. The question of what kind of social ethic evolves or is inferable from Jesus has been an unresolved problem throughout Christian history. The Unification Church makes a point of this and suggests we must add to the individual theonomy of Jesus the second two blessings. Beyond Jesus' individual perfection, we must solve the social problem and the ecological problem. We haven't talked much about the ecological problem so I'll leave that out for the moment. The social problem in Unificationism is to be solved through the family. Let me say that in general terms there is nothing new about that. There come to mind the proposals of Protestant liberalism on which I cut my theological teeth, for example, Harnack's brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God. The central Christian mandate is what we are striving for in the human family. In terms of the exchange that went on between Lonnie and Steve, the concept of family is ambiguous in the role it plays in the discussion. On the one hand it has a literal signification; on the other hand, obviously it has a symbolic function. Insofar as we are talking about the literal family, I would argue that this does not really advance us far beyond the problem that inheres in the older kind of Christian individualism. Indeed the sorts of psychic and social resentment and competitiveness that are generated

between the nuclear families that make up religious groups are even more problematic and vicious than the problems that exist between individuals. This has been historically the experience in religion. But "family" in Unification theology tends to function at the same time symbolically in the social organization of the Unification movement. We don't have simply the nuclear family as the main thing that hits one in the eye, but we have a communal organization which is much wider. Just one final point going back to Tillich's notion of theonomy. In regard to some of the discussion yesterday I recall how Tillich thought that in developing an adequate idea of theonomy there is a problem in the overemphasis in some strains of the Christian tradition upon the personal God. He held there must be some way of alleviating the inherent problematic of the overagainstness and hierarchicalness of the personal God as this was discerned by Freud and others. I am trying to say too much here too quickly. I just want to suggest that it was precisely because of this that Tillich attempted to offer symbols such as "ground of being" that alleviate and qualify or dialectically balance the symbol of the personal God. Tillich never made peace entirely with this problem. He says in his *Systematic Theology* that the symbol of the personal God is absolutely indispensable and yet at the same time there is a great deal of struggle in Tillich to overcome that symbol dialectically or at least in some way balance it. I would suggest again that this is part of the problem that is left to us as our theological task.

Lonnie Kliever: Point one is simply to say a good word for the word "bureaucracy." Some are horrified that we would use that word to talk about holy institutions, Catholic or Unificationist, and I have heard two disavowals that the church is bureaucratic. Such disavowals assume a moral negativism surrounding that word *bureaucracy*. I use it in the more descriptive sense of simply denoting the specialization of tasks and the rationalization of ends in modern social structures. That is precisely what Max Weber meant by bureaucracy and it seems to me that the Unification Church is thus bureaucratic in this sense. Mr. Kim and I enjoyed breakfast together and one of the interesting things that I learned from him is something about the way in which Rev. Moon

assigns special tasks and lets people fulfill those tasks. It is one of the geniuses of bureaucracy to fashion institutions and structures that perform specialized tasks and serve specific ends.

A second comment: I certainly want to disabuse myself of being a crypto-Niebuhrian, whether Reinhold or H. Richard. I have studied with one and have written about another and I certainly am heavily indebted and informed by their own critique but I have not in the paper been arguing a Niebuhrian position. Indeed, I have not intentionally argued any position but simply sociologically described the religious scene as that scene comes to expression in the images and the institutions of the Unification Church.

A third point and this is in a sense a moot point but it is worth pointing out. Steve comments that my paper is not radical enough, that what we need is a pre-Constantinian, counter-culture sectarian ethic. An implication of my paper is that sectarian ethics is not as radical as it seems. My point can best be made by suggesting that you read Thomas Luckmann's *"The Invisible Religion"* and Carl Braaten's *"Christ and Counterculture"* side by side and ask yourself if countercultural ethics is not the only appropriate ethics for modernity where the moral and the religious has increasingly been confined to what Luckmann calls the "private sector."

A fourth point that strikes me is that the whole image of counterculture which Steve touches on is a double-edged one. I am intrigued with what will happen to the Unification Church as the home church movement becomes more aggressive and more successful, when more and more people within the church will not submit their lives and their energies to the fulltime service of the church. What happens when Unificationist faith comes in conflict with the performance roles imposed by society's primary institutions. One of the clear things that comes across about the Unification Church, at least in America is its ghettoization and that ghettoization is through and through—it is familial and vocational as well as religious. That is its power and that is its attractiveness. But I am wondering as a very interested observer what will happen if the home church movement is successful. Here H.

Richard Niebuhr's works on *Social Sources of Denominationalism* is instructive. What happens when a sect becomes a denomination? I think Niebuhr's contribution is dated but the "church-sect" question is still important in the context of the American cultural and religious scene.

David Kelly: The thing that comes to mind as context for the first two comments is a comment that was made by one of the commissioners during the Watergate hearings. He suggested that if an animal comes into the room, and if it walks like an elephant, it may be but probably is not a mouse with a glandular condition. (laughter) That is very facile and very simplistic. I don't mean it as a putdown at all but both the distinction between heavenly side and satanic side and the language that can lead to sexism are present in *Divine Principle*. Now it is correct that many of the papers that have been written here definitely work against those kinds of negative ideas. But there still is within the ontology of *Divine Principle* a sense of identification of good and evil in present culture in ways that I find at least potentially dangerous, and there is within Unification thought (not the book *Unification Thought* particularly but also there) and within *Divine Principle* some language that certainly looks to me to have sexist implications. Specifically *Divine Principle*, pages 48 and 49: God gives love as subject, man returns beauty as object; and between men and women, man is the subject giving love and woman is the object returning beauty. Now when I read that I see, at least within my language tradition, God as somehow more than human beings. Therefore when the parallel is made, I see man as subject being more than woman as object. Now that certainly can be developed as Lloyd did here and at breakfast. Finally when we get to "thoroughly gnostic and arcane," if that turns out to be the major issue of contention, I am willing to retire "thoroughly gnostic," but you will have to grant me some kind of word that means arcane. As Durwood also pointed out, this is an important mosaic within the way in which *Divine Principle*, if indeed it has anything to say at all, says it.

Lloyd Eby: First of all I want to come back to something that Frank Flinn said earlier. This applies also to something that I noticed in Lonnie's paper. Unificationism doesn't stop at the family. Even the

Divine Principle text as I remember talks about further levels of social interaction, what it would call society or tribe, nation, and finally world. Those aren't incidental; those are necessary for the developments of the underlying stuff, and I think that is important. In other words, there is an implication there that the simple understanding of the family isn't sufficient.

To Neil's comment—most of what you said I agree with, all the premises I agree with—then you ask the question about the possible tantric use of sex.

Neil Duddy: Lloyd, I was just drawing the parallel and asking you to differentiate.

Lloyd Eby: Right, all the premises up to the question. Then you ask, what is the distinction between that and the Unification view? I think the difference is in the Unification claim that a give-and-take relationship does not subsume the poles that make up that relationship. The relationship is a relationship between the poles and it requires both poles; it doesn't subsume them. Therefore you do not have a loss of individuation nor a loss of differentiation in the Unification view whether it is sexually or whatever, so it seems to me that that point is different.

Neil Duddy: Let me just take that one step further, because scripture says that you become one flesh, and as I read your statement about the interchange of spirituality I got a sense of spiritual exchange taking place. I was asking for some notion of what that implies.

Lloyd Eby: I think it implies that, for example, if you and I have a conversation that is in any sense a conversation that isn't trivial, we interchange things. I take, I learn something from you, you learn something from me and we build on this. There is an interchange going on, but that does not deny either my or your individuality. And it seems to me that is precisely the same model.

Neil Duddy: But conversation is a spiritual exchange.

Lloyd Eby: Right. It is a conversational model.

Now to some things that Durwood Foster said concerning the conflict between freedom and order, autonomy and heteronomy. That is

an important point; I think that conflict, that tension, is built into Unificationism and I think that the tension is a healthy one. I think that tension ought to be there. If we use the Tillichian language and talk about theonomy, fine. You raised the question whether it is possible within history, and then Lonnie whispered in my ear and said that the further question is, is it necessary? I think Unificationism would want to say "yes" to both those questions: Yes, it is necessary and yes, it is possible, and it would see the possibility in quite a similar way. I don't know Tillich well, but if I understand your reading of Tillich accurately I take it to be that Tillich is saying that somehow this begins to occur in Jesus of Nazareth and his work. I would say, Yes, that is precisely what Unificationism is claiming. In the work of Jesus of Nazareth and the work of the Lord of the Second Advent (and the Lord of the Second Advent, incidentally is necessarily and not incidentally a couple, not an individual, a couple) that is the way both the necessity and the possibility get worked out in Unificationism.

Durwood Foster: Lloyd, it would be very interesting if you would tell us where that teaching of the Lord of the Second Advent as a couple is grounded. Would you agree that it is not in *Divine Principle*?

Lloyd Eby: I don't know. I would have to look at the book again; I haven't looked at it for a while. If it is not in the book, it ought to be there. It is based on the Adam and Eve typology. It wasn't just Eve who fell or Adam, but it was Adam and Eve together who fell. The human race, the human family, or whatever you want to call it, comes not just from Eve or from Adam, but it comes from a combination of the two, therefore the salvific work has to also come from a pair, and therefore the Lord of the Second Advent comes to complete what Jesus was prevented from completing, namely the salvific work of the family. It seems to me that that is the very basis of Unification theory.

Klaus Lindner: It is also based on the Bible that the Lord comes as a bridegroom, that kind of imagery.

Lloyd Eby: Now to something that Steve Post said that I am very unhappy with and that is his defense of Rawls. I want to completely disassociate myself from Rawls because I think that one doesn't get

anything that can get you anywhere in Rawls.

I will admit that there is some place in Unificationism for some understanding of contract and the importance of contract theory. I tried to suggest that, although not very well, in my paper, when I suggest that the relationship between nation states, for example, is the relationship between mature individuals. That is a kind of contractual relationship. I fully anticipate that in a restored world I would go to the grocer and pay him money for my groceries. That too is a contract. And I don't have to worry about his family and his children and all those things at the time that I am buying my groceries.

Now to Lonnie's point about bureaucracy. I think he is right and I accept that bureaucracy is descriptive and it is not necessarily bad, but it is a specification of tasks and rationalization of ends.

On the question, what happens when a sect becomes a denomination, it seems to me that that is assuming too quickly that the same pattern one has seen as a historical development applies to Unificationism. It seems to me that one can't make that assumption; it may indeed be true but one can't just assume that it is true.

James Deotis Roberts: My first point has to do with the issue that has been raised about what I consider to be a conflict in metaphysics, and we need to sort this out. For example, it seems to me that much of *Divine Principle* reflects a Taoist metaphysics in which there is no absolute substantial difference between things but an interaction within one continuum. That is to say, a chain of relationships within one continuum rather than changes from one substance to another substance.

There seems to me to be a conflict between Western metaphysics and some of the original things which may have come out of the Chinese philosophical tradition where there is an assertion that reality is one thing and there is change within one continuum between relations of positive and negative and so forth. We refer here to the yin-yang interaction. The concept of substance which seems to be mixed with that is one that comes out of the Greek tradition and developed in the Western philosophy of science. This view has been criticized somewhat by process thought which might be very useful in recovering some of

the original flavor and overcoming some of the problems which exist when two things are in conflict. This would enable Westerners to understand something of what is being said. Conversely those who know the Eastern tradition may understand what was originally intended.

Another thing, it seems to me, which needs sorting out is the understanding of sin in relationship to sexuality. That is to say, Western theology got boxed into the Augustinian tradition of sin as sexuality. Some of that was overcome when Reinhold Niebuhr talked about sin as pride. And one of the statements of Reinhold Niebuhr deals with the pride of this nation, the pride of wealth, the pride of power, and the pride of race. That was a very prophetic and concise statement, which needs to be brought into this discussion. The subject of family deserves attention also. In my own tradition we have been working very intensely on the family for the last ten to fifteen years since Moynihan wrote his report on the Black family and concluded that the Black family was pathological. He failed to understand that the Black family is pathological primarily because it exists in a pathological society. This view of Moynihan triggered a controversy that was taken up by a number of Black scholars in theology and sociology. Recently I have researched and will publish on the Black family. As you know there is a lot of interest in the family, but on that score the real issue is which is prior in terms of the problem we want to solve, whether we can simply solve the larger problem, the structural problems in the economy and so forth through the family, or whether we have to work at those structural changes and humanize those structures in order to make the health of the family possible.

The real test of democracy in the urban centers of this country as well as in South Africa rides upon the extent we can make life human for racial groups that are outside the mainstream. For ethnic groups that are not really integrated into the mainstream, you cannot separate the problems within the family from larger social ills. As church leaders concerned about strong healthy families we see this matter as crucial for the survival of people. We cannot see that, however. Just in terms of counseling families, we have to work with the structures of society such

as the unemployment of Black males for example, or the high suicide rate of young Black males between eighteen and thirty-five. There are many young men on drugs or in prison. We have to deal with the criminal system, we have to deal with the administration of justice. The actual number of Black women who are of marriageable age is many times greater than that of Black men. There is a whole cluster of problems that are structural that we have to deal with at the same time that we deal with the family and the church ministering to these families. Otherwise we cannot contribute very much to the solution of these problems.

I am not enchanted with democracy. We have been victims of it for hundreds of years and so have many Third World peoples. Democracy is on trial. The free enterprise system is on trial in the inner cities of this country as well as in say South Africa, in the neo-colonial situation, right here on this island. In talking to the natives I found out that they have the political power but Americans and British people have the economic power, so these are the kinds of problems that have to be dealt with before we can talk about the kingdom of God, the kingdom of heaven on earth.

Lloyd Eby: I want to respond to that. I completely agree with you. I think that is exactly right, and it seems to me that you are implying by your point that Unificationism has not yet dealt with these problems in an adequate way and I think that is quite right. One of the things I want to do is turn the point back to you, and then I would suggest that if you can tell me or us how to deal with those problems in a way that we don't know, then please do that. It seems to me that nobody has quite figured out how to do that yet, and to suggest somehow that there is a failing in Unificationism because we haven't figured out how to do that is true, but nobody else has either, or at least in any very good way.

Frederick Sontag: I just have two questions, one for Lloyd and one for Steve. For Lloyd, I want to see if I understand him correctly. For Steve, I want to see if I can understand him at all. He is too metaphysical for me. People who claim they are not metaphysical actually have a very elaborate metaphysics.

Lloyd, you say in Western democratic contract theory the underlying

ontology is individualistic. Now if I understand you, are you really trying to claim that the entire Western tradition is like that?

Lloyd Eby: No, I am not. What I have done is paint with a very broad brush for heuristic purposes. I agree that within both those paradigms one can find all kinds of differences.

Frederick Sontag: Well, that seems to me to destroy the whole thing.

Lloyd Eby: No, I don't think so, because what it allows us to do is to think systematically and see where we are going.

Frederick Sontag: But then don't make the contrast between Western and Eastern and say Unification claims that these are inherently related to God, and to other people. Somehow this is unfair. Take Spinoza, take Hegel, take British idealism. You say in Western thought, man is primarily an individual, and society is an artificial identity. This just doesn't seem to do much justice to a long Western tradition. In addition, you say that the Western paradigm has negative economic implications. If each person is an isolated individual, then each person will want only what he wants. Well, Marxism comes out of Western thought, and this is primarily community oriented. Its statement comes out of Hegel. Everybody isn't an economic individual in Western thought. That is only one side of Western thought. So the argument, you admit, is an oversimplification, but then I don't get the point. I guess Unification thought is picking up aspects of Western thought but somehow not contrasting itself to all Western thought. Could that be?

Lloyd Eby: That is fair. I also made a deliberate oversimplification. But I did it because it seemed to me that that was a useful procedural method.

Frederick Sontag: Steve, I can't get a hold of what you are trying to say and I have tried, I think. You say, "This means the most radical transformation will be on the level of family life and the existing political structures will be largely unchanged." I don't get that. I simply don't see how family life could change radically and existing political structures could just go on. In the first place, I don't see it as a

goal of *Divine Principle*. It seems to me that existing political structures must be changed in some way. And you do have a slight romanticization of democracy, as both you and Deotis were agreeing. And I don't think that it does function perfectly. It is understandable that the romanticization of democracy came out of American colonial notions, and that in Korea at the time of the origins of the Unification Church there was a great drama about American democracy and its goals. There are certain beautiful qualities to it, but we are in the midst of reappraising some of the negative sides. The Unification sectarian status can begin to shift from a ghettoized minority to a spiritual and political reform movement which can ultimately reshape the world in the form of the Unification Church. Well, it is going to be a reform movement and it is either going to reform the whole world including political structures or it is not.

Stephen Post: I quite agree that in the history of Western thought there is a precedent for Unificationism, and I think it is erroneous to imply that we have to go the Eastern instead.

Jonathan Wells: It seems to me that there has been something lacking in the discussion this morning, except maybe for Deotis' remark. What has been lacking is any mention of the context in which the discussion is taking place. The Unification proposal is not being made in a neutral environment, but in a world facing a disaster situation. Not only are we in trouble internationally, but also domestically, sociologically, familially, and psychiatrically; and it seems to me that we can't ignore this when we analyze the problems and ambiguities of the Unification proposal.

Modernity's "celebration of democracy and autonomy" is more than offset by alienation, a sky-rocketing crime rate, and widespread family breakdown. It seems to me that we have got to *do something*, and that something has got to be radical. To consider Unificationism in isolation apart from the need for this radical change seems to me to be overlooking something essential.

Anthony Guerra: A paramount religious question is indeed whether radical change within the historical order is possible. Now I think that Unificationism clearly answers this question in the affirmative. It

should be noted, however, that St. Augustine and many of the Christian traditions, enunciated a negative response to the same question. These latter are exempted therefore from a task which the Unificationist must deliberate upon—namely, a praxis for the transformation of the social order in accord with its understanding of God's will. The Unification written sources provide no detailed blueprint for the reformation of society but scrutiny of the multi-faceted Unification movement is highly instructive and may afford more insight as to its proposed praxis for the rebirth of civilization. I have coined the term a "cooperative-alternative culture" to describe the social entity of the Unification movement. The term "counterculture" is inappropriate and violates the Unificationists' self-understanding of their community. Unificationism is forming an alternative society which seeks to cooperate with the established social order in order to promote a gradual transformation of the entire society. Unificationists believe that the process of cooperative interaction between itself as an alternative social model and the wider society is essential for the realization of its ideals.

Lonnie Kliever: First of all, speaking for myself and my perception of the papers, I am not aware of any of the four of us closing our eyes to the problems of the world that surround us and the tumult that troubles us within our own breasts. If I thought for a moment that we were ignorant of that and that we had been deceived by the palms waving outside the window into believing that we were in some sort of Edenic paradise, then I think we would deserve your sermonic gesture, Jonathan. But I don't think that we have forgotten that context and I think that the affirmations and the criticisms that have been raised on both sides of the table are made with that unwholesome and unhealthy world before our eyes.

A second comment, and that is to say something that I did not say in the paper. I do affirm the importance of sectarian communities and countercultural moralities. It seems to me that if renewal is to come in society it is to be gained only in this way. The evaluation that I made simply marked the troublesome disparity between Unificationist ideology and the institutionalization of that ideology. I have heard nothing really

to suggest that this disparity is far from the views expressed on both ends of this table and I am wondering how that disparity is to be bridged.


A third comment: I do believe that Durwood's earlier notion about the two ranges of the metaphor of family is important to keep in mind. I at least suggested that in my paper by speaking of the family as religious cult and the religious cult as family. And it is certainly the case that the paradigmatic community that I see in the Unification Church is not limited to the nuclear family; it is the church as family. That paradigmatic family includes reaching out into business and into politics and I think that is one of the interesting and important contributions that this church will make.

Finally a fourth comment: I was reminded in listening to this conversation of Harvey Cox's call in *The Feast of Fools* for a "metainstitution" —an institution which denies its own self for the sake of the institutions of society. I have some trouble finding that in *Divine Principle*, but I do not have trouble finding it in conferences like this one or the International Conference on the Unity of the Sciences. One of the remarkable things about the Unification Church, and this is something that Mr. Kim and I were talking about at breakfast, is the way in which this church has taken the lead in bringing together parties, persons, and perspectives without requiring any signatures on the bottom line that you are going away with a different faith or a different morality or a different perspective than what you brought. I see in the practical work of the church in these sorts of ventures the first glimmering of what Cox talked about as a "metainstitution" that seeks to renew other institutions. That sense of mission I applaud and I celebrate.

Darrol Bryant: I want to say for purposes of the record and since Mr. Kim is here that it seems there is a certain problem that we are beginning to run up against in these conferences and that is that we are running up against the limits of *Divine Principle* as presently stated and constituted and that has been said before. The text is not yet a finished text and the discourse on the Principle is to continue and, as we have it in its present form, it does not yet move from the first blessing stage

into the second and third blessing stages, and I feel often that our conversations find us constantly coming up against its edges and saying there are clearly other things that are needed.

Hermeneutics of the Future



The Future God

Dagfinn Aslid

We do not drift through history with our backs to the future and our gaze returning ever and again to the origin, but we stride confidently towards the promised future. It is not the primeval ancients who are near the truth and dwell nearer the gods, but it is to future generations that the promises are given in order that they may see the fulfillment.¹

This quote from Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* is a good illustration of the Unification attitude towards the future; one might say that the future, rather than being an object of speculation and foretelling, is "that toward which we confidently stride." But neither can it be said that the past is totally ignored, for without it we should be unable to act as hosts for the future and such is our eschatological task.

The following account of the Unification reading of the future falls in three main parts. The first concerns the more general issue of futurology, emphasizing the problems of epistemology and verification criteria. The second focuses more on the eschatological vision and the hermeneutics of hope, whereas the third deals with the nature of the kingdom of God in terms of its projected modes of knowing.

Unification Futurology as Eschatology

Should we have only futurum and seek a transformed humanity in the basis of only present realities, then our hope would risk dissolving into despair. But Christian eschatology offers something more than what secular or humanistic futurology is able to do alone: namely the gospel, the good news that we are not left alone in our failings but that we can rely upon divine power to finally bring world history to its consummate fulfillment.²

The gist of Peters' argument for the relevance of theology for future consciousness is that the future, because it is open-ended, cannot be extrapolated from the present or from history. It is here that the theologian can point out "a certain ontological basis"³ for our living and deciding in behalf of the future. But even here we do not escape the problem of freedom and determinism that haunts any attempt to speak of the future.

Unification theology has been criticized for making God subservient to the Principle,⁴ and questions have been raised whether the "God of the Principle can survive the refining fire which the God-beyond-the-Principle seems to send to test every new incarnation."⁵ This is not the place to make a detailed response to Sontag's incisive critique of the Unification view of God, however, the following remarks may be helpful in clarifying some of the issues at stake.

What distinguishes Christian eschatology from secular futurology is that it does not proceed from the present to the future, but "begins with what has been prophesied about God's final future and then approaches the present."⁶ Similarly, it is true that Unification eschatology is indissolubly joined to the doctrine of creation, thus seeing the consummation of human history in terms of the fulfillment of God's purpose of creation. It must furthermore be granted that God is portrayed as never violating the integrity of the Principle which is equally indispensable for the realization of God's purpose. However, the Principle cannot be taken to mean a "new Legalism," or a "rigid code of behavior" to which both God and humans are bound.⁷ Neither is it true that the Principle, in its present literary expression, is a closed canon in the sense of being "fully revealed,"⁸ or that it may be conceived as a script or an agenda that God is bound to follow.⁹ I would suggest that it might be helpful here to distinguish between God's original image, heart, and purpose, which are conceived of as eternal, unchanging, and absolute, and the realization of these in human history, which are subject to contingency and relativity. In the latter, God is indeed seen to always keep an "escape clause" (and wisely so). Consequently, we can find trust and confidence in God's unswerving commitment to fulfill

the providence of restoration, while our "attitude in the last days"¹⁰ must remain open to God's ever changing ways of working. Those who are "tenaciously attached to the environment of the old age and comfortably entrenched in it will be judged along with the old age."¹¹ Sontag's critique is well taken in that the Unification people do need to be careful not to exempt themselves from the open attitude so warmly recommended to "others," absolutizing a provisional understanding of God's ways. In other words, if the heuristic tools for understanding providence— analogies, typologies, numerology, etc.—come to be used as "categorical imperatives," they are likely to backfire. Let me also mention here, for what it is worth, that the most characteristic trait of Rev. Moon's ways is that he never seems to run out of surprises. In this he seems more of a pragmatist than a formalist.

While it must be granted that any eschatology that is as intimately linked to the doctrine of creation as it is in Unification theology, runs a certain danger of determinism, this is less so if God is thought of as a future God, rather than as the Creator. As such, God's revelations necessarily take on proleptic nature, anticipations "whose final truth remains a theme of eschatology."¹² Thus, both for Pannenbergians and Unificationists God may be conceived of as the "Power of the Future," and the present only acquires meaning in light of the end, the time of the "eschatological inauguration of the new aeon."¹³ Consequently, both the meaning of human life and of reality as a whole are verified in light of the eschaton. We might say that history here is seen in light of the future, each event acquiring its final significance in light of the totality of history. This emphasis on the primacy of the end of history is peculiarly eschatological and entails, among other things, the openness of the past and the fluidity of the present. The present moment may indeed be experienced as productive and disclosive, but it is one, like all others, that will be overcome and fused with future horizons.¹⁴ Undoubtedly, then, the Unification movement, and Unification theology, as we see it today will come to look quaint and dated in the eyes of future generations—but hopefully our efforts will have come to have a positive significance. Irrelevance is the saddest thing.

Hermeneutics of Hope

For I know the plans I have for you, says the Lord, plans for welfare and not for evil, to give you a future and a hope. Then you will call upon me and come and pray to me, and I will hear you. You will seek me and find me; when you seek me with all your heart. Jeremiah 29:11-13

When we study the modern scholarship on the canonization of the Torah during the Babylonian exile¹⁵ we see that the “Torah-story” is left open-ended: it ends with Moses’ admonitions as the people of God *are about to enter* the promised land; a simple observation, but a telling one. During the centuries this People has continued to survive on the way, nourished by a canon that is amazing in its richness of meaning and adaptability for life. Christianity inherited and transformed this tough hope, says Pannenberg, from post-exilic Judaism:

It is in the context of this latter, and in a certain sense as its culmination, that the message must be understood, with its demands that the whole world in which man lives must be understood and lived solely on the basis of the future of the kingdom of God.¹⁶

It is in the same vein that Moltmann substitutes an eschatology of history for a philosophy of history where “the place of dispassionate observation and contemplation . . . is taken by passionate expectation and by participation in forward-moving mission.”¹⁷ Christianity is here seen as that which turns people into incurable hoppers.¹⁸

It is well known that “hope” is a favorite topic of Rev. Moon. The Unification movement is both admired and sneered at for its “optimism” —admired for its vitality and dedication, sneered at for its simplistic utopianism. Even from a friendly critic we hear words of caution against “the inexorable march to goodness.”¹⁹ Yet I would argue that Unification hope is a well-tempered hope, quite unlike the “sloppy agape” which we, in our turn, frown upon in certain Christian sisters and brothers. I agree that the words of *Divine Principle* must sound saucy to twentieth century ears. Critical scholars comment that our epistemology might need a cold Kantian shower, and somehow “the steady rise of goodness and decline of evil” sounds hollow to a jaundiced age of environmental devastation and haunting holocausts.

The hope I see in Unification eschatology is more like the trembling trust of Jeremiah before the Lord:

Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed;
 save me, and I shall be saved;
 for thou art my praise.
 Behold, they say to me,
 "Where is the word of the Lord?
 Let it come!"

Jeremiah 17:14-15

God is the master surgeon, not a greedy banker, or a sneering maniac. But we tremble before the heart-transplant, yet trusting that God plans for welfare and not for evil, to give us a future and a hope (Jeremiah 29:11).

Furthermore, the last days are expected to arrive, not as a blue-eyed Camp David, but more in the ways of *Ragnarok*; terrible, confusing, ambivalent. The image is that of myriads of spirit people of sundry kinds descending for a resurrecting indemnity bath as the totality of history, of cultures, lands, and religions tremble in birth pangs. And yet the Unification hermeneutics of hope is not apocalyptic. True, there are strains reminiscent of shamanism, but the task of the Messiah in the midst of a confused world is also that of a historical midwife:

The great man of the age is the one who can put into words the will of his age, tell his age what its will is, and accomplish it. What he does is the Heart and essence of his age; he actualizes his age.²⁰

In Unification terminology, one might say that the Messiah's task is to understand, establish, and fulfill the right indemnity condition in order to further Providence. It is only possible, furthermore, to act as a host for the kingdom of God when the particulars and content of the providence of restoration are fully grasped and salvaged in the present. Herein lies the reason for the diligent study of history in Unification theology.²¹

Lest we make of the Messiah a Minerva's owl that flies at the dusk

of history, let it be understood that Unification hermeneutics' sister is the pedagogy of suffering. The one who has not shed tears does not know God, for the God of Principle is also the crucified God, a vulnerable God. A quick survey of Unification hymnology reveals that almost all *Holy Songs* center around the theme of suffering and hope. It seems that the tone and ethos of the pages of *Divine Principle* tend too far towards the rational and discursive side to accurately reflect the mode of knowing of the Unification movement as a whole, and those who only know us "by the book" inevitably get an image of fervent ideologists. But that is only the second half of the picture.

Pedagogy for the Perfect

But this is the covenant I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says the Lord;

Jeremiah 31:33-34

'Behold, the dwelling of God is with men. He will dwell with them, and they shall be his people' . . . And I saw no temple in the city, for its temple is the Lord God the Almighty and the Lamb.

Revelation 21:3, 22

"Do not speak of the Unification Church! The Unification Church is nothing: it must die! Speak only of God and of one world under God!"²²

People in the kingdom of Heaven on earth will not spend a great deal of their time studying *Divine Principle*. They will have more enjoyable things to do. There is general consensus in the Unification movement that the Principle, as we know it now will eventually be superseded by a more direct and experiential way of knowing and living with God. Often this new way is spoken of in terms of a New Tradition, centered, in its turn, on the notion of the True Family. Frankly, I find the Confucian orientation quite prominent here. Truth is conceived more as "true personhood" than correspondence of idea and reality. As

with Wang Yang-Ming, truth is done, not thought. Indeed, the whole business of separating knowing and doing becomes absurd. Humankind has come into its own at last. Goodness and truth pass from generation to generation, from parents to children by osmosis, as it were. Naturally, institutional religion has become a thing of the past.

It is also true that the family here has become the *sine qua non* of knowing God. The intra-familial relationships are the heuristic means by which people mature towards the status of divine spirits. Loyalty, filial piety, and fidelity are the cardinal virtues that serve to maintain the healthy dynamic function of families and society.

The universality and secularity of humankind come into their own like the eschatology of the Great Awakening, not an apocalyptic vision.²³ It may be seen as the final passage of *Heilsgeschichte* into universal history—the God of Israel becoming the God of all.²⁴ It is a “Christification of the world, and, simultaneously, a worldification of Christ.”²⁵

After the fall, so teaches the Principle, goodness came to be found in religion over and against a world under the dominion of evil. The very notion of “spirituality” has acquired connotations of alienation from the natural world, the polarity of spirit and matter tending to appear as a threatening antinomy. Unification eschatology moves from this world-rejecting spirituality to a world-affirming sensuality, since the future of God is also the future of the world.²⁶ In regard to the natural world we thus advocate the attitudes of sensitivity, of relationality, of interconnectedness. Consequently, our relationship to the non-human is no longer a threat, but a fulfillment. Mother earth is allowed to take humankind in her warm embrace. Ecology also soars from the status of a moralistic appendix to a way of life. The “oughts” and the “musts” that bedraggle the ethics with regard to the conservation of the environment are expected to be replaced by a spiritual empathy that turns any exploitation of the natural into a crime against ourselves. There is a real ontological basis for “relationships between God, Man, and All Things.”²⁷ On this foundation the notion of a “just and sustainable world” is no longer gratuitous, it is, so to say, in our guts.²⁸

Finally, I should like to say a few words about ethics. Ultimately, I find that the Unification views here are best expressed in terms of "richness and intensity of experience."²⁹ The ideal world is one where the human potential finds maximum opportunities for creativity, for realizing the uniquely divine in our day-to-day living. The challenges of innovation and self-transcendence are integral to maximizing experience. There is always the precarious tension between the intensity and the integrity of life. Thus the notion of unambiguous goodness does not apply in an unqualified sense. Even in the kingdom of heaven there may be failure as well as success—and if I may say so, if you can't lose, what is the point of victory?

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Jürgen Moltmann, *The Theology of Hope* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 298.
- ²Ted Peters, "Futures—Human and Divine," *Lutheran Quarterly*, 27 (1975), 123-24.
- ³Ted Peters, "Future Consciousness and the Need for Theology," *Dialog*, 13 (1974), 257.
- ⁴Frederick Sontag, "The God of Principle: A Critical Evaluation," in *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church*, ed. Herbert Richardson (Barrytown, N.Y.: Unification Theological Seminary, distributed by The Rose of Sharon Press, Inc., 1981), p. 123.
- ⁵Sontag, p. 137.
- ⁶Peters, "Futures," p. 119.
- ⁷Sontag, p. 137.
- ⁸Sontag, p. 116.
- ⁹Sontag, p. 115.
- ¹⁰*Divine Principle* (Washington: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), pp. 133-36.
- ¹¹*Divine Principle*, p. 135.
- ¹²Wolfgang Pannenberg, *Basic Questions in Theology* (London: SCM, 1970), I, 169.
- ¹³Wolfgang Pannenberg, *Revelation as History* (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 132.
- ¹⁴David E. Linge, "Dilthey and Gadamer: Two Theories of Historical Understanding," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 41 (1973), 550.
- ¹⁵The significance and impact of the canonization process as a dynamic and open-ended process on the maintenance of the identity and integrity of the Jewish people is discussed in various works by James A. Sanders. The most popular currently is *Torah and Canon* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972).
- ¹⁶Wolfgang Pannenberg, *The Idea of God and Human Freedom* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), p. 209.
- ¹⁷Moltmann, p. 260.
- ¹⁸Peters, "Future Consciousness," p. 253.

- ¹⁹Sontag, p. 35. Cf. *Divine Principle*, p. 253.
- ²⁰Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. T.M. Knox (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1942), p. 295.
- ²¹"Fallen men can never find the way of life without knowing the particulars and content of the providence of restoration. Herein lies the reason that we must know the principle of restoration in detail." *Divine Principle*, p. 238.
- ²²Warren H. Lewis quotes Rev. Moon from an informal faculty dinner in "Is the Rev. Sun Myung Moon a Heretic? Locating Unification Theology on the Map of Church History," in *A Time for Consideration*, ed. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson (Toronto: Mellen, 1978), p. 203.
- ²³M. Darrol Bryant, "Unification Eschatology and American Millennial Traditions," in *A Time for Consideration*, p. 268.
- ²⁴Pannenberg, *Revelation as History*, p. 133.
- ²⁵Peters, "Future Consciousness," p. 254.
- ²⁶Cf. Pannenberg, *The Idea of God and Human Freedom*, p. 195.
- ²⁷Young Whi Kim, *The Divine Principle Study Guide, Part I* (Tarrytown, New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1973), pp. 24-25.
- ²⁸It is encouraging to see that efforts to develop the ontological underpinnings of a specifically Christian ethic of nature are evidenced today. For details, see *Burning Issues*, 25 (January 1979), esp. pp. 52-57.
- ²⁹For this notion I am indebted to John Cobb and Charles Birch who argue from a biological and ecological vantage point to an ethical and religious stance in a forthcoming book, *The Liberation of Life*.

Women and the Hermeneutics of the Future

Lorine M. Getz

To a post-Christian feminist theologian, that is, to one acutely aware of the social, political, economic, and religious discrimination against the powerless, especially women, in the history of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the revelation of a new age in human development based on re-creation, unity, and equality is indeed welcome.¹ *Divine Principle* speaks of the equality of persons and the unity of cultures and religions through the re-creation of the kingdom of God on earth. It describes God's purpose in creation in terms of the joy received in relationship with perfected creatures, the destruction of evil, and God's continued providence at work in the restoration of humankind's original blessedness.² However, no promise of change can be accepted uncritically, especially one purporting to complete a testament whose first two volumes have not only recapitulated society's underlying myth of male supremacy but have also been employed by religious leadership throughout the centuries to oppress women systematically in the name of God. In what does the new revelation, *Divine Principle*, consist? How does it interpret a religious history which has permitted if not fostered oppressions such as racism, economic injustice, age discrimination, and sexism? In whom or in what is the hope of re-creation to be placed? How is the "new" future described? How can it be interpreted? How does it relate to the existential need for humanization expressed in the various liberation movements of the present age? Specifically, does it present a future for women?

Before proceeding to examine *Divine Principle* teachings concerning the nature of its message and the future posited by its revelation, it will be helpful to comment briefly first on the position of feminist theology regarding the Judeo-Christian myth of male supremacy and second on the fundamental relationship of this myth to societal and theological structural myths which can now be seen as modes of dehumanization and oppression. No attempt will be made to develop a complete feminist theology or to set forth an adequate theory of liberation. Rather, some key concepts will be set forth to define woman's experience of disaffection from the major religious traditions of the West and to indicate some hermeneutical standards required for a libertarian re-mythologization of salvation history.

The hermeneutical stance of the feminist with regard to the promise of social change and future freedom is one of hope amid suspicion. Women, as members of the oldest and primary oppressed group,³ have learned to mistrust religious promises. They have come to recognize central facets of the male supremacy myth: God symbols which are male, the male incarnation of the divine in Jesus, the mind-body split which identifies man primarily with the mind and woman primarily with the body, male righteousness and self-assertion, and hierarchical anthropology. Realizing that religious symbols provide not only models of divine existence, but also models for human behavior, feminists choose to abandon all myths, symbols, and traditions which devalue the feminine and exalt the masculine. The emerging self-conscious woman cries out for liberation from patriarchy, subservience to males, body-object identity, and all other aspects of male supremacy and oppressive control. Assuming a posture of suspicion based on the lessons of past experience, she desires to examine and challenge all religious meanings and messages for their liberating potential. Rejecting scripture and religious traditions for substantiating, even blessing, the prevailing cultural sexism, the feminist turns to her experience as the source of theological meaning. Only a theology which adequately reflects her own lived experience and promises a *different* future can be accepted. Thus feminist theology seeks images, myths, and ideologies

which have a universal message and which lead toward humanization and freedom for all persons regardless of sex. The emergent woman has the power to self-define; she seeks a revolution which can end male domination and a mutual healing of the master/subordinate sex caste experience. Until she is able to be valued as a whole, integral being, woman cannot fully enter into partnership with man, for only equals can form true partnerships.⁴ Only a world view which encompasses complete equality, justice, and freedom for each person regardless of race, age, socio-economic position, or sex can be understood as salvific for the future.

The myth of male supremacy forms the primary model for other forms of discrimination. It is held to be the most ancient and prevalent oppression. The most essential dehumanization (sin or evil) in civilization is not, as some religious traditions would insist, individual sins of omission or commission, or personal pride or concupiscence, but the victimization of the powerless by the powerful which appears to have its roots in male aggression against the female. From the model of male supremacy, other forms of oppression have been patterned: racism (the power of dominant race over racial minorities), capitalistic imperialism (the exploitation of poor countries and peoples for the economic benefit of the wealthy), age discrimination (the domination of those in their prime over the young and the aged), etc. While it is not to be implied that males (especially white American males) bear the responsibility for each of these cultural and social inequities which plague Western society, it is now becoming clear how the subjugation of the females by males provided a working model for dehumanizing patterns throughout society. One example of this can be found in American history, where the legislative principles for governing black slaves were taken directly from existing laws for women.⁵ By focusing then on this pivotal concept, the essential equality of males and females, feminine hermeneutics seeks to articulate the reality of the present oppression of women by society, culture, and religion, and to reject as dehumanizing and sinful all non-liberating ideologies, myths, and symbols of the future. Based on the premise that sexism is a formative principle behind all other

types of discrimination, feminist theology seeks to support revolutionary ideologies or philosophies which have as their objective the creation of a world based on freedom, equality, and true partnership.

The Future According to *Divine Principle*

The new revelation and essential message of *Divine Principle* is the coming of the eschaton, the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. In these “last days” the Lord of the Second Advent will complete the providential salvation begun by Jesus. *Divine Principle* presents both the fulfillment of the traditional Christian belief of the re-creation of God’s kingdom among mankind through the action of the Messiah and a “new” revelation of the essential relationship between God and human persons—the Principle itself.⁶ The “new age” is directly related to the original creation. Since God’s plan for relationship with Adam and Eve and through them with all of creation was perverted when the original couple gave their allegiance instead to Satan, God once again provides the opportunity in time for mankind to perfect itself and re-establish a primary relationship with its maker.⁷ Thus, *Divine Principle* eschatology both recapitulates traditional salvation history and adds new aspects to the myth.

Central to the restoration of the original plan for creation is the coming of the Lord of the Second Advent. *Divine Principle* asserts the spiritual restoration accomplished by the life of Jesus and posits the complementary physical restoration to be accomplished by the Lord of the Second Advent. This final restoration, also called “resurrection,” refers not to physical revivification of those who have already died but to the re-establishment of mankind’s physical lineage to the Creator and the severance of the present lineage to Satan.⁸ The Lord of the Second Advent, “equal to Jesus,” that is, a person who has attained individual perfection (the first of the three “blessings”), but differing from Jesus in time and order,⁹ and identified with the tree of life (or male principle), restores the integrity and righteousness of the original creation through the re-establishment of the tree of knowledge of good and evil (or female principle).¹⁰ Having already established his relationship to God (spiritual

redemption), the Lord of the Second Advent will establish a perfect (that is, God-centered) relationship with a woman (physical redemption), thus fulfilling the second blessing (multiply and fill the earth). The children of this perfect union will be born without original sin, for the sexual link to Satan established in the fall will be broken and the link to God will be restored. The God-centered families thus formed will then fulfill the third blessing of dominion over the rest of creation.¹¹ Through the accomplishment of the three blessings, the disparate aspects of creation will be reunited: male and female; science and religion; cultures, races, and religions; even Satan and Christ (through Satan's final conversion).¹²

Though *Divine Principle* suggests a second "future," the kingdom of God in heaven, this concept is not developed; nor is there an independent description of God apart from his relationship with creation. However, some key aspects of God's being are revealed in conjunction with discussion of his plan for mankind and its relational basis. God is described as One and dual. He is the single source of creation (Parent, Creator) yet he is *sung sang* and *hyung sang*, Original Positivity and Original Negativity, Father and Mother. Within the Divine, these aspects are described as non-hierarchical, integrated polarities. Yet, when *Divine Principle* moves from its consideration of the ontological ideal into practical application, the dualities separate out into hierarchical values. God, the Parent, quickly becomes merely the Father. In relationship to mankind, God is described as subject, positivity, *sung sang*. Thus, despite a theoretical monistic thrust, God is seen and described according to dualistic values. From this it would appear that despite the desire to present a single, unified concept of God and by extension a final unity of all creation with God in the final "future," the deeper cultural and psychological structures of dualism prevail.

The Feminist Critique

A critical reading of *Divine Principle* according to feminist theological principles yields ambiguous results. The message is mixed, the news good and bad. Certainly the theoretical model of ultimate monism

gives hope not only to feminists, but to all those who seek liberation through universalism. Statements concerning the process of give and take as a mutual relationship and the re-creation of the earth give hope to Christians who had long abandoned belief in traditional eschatology, but are not afforded the promise of a new, graced earthly renaissance. Presumably through the final accomplishment of the three blessings (personal integrity, reunion of the sexes and the genesis of blessed children, and responsible dominion over material creation—all God-centered activities), an ideal society would be established and maintained. Here not only discrimination and oppression would cease to exist, but so would other, "physical" problems such as hunger, poverty, pollution, and war. Countering the tendency in Christian traditions to emphasize the kingdom of heaven (after-death state) thus excluding or minimizing the need for change on earth, *Divine Principle* teaches that God and mankind will work together to resurrect the earth. Indemnity (human contribution) and providence (God's share of the responsibility) at least coalesce in time and space. Humankind's position approaching this promised future is not one of passive waiting, but of active participation and preparation. The prophesied re-integration binds the secular and the spiritual; it promises to move beyond traditional concepts of salvation for graced individuals to resurrection for all those who choose to participate freely.

But, alas! All is not well in the promised future. Feminist theology must resist being swept unaware into another illusory utopia grounded once again on sexist principles and symbols. The ambivalent ontology and anthropology which argues for equality and reciprocity between male and female on the theoretical level but betrays consistent evidence of patriarchy and misogyny on the practical level is particularly troublesome.¹³ Unificationists insist that no sexism exists in their futurology except that carried over in archaic language forms and in women's own experience.¹⁴ Yet the naming of God as "Father," never "Mother," is consistent throughout; the "fallen" element in creation which must be re-established in the tree of knowledge of good and evil is constantly identified as both female and negative. A male savior who

is righteous and self-assertive is required numerous times throughout history to implement God's plan, while woman's single noted act of sexual submission to the aggression of the male (in the *Genesis* myth, Satan) is judged as the source of all evil in the human world. Woman is therefore relegated to a permanent role of the passive victim to be saved. In each of these instances, male aggression and patriarchy are championed while females are either completely ignored or subjugated. A case in point regards the re-creation of the kingdom of heaven on earth yet to be established by the Lord of the Second Advent: the place and time of his birth are emphasized; his personal righteousness and God's blessing on his act of self-assertion are noted. But the complete task of the physical redemption of the earth cannot be completed by man in isolation. In order to fulfill the second blessing and establish a family base upon which the eschaton will be built, he must marry. But whom? *Divine Principle* provides no answer to this riddle: the potential bride's birth goes unnoticed; her righteousness and her actions go undiscussed; she is unidentified except for her sex; she is portrayed as completely passive and accepting, a Sleeping Beauty rescued from oblivion and used by the charming savior-prince merely as an anonymous vessel to bear his children. If this is the basis upon which the new revelation is built, there is no salvation for women. Once again women have no identity, no rights, no future—nothing is made anew, the old experience is simply recapitulated in a different time and space.

Is *Divine Principle*, then, to be rejected by feminist theology? Not entirely. Certainly it does take some steps toward universal humanization. But the whole message must not be embraced without scrutiny and caution. Rather, it must be examined in light of its position on the role of women, and the resulting critique must be heard. Those elements within *Divine Principle* which are culturally conditioned must be acknowledged; those which are patriarchal and misogynist must be exorcised; and those which are re-creational in the truest sense must be expanded and enhanced. The movement is young, searching, and flexible. Perhaps it will be open enough to evolve a theology reflecting true equality and thus true unification.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹See, for example, Mary Daly, *The Church and the Second Sex* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), and *Beyond God the Father* (Boston: Beacon, 1973); Rosemary R. Ruether, *Liberation Theology* (New York: Paulist Press, 1972), *New Woman/New Earth* (New York: Seabury, 1975) and Ruether, ed., *Religion and Sexism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); Sheila D. Collins, *A Different Heaven and Earth* (Valley Forge, Pennsylvania: Judson, 1974); Elizabeth Clark and Herbert W. Richardson, eds., *Women and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); and Rita Goss, ed., *Beyond Androcentrism* (Missoula, Montana: Scholars' Press, 1976).
- ²*Divine Principle*, 5th ed., (New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1977) pp. 41-42; hereafter cited as *DP*.
- ³Introduction, Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow, eds., *Womanspirit Rising* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), pp. 1-17.
- ⁴For a complete discussion of criteria and forms of partnership, see Letty M. Russell, *The Future of Partnership* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979), especially pp. 159-65.
- ⁵See Mary P. Ryan, *Womanhood in America*, (New York: Watts, 1975), especially pp. 4-25; and Gerda Lerner, *The Woman in American History* (Menlo Park, California: Addison-Wesley, 1971), especially pp. 11-19 and 57-65.
- ⁶M. Darrol Bryant, "Critical Reflections on Unification Eschatology," in *Exploring Unification Theology*, ed. Susan Hodges and M. Darrol Bryant (Barrytown, N.Y.: Unification Theological Seminary, distributed by The Rose of Sharon Press, Inc., 1978), p. 203.
- ⁷*DP*, especially pp. 27-32 and 103-10.
- ⁸*DP*, p. 171.
- ⁹*DP* is highly specific with regard to the birth place and time of the Messiah of the new age; see pp. 519ff.
- ¹⁰*DP*, p. 107.
- ¹¹*DP*, pp. 119-29.
- ¹²*DP*, p. 188.
- ¹³Elizabeth Clark articulates this point with regard to the Unificationist insistence upon and interpretation of the Eve myth. See her "Women in the Theology of the Unification Church," in *Exploring Unification Theology*, pp. 148-66.
- ¹⁴See, for example, "Discussion II," in response to Clark's argument, in *Exploring Unification Theology*, pp. 166-78.

The Principle of the Future

Frederick Sontag

In what sense can the future ever be used as a present principle of interpretation?

Where eschatology is concerned, can we take a projected future and use it as a basis to interpret the present? And more important: Can God ever be used as a base that allows us to predict a future different from the past? We can answer this question only if we are able to say what God is going to do. This depends entirely on whether he is a God capable of controlling the future. We must ask: What can change the future to be anything but an extrapolation from the past? The only theological answer is a God of sufficient power, and sufficient independence, to alter history. Using the word "eschatology" is not enough. How can we be sure God is able to deliver on his promises?

The premise we need for such a belief is that God cannot be tied to any particular program. If we claim to know God's plan of action in advance, we tie him to that, and we must be careful about whether this also restricts his power to act. Ironically, if one leaves God free to act outside any scenario we devise, we lose control and have no firm base to point to to prove our confidence in God's future action. Most religious individuals are caught in the dilemma of wanting to be sure they know how God will act, so that they can base their confidence on this certainty. But then they are often forced to reject God if their specific

projected plan does not unfold. God must be free to shape the future, but for that he must be free of foreknowledge and aloof from specific religious predictions.

One additional factor is that God must be free of any need for human assistance, although he may allow us certain determinations. Classical theology fixed the future and eliminated contingency in the world in favor of divine omniscience in order to secure God's independence. But that is not the only possible way to do this. God need not determine events from the moment of creation, but he does need to be free of dependence on human accomplishment and able to act in spite of how events turn out contingently. Nor can God be fully revealed in any historical event, not even the whole course of history, for then he is tied to it. This places us under a handicap, for the religious temperament likes to locate a place where God can be clearly seen. In recent times, one favorite arena to locate God has been the course of history. But if this is so, God is tied to that reading of history and cannot act outside of it.

The question, then, as to whether a projected future can be used as a present principle of interpretation depends entirely on what the future is projected to be and what can be pointed to as capable of bringing it about. If it is a God not fully present in history, whether past or present, nothing about the certifiable record serves as an adequate ground for belief in such a God. Then, where can the notion of such a God come from, if not from the record of history? He can appear to, or act in, the lives of individuals or small groups, but in this case the evidence is far from universal. There may be "intimations of the future" in the present or in recorded past religious events, but this depends on whether we select out certain minor happenings and give them a significance larger than the bulk of human experience and the major events of history.

In what sense can Jesus serve as a principle to support our belief in God's future action?

Most religions do not claim to study history and then develop a new idea of a radical future from that. Eschatology is a useless notion

without the idea of revelation. Something needs to be told to us which is different from what our common human experience might have led us to suspect. Usually this is connected to a charismatic or divine figure, one who teaches or reveals in his life what God's future plans are to be. For Christians this activity centers in Jesus, so that, in the case of Christianity, the locus of the interpretation of the future actually centers in the life and action of a person. Although prophets continually appear to revive or alter our image of Jesus, later religious figures derive their significance from the original revealer of the future.

In what sense did Jesus' words or his life reveal the future? In the early days of his ministry, up to the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, he appeared as a messianic figure who might usher in God's kingdom by his own action. Instead, events deteriorated rapidly, until he was convicted of crimes against religion and the state and was put to death. Thus, if it were not for the resurrection event, Jesus' life would offer no hope for a future different from the past. True, any individual may try to live his or her life according to Jesus' advice for example, e.g., the Sermon on the Mount. But although any individual might succeed in becoming saintly thereby, Jesus' example leads us more to suspect that violence and death lie ahead for the disciple rather than a radically altered future.

From Saint Paul on down, Christian tradition has taken belief in the resurrection to be central to Christian hope. This does not mean that Jesus' life itself becomes our basis for belief in a new future. Rather, it is God's action to restore a life which failed that is the center of hope, not his life as such. Hence, if Christians say that their hope for a new future centers in Jesus, this cannot be an accurate statement, since Jesus' individual effort ended in disaster. The center of confidence must shift to God's ability to rescue and restore human failure and destruction. God's power was not so much evidenced in Jesus' life (although we now read God's power back into it) as in what God did to Jesus' life once it ended in tragedy. Christian hope can never be a simple optimism. It is always a hope that rests on the reversal of tragic loss.

This is why Christians so often speak of the "risen Christ" and why

the discovery of the "historical Jesus" gives us no basis of confidence whatsoever. Paul is the great first preacher of Christianity, but Paul was never Jesus' companion on his road of brief adulation and violent destruction. Paul (or Saul) persecuted those who were with Jesus because they were heretics to Judaism. Only Saul's encounter with the risen Christ changed him into Paul. But the risen Christ is neither the historical Jesus nor a present part of history in any obvious sense. Jesus was restored after his violent death, but he did not stay long. Thus, no figure available on the present stage can be an anchor for our future confidence. The Holy Spirit established the early church and roused the disciples from their despondency. We can only ask today: Where does one encounter the risen Christ, and how does one receive the inspiration of the Holy Spirit as a foundation for future hope?

Jesus' words are now fixed, but no prediction of the future can ever be as fixed as the canon of scripture or the formulas of any dogma.

As a matter of fact, dogmatic formulation, trust in the church as an institution, in its tradition or its leaders, or the attempt to use the words of scripture as an inerrant norm—all these efforts come about precisely because our knowledge of and ability to predict the future is so uncertain. In our frantic search for certainty, we want to fix the historical record and codify it. But if the future is to be radically different and cannot flow from the past, to pin down the past, if we can, does not solve the problem of the future. This by no means prevents anyone from claiming that he has faith that the future will work out according to God's promise. But it does mean that no past history or established words are sufficient to justify this belief.

Is there, then, any such thing as a fixed view of God's nature or his actions which cannot change? Much of classical theology thought it essential to deny change in God's nature in order to preserve God's power to deliver on his promises. Without appraising the metaphysical views which lie behind this belief, it should be clear to us now that a

God who is to make the future radically different from the past, or different from any projection based on the course of history, must himself be capable of change. Some classical theologies pictured God as programming these future changes from the beginning of time. But if the future is uncertain, God must be of such a nature as to be free from our predictions and open to change the future without regard for the drift of history. His nature must contain the ability for self-determined change.

If this is true, how are we to view: (i) the canon of scripture; (ii) the dogmas which seem so sure of God's past and future actions; (iii) and all the utterances of religious figures whose credibility depends on presenting their view of God's program of activity as a definitive plan? Given our uncertainty over the exact shape of the future, it is necessary for us to project definite programs and to believe credible religious figures who offer us an analysis of God's action. These accounts tell us how God *may* act but not how he *must*. It is a natural human confusion to think that what we hope will occur is in fact certain, but a God of the future cannot be bound by certainty. Can he, then, be trusted, so that our hopes are not in vain and our faith a worthless dream?

Yes, that is why "faith" means "belief in things unseen." And it is also why our major confusion is to mix up the promise of a new future with tying God down to one specific program, instrument, or timetable for its enactment. Given our uncertainty about God's future actions, coupled with our faith in his ability to produce a new future, we leap at any offer of an explanation for God's method of operation. To project a definite program clarifies our uncertainties. But we must never confuse a human reading of God's intention with a certainty that he is bound to that scenario. The irony is that the God who is free to offer us a new future is at the same time the God whose freedom cannot allow him to be bound by the details of any definite program we project.

Discussion

Frederick Sontag: I don't believe that a paper should be apologized for but I want still to say a little about mine. Namely, a week ago yesterday on Friday I received a telephone call saying where was my paper, and my answer was: You never asked me for one. Between last Friday and the time I left I tried to do a paper. They said do anything you want. I didn't think I could do a sort of critique of *Divine Principle* eschatology in that short a time so I quickly did a kind of statement of my own on what I think some of the problems are in using the future.

But let me say a few things about some of the strengths and weaknesses that I see in Unification eschatology. First, I think that God is free. This is a decided advantage. It allows for principles and contingencies and the future to be kept open. My critique of Unificationism is that God is limited to the Principle and cannot intervene except in ways in which the Principle allows. As far as the new future is concerned, it does allow for God's initiating action. Klaus makes this point in his paper. The Unification movement's announcement that this has already taken place leads to an air of excitement which is an attractive quality. However, it may fail. This is part of the doctrine and God will want to try again. But this makes God a prisoner of his own system. As someone mentioned yesterday, every theologian has commented on what God cannot do, but I do believe this isn't a fixed notion. I would not want to limit God to acting within the Principle. The main

claim, I think, for the eschatology is that the new family has been begun and the restored family is established. We want to ask, what can be pointed to as evidence of the change and God's present action? I once asked a member, what makes you think it will succeed? He said, "Because it is already more than fifty percent on its way." That is a crucial kind of feeling. The sense that restoration is already underway lends a sense of campaign and urgency to the movement, but this sense, I think, is probably behind most of the mistakes that the Unification Church has made and has brought it in for criticism. They are in a hurry. My own conviction is that God has not fixed the eschatological plan yet nor finally determined to work through human interests. I am not convinced that that is a viable way in which to bring in the eschaton. I think that *Divine Principle*, and those who believe in it, have an answer as to where they find the movement of the Holy Spirit in the present day. I cannot understand how anyone could be a "Moonie" who does not think that God is active in Rev. Moon and that he is the locus of the Holy Spirit's activities in the present day. My own feeling about this is that God could act in this way, but I do not think he needs to.

I want to make a couple of points on the other three papers. When Klaus finally gets around to Unification thought, he says that the manifestation of the effective presence of Jesus is already reached. Both the resurrection and judgment are invisible spiritual events. There is a problem with that. If they are essentially invisible, how do we test their presence, that is, how do we know that the resurrection is in a sense really within us? You can say that they are invisible and it gets you off the hook, but surely you have to point to some evidence that indicates that they are spiritually present. Now, I believe that every Unification member believes that they are present but you can't just hide behind invisibility. Just below that you say that according to Unification theology God has already acted and that the new history has begun. I do believe that is the claim and that is the basis for the eschatology—not a future projection but something here and now. That gives excitement to the movement. The new family is an integral part of the kingdom, but how do you test this?

Dagfinn rejects my notion that the Principle is a new legalism or rigid code of behavior like the Old Testament and that we need to find release from it. He says Unificationists are not bound to that but he has not given any reasons for why they are not. Why aren't you bound to the Principle as a way of operation? You do show your side as non-eggheaded in the paper. (laughter) One of the characteristics of Rev. Moon's way, you say, is that he never seems to run out of surprises. Now what you are doing is appealing to the person versus the book. That is all right; I don't think Mr. Salonen will mind. Mr. Salonen told me that Rev. Moon was the great revolutionizer in the church. As soon as anybody settled down, something would happen and they would be stirred up again. But we are caught here—you are appealing to Rev. Moon as a person versus the confines of the doctrine of the book. I think this is legitimate to do but it certainly puts us into a quandary. Then you say that history is seen in the light of the future. I am not really sure that that is *Divine Principle*. It is an interesting point—and as you know I like it (laughter)—that the Principle as it is now will eventually be superseded by a more direct and experiential way of knowing and living with God. Now that is a very revolutionary kind of notion; it is a touch from Zen that there shall be no text to which you shall be bound. If you are really going to claim that this is revolutionary, then unfortunately all the scholars like Tony and Klaus are going to have trouble because they love a definitive text. And if you are going to now preach that there is going to be a kind of experiential way of knowing God that is really an amazing, startling kind of definition and I hope that the board of investigation on unmoonie activities will call you up to account for that! (laughter)

As for the feminist critique, I have only a couple of things to say. This is quite different from the other papers here, so I have given ear. Lorine says women choose to abandon all myths, symbols, and traditions which devalue the feminine and exalt the masculine. I have a belief that, unfortunately, you can't put all people into one. My question is: all women? I am not convinced of that. Some women may, but you act as if every woman would do that, and I don't think that is correct. Either you

have got to make the case as they all do now or that they all will. There are many, many women who simply don't do that. They don't reject the ancient myths. In a very similar vein you say that only theology which adequately reflects a woman's own lived experience and promises a different future can be accepted. Again my question is: by whom? I am not convinced that all women will abide by that injunction on your part. Secondly, you make an even more important assertion, that there is a single experience for all women. I am not convinced of that. I know that is not my wife's notion and she would insist that she is a woman! (laughter) There is a kind of an assumption of a uniform position here which I am not really convinced is justified.

Klaus Lindner: Thank you for your comments, Professor Sontag. I want to start with Lorine's paper. I liked Lorine's paper because it made constructive comments, especially in the conclusion, which I agree with. I think that the things you do not want, *Divine Principle* also doesn't want. I think that Unification men may be the only Christian men who can express with women like you the hope for the coming of woman as part of the Second Coming. Your criticisms are based on the way things are expressed in the text. You talk about how physical redemption comes about by the Messiah's relationship with the woman. That is not precisely the Unification position. It simply says that alone we cannot go past a certain point. Relationship does not mean a one-sided relationship. Both are influenced by each other and therefore it is not his relationship with her but precisely their relationship. It comes out in your paper as though the relationship with the woman is the physical aspect and individuality is the spiritual aspect. That is not what the Principle really wants to say. On the same page you say that the concept of the kingdom of God in heaven is not developed. I think that it is developed in terms of the spiritual kingdom of heaven after death. There is a whole chapter on the spiritual world and how people will live there. It is developed much more than in traditional Christian eschatology. Also, we would usually take as a strength that God is seen precisely as relational, as related to people.

You say the deeper cultural psychological structures of dualism

prevail because God remains in the subject position. Unificationists really believe that the subject-object relationship in perfection is not something that set. Perfection is an interchangeable thing. Even the relationship with God in perfection is not just a subject-object relationship. God always remains God, but a human being who has a perfect relationship with God can take the subject position. I think all Unificationists would agree with me that this is a very essential part of the teaching. Many of the people in the Unification Church also see that there is an inherent problem with naming God just father, and I think in Unification theology the image of God is actually the image of true parents. We also try to put more into the father image because of that, but I agree that ultimately to call God “father” is a problem because you will always have to redefine it.

Finally, when you say that the bride of the Lord of the Second Advent is unidentified and is portrayed as completely passive and accepting, I think you should hear Mrs. Moon’s testimony on that. At the time that *Divine Principle* was written she was maybe thirteen or fifteen so that was not yet clear, but there is certainly not the feeling that she is completely passive and has no course of equal responsibility to go through.

Briefly on Professor Sontag’s paper—I told him already that his criticisms are very cogent but what I don’t think he can offer is an alternative. He says that the only theological answer is a God of sufficient power and sufficient independence to alter history and that this God will be able to deliver on his promises. The problem is that the God who is completely independent from man raises the question why, in fact, that God did not alter history. I prefer the Unification alternative here as a solution to the more traditional one.

Lorine Getz: I thought it would be possible to put our papers in context in the beginning. In response to Fred, I wrote my paper specifically from the position of post-Christian feminist, a perspective I assumed people would perceive as they read this through. A similar kind of problem arises when someone says “You know, all Blacks believe” Obviously there are all kinds of positions among Blacks. In

order to make clear distinctions I took what I thought to be the most radical of the women's critique and left out all the nuances. I did the same thing with *Divine Principle*. There are all kinds of nuances in *Divine Principle*, especially regarding how it is lived. Not only what is in the book is relevant—note the point about Mrs. Moon, for example. I am dealing here exclusively with the text and what I see to be the problems in the text. Let me just point out further that the graphics in the green handbook¹ put women only in the object position. I think this is a prevailing problem in the texts of the church.

As I read Fred's and Dagfinn's papers it seemed to me that they both defined God as powerful and insisted on his freedom, an attribute that I can appreciate. But I found their concepts of God to be so edited into an ahistorical mode that God cannot be understood as entering into any relationship whatsoever. I find that problematic. The other problem which is one I see repeated in Christian history is the question of Jesus' meaning and whether his life or death or resurrection has continuing importance to us. To describe the meaning of Jesus as the hope and the tragic loss does not help me any. When you tell any minority—or oppressed group member that the promise lies precisely in a tragic loss—that is the same as saying there is hope and no help at all. I find that somewhat problematic. The third point that I wonder about is the question of whether you perceive there to be the possibility of the development of spiritual life based on relationship between humans and the divine? If so, does that give us some kind of spiritual link whereby we can develop in some specific direction?

With Klaus' paper I had the feeling that I was specifically at a disadvantage. I am not really conversant with the Protestant theology of history. My question to him deals specifically with the new history, the new family, and the new man. It seemed to me, Klaus, that you wanted to link *Divine Principle* right into the heart of Christian tradition and to say that *Divine Principle* picks up the eschatological expectations of the Judeo-Christian tradition. My experience is that for most of the rest of the Judeo-Christian tradition the eschatological expectation is dead. My interest in *Divine Principle* is that it is not an attempt to revive

something that is dead but initiate something that is new, exciting, and to be pursued. I don't sense the need to baptize it right into the old tradition. Why not just go ahead with its own new message?

Dagfinn, I was very excited about your paper, though I may need some corrections to my understanding of it because I was reading it in keeping with my Jungian perspectives. You highlight the relational aspects of *Divine Principle* and present an indication of psychological development which I have found singularly unexpressed previously. You want to define most of what is going on in terms of understandable relationships with a significant human and divine base. I find there to be a lot of creative possibility within that kind of definition.

Dagfinn Aslid: It is tempting to respond, of course, to both of you but I will try to play it by the ground rules. I'll start out by making some comments on Dr. Sontag's paper. There might be more likenesses between us than you think, Fred, and I hope this doesn't sound too sugary. I think we both affirm the important distinction between futurology and eschatology—though both stress the fact that the future is not something that is extrapolated from history or the present but that the future is something that is new. This is an important point and is the basis for God's freedom to act. Now you ask, how can we be sure without imprisoning or constraining God by the Principle? This is a critique on just about every page in your paper. I don't see that our interpretation of history or even our expectations are "binding on God in a legalistic sense." I'll go more into that later. You ask how God is able to deliver his promises. Well, we cannot really be sure because it is always contingent upon humans, but I would say with many other theologians that the Old Testament in particular is testimony to the trustworthiness of God keeping God's part of the bargain. I would like to ask you a question. Why is it that God must be free of any need for human assistance? The interdependency, of course, is explicit in *Divine Principle*, and there are basic differences between us. I would just like you to expand on that a little bit.

On the notion of revelation, you do mention the essential need of revelation for eschatology. Here again I would stress a difference. When

you speak of revelation it is essentially a supernaturalistic type of revelation whereas we speak more in a neo-Thomistic sense of harmony between reason and revelation and would insist that this is not contradictory to a significant eschatology.

As a converted "Moonie," I have to affirm that the resurrection event is also stressed. It is not very much stressed, but sufficiently stressed. It is the source for Christian hope. You ask, why is God's action now restoring the life which failed? I am not sure if you mean this regarding Jesus or regarding more psychological applications to the human situation. When you say "source of hope" based on "the reversal of tragic loss," that is something quite explicit in our view of history and our view of the present situation. It is a hope which has the side of hopefulness in spite of many failures, a persistent hope which continues. I think we differ on this. Your ground for hope is different from ours. As Lorine pointed out, she doesn't see the realism in your hope due to the ahistorical tendencies of your existentialist position, whereas we ground our hope in a more historical perspective.

You say God must be capable of change. I am sure you don't mean that in a process sense of a consequent nature to God. I would appreciate some resonance from Durwood Foster on this point. You mention very significantly the affinities between a process perspective and the Unification perspective.

In my response to Lorine's paper, I agree that it is absurd to have a bunch of males sitting here working out a feminist theology and christology. I am glad that we had the sense to include women in the forum. My reaction is affirmative of your paper. I have made a definite step to change at least my language. I try to avoid using the male pronouns and the rest. This is part of being at Claremont and the concern with using inclusive language. This is a lesson that we need to learn in our church because our church, in being as new as it is, doesn't have to be afraid of changing keys or feeling so threatened by this as many traditional churches which are rigidified. Lorine, you say *Divine Principle* speaks of equality, etc., but on the whole this is just so many words. You intimate that our practice doesn't verify our ideas. In a sense

that is right—we haven't as yet come to the point where we are ready to thematize these issues. When we do, we will need women theologians to work on it. You resonated to the concept of relationality which is prominent in my paper, although I agree with David Kelly that there isn't a simple solution. The important element of our vision of the future especially rests on its formation of the centrality of inclusiveness, the notion of ethics as richness and intensive experience. That is an ontology and a view that necessarily includes the female.

I appreciate your warning about the male symbols. That is something that has sneaked its way into our theology from the tradition. When you say the feminist turns to her experience, I can only say, Yes, this is something that we need in our theologizing. You critique christology as being that of the "macho prince," to caricature your own caricature. In Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Germany some sisters came and took the initiative in restoration. We also speak of our "true mother." This is not merely piety. There is a very theological significance in this, and I think it is something that definitely should be included in the canon of the Principle with time.

Patricia Zulkosky: It is difficult for me to speak as detachedly about the issue of Lorine Getz's paper as other people appear to be because I feel myself to be intimately involved with the issue. I am very grateful for what Lorine has done in terms of her recognition of the situation, her way of bringing the situation to the attention of people, and also her initiative in gathering the women of the whole seminar together to discuss the situation. At this point I am going to leave my position as a Unificationist who defends *Divine Principle* in order to speak out on some of the ways that the theory does not match the practice. The theory has a great deal of potential in terms of bringing about the equality of men and women. In terms of the practice at this moment, I think we need to look at what women like myself have experienced.

Dagfinn makes comments about the role of Mrs. Moon. In the small discussion by women the question was raised about the role of Mrs. Moon: How much can Mrs. Moon be a role model for me as a woman in the church? Frankly, I don't know anything about her. I think

that this is just an indication of the kinds of directions in which the church needs to go. I haven't raised questions about women in leadership positions in the church or situations like that in which I myself feel that I have been burned at certain times in the church. I do not want to get into that kind of emotional issue but just to deal with some of the ways that we present ourselves. The worst thing in the green book is not the language but the pictures. If someone doesn't read this book—and you well know that people don't read books very much, at least a lot of the people that we are trying to reach—they will go through and they will look at only the pictures. They convey a deeper meaning or impression beyond the words.

I am really frustrated by the situation. I believe in the theology and the potential development of Unificationism. My plea to you is, if you feel the way I do, make those feelings well known. I don't think there has been enough opportunity for women in the church to make this kind of point. It is not the problem of everyone in the church and, as someone was saying, not all women feel this way. But I do think that it is a problem of everyone who becomes sensitized to the issue. Any oppression becomes that much greater when you are aware that you are being oppressed, and until you become aware of that then it doesn't matter to you. There are a lot of times in my life in the church and other times when I have felt what was happening to me was happening to me because of my personality. I have some rough edges that need working on. On the other hand, when women get together and start to share their experiences, and it turns out that every woman in the group is sharing the same experience and rationalizing that experience by saying it is her personality, then it becomes clear that it is not only my personality but our culture. Since we have the possibility of being flexible in the development of our theology and lifestyle, I really hope that we make the best of that to try to set a model of equality between men and women in a way that I think only *Divine Principle* offers to the world.

Nora Spurgin: I would just like to say that I appreciate Lorine's understanding. Theologically, I think we have a framework where men

and women can be equal to an extent that hardly any other theology does. We are also evolving and developing. It is important that we look at how we can really make our practice follow our theological framework. I do think that in the *Divine Principle* understanding of God's making of man and woman, there is an essence of masculinity and femininity apart from the objects within which they dwell. I think these essences are within both men and women to varying degrees and in varying ways.

It is also interesting that our view of God is that God is not just an initiating being but also responsive to our suffering. It is quite different from a view of God as one who creates the world and then doesn't have any feeling for it and closes himself off and remains aloof from the impact of what is going on. Our view of God includes responsive energy and that is a kind of nature which maybe we label as feminine.

I personally haven't been so burned in the church by any of the male leadership although there are times when things happen. For example, not so long ago my secretary was taken away from me and I wondered if that would have happened if I was a man. But in general, I haven't felt that I have personally been unfulfilled because of the situation I'm in. I am in a situation now where I am a mother and a wife, and I feel that the church has provided quite a broad range of opportunities for me. We are developing a lot, and we as increasingly enlightened women want to be a part of the process of life, a part of planning the future. We have to be aware of it. I do believe that we have a lot of things to work out and I also believe that some of them will get worked out. But I don't think that they will get worked out easily.

Frank Flinn: I am going to shift back to the earlier discussion. Lorine, this is not a put down. I'm going to argue standard, mainline, orthodox Roman Catholic theology. Right now I think that I see a deficiency in *Divine Principle* in terms of the theology of creation. Creation is first by separation. The root idea of the word *barah* in Hebrew, in the ordinary sense, means to cut in two or divide. That sense is preserved in the Hebrew piel form. This means that there are irreducible structures in the creation. When God talks about man and woman in Genesis chapter one, the words should not be translated,

“male” and “female” but “masculine” and “feminine.” The words are not *ish* and *ishah*, as in Genesis chapter two, but *zakhar* and *nekebah*. They are linguistically unrelated yet both are in the image of God. If I read Genesis I rightly, it is saying that the masculine is irreducible to the feminine, and vice versa, and that is what the image of God is. Now it is in the second account of creation that you get male/female or man/woman imagery coming. That has to do with the fall and the fall is a distortion of the structure of creation. One of my cavils with Unification theology is that I see that creation as separation is prior to creation as relatedness, i.e., logically prior to. Unificationists see creation only as relatedness.

Another point I would like to add is about the bodily resurrection. I believe that I am going to be raised in my body. The reason that I believe that I am going to be raised in my body is that when God created the world he created a material world and a spiritual world and they are equally good. This is why I believe in the resurrection of the body. You have to go back to the doctrine of creation to make sense out of the theology of resurrection. When Unificationists get charged with being gnostics, it is precisely on this point that they are going to get charged with being gnostics. Unification does not deal with the doctrine of resurrection except in a vague Pannenbergian, futuristic sense.

Andrew Wilson: I would like to consider whether we have a problem with sexist language and if so, whether it also gets into our ontology. David made the point that our ontology was not so bad but that our language is. When we talk about subject and object in *Divine Principle* we say that all these subject-object relationships work within in the same ontological unit which is the four position foundation. In the four position foundation there is the concept of the triple objective purpose, namely, that every one of the four positions must serve at some point as subject to the other three positions. In other words, in the family, sometimes the father is object and the mother subject. Sometimes the child is subject. Sometimes God is subject, and sometimes we are subject in our relationship to God. This ontology implies a radical equality of value and of relationship not only in terms of man and woman but by the same reasoning in terms of human beings and God.

It means that we cannot think of God only as our father, but also as our child and as our husband or wife and so on. By the same token this ontology completely denies the basis for an authoritarian social structure. It means that our social structure must involve this kind of consensualness which Steve Post talked about. If we want to be consistent—I am not sure if we want to be consistent here but I hope we want to be—this means that the resolution of the problem of the role of women is bound up with the problems of our social structures in general. The relationship between leader and follower in the Unification Church has been criticized many times by Rev. Moon himself as too dictatorial in terms of how people relate to each other. Unification ontology cannot support that kind of authoritarian relationship by the same ontological argument that it cannot support male domination. If we want to hold to our ontology, we have to tie all of these things together.

David Kelly: And, if you can develop and show in *Divine Principle* and Unification thought that indeed you believe that we create God, that this relationship is both ways, that God is not only parent but also human child, this is the first time I have heard that idea here. If this is accurate, I will withdraw my charge of ontological sexism on the subject-object issue.

Stanley Johannesen: I would like to address myself to this. My notion of human culture is that the range of personality types we deal with starting at the most elementary and original level is related to sex roles. I think in any human society there is the trickster, the willing worker, the fool, even the misogynist, the wife, the Sibyl, the whore, the scholar. Some of these roles are not sex specific. One of the ways that you can define cultures is the way in which different societies pattern all these possible social types to give them functions, to reward or to suppress certain types. I want to get back to the idea about counterculture. A counterculture within a larger culture can rearrange those allocations to a certain degree but only to a limited extent. The Unification Church seems to exhibit a very high degree of congruence between the kinds of people that it rewards or the personality types that it finds valuable and the personality types that the wider culture finds valuable. This is your

point, Tony. It is a cooperative counterculture, oriented towards success for instance. It is not a counterculture that despises the rewards of personal or material success. Bureaucratically it exploits individual talent in a way that is valued in the larger culture. There is a particular thing that I want to argue because I think it has to do with the sexist problem, and that is the extraordinary idealization of personal relationships. What I object to in Unification thought is precisely some of the things I object to in modernism. There is an area here in which the Unification Church buys into some of the worst things of modernism. The tendency to idealize personal relationships as opposed to working them out and the idealization of the family has a tendency to create certain cast-iron expectations around sexual roles which cannot be fulfilled.

Lloyd Eby: I want to go back to Fred's remarks. Your positivistic concept of God is one that sees God as a being who moves or operates according to no knowable or predictable principle; God is knowable only through some kind of positive faith or experience. I am not being very subtle, but I'm trying to make a point. Now, if that is so, then there are certain consequences. First of all, God is irresponsible; secondly, and much more importantly, God is fundamentally unknowable because epistemological consistency is denied. Any principle by which one could judge whether reported divine activity is really a divine activity is abandoned. You have cut the epistemological connection between God's activity and knowability. I think that account of God is pathological. You implicitly deny any kind of inner relationship between God and man. There is no logical problem with that but there is a very deep theological problem with that.

As to Frank Flinn's point about the root meaning of creation as division, I find that a very interesting suggestion. I think this intent is in Unificationism; it is compatible with it but something that we have to talk about.

Henry Vander Goot: I don't think that is in Unification, because it isn't in any kind of thinking based on bipolarity. Unificationist ontology seems to be monistic. The principle of bipolarity is perfectly com-

patible with a monistic principle and in fact it is dependent upon it.

Lloyd Eby: I deny that it is simply monistic. I hold that it is simultaneously monistic and dualistic. It can be.

Henry Vander Goot: No, it can't be dualist and monist at one and the same time. Monism tries to account for the whole in a certain way; that same whole is accounted for by the dualist in a different way.

Anthony Guerra: My first point is to make a refinement as to my suggested term which I now will state as "alternative cooperative culture" as distinct from counterculture. I want to use the word "alternative" because I think we are creating new structures, new forms which hopefully correct some of the problems in the existing culture. I want also to use the word "cooperative" because the new structures are to be set, not in dialectical opposition to existing culture but rather in a kind of cooperative dialogue in a non-violent way. That is the reason I prefer to use that term as distinct from counterculture.

Fred Sontag says if the future is to be radically different it cannot flow from the past. To pin down the past does not solve the problem of the future. Granted, the future will be different from the past. But to say that it cannot flow from the past is to deny the fundamental Judeo-Christian affirmation that God is working in history through such people as Jacob, Moses, Jesus, and down throughout the saints to the contemporary Christian age. Although the future will be different from the past it will not be radically discontinuous and that is precisely the reason for looking at the past.

Frederick Sontag: First of all, I don't think that there is any theology without its weakness. There is no such thing as a perfect theology for many reasons which would take me far afield. I am saying this because the questions that have been raised are all very good ones.

Klaus, why hasn't God altered history before now if he is capable of it? That is the great and painful question. That is the possibility but it is the reverse side of the dialectic of history. You are bound to the fact that you see progress coming if you think he is aloof from history but can intervene.

Lorine, you say God is ahistorical and therefore could be totally

irresponsible. I won't answer in detail because some of the things I want to say will bear on that. But I would agree basically. Yes, he could be. What is your evidence for that? Then just a brief comment on your notion that tragic loss is not necessary. That has some problems but what I would appeal to is, in fact, that in our human experience it is a whole series of tragic losses, and I am not convinced that it is going to change. Now I think your most interesting suggestion was the development of spiritual life which is in touch with the divine, which gives us some link and hope. I didn't stress that at all but you hit the nail on the head. The spiritual tradition is the linkage between individuals and God and does not bear much relation to the historical times. In fact when times are chaotic the spiritual link comes back through and I think that is what does act, and I think that is where confirmation would come.

Dagfinn, you ask, how can we be sure without imprisoning God? That is a dilemma that I, too, pose but take the other side—I would rather not be sure. When you point to the Old Testament as testimony of God's trustworthiness, you are idealizing Judaism. The Jews are still waiting. The Jews in the death camps were very torn by this problem of God's trustworthiness. "Though he slay me, yet will I trust him"—this is an incredible statement given to history by the Jews, so don't idealize them.

Faith is belief in things unseen. Yet I accused Klaus of not providing evidence. That is quite correct and it goes back to my response to Lorine. My evidence is that we ground our hope on the traditional life, the spiritual life and the fact of the feeling of God's presence, and the change in our lives. I began to take "Moonies" seriously when over and over again I got the statement, "My life was changed." As a former Baptist, I recognize that testimony. The spiritual change of the individual is the ground of hope. I don't see any other. Klaus was changed. You, Tony, were changed. That is your testimony; I have read it.

One more point and then a little story. Lloyd, I won't argue about this charge of positivism although I don't understand it. It does make

God fundamentally unknowable if you insist on the traditional kinds of evidence. My response to you as to why I would go that way is, Yes, it makes God much more difficult to pin down and we have no epistemological cord. In the history of man's relationship with God I see no consistency. I see a fantastic collage of a hundred different ways. Nobody has managed to pin him down yet, so yes, I see the difficulty of that side.

Now my little story which I recall Mr. Salonen was witness to. When I did the interview with Rev. Moon I focused on the point of resurrection. I asked if it was correct that Unificationism does not stress the resurrection. This is your main problem with many traditional theologians. When I asked Rev. Moon the question, there was much muttering in Korean and no answer came. I said to Col. Pak, "He didn't answer my question." and the Colonel said, "He doesn't like your question." I said, "I don't care whether he likes my question; I want an answer to it." More Korean talk followed and the answer came, "He says that if you know as much about our church doctrine as you claim to, you should know the answer to that question yourself." I said, "Well I don't and I want it answered." Finally, we calmed down and had a drink of Ginseng, then the answer came: "We do not use the term resurrection so much; we prefer the term restoration and in our doctrine restoration is the way we interpret and substitute for resurrection." The whole thing then flashed over me. It was true, I should have understood that Rev. Moon was right that you really don't stress the resurrection in the traditional way. You reinterpret the notion of resurrection into restoration.

Klaus Lindner: I was myself quite moved by what Patricia said. Many Catholic women, the largest group of women at Harvard Divinity School, have problems like that within the structures of their church. The reason why it is so important for Unification theology to address that is precisely because we want to transcend that and offer something better. I think we can but the problems are not so much problems we create as problems we haven't been able to resolve completely.

Patricia Zulkosky: Or that we haven't addressed.

Lorine Getz: Occasionally, *Divine Principle* talks about a Father God

who has a Son, and there is kind of a vague openness to the Holy Spirit; this is where the feminist definition keeps entering in. Then everyone says that we don't know much about the feminine aspect of God and we need to work that out. This trinitarian model on the psychological level at least, presupposes a male point of view. There are the two roles that men can specifically relate to, namely, father and son. We don't have any idea of how God works in the "feminine" role of the Holy Spirit. How should I think about that? I certainly know all kinds of things about mother and daughter roles, but I don't know how to relate them to the theological notion of the Holy Spirit. What I plead for both as a feminist and also as a person sympathetic to the Unification movement is space for women to begin to develop their own "trinitarian" models which would begin with a notion of God as mother and daughter and include an undefined "masculine" role as Holy Spirit.

This comes from my Jungian background, but I think Jung can also be a trap. Although Jung moves beyond a trinitarian notion and develops a quaternity model, he then identifies the feminine and evil, which is no help. When Jung discusses the feminine as anima, he starts talking about pornography, virgins, etc. I can't relate to that understanding of woman. Herb Richardson does the same thing in *Nun, Witch and Playmate*. I love Herb dearly, but when he wants to tell me that his book is a theology of sexuality, I want to tell him I don't dream about nuns and witches and playmates. That is only half of the model; I want time to develop my half.

Dagfinn Aslid: Lorine, you theologize in a good Unification style—and with a lot of imagination. On the question that you raised about the development of relationality, I would affirm the use of the Jungian mode of theologizing. It is conducive to inclusiveness of the feminine and stresses sensitivity and the earthiness of what we might call knowledge. Our spirituality affirms secularity in a way that traditional Christianity rejects in its dichotomy between the spiritual and the physical paradigm that can allow us to affirm the feminist position.

Durwood Foster: I would have to respond to Dagfinn later about how process theology relates to Unification theology. One sees an effort

to overcome the contradiction which as Henry Vander Goot says is a real contradiction between monism and dualism. Panentheism is an expression of that. There are an awful lot of things to say along that line. But what I mainly want to do is express appreciation for this extremely stimulating and rich session and particularly, among many other things, for the way in which the problems of sexism have been openly addressed and responded to. One thing that it teaches me about our basic purpose of being here in accord with our rubric of hermeneutics is that surely a cardinal rule of hermeneutics is to have present those who are being talked about and to attempt to listen to them and to respond to them freely and responsibly. I think that has happened here and I am grateful for it.

FOOTNOTES

¹*Outline of the Principle, Level 4* (New York: Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1980).

List of Participants


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