UNIFICATION THEOLOGY

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

Edited by Antony J. Guerra

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Studies in Honor of Professor Young Oon Kim

Contents

Foreword

Professor Young Oon Kim is a rare person whom God has graced with a multitude of talents. This book acknowledges only one dimension of Prof. Kim's life endeavors—her academic labors. My first opportunity to work alongside Prof. Kim, however, was not in the study, as has been the case in recent years, but as a fellow pioneer and missionary from Korea to the United States. As she has excelled in her present academic achievements, so it was the case in the past that she was very fruitful in the mission field. As one of the early important figures in the establishment of the Unification Church in the West, Prof. Kim has labored to bridge the gap between East and West by teaching, through her own example, the best traditions and virtues of both.

I am certain that she will be most grateful that young men and women are continuing the work which she has initiated, to develop Unification theology in a manner expressive of the depth of the Unification religious experience and life. She will be happy to know that this volume which is dedicated in honor of her 70th birthday, is the first collection of essays on Unification topics written entirely by Unificationists to be published in the world. It represents the fruit of the first generation of Western-trained Unification scholars, whom she herself has inspired.

May God continue to bless her in her many efforts,
David S.C. Kim, President
Unification Theological Seminary
August, 1985

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Introduction

Professor Young Oon Kim has placed at the foundation of her academic work an earnest and rigorous study of the Christian theological tradition and the breadth of the world's religious heritage. In so doing, she has established a courageous direction for Unification academic work, from which there can be no retreat. All contributors to this volume have been students in the classroom of Prof. Young Oon Kim.

After graduating from Kwansei Gakuin University in Japan, Young Oon Kim became Professor of New Testament and Comparative Religion at Ewha University, Korea's oldest and most renowned women's college. From 1959-72, Young Oon Kim accepted the call to introduce the teachings of the Unification Church to the West. From 1972 to the present, she returned to academic pursuits and has been engaged in teaching, research and writing. The first three works of this period: *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* and *World Religions* (1976), and *Unification Theology* (1980) express her consistent efforts to construct Unification theology in dialogue with contemporary Christian theological thought as well as the spiritual heritage of the world religions. Professor Kim is equally forthright and unabashed in pointing to both similarities and differences between Unification theology and time honored religious traditions. In *Unification Theology and Christian Thought*, Professor Kim defines the Unification position on such central issues as God, Creation, Sin, Christology, and Eschatology against the backdrop of historic Christianity as well as the divergent contemporary Christian perspectives on the same. In her trilogy, *World Religions*[1] Professor Kim focuses on parallel thematic emphases in the world religions and manifests here her characteristic appreciation for both the metaphysical heights and spiritual profundities of each tradition. In her 1980 publication, Professor Kim examines the influence of the Korean religious heritage as well as Protestant Christianity on Unification teachings. She presents there her mature reflection on Unification theology which she has been developing for nearly thirty years. The scope of the essays in this volume reflects only in part the range of Professor Kim's own scholarly interests.

Section One presents essays discussing the Unification understanding of God with respect to the issues of creation, gender, and the spiritual and physical poles of existence. Jonathan Wells articulates the Unification position in the "creation-evolution controversy." He defines his task as "conceptual clarification" signifying his concern with the ideas rather than with the sociological or historical aspects of the controversy and with the precise delineation of the Unification agreements and disagreements with the positions described rather than the defense of the truth of any given position. Wells

describes the Unification position as creationist to the extent that God is the Creator of all things, and despite debate over whether Unification theology affirms the traditional doctrine of ''creation from nothing'' he argues that it does affirm the intent of this doctrine in rejecting both dualist and pantheist options for conceiving of the Creator. Wells concludes that the Unification view rejects Darwinism, while it affirms the general concept of evolution as it acknowledges a process of orderly changes which extends over hundreds of millions of years and in which later stages are somehow derived from earlier ones. Further, Wells concludes that the Unification position is theistic rather than deistic for its holds that the origin and diversification of living organisms require God's creative energy.

Writing as a Unification feminist, Helen Ball Feddema notes that a theology which makes a clear break with patriarchy, but at the same time does not deny to men their part in the image of God is hard to find. Having reviewed six competing models of the nature of divinity, Feddema argues her preference for the Unification view of God's nature which she claims preserves the divine unity while representing adequately both male and female aspects. Feddema proposes not only that the Unification notion of divine polarity offers a constructive reinterpretation of God's nature as incorporating both male and female elements but also that the Unification emphasis on mutuality and cooperation in this polarity provides a positive model for relations among men and women.

In his meticulously documented study, Theodore Shimmyo, a Japanese Unification theologian, compares the ''dipolar'' conceptions of God in Unification thought and Whitehead. In both instances, God is conceived as constituted by a mental/spiritual as well as physical pole. Although Shimmyo raises some tough questions to Whitehead, particularly whether God has been reduced to only one instantiation of his metaphysical principle and also whether the unity of God is preserved, he credits both Whitehead and Unification theology with conceptualizing God so that the two prominent biblical images of the ''God of eternity'' and the ''Lord of History'' are embraced. Most importantly, for Shimmyo, God is understood in both process thought and Unification thought as a co-sufferer and thus they make possible a more encompassing God-human relationship.

Section Two engages issues intersecting biblical theology and Unification theology. All three articles included in this section utilize a modern scientific approach of biblical criticism. As Andrew Wilson notes at the start of his essay, Prof. Kim in her own works has already moved beyond the biblical literalism which characterizes many of the primary Unification sources. In his provocative article entitled ''The Sexual Interpretation of the Human Fall'' Wilson argues the thesis that historical critical research is supportive of

Unification theology's construal of Genesis 3 as a basis for a sexual interpretation of the human fall. He points, *inter alia*, to a growing consensus among scholars affirming that a polemic against Canaanite fertility cults practicing rites of sacred prostitution is a substratum of the narrative in Genesis 2-3.

Comparing the functions of afterlife concepts and imagery in the communities of the New Testament and of the Unification Church, Whitney Shiner focuses on three areas of concern: consolation of the bereaved, moral exhortation, and relations with the dead. Although Unification shares with New Testament apocalyptic thought the concept of a reward in the afterlife as an incentive for ethical living in this life, Shiner perceives several differences. Rather than awaiting a final judgment scene, Unification understands that after death, one enters immediately into the spiritual world where one's state is directly dependent on the degree to which one has responded to the love of God and has lived out of this love. There is no simple division between the "elect" and the "damned" for in the Unification perspective even the most saintly individual can continue to grow by loving and serving more. Further, he states the Unification view that even after death, persons are capable of growth by cooperating with living persons. Shiner thinks that this last view does not nullify the moral exhortatory function of the after-life concept because Unificationists also believe that to grow in the after life is far more difficult than during one's earthly existence.

In "The Will of God and the Crucifixion of Jesus," Anthony Guerra examines the Unification soteriological formulations in the light of the scholarly consensus as to the most likely genuine logia of Jesus. In this essay, Guerra begins by discussing the formal question of the theological structure of the *Divine Principle's* construal of the mission of Jesus within the context of Creation and Fall and suggests that this approach is congruent with the canonical shape of the Scripture itself. He then raises the critical issue of Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God and distinguishes it from that of contemporary Jewish apocalypticism as well as the early Church's interpretation of Jesus' message. Guerra suggests that Jesus' radical demand to love, to respond to the will of God and his intimate understanding of God as *'Abba'* are compatible with the *Divine Principle's* emphasis that the messianic task is to transform both the spiritual and the material dimensions of the historical order, a radical transformation on the individual as well as the cosmic levels. When the salvation event of cross and resurrection is measured against the criterion of Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God, then this event can only be accounted rightly as a partial realization of the intentions of Jesus and God. Finally, Guerra proposes a reformulation of the *Divine Principle's* assertion concerning spiritual salvation along the lines of the traditional theological (biblical) terminology of justification/sanctification.

In Section Three, Unification practical theology, contributions are found that articulate Unification perspectives on political issues and ethics. In an article entitled ''The Cain-Abel Typology for Restoring Human Relationships,'' Gordon Anderson differentiates the Unificationist use of this biblical typology from that of Augustine for whom Abel and Cain represented respectively the saved and the damned. Anderson points out that the Cain-Abel model in Unificationism can be applied simultaneously on multiple levels (individual, family, tribal, national, and world) and thus presumably the same individual may be understood to warrant both Cain and Abel designations. Anderson argues that as the world is in fact divided into hostile and conflicting groups that the Unification Cain-Abel typology acknowledges this reality and further allows for the judgment to be made that one side is morally and theologically preferable to the other. Anderson is quick to point out, however, that victory is won through the end of conflict and a unity achieved through the self-sacrifice of ''Abel'' to win''Cain'' through love, not violence. Anderson contrasts this Unification approach to that of Marxism which he understands as operatively exploiting resentment, jealousy, revenge, and violence.

In a second article, Guerra articulates the beginnings of a Unification liberation theology. He asserts that the distinctive mark of this theology of liberation is that this task of Liberation from the Unification perspective must be extended to include the liberation of God who suffers as the Parent of all people. Guerra affirms that the religious experience of God who suffers with his children leads not to an otherworldly mysticism but to a fully responsible commitment to world transformation. Guerra confronts two publicly controversial issues of the Unification movement, namely its anticommunism and its mass marriages. Guerra seeks to subordinate the ideological critique of communism to both a theological and humanitarian critique of specific communist regimes and their practices and understands the ideological critique as complementary to the two prior modes of analysis. Finally, Guerra discusses the larger social vision of international and inter-racial harmony and how the Unification family system is conceived of contributing to the accomplishment of these goals.

The articles of Thomas Walsh and Franz Feige represent seminal contributions towards the development of Unification ethics. Whereas Walsh argues that Unification theology implies a form of social organization governed by a vision of the family, which vision he asserts is neither individualistic nor abstractly collectivist, Feige believes that the emphasis on the family in Unification ethics needs to be balanced by both the *imago dei* concept as well as the organic model which are also to be found in Unification sources. Both think that the Unification concept of the ''three blessings'' (see discussion within) offers the theological framework for the articulation of Unification ethics.

Feige, however, also dwells on the dialectic between an ethics based on Creation-Eschatology and an interim ethics of Restoration as fundamental to Unification ethical reflection. Walsh argues that the task of Unification ethics is to redefine practical theology in the "aftermath of Marxism." Both Walsh and Feige are acutely aware that they are wrestling with the foundational questions to be raised in the formulation of a Unification ethical theory.

In Section Four, contributors deal in comparative perspective with some classical issues of Western and Eastern philosophy: theodicy, monism, and the concept of self. Lloyd Eby is a philosopher who is equally comfortable with thinking through matters in either the discursive or metaphorical modalities of discourse and he engages the problem of theodicy at both levels. Eby begins by making four assertions which he believes to be normative for most within the three great monotheistic religions, namely that God exists, that God is the unique Creator, that God is good, and finally that God is omnipotent. Eby doubts all four assertions can be sustained in the face of a fifth assertion readily allowed by the same religious traditions, i.e., that there is evil in the world. In reviewing the classic Christian responses to theodicy from Irenaeus to the Reformers and such contemporaries as Alvin Plantinga and John Hick, Eby helps confirm his skepticism as each seems to relinquish one or more of the four assertions of monotheism (most usually the omnipotence factor although the reformers struck at the assertion that God is good). Eby finds that the problem of natural evil is most intractable. He turns towards what he terms an "existential" theodicy which he finds cogently expressed in *The Brothers Karamazov* wherein Dostoevsky adduces the genuine goodness of Father Zosima as the only response to the indictments made by the Grand Inquisitor against God. Eby maintains that this "existential" theodicy is most compatible with Unification emphasis on remembering the lives of exemplary religious figures throughout the ages.

James Fleming provides us with a review of the thought of Paul Carus and points to several of his concerns which are shared by Unification theology, most particularly the vision of unity between science and religion and of the unity among all religions. Carus played an important role in the 1893 Parliament of Religions in Chicago which the Unification movement has made plans to commemorate on its centennial. Carus espoused a "monistic" conception of reality and understood there to be laws residing in things which depend on God as their source and are discovered, not created, by the scientist. Carus, however, did not contend that there is only one substance in the world either spiritual or material, but rather that there are two dimensions of one and the same reality. In accord with his conviction that science and religion are not contradictory but complementary, Carus became an enthusiastic advocate of Biblical criticism. Having encountered representatives of Buddhism at the

Parliament of Religions, Carus came to appreciate Buddhism for its eminently scientific worldview and thereafter encouraged Buddhist missionaries to come to the West so as to promote interreligious understanding at a grassroots level.

In an experimental venture, David Carlson and Thomas Selover present an example of the Unification dialogical approach to the encounter with other religions, in this case Buddhism. Acknowledging fundamental differences between the Buddhist concept of Anatta (no-self) and the Unification understanding of the fallen self, they nonetheless find three areas of agreement between them: 1) relationality, 2) the falseness of the fallen self, and 3) a large and compassionate vision of life. Selover and Carlson note that both Unification theology and classical Buddhism view human life in a context wider than just one lifetime. The authors point to the correlation between the Buddhist doctrine of karma and the Unification teaching on sin which affirms collective and inherited dimensions that determine the individual's real conditions of existence. In their ascetic practices both Unificationists and Buddhists eschew the extremes of self-mortification which is understood by the former to enhance self-righteousness and by the latter to heighten the illusion of the ''self.'' For Unificationism, however, ascetic practice has the purpose of re-orienting sense experience towards God whereas in Buddhism the overcoming of craving leads to the awareness of no-self.

I wish to express my gratitude to all the contributors to this volume, to Farley and Betsy Jones who gave me encouragement at several critical moments during this work, to Thomas Selover who first suggested to me the idea of a Festschrift for Prof. Kim, to Patricia Gleason who helped in the final stages of preparation of manuscripts, to the publication staff of the Unification Theological Seminary, in particular, to Ann Stadelhofer, Elizabeth E. Colford, Kerry Pobanz, Carol DeMicco Pobanz and Angela Eisenbart, who were responsible for the production of the volume, and finally to President David S.C. Kim for his offer to publish as well as to write the Foreword to this volume.

Anthony J. Guerra
Cambridge, Massachusetts

VISION FOR THE WEST

by Dr. Young Oon Kim

When I was sent as a pioneer missionary to America I felt, first of all, that I had to operate by trial and error to find my way in a new society. I could keep my faith as I ventured out alone, because for one thing, I had a strong faith in God and many spiritual experiences. For another, I knew that Father was truly depending on me and had shown me deep love. Whatever happened, I didn't want to fail him. And finally, I personally have a strong sense of responsibility in my nature; once I started something, I just had to fulfill it. I couldn't afford to get discouraged. Since I am, by character, a mission-oriented person and my mind is always busy, I never allowed any experience of loneliness to remain for more than a few minutes.

I KNEW FATHER'S CONCERN

For four years in the Seoul Church I lived under the same roof as Father. At one point I went home to clean my family's house for a little over a week. One day while I was sweeping the entrance way, Father suddenly appeared, life-sized, in front of my door. I never saw such a life-sized vision before. He testified that he woke up every morning and looked across the Han River, longing for me to come back. He missed me and wanted me to be living in the Church, even though I had been gone only one week.

So, you see, every morning as a missionary, far across the ocean, I felt that Father woke up and thought of me. Before I left, in fact, Father had asked me to write to him every three days, but I said once a week would be enough to report to him. As a loving parent with concern for this American Mission, he wanted to hear details about every person I talked with and every development; in fact, Father wrote and phoned me a few times to ask how things were going.

LACK OF MONEY PLAGUED US

When I left Korea, the government only allowed me to take $30 with me. I had to leave my other money behind and it did not reach me for some time.

Arriving in Eugene, Oregon, I went to the University Student Advisor. He told me that since I was older, I wouldn't like living in the dormitory (I couldn't have afforded it anyway). He directed me to a Catholic widow with four children who needed someone to help her with her family; fortunately she lived right next to the campus and I was able to get room and board there. I had no money for a new suit that first winter and I ended up wearing a navy wool suit I had had in Toronto, years earlier. The first American members I found all thought I was just an ascetic, but I was literally too poor to be anything else at the time.

In the earliest American Church we had no businesses or enterprises to support ourselves. All of the members got their own jobs and contributed to our work. Unless we made a major purchase, I didn't even get involved in the daily finances. I was able to earn a little myself by tutoring professors and Peace Corps people in Korean and by selling cosmetics. From this effort I was able to save enough to finance the printing of *The Divine Principle and Its Application*. Whenever we needed to purchase something, the members freely donated out of their own personal resources.

TO INTEREST STRANGERS IS NEVER EASY

How did I begin the American family? To me there is little difference between witnessing to Westerners or Easterners. What is difficult, no matter where you are, is to go up and speak to any stranger. Naturally, I was looking for people who were searching. My approach, when I first arrived in America, was to meet someone in a quiet place. On Sundays I began visiting churches, hoping to approach someone after the service. But everyone would rush right away. So I decided to attend weekly meetings at Christians' homes. Because I needed a ride I asked someone to pick me up for their prayer meeting.

On this occasion, I attended a young adult group of about a dozen people and just observed. Two young women spoke more courageously than the others, so I approached them at the end and asked if I could phone them. Thus, I called Eileen Welsh Lemmers upon my return home and she expressed interest and responded. We met and I gave her a testimony of my religious experiences. She seemed to think that I had more to offer than just

an ordinary person; on that foundation I gave her a copy of my lecture on Creation. She expressed interest to hear more.

Then I got in touch with the other woman, Doris (Walder) Orme. I shared my spiritual experiences and she told me about hers. I also offered her my manuscript, since it was awkward to lecture to only one person. Doris' husband was supportive. Because Doris had had spiritual experiences of her own, it was hard for her to be so open to what I had to say and she was reluctant to come back, but her husband encouraged her to study more. Doris introduced me to her friend, Pauline (Phillips) Verheyen, who was sick at home. After I visited Pauline, she said the "numbness" from which she was suffering left her. She felt that I had healed her.

I met a young man who spoke in tongues. When I gave him chapters on the Principle he had very dramatic experiences. For example, he saw "Chapter Two" enacted like a movie in a vision. On the day before he read this chapter, the spirit of St. Paul urged this man to hear more. Because of this, I felt encouraged that God worked in such a dramatic way.

This gave me courage to seek spiritual people, so I started attending services at a Church of God, where people were speaking in tongues. Someone gave me a ride home in their car. I invited the woman to join a small prayer meeting I had started. This lady (in her early forties) was very spiritual and possessed a very clear mind. At one meeting she said she had a vision of Jesus while I was praying. Another time she said she saw a bright crystal stone on which I was sitting and a bright crown on my head.

I explained to them that the teaching I was offering was a bright solid rock of truth. I also visited the Quaker Church nearby. I stood up and spoke at one of their meetings. I was invited by a doctor in attendance to come and share more. He even offered to sponsor Father to come to America at that time.

So my witnessing progressed in that way, one contact after another. I didn't have so much time since I was going to school. To pay my room and board I took care of four children and did some cooking as well. I found that witnessing seemed impossible on the college campus; I was older than most of the students and they would all rush away after classes. There were no chances to talk deeply with anyone.

REACHING OUT TO A WIDER AUDIENCE

In order to reach more people, I wrote an article on Jesus and sent it to 72 Christian magazines to publish, but most of them responded with

various explanations as to why they couldn't print it. I also wrote letters to prominent Christian leaders, whose replies offered their polite disagreements with my thinking. By this time, Doris started to grasp the Principle and became the most active, speaking to all her friends.

MOVING TOGETHER

By this time, I had a room in a women's club. I had to pay $15 a month rent, but no one knew my financial situation. Without my saying anything, Galen Pumphrey invited me to come to the Oak Hills area (in the outskirts of Eugene) and live with them in one of their houses. So that I wouldn't be alone, George Norton stayed with me and bought my food. So, through George and Galen I was supported. It was there that I retranslated the Principle. We were about to find the money to print 500 copies. Faithfully and loyally, these friends supported me.

Every night our little group would gather and I would use this time to raise them up. I traveled to Salem and Albany, Oregon to speak to spiritually-oriented individuals and groups. There I found ladies whom I met with weekly and began to teach them the Principle. One of these ladies asked me directly, "Who is Reverend Moon?" I told her to pray about it. She received a revelation which told her that he was the "Third Adam." Also, at this time, Father shipped me some special food from his Blessing Celebration, and when I shared it with them, she received the message that it was from the Marriage of the Lamb. When I left Oregon, however, I lost contact with many of these people.

MOVE TO CALIFORNIA

Doris and Pauline decided to leave their homes and families in order to be free to fully dedicate themselves to the mission. So that their husbands would not accuse me, they felt it was best for them to leave without my knowledge. Although I never asked them to separate from their husbands, they felt a strong spiritual push to no longer live a married life. Although Korean members had separated like this, I didn't want to jeopardize such a small movement by asking such a sacrifice—but spirit world pushed them. They phoned me after they crossed the state border and settled in Fresno, California. Since there was no place in Eugene to bind my books, I had to either go to Portland or San Francisco. I decided that San Francisco was a more cosmopolitan city; thus, George and I left to join Doris and Pauline. Galen and Patty Pumphrey followed us later.

THE UNIFIED FAMILY CENTER

In San Francisco we rented two flats in a three-story house where we all lived together. We called ourselves, for the first time, the "Unified Family Center." Everyone found a job and I stayed at home where I taught Principle, revised my book, and studied law books in order to incorporate our Church in America. One of our new members, Ursula Shuman, met Peter Koch. He was a Berkeley student but he couldn't seem to concentrate on his studies. After he came over and heard lectures, he immediately accepted. He also had a vivid spiritual experience about the way his father had been killed in the Second World War, which helped to strengthen his faith. Peter tried witnessing, but one on one witnessing was difficult for him, so he finally wrote a letter to all the foreign students at Berkeley; from that effort Edwin Ang came.

At that time, I was still teaching informally. We read through my Principle book together. Peter used to say, "The kitchen is the best place. She always explains things best in the kitchen." We also made a couple of tape-recordings of the Principle because many people came to hear different sections of the Principle.

PERSECUTION

Eventually, we moved to the Masonic St. house. It was there that we actually started lecturing. We hung a sign out in front of the Masonic house and at first it didn't cause any problem with the neighbors because I always swept the streets. Then one day, an official came and announced that we couldn't have such a center. I felt I had to go and explain to him what we were doing. Whenever I went to explain, I felt the spirit of God always filled me, and consequently this official was very moved. He told me then that it had been a neighbor who complained about our sign. He was really a very sympathetic man.

One other early experience of persecution came in San Francisco when one of our members gave a minister of a large church a copy of the Principle. He began denouncing us from the pulpit as being the work of Satan and wrote out a check in payment for the book made out "To This Heretic." We decided to save it for history, and I still have it today. These small incidents were really nothing to me. External persecution was at a minimum because I was discreet and low-keyed in my witnessing; I quietly approached the most prepared people and did not cause things to be stirred up. I didn't want the movement in its infancy to be strangled by a heavy reaction.

SEEKING CAPABLE LEADERS

But inwardly I suffered, because many of the early members lacked a sense of the larger mission we were striving for and the level of responsibility involved. Too easily they were satisfied with just filling daily routines and felt pride in minimal accomplishments. Some of the new college educated members eagerly wanted to take the leadership, but they had so little foundation. I couldn't help feeling impatient with them.

We tried all sorts of ways to reach people at that time. We went out on the streets and parks with signs, banners and loudspeakers. This never brought any real results. As a witnessing method, we made ourselves available to people who were thinking of committing suicide; that brought us many phone calls, but no result.

The idea when I set out was that I should bring the Principle message across the water, and then the Americans who joined should develop their own movement. But I had trouble finding really dedicated members. I found that American members, many of whom were college graduates, wanted to accept positions of responsibility. And because of their capability level, I wanted to pass the major responsibilities on to them, while I could be more free to creatively experiment with new approaches.

For instance, one brother, who was a trained linguist, wanted to lecture and be made president of the American movement, thinking this position would bring him closer to Father. But when I agreed to it, he really wasn't very active. Sometimes he and I would go together to teach someone. He had a very smooth lecture, ''like running water,'' but he didn't touch the listeners' hearts. They would end up saying, ''Let the Oriental Lady talk.'' Finally he agreed to go pioneering in Texas and begin at the bottom.

YOUNG MEMBERS WENT OUT TO OTHER CITIES, STATES & COUNTRIES

From the beginning, my idea was to build our movement in America by beginning in one city until we had many members. Then we could move onto the state and regional levels and then impact the whole United States. But Father sent David S. C. Kim and Colonel Pak (and later Mr. Choi) as missionaries to America as well, and we were located in different cities. This, and our separate groups, made unity very difficult to achieve.

Before long, Father asked me to send my spiritually young American members out pioneering to different states. Some of them could do it, but some were not strong enough. You have to remember that Japan, for instance, is barely the size of Wyoming, and America is many times the size of Wyoming.

Then Father told me to send out people to other countries. Doris went to Italy, Paul Werner to Austria, Ursula to Spain, Peter to Germany and Teddy went to Holland. I went to England, myself, to pioneer with only one month's rent to my name. But I knew that America was the key nation in the worldwide providence. Father did not want me to keep too many people, but how could I strengthen and expand and still send people out? Father was *so anxious* to bring the Principle to *all* the western world.

Then we moved to Washington, D.C., and I had to return to Korea briefly. Philip Burley came and he was freshly enthusiastic. Then Jim and Mary Fleming joined. Mary was quite spiritual and contributed an internal guide. Soon Rebecca (Salonen), Hillie (Edwards) and Sylvia (Norton) moved in, and Sylvia began working with me on writing projects.

Philip and Farley Jones both tried to handle the assignment of American family leadership, but at that time they were not fully prepared for such responsibility and I was anxious for them. Travis Jones, Gio Mathis, Vivan (Burley) and Neil Salonen came and we developed more V.O.C. I tried my best to use this approach to raise up American leadership. I realized that they were educated and ambitious. But I found that, if I scolded Americans all the time they became incapacitated, so I worked behind the scenes, trying to encourage them to do things more voluntarily. If members were well educated, I expected more—but even so, the goal we should accomplish was always so far away.

I always tried to teach the members that witnessing was important for their own faith and growth. I wanted them to understand the fundamental principle of this, rather than telling them what to do every day. My vision and my mission were so vast that I could never feel satisfied with the level of our work.

EXPANDING CENTERS

We were all living in the Upshur St. house at that time. Then we bought the Varnum St. house before Father came in 1972 to settle down. Father held training sessions in San Francisco and directed David Kim and I to serve as I.W.'s on IOWC teams across America.

Soon Philip had located the Belvedere Estate. A medium in Korea had once told me quietly that I had personal responsibility to build a temple on this earth for Father. When I first saw Belvedere, I understood what she had said. I began negotiating with the owner of Belvedere, and our College Park, Maryland group began making and selling candles to raise funds. In

completing the purchase there were four major obstacles, but each time the agent, with large bright eyes, stuck by us, maintaining that he had "promised an Oriental Lady." It was now my mission to prepare the down payment, so I toured the family centers, encouraging them to make donations from candle sales.

WRITING

One day Father asked me what I wanted to do. I shared with him that I wanted to write three books: one on theology, one on world religions and one on spirit world. Father approved, but asked me to reserve the book on spirit world a while "because there are so many changes taking place in the spiritual world."

I must say that through the witness of my few books, I have reached far away and over time. My books were well received in America, but people with whom we are associated from all over the world write to me and thank me at conferences. They tell me they like my books because they are so clear and useful for study and teaching. My deepest desire now is to send my theology books where there is great spiritual hunger, but where I cannot travel.

I don't often look back, but I can say that America has been the best country for my kind of work. I really chose to come to this country. Once I began here, I knew there would be no going back. On the Fourth of July this year, with all the Statue of Liberty celebration, I could only thank God again and again for allowing me to work in this country.

After I finished my books, the Seminary opened and Father asked me to come and teach. In the past 11 years I have taught hundreds of students and shared many things with them; it certainly has been a most profitable time.

In America I have had many intimate experiences with God. I have always worked with God leading me. I hope that a great harvest can be reaped by God from my small effort. One thing I have learned is that whenever I am rejected in some way, a better way always opens up for me. I never shared my suffering with Father. That is because I believe it is the result that counts; if the results are good then suffering takes on meaning. If I have offered my work with selfless motivation, then it is never lost, no matter how far we still are from the goal.

I am now on the edge of a new mission. The world mission is waiting for me. I'd like to devote the rest of my life to meeting, comforting and inspiring our family throughout our world missions.

SECTION ONE:
UNIFICATION THEOLOGY
ON GOD AND CREATION

THE CREATION-EVOLUTION CONTROVERSY AND UNIFICATION THEOLOGY

by Jonathan Wells

The controversies which erupted with the publication of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859 are far from over. The continued vitality of the creation-evolution controversy in the United States, in particular, is symptomatic of an unresolved conflict over the religious implications of Darwin's theory of evolution. The precise nature of the conflict, however, remains a matter of dispute. Is it a conflict between the divinely revealed chronology of the Bible and materialistic pseudo-science? Is it a conflict between enlightened modern science and crude backwoods fundamentalism? Or are there more subtle issues involved which are obscured by the well-publicized battles between partisans of these two positions?

The first two parts of this essay are an attempt to answer these questions by distinguishing various meanings of "creation" and "evolution," and thus to demonstrate the complexity of the conceptual issues involved in the controversy. The third part of this essay attempts to sketch a Unification position on creation and evolution, and to locate the Unification position in the context of the general controversy.

All three parts of this essay are exercises in conceptual clarification: "conceptual," in the sense that my primary concern is with ideas rather than with the historical or sociological aspects of the controversy; and "clarification," in the sense that my primary concern is to identify areas of possible agreement or disagreement rather than to determine the truth or falsity of any particular position. In other words, although I write as a Unification theologian, it is not my purpose here to defend the truth of Unification theology against opposing views, but merely to clarify its relationship to some of the issues involved in the creation-evolution controversy.

Creation

Generally speaking, to "create" is to "bring into existence"; and to call God the Creator of the universe means, at the very least, that God somehow brought the entire universe into existence. Someone who is a "creationist" in this general sense, however, could take any one of several different positions with respect to the origin and diversification of living organisms. These various positions can be broadly divided into two categories, "deistic" and "theistic," depending on whether they consider God's creative activity to cease or continue after the initial creation of the universe.

Deistic positions attribute the initial creation of the universe to God, but maintain that everything thereafter is left to the operation of created but autonomous laws. The origin of life is general and the origin of species in particular (assuming they do not coincide with the origin of the universe), would then be due to the ordinary forces of nature, operating independently of God's guidance or intervention. Among the adherents of deistic positions are those who believe in God as the Creator but maintain that all events subsequent to the "big bang" are explicable solely in terms of natural laws.

Darwin's position, at least in his Origin of Species, seems to have been basically deistic, with one significant exception. Although he was willing to attribute the origin of the universe to a Creator, and although he assumed that the present diversity of living organisms is wholly explicable in scientific terms, without any reference to divine action, he exempted the origin of life from this assumption. Instead, he assumed that life was "originally breathed into a few forms or into one," perhaps by a Creator; and his theory attempted to account only for the subsequent modification of those primordial forms.[1] Almost all modern Darwinists, however, take the more consistently naturalistic view that the origin of life was due solely to natural causes.

Another position which can be considered basically deistic maintains that all natural events subsequent to the origin of the universe, including the emergence of *Homo sapiens*, are explicable solely in terms of natural laws; but that when *Homo sapiens* first appeared, God bestowed a supernatural and immortal soul on each individual. In other words, God did not guide the evolutionary process but was content to let it take its natural course, and merely awaited the emergence of an organism suitable for the reception of a soul. According to this position, however, the

rudimentary forms of intellect, emotion and will which are found in "lower" animals are produced solely by natural causes. Presumably, then, the intellect, emotion and will which have traditionally been considered attributes of the human soul are likewise produced by natural causes; and the necessity for God's involvement in the origin of the human soul seems to be limited to the bestowal of supernatural attributes such as immortality.

Positions which historically have been called "theistic" to distinguish them from the basically deistic views described above consider the origin of life, in general, and the origin of the major kinds of plants and animals in particular, to be due not to the autonomous operation of natural processes but to God's direct control over, or periodic intervention in, those processes. According to theistic creationists, God's creative activity is a necessary factor in the emergence and development of living organisms, especially at crucial junctures marked by the appearance of significantly new organs, adaptations, or life forms. The difference between deistic and theistic views is analogous to the difference between a machine which is programmed to perform according to pre-determined instructions and a device which is controlled by a human operator.[2]

It is possible to distinguish two types of theistic creationism, depending on whether God's activity is interpreted as control or intervention. The former implies that natural processes are such that God can use them without suspending them; in other words, the chain of natural causes is connected, in some sense and at some level, to God. The latter implies that God chooses to suspend or ignore natural processes and to act supernaturally or miraculously instead. The former might be considered analogous to the use of tools by a human agent; the latter, to the extent that it is conceivable at all, might be considered a sheer act of will, making no use of any natural means. The distinction between control and intervention is not as sharp as it first appears, however, since in the former case God would presumably set the chain of natural causes in motion by something like a sheer act of will; and in the latter case God's act of will would have to impinge on natural processes at some point if it were to make any difference in the world. The two types are alike, moreover, in implying that natural science would be unable in principle to give a full explanation of the origin and diversity of living organisms, since no explanation would be complete without taking God's agency into account.

The so-called "Scientific Creationism" which currently figures so

prominently in controversies in the United States can be considered a variant of the "intervention" type of theistic position. According to Scientific Creationism, living organisms were not created at the same instant as the universe, nor did they evolve over a long period of time; instead, the major kinds of plants and animals were created by the direct intervention of God during the six days following the creation of the universe, and have persisted essentially unchanged ever since.[3] Significant features of this view include: (a) its emphasis on the immutability of the major kinds of plants and animals; and (b) its reliance on a literal interpretation of biblical chronology.

The "immutability of kinds" involves at least two conceptual difficulties, the first of which is the difficulty of defining "kinds." Some religious critics of evolution have, at times, equated kinds with biological species, asserting that all species have been specially created by God and that they have remained essentially unchanged since their initial creation. This simple equation is problematic, however, partly because the biological definition of species is itself problematic, and partly because there is scientific evidence that some species (at least, according to some definitions of species) have arisen solely by natural means. But if kinds do not correspond to species, they do not clearly correspond to any other taxonomic category, either. No precise definition is found in the Bible, which includes vegetation, plants, fruit trees, fish, birds, cattle, creeping things, beasts of the earth, and human beings among the divinely created kinds. Many religious critics of evolution, therefore, have not attempted to offer a precise definition of kinds; instead, they have confined themselves to asserting that the basic kinds (or types, or forms) of living things were created by God, while acknowledging that their diversification into what are now designated species by biologists may have resulted solely from the operation of natural causes.

A second conceptual difficulty involved in the "immutability of kinds" is the notion of "immutability," or changelessness. The difficulty stems from a logical dilemma: *can* one kind (defined as a group of organisms which are essentially similar) change essentially into another, or does the first kind merely cease to exist once all extant organisms have become essentially different? In other words, is immutability merely a logical consequence of the definition of kind, and therefore tautological? If it is not, then presumably it amounts to the claim that all kinds are original (i.e., that no kind is derived from any other kind), and possibly to the

additional claim that all kinds are permanent (i.e., that no kind ever becomes extinct). If immutability were defined in terms of underivability (with or without permanence), and if kinds could be suitably defined, then the immutability of kinds might conceivably be both meaningful and true. But it is *not* necessarily implied by the general concept of creation: permanence of biological kinds is not required by either deistic or theistic creationism, and underivability would be required by theistic creationism *only* if derivability were defined in such a way as to exclude divine control and intervention. In other words, a person may be a creationist and nevertheless consistently maintain that major kinds of plants and animals were derived from other kinds (which may now be extinct), though a theistic creationist would want to add that the process of derivation requires God's control or intervention.

A second significant feature of Scientific Creationism, and the one which most sharply distinguishes it from other creationist positions, is its reliance on a literal interpretation of biblical chronology. Despite scientific evidence that the earth is billions of years old and that living organisms have been evolving for hundreds of millions of years, Scientific Creationists interpret literally the six days of creation in Genesis and the genealogies in the Old Testament which seem to fix the age of the earth at about six thousand years. The major difficulty with this chronological fundamentalism is that it can be maintained only at the expense of ignoring or discounting a considerable body of scientific evidence to the contrary. The most common way Scientific Creationists discount such evidence is to point out that geological dating methods are based on the principle that processes such as erosion, sedimentation, and radioactive decay have been occurring at a more or less uniform rate since the origin of the earth; and that this principle of uniformity cannot be proved, but must be assumed, like an article of faith.[4] Regardless of the merits or demerits of this argument, it should be noted that the chronology issue is conceptually distinct from the issue of creation, and that neither deistic nor theistic creationism necessarily entails any particular chronological claims.

The preceding list of positions, of course, is not exhaustive. Other combinations and permutations are possible. It is not necessary, however, to list all possible variations on these themes. It is sufficient to note that there is a whole spectrum of views which could, in some sense, be called "creationist," and that there are important distinctions between them. In particular, it is important to note the distinction between deistic and

theistic creationism, and the fact that theistic creationism does not
necessarily imply either the immutability of biologial kinds or a literal
interpretation of biblical chronology.

Evolution

Similarly, there is a whole spectrum of views which could be called
"evolutionist," some of which are quite compatible with some of the
creationist views presented above. Etymologically, "evolution" means
"unrolling," and it was first used in biology nearly two centuries ago to
refer to the development of any embryo. Partly because of its embryological
connotations, and partly because of its close association with the philosophy
of Herbert Spencer, Darwin rarely used the term, preferring instead the
phrase "descent with modification." As used in modern biology, however,
evolution refers in its most general sense to the series of more or less
orderly changes exhibited by the origin and diversification of living
organisms, in which later stages are somehow derived from earlier ones.

It is possible to distinguish several different levels of evolution.
First, evolution may refer to inheritable changes within a single species
which develop over the course of several generations, such as the evolution
of antibiotic resistance in bacteria, or the evolution of certain color patterns
in moths which make them less visible to predatory birds. Second, evolution
may refer to the origin of a new species, marked by the first appearance of
a morphologically different organism in the fossil record, or by the
establishment of permanent reproductive isolation between two previously
interbreeding populations. Third, evolution may refer to large-scale changes
which transcend the origin of any particular species, such as the emergence
of complex organs (e.g., eyes), or the origin of major new taxonomic
groups. The first level (sometimes called "microevolution") is much more
accessible to direct scientific observation, and is therefore better understood,
than the second and third levels (sometimes called "macroevolution").

The concept of evolution embraces both the temporal and spatial
patterns which are the effect of change, and the *processes* which are the cause
of change. The *patterns* of organic evolution are so well documented by the
fossil record, geological dating methods, and the geographical distribution
of extant species, that this aspect of evolution might justifiably be called a
"fact." The *processes* responsible for evolutionary change, on the other
hand, are not so well understood, and it would be more accurate to
describe the current state of understanding of such processes as "theory"

rather than fact. These distinctions between pattern and process, and between fact and theory, must not, of course, be pressed too far: pattern and process, as well as fact and theory, are inseparably related, and cannot be understood in isolation from each other. Nevertheless, it is undeniably true that far more is known about *when* and *where* new forms of life evolved than is known about *how* they evolved.

Theories about the processes of evolution, if they are to be considered "scientific" in the modern sense of the word, must attempt to explain those processes in terms of natural causes, without referring to divine activity. Since a scientific theory must be testable (which usually means that observations obtained by one experimenter must be reproducible by others), and since an act of God (even if it were observable as such) would presumably be reproducible only by God, references to divine activity are methodologically excluded from scientific explanations. It should be noted, however, that the methodological assumption that references to divine activity must be excluded from science does not require the much stronger metaphysical assumption that God never acts in nature. It may be that some natural phenomena do, in fact, depend on God's activity, and that only some aspects of such phenomena are accessible to scientific investigation and explanation.

Although some philosophers and scientists have questioned whether Darwin's theory is scientific in the sense of being testable, it is certainly scientific in the sense of attempting to explain the evolutionary process (at least, subsequent to the origin of the first primordial form or forms) solely in terms of natural causes. Those causes, according to Darwin, are natural selection and random variation. Arguing by analogy from artificial selection, whereby a breeder selects for reproduction only those plants or animals with the most desirable characteristics, Darwin attributed changes within wild species to "natural selection," whereby the struggle for survival permits the maturation and reproduction of only those plants and animals which possess the "fittest" characteristics in a given environment. Then, arguing by analogy from changes *within* species, Darwin attributed differences *between* species (and all higher taxonomic categories) to the same process extended over longer periods of time.[5]

One conceptual difficulty with Darwin's theory is the notion of "fittest": sometimes fittest is defined retroactively by observing which organisms happen to survive, in which case "survival of the fittest" is a mere tautology; though it is possible to avoid this tautology by defining

fittest in terms of specific capacities in a given environment. Another difficulty with the theory is what many critics consider to be its overly simplistic assumption that the same process which may account for microevolution is also capable of accounting for macroevolution. Scientifically, Darwinism has difficulty accounting for the fact that new species generally seem to appear rather suddenly in the fossil record, whereas the theory predicts gradual transitions between species. It should be noted, however, that these are difficulties with Darwin's particular theory about the process of evolution, not with the concept of evolution *per se*.

Darwin was convinced that the process of natural selection (i.e., survival of the fittest) acting upon random variations (i.e., the slight differences between individuals in any given species) could account for evolution without invoking any sort of divine guidance or design. Although he was willing to concede that the laws of nature (including the law of natural selection) were designed by God, Darwin differed from many nineteenth-century biologists in claiming that specific organs and adaptations were *not* designed by God, but were merely by-products of the struggle for survival. For example, an animal does not possess eyes because God designed it to be able to see; instead, an animal possesses eyes because its remote ancestors accidentally acquired a rudimentary sensitivity to light which gave them a slight advantage over their competitors in the struggle for survival, and because this same interaction of random variation and natural selection gradually produced increasingly complex and more efficient organs of sight. Darwin rejected the suggestion that some variations might have been designed by God, or that God guided the evolutionary process in any way. Variations are accidental, and natural selection has no "design" other than survival. Therefore, although God may have ordained the evolutionary process, according to Darwin's theory no particular outcome of that process is foreordained.[6]

It is clear from this discussion that the relationships among the concepts of creation, evolution, and design are fairly complex. First, the relation between creation and evolution seems to be that 1) deistic creation is compatible with evolution; 2) versions of theistic creation which admit the derivability of biological kinds are compatible with evolution, so long as evolution is not defined in such a way as to exclude God's control or intervention; but 3) the particular version of theistic creation known as

Scientific Creationism, with its emphasis on the immutability of biological kinds, is *not* compatible with evolution. Second, evolution may be related to design in such a way that 4) evolution is undesigned in any sense; 5) evolution is undesigned except perhaps in the general sense that natural laws are designed (Darwin's mature position); 6) *some* particular products of evolution (e.g., some organs, adaptations, or organisms) are produced by design; or 7) *every* particular detail of living organisms (right down to the number of hairs on a head) is produced by design. Finally, design and creation are related to the extent that 8) deistic creation presumably implies that natural laws are designed by God, though particular products of the evolutionary process may or may not be designed; while 9) theistic creation, with its emphasis on God's guidance of the evolutionary process, implies that at least some particular products of evolution are designed. According to 1), 5), and 8), a deistic creationist who believes that the process of evolution is designed, but that the specific pattern resulting from evolution is undesigned, can be a Darwinist; 3) indicates that a Scientific Creationist cannot even be an evolutionist, much less a Darwinist; while 2), 5) and 9) lead to the conclusion that a theistic creationist who is not a Scientific Creationist can be an evolutionist, but not a Darwinist.

It is possible, of course, to argue that the distinctions outlined here are too simplistic. For example, some people might maintain that there are versions of Darwinism which do not exclude design as rigorously as the version I have presented here. The most important point, however, is that creation and evolution are not mutually exclusive. Between the extremes of Scientific Creationism and Darwinism there are numerous positions which are compatible with both creation and evolution. Of particular relevance is the position taken by a creationist who accepts as fact the pattern of evolution (and who thus rejects Scientific Creationism), but who maintains that the process of evolution is guided by God (and who thus rejects Darwinism as well).

Unification

Defining a Unification position on creation and evolution is not a simple matter, partly because the sources for doctrinal authority within the Unification movement are still undergoing development, and partly because the interpretation of such sources inevitably leaves room for a certain amount of disagreement. In fact, I have met some members of the Unification movement who could be called Scientific Creationists, and others who could be called Darwinists, though the vast majority belong to

neither extreme. What follows, however, is not based on a survey of the opinions of members of the Unification movement; instead, it is based on my understanding of the teachings of the movement's founder, Sun Myung Moon, as reflected in some of his own statements and in various books written by his Korean followers. Among the latter, I rely in particular on *Divine Principle* (1973), an English translation of *Wol-li Kang-ron* (1966), by Hyo Won Eu; *The Divine Principle Study Guide* (1973), by Young Whi Kim; *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (1976) and *Unification Theology* (1980), by Young Oon Kim; *Outline of the Principle: Level Four* (1980), by Chung Hwan Kwak; and *Explaining Unification Thought* (1981), by Sang Hun Lee.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the Unification position is creationist. In the most general sense, to call God the Creator is to assert that the universe owes its existence to God, and that God's existence is independent of the universe. According to Divine Principle, "God is the Creator of all things," the "First Cause of the world of creation," and "the source of the energy which enables all things to maintain their existence"; yet God remains "eternally self-existent, transcendent of time and space." Some theologians have objected that the Unification doctrine of creation is incompatible with the traditional doctrine of creation from nothing, since in the Unification view matter is derived from God's "Universal Prime Energy," and the relationship between God and the universe is compared to the relationship between mind and body. The theological function of the doctrine of creation from nothing, however, is to affirm God's creatorship in opposition to cosmogonic dualism and pantheism. Cosmogonic dualism, which maintains that matter is distinct from and co-eternal with God, denies that the universe owes its very existence to God; and pantheism, which identifies God with the universe, denies that God's existence is independent of the universe. The Unification doctrine of creation, on the other hand, consistently affirms these essential elements of God's creatorship, and thus is neither dualist nor pantheist, but creationist.[7]

Furthermore, there can be little doubt that Unification creationism is theistic rather than deistic. *Explaining Unification Thought* maintains that the origin of life cannot be accounted for on the basis of natural laws alone, since "life can only be created by God." According to *The Divine Principle Study Guide,* "the transition between lower beings and higher beings" on the evolutionary scale "indicates the continuous addition of

God's creative energy, heart, intellect, will and creativity." A 1976 speech by Sun Myung Moon asserts that the "stage-by-stage progression" whereby living things "developed into more complex and higher beings" would have been "absolutely impossible" without God's creative energy, and that living organisms have evolved rather than deteriorated only because of the periodic addition of "outside energy" by "the first causal being." Clearly, the Unification position is that God did not leave the origin and diversification of life to autonomous natural laws, but either controlled or intervened in the operation of those laws to create the biological realm.[8]

The Unification doctrine of creation also maintains that at least some specific aspects of the biological realm were created by design. According to *Divine Principle,* God's "original purpose of creation" was to establish a heavenly kingdom, physical as well as spiritual, inhabited by human beings who reflect God's character in such a way as to bring God joy. Therefore, the plan to create human beings in God's image preceded the actual creation of the universe. In some 1965 remarks on creation and evolution, Sun Myung Moon stated that "the whole being, physical and spiritual, is created in God's image," in the sense that "the body is created to conform with the mind, and the mind is created to conform with God." *Unification Theology* also interprets God's image as being, in some sense, physical as well as spiritual: part of the purpose of creation "was for God to be able to express Himself in a physical way," and "we could say that God created man to be His body." God's design, however, is not limited to human beings. Furthermore, the 1976 speech referred to above calls the human organism "the model of the existing world," after which all other aspects of the universe were patterned. Expanding on this theme, *Explaining Unification Thought* maintains that after conceiving the image of human beings, "God conceived the images of animals, leaving out the spiritual aspects of the image of man. Next He conceived the images of plants, leaving out the instinct and nervous system of the animals. Finally, He conceived the images of minerals, leaving out the life, tissues, and cells of the images of the plants." God then created the simplest building-blocks first, progressing stage by stage to the creation of human beings.[9]

Both in its claim that the origin and diversification of living organisms require God's creative energy, and its claim that at least some aspects of the biological realm are specifically designed by God, Unification creationism is incompatible with Darwin's theory of evolution. In his 1965 remarks on evolution, Sun Myung Moon agreed that Darwin's

theory may explain change "within a certain formula or plant or animal" (for example, "within the family of chrysanthemums"), but denied that it could account for all aspects of evolution (for example, the creation of human beings). *Explaining Unification Thought* similarly rejects the modern version of Darwin's theory which attributes all aspects of evolution to natural selection and genetic mutations. [10]

Although the Unification view rejects Darwinism, however, it affirms the general concept of evolution. Sun Myung Moon's position in 1965 was that "on the whole, the process of creation was evolutionary," and lasted "perhaps millions of years." *Divine Principle* accepts the fossil record and geological time scale as a more or less accurate reflection of the pattern of evolution. According to *Unification Theology and Christian Thought,* the six "days" of creation in Genesis were "epochs of indeterminate time"; and *Outline of the Principle: Level Four* acknowledges that the six days "were not actual twenty-four hour days," but interprets them to mean that "the universe did not come into being instantaneously, but was created through six gradual periods." Therefore, the Unification doctrine of creation accepts the spatial and temporal pattern of evolution, and thus rejects Scientific Creationism as well as Darwinism. Just as Darwinism is incompatible with the Unification view that the process of evolution required God's purposeful, creative activity, so Scientific Creationism is incompatible with the Unification view that the pattern of evolution extends over hundreds of millions of years. [11]

One final point: the Unification doctrine of the fall is based on the claim that the human species originated with one male and one female, the "Adam and Eve" described in Genesis. At first glance, it might appear that this doctrine is incompatible with evolution. It is certainly incompatible with Darwin's theory, which requires the gradual transformation of an entire population rather than the relatively sudden emergence of two individuals. But is it incompatible with evolution *per se?* In the Unification view, this original pair did not emerge suddenly as fully formed adults; they were created as babies, and had to grow to maturity just as people do today. According to Sun Myung Moon, in his 1965 remarks on evolution "Adam and Eve were created as a baby is created by humans today," though they were not conceived by physical parents in the same sense that we are, but were formed "through the power of God" and were thus "a special creation," nursed by "God Himself" in "a very unusual environment." These statements are perhaps purposefully vague, and

Unification doctrine does not elaborate on this point. Nevertheless, it would seem to be consistent with these claims to speculate that God may have molded two human embryos, one male and one female, in the wombs of human-like animals (such as were known to have existed at approximately the same time as the first human beings); and that these embryos then developed into human babies who had a spiritual aspect bestowed and nourished by God, but who were physically nourished and protected by those same pre-human animals (described by Sang Hun Lee as analogous to a "scaffold" used to erect a building.) Whether or not this speculative scenario is true, it serves to illustrate the difference between the Unification position and a biblical fundamentalism which insists that Adam and Eve were created fully formed, with no organic relationship to what preceded them; and it also serves to illustrate the compatibility of the Unification position with a notion of evolution which leaves room for God's control or intervention.[12]

In the general controversy over creation and evolution, Unification theology thus belongs to neither extreme. The Unification view can be described as creationist, in a theistic sense, since it maintains that God's creative activity was necessary for the origin and diversification of the biological realm, and that at least some aspects of that realm were specifically designed by God. The Unification position can also be described as evolutionist, since it affirms the pattern of orderly changes exhibited by the evolution of living organisms, in which later stages are somehow derived from earlier ones in a process extending over hundreds of millions of years. Therefore, if Darwinism is true, or if Scientific Creationism is true, then the Unification doctrine of creation is false. On the other hand, if the Unification doctrine of creation is true, then the two most publicized positions in the creation-evolution controversy are false.

FOOTNOTES

1. Charles Darwin, *On the Origin of Species* (London: John Murray, 1859) 490.
2. See Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1873) Vols I & II. Hodge criticized Darwin's theory for excluding design, in *What Is Darwinism?* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1874).
3. @tHenry M. Morris, *Scientific Creationism* (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers, 1974) 91-130, 203-255.
4. Morris, 203-255.
5. Darwin, 490.
6. For a detailed discussion of Darwin's views on creation and design, see Neal C. Gillespie, *Charles Darwin and the Problem of Creation* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979) 82-156.
7. *Divine Principle* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1973), 20-28, 44, 76. [Chung Hwan Kwak], *Outline of the Principle: Level Four* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 9-14. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought,* Revised Edition (New York: Golden Gate Publishing, 1976) 11. [Sang Hun Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981) 9-11. Henry Vander Goot, "The Humanity of God and the Divinity of Man: Reflections on Unification's Theology of Creation," *A Time for Consideration,* edited by M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert W. Richardson (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1978), 275-289.
8. *Explaining Unification Thought,* 48-51. [Young Whi Kim], *The Divine Principle Study Guide* (Tarrytown, NY: HSA-UWC, 1973) 36. Sun Myung Moon, "Founder's Address," *The Search for Absolute Values: Harmony Among the Sciences* (New York: International Cultural Foundation, 1977) Vol. I, 8.
9. *Divine Principle* 41-46, 105. Sun Myung Moon, "The Master Speaks on Creation," March-April 1965 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1965), 5. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980), 63. Moon, "Founder's Address," 11. *Explaining Unification Thought,* 35-36, 68-75.
10. Moon, "The Master Speaks on Creation," 4. Moon, "Founder's Address," 8. Also see Sun Myung Moon, "Our Destined Relationship," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 6 November 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977), 5. *Explaining Unification Thought,* 68-72.
11. Moon, "The Master Speaks on Creation," 2-3. *Divine Principle* 51-52. Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* 25-26. *Outline of the Principle: Level Four* 27.
12. *Divine Principle* 66-83. Kim, *Unification Theology* 119-125. Moon, "The Master Speaks on Creation," 2-6. Sang Hun Lee, personal communication, 23 February 1978.

MALE AND FEMALE IN GOD'S NATURE: DUALISM OR POLARITY?

by Helen Bell Feddema

INTRODUCTION

Until recently, theologians and mystics who have experienced and described God's nature as a male/female duality—or indeed, any kind of duality—have generally been viewed negatively in both the Jewish and Christian traditions, with orthodox theologies asserting God's nature to be indivisibly one, either in an absolute sense, as in Judaism's monotheistic opposition to the multiple gods and goddesses of its rivals, or in the Christian trinitarian interpretation of one God in three persons. Frank avowals of the male/female duality of God's nature have been few, and have usually won for their adherents criticism, condemnation as heretical, persecution, and ultimately suppression. Julian of Norwich's description of Jesus as Mother, while not condemned as heretical, has been viewed more as a curiosity than a model; while, more typically, early Gnostic theologians and, more recently, Mother Ann Lee of the Shakers were condemned for their assertions that God was both Mother and Father. It is notable that, historically, the assertion of God's unitary nature has brought in its train an identification of God as male, with a consequent rejection of the female component of divinity—although maleness cannot be logically deduced from God's oneness.

Perhaps the labeling of God as male was inevitable in societies in which power was observably concentrated in the hands of men. Yet the maleness of God has become a theological issue independent of its origins, and has in turn influenced society and its treatment of women. In recent years, however, the almost unquestioned assumption of God's intrinsic maleness has been challenged, and a new awareness of God's dual nature has arisen, one which can now be seen as positive. The first part of this paper is a retrospection on Jewish and Christian history from the viewpoint of monotheism vs. dualism, with a brief consideration of goddess religions

as they contrast with the Judeo-Christian tradition; in the second part I
discuss recent feminist thinking relevant to this issue; the third part of the
paper describes the Unificationist view of the nature of God; and the
fourth and concluding part of the paper evaluates the views of God's
nature treated in the earlier parts.

PART I: THE REJECTION OF DUALISM: MONOTHEISM AND MISOGYNY IN JEWISH AND CHRISTIAN HISTORY
A. The Maleness of God in Judaism and Christianity

There can be no serious question but that the God of Judaism (and
its offspring, Christianity) is essentially a male God. Raphael Patai has
pointed out that even though on an abstract theological level, Judaism's
God has been described as transcending all physical qualities, including
sex, nevertheless in Hebrew (as in English) God is always referred to with
male pronouns;

> every verbal statement about God conveyed the idea that
> He was masculine... Every Hebrew-speaking individual
> from early childhood was imbued with the idea that God
> was a masculine deity. No subsequent teaching about the
> aphysical, incomprehensible, or transcendental nature of
> the diety could eradicate this early mental image of the
> masculine God. [1]

How did monotheism become so central to Judaism? The invading
Hebrews' long struggle against native Canaanite religions magnified their
tendency to insist on Yahweh's maleness, for while local male gods such as
Baal could fairly easily be assimilated to or replaced by the male god
Yahweh, such replacement could not be done so easily—if at all—with
female goddesses such as Anath, Asherah, or Astarte; and thus the *oneness*
of God became fused with the *maleness* of God. In Judaism, as Patai has
demonstrated, the Goddess went underground, after centuries of repeated—
because unsuccessful—campaigns against her worship, to emerge in
medieval Kabbalism as the Matronit. But, in contrast to the independent
power of the ancient Hebrew goddess, the Matronit (as Patai shows clearly)
was woman in the service of man. [2]

The Christian God is no less masculine in nature; Mary Daly has
pointed out that even though

> sophisticated thinkers... have never intellectually identified
> God with a Superfather in heaven, nevertheless it is
> important to recognize that even when very abstract
> conceptualizations of God are formulated in the mind, images
> survive in the imagination in such a way that a person can
> function on two different and even apparently contradictory
> levels at the same time. Thus one can speak of God as spirit
> and at the same time imagine 'him' as belonging to the
> male sex.[3]

The Christian concept of the oneness of God, in addition to its
Jewish foundation, was also influenced by the Greek philosophical ideal of
the oneness of God's nature: "For Greek thought it was axiomatic that
spiritual nature was unitary.... Duality appears only with matter. So
God cannot be dual, nor can man's spiritual image be bisexual."[4] This
was not androgyny, however; either maleness was identified with monism,
or God's nature was held to be wholly sexless.

In Christianity the Goddess was able to maintain a certain influence
in the person of Mary, whose role in Catholicism vastly outreached both
the scriptural testimony to her importance and her position in the early
church. (If anything, the gospels indicate at least as much her opposition
to his work as her support of). Yet Mary is far from being a goddess in her
own right; she is defined by her ancillary relation to another, as Mother of
God (i.e., Jesus) rather than as Goddess, and she is praised for her perfect—
almost mindless—docility and obedience. Indeed, Mary Daly is justified
in calling Mary the "Totaled Woman."[5]

In addition, Christ, the mediator between God and humanity, is also
male, and even if one does not go so far as to say, as did the authors of the
Malleus Maleficarum, that Jesus came to save males,[6] or that—as some
opponents to women's ordination have claimed—Jesus' maleness
demonstrates that only men are suited for the priesthood; yet still the
symbol of Christ is a male symbol, which thus sabotages the claims made
by some feminist theologians that Galatians 3:28 ("in Christ, there is no
male and female") indicates that Christianity (at least in this passage) is
not—or need not be interpreted as—basically male chauvinistic.[7]

B. Can Christianity Be Purified of Misogynism?

A number of feminist thinkers have asserted that Christianity can be
purified of its age-old misogynist bias, and reworked into a religion that is

liberating for all. Their most common approach is to emphasize those passages in scripture which are relatively free from sexist bias, and to reinterpret others. One of the most impressive examples of this genre is Phyllis Trible's reinterpretation of Genesis, which completely reverses the traditional interpretation of the Adam and Eve myth to show Eve as intelligent, assertive, and dominant, in search of wisdom and a fuller life, while Adam is revealed as a passive, lackluster character who follows Eve's lead in everything.[8] Her interpretation is without doubt the more natural one; the text must be tortured to yield the traditional interpretation of Adam as strong and dominant, and Eve as sly, evil-minded, and weak. Rosemary Ruether has argued that Jesus Christ, though male, can be a liberating symbol for women if he is regarded primarily as an iconoclastic prophet, offering fellowship and salvation to all oppressed people, including women.[9]

But Mary Daly, representing the opposing point of view on this issue, has argued most convincingly that it will simply not do to just declare that God is, in fact, not male (which, after all, has been the "official" theological position all along), or that Jesus' prophetic iconoclasm and openness to women is of primary importance, and not his gender. For the maleness of God and of Christ has permeated 2,000 years of Christian history, and God was male through several hundred years of Jewish history before that. In a recent work, Daly states bluntly that "there is no way to remove male/masculine imagery from *God*."[10] One cannot simply wipe out millennia of masculine identification of the Godhead by fiat—even if one is right in doing so. I believe Daly is correct in claiming that the traditional Christian (and Jewish) God is hopelessly male-identified. Only an explicit redefinition of God's nature as a male/female duality, with use of both male and female imagery and pronouns in religious texts and prayers, can remedy the exclusion of the female element from our representations of divinity. Yet such redefinition meets with strong opposition; it is not yet clear whether mainstream Christianity will be able to become inclusive of God's female nature.

C. Dualism outside the Judeo-Christian Tradition: Goddess Worship and the Position of Women

As a sidelight to Judeo-Christian insistence upon a unitary male God, it is useful to consider societies whose major deity was a goddess. While theoretically a monotheistic Goddess religion is possible, one which

identifies femaleness with unitary divinity the way maleness has been identified with divinity in the Judeo-Christian tradition, it appears that Goddess-worshipping societies have always included male gods in their pantheons (though sometimes in inferior positions), and thus have granted the existence of both male and female elements in divinity.

Does the fact that the predominant divinity in a society is female have positive implications for women in that society? Mary Daly has said that "if God is male, then the male is God."[11] Some feminist theologians have suggested that this dictum can be reversed to state that if a society worships a goddess, then its women are regarded as divine. Elizabeth Gould Davis, for example, claims that "the goddess is synonymous with gynocracy: where the goddess reigned, woman ruled."[12] Yet this position is naive; one has only to consider Periclean Athens, whose predominant deity was the goddess Athena, to see that women's position need not be elevated over that of men in a society which worships a goddess. Athenian women of the citizen class could not participate directly in the political life of the city; girls received little education compared to their brothers, rarely going beyond bare literacy; their diet was severely restricted, with minimal amounts of protein; they were married (by their fathers) in their early to mid-teens, and valued primarily for their production of sons; and, in general, women's lives were restricted to staying at home and performing household tasks.[13] This is hardly a situation in which "women ruled." A society can worship a goddess, and can be matrilineal as well, without even treating its real-life women members equally—much less granting them superior status.

Nevertheless, it must be granted that the worship of a goddess does at least grant to women in that society—however low their real-life status may be—the knowledge that femaleness is not excluded from the divine image; that there is nothing intrinsically wrong, shameful, or unnatural about being female. And such positive self-awareness has, in general, been denied to women within the Jewish and Christian mainstreams.

PART II. DUALISTIC TRENDS IN FEMINIST THEOLOGY

The anthology *Womanspirit Rising,* a recent collection of feminist writings on religion ranging in treatment from scholarly to popular, illustrates the central importance of the concept of dualism to much recent feminist theology. For purposes of clarity, it should be noted that *two* basic dualisms are at issue here: the male/female dualism, and the

masculine/feminine dualism which arises from it, is connected with it in a way which remains unclear, and is often confused with it.

For the purposes of this paper, I will define the male/female dualism as the genetically-based physiological differences between male and female human beings; these differences in and of themselves are not a matter of dispute. The masculine/feminine dualism is the controversial one: the actual observed (and prescribed) behavioral/experiential differences between men and women. The category of male/female dualism includes, for example, the female potentiality for pregnancy and childbirth, and the male capacity to become a parent well into old age. The category of masculine/feminine dualism includes, e.g., the observed superiority of boys' math scores and girls' language scores on standardized tests. Throughout this paper, I shall use the terms 'male' and 'female' to refer to the biological differences between men and women, and 'masculine' and 'feminine' to refer to the personality and ability differences noted and/or prescribed for the two sexes in various societies.

It is an open question whether some masculine/feminine differences may not have (as yet undiscovered) biological bases; or whether some of these differences may not arise from acknowledged biological differences. Some people think, for example, that the nurturant and receptive nature often ascribed to women may derive from their potential to bear children.[14] Some light may be shed on this issue by reviewing the work of anthropologists who have studied male and female roles in different cultures. Margaret Mead's work is particularly valuable in this respect, because of her cross-cultural comparisons of sex-linked character traits.

Her findings are illuminating. She notes that:

> in every known society, mankind [sic] has elaborated the biological division of labour into forms often very remotely related to the original biological differences;[15]

and that

> we always find the patterning. We know of no culture that has said articulately, that there is no difference between men and women except in the way they contribute to the creation of the next generation.[16]

Yet the results of her cross-cultural research undermine the foundations of these claims, however unquestionably valid they may appear to those whose outlook is restricted to one society's world-view.

If in one culture, boys are thought of as especially vulnerable, and in another, girls; if one culture considers women too weak to do heavy labor, and another culture holds that they are especially constituted for it "because their heads are stronger than men's," both claims cannot be true.[17] One cannot *prove* that there are no differences in character or abilities between men and women (other than the acknowledged physiological differences), for the same reason that one cannot prove that all ravens are black by examining even enormous numbers of ravens and finding all to be black; the problem is that the next example encountered might be the counter-instance that invalidates the universal claim. Nevertheless, as more and more sex differences once held to be innate are disqualified by being found assigned to one sex in one culture and the other sex in another culture, the less likely it is that there are any genuine, i.e. innate, sex-linked differences; and the more likely it is that the masculine/feminine duality (in its strikingly different variants across human societies) is inherently false and arbitrary, an unjustified limitation of individually varied human potentials.

Another way of exploring the reality of the masculine/feminine dualism is to eliminate artificial barriers to women's entry into masculine fields or men's entry into feminine fields. If (as has been the case), as barrier after barrier is removed, the gender differences in measured abilities (math test scores, for example) continue to decrease, this is good evidence— though again, not absolute proof—that such masculine/feminine differences are culturally rather than biologically conditioned.

Perhaps the only way to accurately determine whether any of the elements currently composing the masculine/feminine dualism are innately distributed differently between the sexes would be to raise several generations of children in an atmosphere absolutely free of gender discrimination, with physiological sex differences treated in the same way that differences of hair and eye color, height and strength are treated today—that is, as (at most) having specific implications for the performance of certain tasks, but not as criteria for separating people into groups which are then treated differently in general. In such an experiment, each individual would be allowed to develop in accordance with his/her individual abilities and interests, and it would be noted whether or not consistent patterns of differences between the sexes would emerge. But

perhaps after living without masculine/feminine stereotypes for several generations, no one would care much whether greater numbers of men than women were pediatric nurses or electrical engineers, any more than people now care to count how many blue-eyed or red-haired people choose specific careers.

In the realm of theology, the masculine/feminine dualism noted by feminist theologians has informed their approach to theology, religion, history and lifestyle, though not in a uniform manner. Those feminist theologians who have condemned the masculine/feminine dualism as an artificial limitation on varied human potentials have tended to incorporate in their theories both male and female contributions to human accomplishments and ideals; while feminist theologians who have accepted the masculine/feminine dualism as innate have often emphasized male/female differences, glorifying females and denigrating males in a manner that mirrors past misogynist denigration of women.

A number of feminist thinkers, particularly those oriented toward a Goddess-centered religion, tend to glorify the stereotypes, i.e., to accept as essential (and positive) qualities of women certain personality characteristics traditionally ascribed to women in recent Western cultures. The fact that anthropological research has revealed quite different patterns of sex stereotyping in other cultures has been given little—if any—attention by feminists of this persuasion. In some cases, these feminine characteristics are not just accepted, but almost idolized, in a way which seems quite unjustifiable, both theoretically and practically.

Goddess-oriented feminist theologians often emphasize women's ties to biological functions and the natural world, as when Sheila Collins claims that women have "a deep empathy for the organic world"[20] and that women have the power to create new life[21] (the male's role in this process is not mentioned). Apart from the inadequate justification (considering the anthropological evidence) for assigning any particular personality characteristics to women and denying them to men, such binding of women to the limited role of child-bearing and nurturing and an anti-technological, separatist, back-to-nature lifestyle carries with it serious dangers, not just for women, but for the whole human race. If women (and not men) are seen as the creators of new life, then women will bear the full blame for the tragic results of overpopulation. If women reject technology entirely (not just the abuse or careless use of technology) in favor of a revival of benign witchcraft and a close-to-the-earth lifestyle,

then social oppression and pollution of the environment—which must be predominantly blamed on men, who have had most of the decision-making power in industrial societies—will continue unchecked, and women's role will become wholly peripheral.

If the yearnings of such feminist theologians could be actualized, the result would be a world of segregated enclaves of men and women, suffering equally from stereotyped sexist thinking and unwholesome exaggeration of masculine or feminine characteristics, and with a consequent demonization of the opposite sex and ostracization or persecution of individuals who do not fit the prescribed stereotypes of behavior appropriate to their sex. To my mind, this would worsen, rather than alleviate, the problems of current sex discrimination. [22]

Another danger in glorifying the feminine stereotypes is that logic and scholarship may be rejected as male tools, in favor of dreams, [23] newly constructed myths [24] or story-telling. [25] Judith Plaskow recognizes this danger in a question at the end of her article, "The Coming of Lilith: Toward A Feminist Theology," [26] yet she does not deal with it. 'Story' or 'story-telling' is becoming a technical term of feminist theology; but it is a term sorely in need of definition, which none of its proponents has given it; I will use the term in its common meaning of a fictional or (auto)biographical account of one's own or another's experience. Stories can be valuable as a means for self-expression, but they lack the precision and logic necessary for an abstract discipline such as theology. A story or myth may be emotionally moving or illuminating—qualities which are appropriate to religion, as opposed to theology—but by itself it cannot reconstruct our concepts; it can only change our feelings.

On a positive level, some feminist theologians, most notably Rosemary Ruether and Mary Daly, have used story-telling and reflection on women's experience (among other techniques) to enable readers to look at theology and church history from a new perspective. Daly has uncovered the inadequacy of Christian theologians' claiming that God "really" transcends sexuality, while using exclusively masculine pronouns, symbols and metaphors for divinity; she points out that this practice has excluded women from the image of divinity, and has provided a ready-made justification for their oppressive treatment in the Christian Church. [27]

Feminist theology need not be done—indeed, cannot be done— within the bounds of traditional male-dominated theology; but neither

should it be a female-dominated theology which excludes and demonizes the male. A feminist theology which views women and men as whole persons, rejecting masculine and feminine stereotypes alike,[28] can be a truly human theology, a prototype for the reconstruction of human society on more balanced lines.[29]

If feminist theology is done without regard for historical accuracy, as when ancient Goddess-worshipping religions are romanticized or prehistoric matriarchies postulated on flimsy evidence, then even sympathetic readers will not take it seriously. But when a feminist outlook is combined with sound and creative use of theological terminology and techniques, as in Mary Daly's or Rosemary Ruether's work, or unimpeachable scholarship, as in Elaine Pagels' research on Gnosticism[30] or Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza's New Testament analysis,[31] then it can effectively correct and reconstruct theology, purifying it of male bias, rather than suffering rejection as trivial, sloppy, cantankerous, or just plain wrong thinking.

In some cases, a feminist theology may go beyond male/female dualism to virtually deny the existence of the male, in a reversal of some male theologians' denial of true humanity to women. Sheila Collins, for instance, says that women (by whom she must be taken to mean feminist women of her own persuasion) are insisting on defining themselves without relation to men.[32] I believe that this is an inherently flawed enterprise. Women who exclude relation to men from their self-definition (or men who exclude relation to women from their self-definition) are cutting themselves off from one-half of the human image, and thereby also from one-half of the divine image; this holds regardless of whether one holds that humanity was created in God's image or God in humanity's image. This is not to say that the inclusion in one's self-concept of relationship to the other sex cannot be negative; it will be so, for example, if women are defined as subordinate to men (or the reverse). But the relationship can be one of mutuality and respect; and then and only then will it be positive and enriching.

Feminist theologians such as Daly, Ruether, Trible, Schussler Fiorenza and Pagels have laid the foundations for the portrayal of divinity as essentially *both* male and female; either as an androgynous male/female deity or as a God/Goddess couple, symbolizing and prefiguring the unity of men and women in a common humanity. And yet there is a division among feminist theologians, with some rejecting the male component of divinity completely (the Goddess-oriented theologians, Mary Daly in her

later works), while others (Rosemary Ruether, Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenzae) try to remain within the mainstream of Christianity while revising its texts and reinterpreting its traditions to purify them of patriarchy—a difficult task, and one which meets with much opposition. A theology which makes a clear break with patriarchy, but at the same time does not deny to men their part in the image of God, is hard to find.

PART III. POLARITY: THE UNIFICATION PRINCIPLE VIEW OF GOD'S NATURE

The *Divine Principle,* in contrast to both traditional Christianity and to contemporary feminism, clearly states that God's nature incorporates both male and female elements: "God . . . is a subject consisting of the dual characteristics of masculinity and femininity." (*DP,* 25).[33] (Here the terms 'masculinity' and 'femininity' are used as abstract terms for maleness and femaleness, rather than in the societally defined sense which I use in this paper.) Yet it must be noted that this clear statement is clouded when the pronoun 'He' is used to refer to God in the English translation of *Divine Principle,* even in the very sentence in which God is stated to be both male and female— an unfortunate choice, perhaps based on linguistic usage in standard English translations of the Bible.

Another cause of linguistic confusion in the standard *Divine Principle* text is the translator's use of the terms 'subject' and 'object'; the labeling of husband as subject and wife as object (*DP,* 32) has led some readers to conclude that Unification Principle is as patriarchal as mainstream Christianity. Elizabeth Clark, for example, states that "in each such polar situation the male is described as the subject and the female as the object,"[34] and furthermore she objects (quite rightly, in terms of the translator's choice of language) to the description of "the masculine characteristic . . . as 'positivity' and the feminine one as 'negativity.' "[35] This misunderstanding is not only understandable, but almost inevitable, for those who have read only the *Divine Principle* text itself; yet it may be cleared up by referring to other sources of Unification doctrine, such as the speeches of Rev. Moon, guides to the study of *Divine Principle,* and the writings of Young Oon Kim, the leading Unification theologian.

In the *Outline of the Principle: Level 4,*[36] for example, two pages of examples of subject-object relationships are given. In most of these examples (parents/children, teacher/students, employer/employee, etc.) both the

subject and object could be of either sex, and need not even be of opposite sex—a female teacher with male students, a male employer and a male employee, etc.—and thus it is clear that a male is not automatically the subject in any relationship, nor is a female automatically the object. Yet, what of the husband-wife relationship, the one example on these pages in which being male and being subject are explicitly linked? In my opinion, this example is out of place, marriage being one of a number of relationships (a business partnership or the sibling relationship between twins would be others) in which the subject-object model is inappropriate; a partnership of equals is the more appropriate model for relationships of this type, where neither partner has built-in superiority of knowledge or experience over the other. In relationships of this type, designation of one partner as the subject and the other the object would be quite arbitrary, and would tend to destroy the harmony of the relationship.

In any case, the relationship of subject and object is not one of crude domination (which the English word 'subjection' may suggest—again, the translator's choice of wording was unfortunate), but rather one of "subject and object becoming one through harmonious give and take."[37] Indeed, Rev. Moon has said in a speech that "when men serve women and women serve men, there is lots of joy and great excitement and no boredom. God made it thus and it's supposed to be that way."[38]

Young Oon Kim has described the basic theme of Unificationist teaching on the nature of God and humanity as polarity, a relationship between two entities which features cooperation and complementarity rather than opposition and separation. "We exist in relatedness. Human nature consists of paired relationships."[39] According to her, Unification Principle teaches that the polarity in human nature mirrors the polarity in God's nature, thus bringing humanity closer to God.[40] This view, which contrasts sharply with the abstract, utterly transcendent God of early trinitarian theology and, more recently, of Neo-Orthodox theology, Kim has found expressed in several variants throughout Christian history, noting particularly the teachings of Nicholas of Cusa, Mother Ann Lee, Schleiermacher, Swedenborg, Mary Baker Eddy, and the Jungian theologian Ann Ulanov.[41]

Kim's notion of polarity offers a constructive reinterpretation of God's nature as incorporating both male and female elements, without one element dominating or suppressing the other, as the subject-object language of *Divine Principle* tends to suggest. Its emphasis on mutuality

and support is important, as it allows the components of God's nature to serve in their internal relationships as a model for relationships among men and women.

PART IV. GOD'S NATURE: SELECTION AMONG ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS

The interpretations of the nature of divinity which I have considered in this paper can be divided into six categories:

1. A male God
2. A female Goddess
3. An androgynous deity combining in one entity male and female attributes
4. An asexual, transcendent deity
5. A God/Goddess couple
6. A deity with polar male and female aspects

Several factors must be borne in mind when selecting an interpretation of divinity that offers all of humanity a wholesome model, free from misogynism (or misandry). Firstly, modern women and men have more accurate information about the process of reproduction than our ancestors had. We know that human mothers and fathers contribute equally to the genetic makeup of their offspring (a fact which feminist advocates of the Goddess tend to ignore); and we know that unchecked fertility leading to excessive growth of population is harmful, both to the individual women who bear great numbers of children, and to society and the world as whole. Thus, purely on scientific grounds, interpretations 1 and 2 are untenable.

In addition, it is morally objectionable to deny to one-half of humanity its share in the divine image. A reversal from misogyny to misandry, such as is suggested by Elizabeth Gould Davis' characterization of men as genetic freaks, inferior to women in every way (an exact reversal of Aristotle's description of women), or Mary Daly's virtual ignoring of men in her later works, is unjustifiable. Men, as well as women, are part of the human species, and contribute equally to the next generation. A theology (or anthropology) which does not take men into account is both unfair and unrealistic, and is just as unacceptable as one which denigrates women.

As far as interpretation 3 is concerned, I agree with Mary Daly that

the notion of an androgynous deity does not offer a useful alternative. Although initially appealing in its incorporation of both masculine and feminine elements in divinity, such a notion lacks contact with the reality of human nature (unless one believes that human beings were originally androgynous—a notion which has little, if any, scientific support).

Interpretation 4, an asexual God such as the abstract God of being Daly proposed in *Beyond God the Father,* only to discard in *Gyn/Ecology,* is not a deity real human beings can relate to in any meaningful way, for it (the only pronoun appropriate for such a deity) is puzzlingly different from them. Not only that, but, because of the long history of male identification of the Judeo-Christian God, the allegedly sexless God is "a unisex model, whose sex is male"[42]—in practice, if not in theory.

The remaining contenders are interpretations 5 and 6, a God/Goddess couple and a divinity with polar male and female aspects of persons (in the sense of the persons of the Christian trinity). Interpretation 5 is admittedly easier to conceptualize and relate to—since after all, humanity is composed of male and female individuals—but it discards the notion of the unity of deity important to many worshippers. In addition, many contemporary people find it hard to relate to a god and goddess conceptualized as separate entities; they are too concrete to be believable in an age used to an abstract deity.

Interpretation 6, the Unification Principle view, preserves the divine unity, in a manner similar to the Christian trinitarian interpretation; but instead of the trinity of three males, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the deity is instead composed of a male/female duality, united in harmonious interaction. This model of divine nature gives to humanity a clear model of wholesome relationships, while promoting feelings of closeness to God in both men and women, rather than separating humanity from God by describing God as utterly different and transcendent, as traditional Christian theologians have done.

I find the Unification Principle view of God's nature as a male-female polarity in harmonious interaction by the far the best of the above alternatives, as in this view divinity provides a wholesome model for human life, an ideal to which humanity can aspire. The polar view of divine (and human) nature represents the male and female aspects of human nature, not in a sex-stereotypical fashion, and not overemphasizing fertility or physical characteristics, but as representing the essential variation and multiple potentiality of humanity, and thus it allows both women

and men to relate to divinity, and to find in divinity a model of their mutual relationship.

FOOTNOTES

1. Raphael Patai, *The Hebrew Goddess* (1978) 8.
2. Patai, 178, 179.
3. Mary Daly, *Beyond God the Father: Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation* (Boston: Beacon, 1973) 17, 18.
4. Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Fathers of the Church," in *Religion and Sexism,* ed. Rosemary Radford Ruether (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974) 153, 154.
5. Mary Daly, *Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism* (Boston: Beacon, 1978) 86ff.
6. *Malleus Maleficarum,* Part I, Question 6, in Elizabeth Clark and Herbert Richardson, eds., *Women and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 125.
7. Daly, *Beyond God the Father,* 80.
8. Phyllis Trible, "Eve and Adam: Genesis 2-3 Reread," in *Womanspirit Rising,* 74-83.
9. Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Christology and Feminism: Can A Male Saviour Save Women?," in *To Change the World: Christology and Cultural Criticism* (1983) Essay IV.
10. Daly, *Gyn/Ecology,* xi.
11. Daly, *Beyond God the Father,* 19.
12. Elizabeth Gould Davis, *The First Sex* (1971) 39.
13. "Women in Democratic Athens" (excerpted from W.K. Lacey, *The Family in Classical Greece)* in *Women: From the Greeks to the French Revolution,* ed. Susan Groag Bell (1973) 21-35.
14. Valerie Saiving, "The Human Situation: A Feminine View," *Womanspirit Rising,* ed. by Carol P. Christ and Judith Plaskow (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979) 38.
15. Margaret Mead, *Male and Female* (1949) 7.
16. Mead, 8.
17. Mead, 7.
18. Saiving, 31.
19. Mead, 99.
20. Sheila Collins, "Reflections on the Meaning of History," *Womanspirit Rising,* 71.
21. Zsuzsanna E. Budapest, "Self-Blessing Ritual," *Womanspirit Rising,* 171; also a similar statement in Carol P. Christ, "Why Women Need the Goddess: Phenomenological, Psychological, and Political Reflections," *Womanspirit Rising,* 281.
22. One contributor to *Womanspirit Rising,* Aviva Cantor, is aware of this problem; while her contribution was a Jewish Women's Haggadah, she had originally aimed at writing a Seder not for women alone, but for men, women and children—taking into account women's issues, but not to the exclusion of other issues. Aviva Cantor, "Jewish Women's Haggadah," *Womanspirit Rising,* 188.
23. Naomi R. Goldenberg, "Dreams and Fantasies as Sources of Revelation: Feminist Appropriation of Jung," *Womanspirit Rising,* 219.
24. Judith Plaskow, "The Coming Lilith: Toward A Feminist Theology," *Womanspirit Rising,* 198.
25. Collins, op. cit., and Carol Christ, "Spiritual Quest and Women's Experience," *Womanspirit Rising,* 228.
26. Plaskow, 208.

27. Mary Daly, "After the Death of God the Father: Women's Liberation and the Transformation of Christian Consciousness," *Womanspirit Rising*, 56.
28. Daly, "After the Death of God the Father," 208.
29. Rosemary Ruether, "Motherearth and the Megamachine: A Theology of Liberation in a Feminine, Somatic and Ecological Perspective," *Womanspirit Rising*.
30. Elaine Pagels, *The Gnostic Gospels* (New York: Random House, 1979).
31. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her* (New York: Crossroad, 1983).
32. Collins, 71.
33. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973).
34. Elizabeth Clark, "Women in the Theology of the Unification Church," in *Exploring Unification Theology*, ed. M. Darrol Bryant and Susan Hodges (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1978), 115.
35. Clark, 115.
36. [Chung Hwan Kwak], *Outline of the Principle, Level 4* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980), 16, 17.
37. Sun Myung Moon, "The Completion Period for the Dispensation," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 12 November 1978 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1978), 8.
38. Sun Myung Moon, "Breaking the Barrier," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 10 December 1978 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1978), 10.
39. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980), 55. 40. Kim, 55.
41. Kim, 57-60.
42. Daly, *Gyn/Ecology*, 88.

DIPOLAR THEISM
IN PROCESS THOUGHT
AND UNIFICATIONISM

by Theodore T. Shimmyo

I.

Process thought, whose primary modern source is Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), has a theory of divine dipolarity. According to it, God is "dipolar" having mental and physical poles, which Whitehead calls God's "primordial" and "consequent" natures, respectively.[1] Unificationism, which is the thought of Sun Myung Moon, founder of the Unification Church, has a similar theory of divine dipolarity, according to which God has the "polarity" of *"Sung Sang"* and *"Hyung Sang,"* which are respectively mental and material in character.[2]

To say that God has a physical pole as well as a mental pole might sound unfamiliar, for traditionally God has usually been understood to be only mental or spiritual. According to Plato and Aristotle, God is purely spiritual, so that the world must be made out of some pre-existent material stuff which is independent of God. According to traditional Christian theism, God is purely spiritual, creating what is material *ex nihilo.* Thus divine dipolarity proposed by process thought and Unificationism is rather a novel perspective in the history of thought. But it is this novelty that is capturing the imagination of an increasing number of philosophers and theologians today.

As a Unificationist who has studied Whitehead's process thought,[3] I have been interested to compare dipolar theism in process thought and in Unificationism. Young Oon Kim, a Unification theologian, has already correctly touched upon the theological affinity between the dipolarity of God's primordial and consequent natures in process thought and the dipolarity of God's *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* in Unificationism.[4] In the present paper, I will pursue a more metaphysical line of comparison. Sections II and III will treat process and Unification dipolar theism, respectively, and Sections IV and V their similarities and dissimilarities

respectively. Section VI will explore the practical implications of dipolar theism in process thought and Unificationism with respect to human religious need.

II.

In process thought, the dipolarity of God is understood along with the dipolarity of "actual entities." Each actual entity, which is an act of concrescence arising out of its data, is "essentially dipolar with its physical and mental poles."[5]

> In each concrescence there is a twofold aspect of the creative urge. In one aspect there is the origination of simple causal feelings; and in the other aspect there is the origination of conceptual feelings. These contrasted aspects will be called the physical and the mental poles of an actual entity. No actual entity is devoid of either pole; though their relative importance differs in different actual entities.[6]

To Whitehead God is an actual entity.[7] Like any other actual entity, therefore, God is dipolar. Of course, God is different from other actual entities because he is non-temporal and others temporal, i.e., because he originates with his mental side (non-temporal) and then is complemented by his physical side, while other actual entities originate with their physical side (temporal) and then proceed to their mental side.[8] Nevertheless, it is clear that God is dipolar like other actual entities. "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."[9]

In his mental pole or "primordial" nature, God conceptually feels the entire multiplicity of "eternal objects."[10] These conceptual feelings in God's primordial nature, "untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things,"[11] have a primordial concrescence of unity among themselves directed by God's own "subjective aim,"[12] so that "there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the process of creation."[13] In his physical pole or "consequent" nature, by contrast, God physically feels the actual entities in the temporal world,[14] and these physical feelings in his consequent nature, too, are directed by his own subjective aim with a view to being integrated with his conceptual side.[15] The difference between the two sides of God which we should realize here is that while his

conceptual side is "unchanged, by reason of its final completeness," his physical side is "consequent upon the creative advance of the world."[16]

There is a third nature of God, however, which is called his "superjective" nature and in which he acquires the "integration" between his conceptual and physical sides centering upon his own subjective aim.[17] Through this integration in his superjective nature God produces some divine input for each temporal actual entity. This divine input, called the "initial subjective aim" of an actual entity,[18] constitutes a vision of what that entity might become. It is a divine persuasive and not coercive unifying activity aiming at "intensity" in the concrescence of each actual entity.[19] As such, it is derived from the order in the relevance of all the conceptual feelings in the primordial nature of God, but it undoubtedly centers around that conceptual feeling of God which is, by reason of the integration of both poles in his superjective nature, "immediately relevant" to the actual world physically felt in his physical pole.[20]

III.

Unificationism understands the dipolarity of God as the cause of the dipolarity of all existing beings: "The *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* of existing beings are derived from the *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* of the Original Image (of God)."[21] Thus God's *Sung Sang* is "the attribute of God that constitutes the fundamental cause of the invisible, functional aspects of all existing beings,"[22] while his *Hyung Sang* is "the attribute of God that constitutes the fundamental cause of the material aspect of all existing beings."[23]

In his *Sung Sang,* i.e., in his mental side, God has the functions of intellect, emotion, and will centering upon his "Purpose" or "Heart" and thereby thinks, feels, and decides his plan of creation by appropriating "ideas, concepts, original law, and mathematical principles."[24] "Ideas" and "concepts" thus appropriated in God's *Sung Sang* are equivalent to Whiteheadian "eternal objects" conceptually felt. The plan of creation thus made in God's *Sung Sang* is called "Logos."[25] God's *Hyung Sang,* i.e., his physical side, by contrast, is a kind of latent energy which is called "pre-energy"[26] or "pre-matter."[27] As material cause, God's *Hyung Sang* takes various forms, when the Logos, his *Sung Sang,* unites with it.[28]

The *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* of God unite with each other centering upon his Purpose or Heart to constitute a "United Body,"[29] through which is generated some divine input for the world. This divine input is

either "forming energy" to form the internal unity of each creature or "acting energy" to enable all creatures to interact with one another.[30] Whether "forming" or "acting" energy, it represents God's vision of unity.

IV.

From the last two sections it is already clear that there are striking similarities between process thought and Unificationism concerning dipolar theism. The present section will deal with them more specifically.

First of all, both process thought and Unificationism conceive of God as having a fourfold structure. In process thought, the fourfold structure of God contains: 1) his own subjective aim, which is sometimes called "appetition"[31] or "Eros";[32] 2) his primordial nature, which is his mental pole; 3) his consequent nature, which is his physical pole; and 4) his superjective nature, which is the integration of the two poles, producing the initial subjective aim of each temporal actual entity. In a very similar way, the fourfold structure of God in Unificationism contains: 1) his Purpose or Heart; 2) his *Sung Sang,* which is his mental pole; 3) his *Hyung Sang,* which is his physical pole; and 4) the United Body of the two poles, producing forming and acting energy for creatures. Unificationism calls this fourfold structure "Quadruple Base" or "Four Position Foundation."[33] For the sake of visual clarity, I have schematized this structure of God in both systems below.

Secondly, there is an important parallel between God's Eros in process thought and God's Heart in Unificationism. In process thought, God's Eros or appetition is "the eternal urge of desire,"[34] or "the living urge towards all possibilities, claiming the goodness of their realization."[35] Its importance is such that it can be regarded as the center of the fourfold structure of God, though it actually belongs to his primordial nature.[36] In Unificationism, God's Heart is "the emotional impulse to seek joy through love,"[37] so that it occupies "the central position" in the fourfold structure of God, though it actually "lies deep within the *Sung Sang* (of God)."[38]

Thirdly, when talking about dipolar theism, process thought and Unificationism do not suggest a dualism of the two different poles of God at all. In process thought, the unity of the two poles is maintained through the superjective nature of God which secures the relevance of eternal objects to the temporal world.[39] In Unificationism, the unity of the two poles of God is maintained because the *Sung Sang* itself has *Hyung*

The Fourfold Structure of God
in Process Thought

The Fourfold Structure of God
in Unificationism

Sang elements and the *Hyung Sang* has *Sung Sang* elements.[40] "*Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* are essentially of the same quality, with only a relative, not an absolute, difference."[41] Unificationism is "neither dualism, nor spiritualism, nor materialism: it is Unitism."[42]

Fourthly because of this unity of the two poles of God, both process thought and Unificationism can blur the traditional sharp distinction between universals and particulars which has plagued much of Western thought. In process thought, God with his two poles united mediates between the timeless realm of eternal objects (universals) and the temporal realm of actual entities (particulars).[43] Thus universal eternal objects are particular in the sense that they do not exist except as being exemplified in particular actual entities; and particular actual entities are universal in the sense that they can, by reason of their exemplification of universal eternal objects, enter into the description of other particular actual entities.[44] Whitehead calls this the "ontological principle."[45] In Unificationism, the unity of the *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* of God is such that elements in his *Sung Sang* (universals) are relevant to the world of "individual truth bodies" (particulars)[46] whose material cause is his *Hyung Sang*. Thus universal "ideas" and "concepts" are particular in the sense that they do not truly exist except as realized in particular individual truth bodies. Especially "ideas" as God's "Individual Images" of particular individual truth bodies are particular in the sense of being just what they are;[47] and even God's "Universal Image," which is the universal "dual characteristics of *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang*, positivity and negativity"[48] and which "may be denoted by a concept,"[49] is particular in the sense of being, "without fail, regulated by an Individual Image in its development into the world of phenomena."[50] Particular individual truth bodies, on the other hand, are universal in the sense that they can, by reason of their realization of universal "ideas" and "concepts," enter into the description of other particular individual truth bodies.[51]

Fifthly, when maintaining the unity of the two poles of God, both process thought and Unificationism are "panentheistic" (not "pantheistic"), holding that God is *in* the world and the world *in* God. According to process thought, God is in the world because through the unity of his two poles the initial subjective aim of each actual entity in the world is generated; and the world is in God because it is physically felt in his physical pole to be eventually integrated with his mental pole. Thus Whitehead says: "It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God,

as that God is immanent in the World."[52] Unificationism holds that God is in the world because the unity of his *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* produces forming and acting energy of the world; and that the world is in God not only because it is close to his *Hyung Sang* which is "pre-matter"[53] but also because it is perceived by his *Sung Sang* which has his *Hyung Sang* integrated with it.[54] This panentheistic position of process thought and Unificationism would not agree with the traditional understanding of God as the self-contained Absolute.

Sixthly, both process thought and Unificationism can well establish the so-called "internal relations" of particular existents, because their dipolar theism, blurring the sharp distinction between the universal and the particular, can reject the traditionally prevalent thesis that the relations of particular existents, being merely "external," can only be described purely in terms of transcendent universals. In other words, both process thought and Unificationism can metaphysically affirm the genuine interrelatedness of particular existents, unlike the traditional thesis that particular existents are essentially independent and not requiring each other in order to exist.[55] Whitehead calls this the "principle of universal relativity" and holds that particular actual entities are "present in" each other.[56] Unificationism calls this principle the "give-and-take law"[57] and says that individual truth bodies have "give-and-take" with each other in order to exist, multiply, and act.[58] It goes without saying that this genuine interrelatedness of individual existents is that which is aimed at by the previously mentioned divine input (i.e., initial subjective aim in process thought, and forming and acting energy in Unificationism) generated through the integration of the two poles of God.

Lastly, this divine input aiming at interrelatedness and unity in the world is persuasive and not coercive, because particular existents in the world are given their portions of responsibility according to process thought and Unificationism.[59] Whitehead says that "the divine element in the world is to be conceived as a persuasive agency and not as a coercive agency,"[60] for the God-given initial subjective aim of a temporal actual entity is completed only through that entity's own "self-causation"[61] or "decision"[62] which is "self-creative."[63] According to Unificationism, though God's will to accomplish his purpose itself is "absolute," the accomplishment of that will is not coercive but "relative," for "God's purpose of creation is to be fulfilled only by man's accomplishment of his

portion of responsibility."[64] The human possession of responsibility allows
for the inheritance of God's "creatorship."[65]

V.

There are however at least a couple of important dissimilarities between
process and Unification dipolar theism which we must not neglect.[66]

First of all, process thought and Unificationism somewhat differ
from each other over the role of the physical pole of God. Whereas process
thought says that in his consequent nature God physically feels the temporal
world, Unificationism does not attribute such a positive role of perceiving
the world to the *Hyung Sang* of God. Of course, both schools agree that
the physical pole is close to the world by reason of its character of being
immanent in the world. But Unificationism explains that immanence
simply by saying that the *Hyung Sang* of God is "pre-matter."[67] Thus
Unificationism does not attribute the role of perceiving the world to his
Hyung Sang so much as to his *Sung Sang* which has intellect, emotion, and
will.[68] The *Hyung Sang* of God in Unificationism, then, is more like
Plato's "matter" with respect to its passive character as stuff (and, needless
to say, not with respect to its being outside of God). Of course, if we
know the fact that Whitehead equates what he calls "extensive continuum"
in the consequent nature of God[69] with Plato's "Receptacle,"[70] then we
would be able to see better the parallel between the consequent nature of
God in process thought and the *Hyung Sang* of God in Unificationism. But
still the above difference should be noted.

Secondly, process thought and Unificationism disagree with each
other over the locus of the ultimate cause of creativity. Whereas process
thought locates it outside of God as "the ultimate metaphysical
principle,"[71] Unificationism locates it inside of God as part of "God's
own character."[72] In other words, in process thought God himself is not
the ultimate principle of creativity but an actual entity, if an aboriginal
one, which merely "characterizes" it like all other actual entities do.[73] In
Unificationism, however, God himself is the ultimate cause of creativity.[74]
This disagreement should be taken seriously, because process thought
does not maintain that unity of God which Unificationism upholds.[75]
Thus it can be said that the God of Unificationism is more powerful than
the God of process thought. Therefore, whereas process thought denies
omnipotence to God,[76] Unificationism still talks about God's omnipotence,
if in a qualified way.[77]

VI.

Robert B. Mellert explains, and correctly, I think, that there have historically been two different views of God: a God of eternity and a God of history. Thus the Bible, too, says Mellert, contains two different images of God: Yahweh and Lord. Yahweh is a God of eternity who said, "I am who I am";[79] he is eternal, unchanging, unchanged, transcendent, and far removed from the world, so that we have no control over his will. By contrast, the Lord in the Bible is a God of history, taking sides in history, showing constant care and concern for the Israelites, loving and suffering for them, and even being affected by them.

When the early Christian Church had its rapid movement to the Greco-Roman world, the image of Yahweh was more favorably accepted than the image of Lord, for it was more easily combined with Roman imperialism and Greek philosophy. Thus the Christian God became "the ruling Caesar, or the ruthless moralist, or the unmoved mover," to use Whitehead's expression.[80] The image of Lord was forgotten to a large degree. There was especially a great influence of Greek philosophy upon the formation of the Christian doctrine of God. To Greek philosophers, God was an ultimate philosophical principle which is perfect, self-contained, immutable, unmoved, and passionless. Basically, therefore, God in Christianity became a perfect, self-contained, passionless God who is not acted upon by what is going on in the world.

This doctrine of God, however, would not be able to satisfy completely the religious need of human persons who seek an intimate relation with God. Thus Christianity would have to restore the other side of God: the image of the compassionate Lord who is always with us. It is however a very difficult task to restore it, because it involves the problem of how to reconcile it with the already familiar image of the transcendent Yahweh. As John B. Cobb, Jr. and David Ray Griffin point out,[81] this is exactly the problem which Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas had to face when they, who under traditional theism believed in the unmoved, passionless God, attempted also to retain the biblical notion of divine compassion for the world.

What is important about process thought and Unificationism is that they have solved this problem by introducing dipolar theism. Yahweh and Lord, roughly corresponding to the mental and physical poles of God, can become one, because the two poles of God are one.[82]

Dipolar theism in process thought and Unificationism, introducing

the physical pole of God, can affirm God's close companionship with humans which is critically important for religion. According to process thought, everything we do makes a difference to God because he feels it in his consequent nature to eventually integrate it with his primordial side. Thus God has "a tender care that nothing be lost."[83] Not only the intensity of satisfaction which we experience but even our suffering is understood by God and made valuable in his companionship:

> He [i.e., God] gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it. He is the ideal companion who transmutes what has been lost into a living fact within his own nature. He is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness.[84]

He also suffers when we suffer: "God is the greatest companion—the fellow-sufferer who understands."[85] Unificationism, too, has a similar theory of divine companionship by reason of the *Hyung Sang* of God which is immanent in the world yet at the same time united with his *Sung Sang:*

> God is love; God has tears and compassion. God is sensitive and feels sadness; God feels deep compassion as well. More than anyone else, God also needs a companion.[86]

According to Unificationism, therefore, God suffers when humans suffer.

There is, however, an element which makes Unificationism quite different from process thought in regard to the suffering of God. It is the unbearable tragedy of the human fall. Unificationism emphasizes it, while process thought does not. Because of this, Unificationism portrays God as more tragic than process thought:

> When Adam and Eve rebelled against God, they indeed broke His heart. Ever since, God has been a tragic, sad God, but He has never given up hope.[87]

Process thought does not have such a strong expression to describe the suffering of God. Nevertheless, it would be right to say that Unificationism has more optimism than process thought, because the God of Unificationism is more powerful than the God of process thought, as

was mentioned at the end of the preceding section. Thus, the God of Unificationism will not bear the human fall forever and therefore must seek the restoration of humanity. We are therefore persuaded to console the suffering heart of God through our efforts to become his loyal children (in spite of our own suffering) in the course of restoration. Thus the founder of the Unification Church says:

> I never prayed from weakness. I never complained. I was never angry at my situation. I never even asked His help, but was always busy comforting Him and telling Him not to worry about me. The Father knows me so well. He already knew my suffering. How could I tell Him about my suffering and cause His heart to grieve still more? I could only tell Him that I would never be defeated by my suffering.[88]

In spite of this difference, however, there is no doubt that process thought and Unificationism, because of their similar theories of divine dipolarity, can together open a new dimension in religion.

FOOTNOTES

1. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality,* corrected ed., ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free, 1978) 343-46. Henceforth abbreviated as PR.
2. Sang Hun Lee, *Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1973) 11-13. Henceforth abbreviated as UT. *Sung Sang* and *Hyung Sang* are Korean terms and can be roughly translated as "internal character" and "external form" (UT 8).
3. See my Ph.D. dissertation, "Transition and Concrescence: A Comparison of the Two Species of Process in Whitehead's Metaphysics" (Drew University, 1984).
4. *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 63.
5. PR 239.
6. PR 239.
7. PR 18.
8. PR 345, 348.
9. PR 343.
10. PR 31. "Eternal objects" in process thought are equivalent to Platonic ideas or forms, though unlike Platonism, process thought does not allow an eminent reality to them.
11. PR 344.
12. PR 87-88, 344.
13. PR 344.
14. PR 88, 345.
15. PR 345.
16. PR 345.
17. PR 88, 345.
18. PR 244, 344.
19. PR 67.
20. PR 225.
21. Sang Hun Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981) 45. Henceforth abbreviated as EUT.
22. EUT 6-7.
23. EUT 10.
24. EUT 7, 34-35.
25. EUT 23-26, 34-35.
26. EUT 10.
27. EUT 11.
28. EUT 13.
29. EUT 29.
30. EUT 11.
31. PR 105, 207.
32. Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933) 256, 381. Henceforth abbreviated as AI.
33. EUT 29.
34. PR 344.
35. AI 381.
36. PR 207.

37. EUT 21.
38. EUT 29.
39. Therefore we do not have to join Gene Reeves and Delwin Brown, when they are afraid that the unity of the two natures of God is not well worked out by Whitehead. See their "The Development of Process Theology," in *Process Philosophy and Christian Thought*, ed. Delwin Brown et al. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1971) 31.
40. EUT 14.
41. EUT 15.
42. EUT 15.
43. PR 40.
44. PR 48.
45. PR 48.
46. "Individual truth bodies" simply refer to individual existing beings. But for the technical definition of the term, see UT 42, EUT 45.
47. EUT 18-20, 73-74.
48. EUT 18.
49. UT 68.
50. UT 63.
51. This point is not explicitly expressed anywhere in UT and EUT, but in my opinion it is implied in their chapters on epistemology. See especially UT 195-205, EUT 144-57.
52. PR 348.
53. EUT 11.
54. EUT 7.
55. As an example of the traditional thesis, see Descartes' definition of substance: "Really the notion of *substance* is just this—that which can exist by itself, without the aid of any other substance." *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, 2 vols., trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1911-12, and 1931) 2:101.
56. PR 50.
57. EUT 62, 338.
58. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973) 28.
59. Note, however, that while process thought attributes more or less responsibility to any actual entity, living or non-living (PR 109), Unificationism basically attributes it only to man (DP 55-56).
60. AI 213.
61. PR 244.
62. PR 224.
63. PR 25.
64. DP 197-98.
65. DP 55-56.
66. Apart from dipolar theism, there are of course some general metaphysical differences (as well as similarities) between the two schools of thought. It is however beyond the scope of the present paper to deal with them. For them, see my unpublished paper, "The Four-fold Structure of Whitehead's 'Process' and Unificationism's 'Quadruple

Base': A Comparison," read at the Conference on Process Theology and Unification Thougth in Lake Arrowhead, California, in 1982.

67. EUT 11.
68. EUT 7.
69. The "extensive continuum' is "one relational complex in which all potential objectifications find their niche. It underlies the whole world, past, present, and future" (PR 66). That the "extensive continuum" is part of the consequent nature of God can be understood from the following words of Whitehead: "This extensive continuum is 'real,' because it expresses a fact derived from the actual world and concerning the contemporary actual world" (PR 66).
70. AI 192, 240-41.
71. PR 21.
72. EUT 26. More precisely, it is located inside the *Sung Sang* of God (EUT 26).
73. PR 225. It is interesting to observe that Whitehead equates the ultimate principle of creativity with the Aristotelian ultimate "matter" which is outside of God (PR 31).
74. EUT 26-28.
75. Unificationism agrees with Robert C. Neville's challenge to process thought in this regard. See his *Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology* (New York: Seabury, 1980).
76. See, e.g., Charles Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 1984).
77. DP 95-97, 195-201.
78. *What is Process Theology?* (New York: Paulist, 1975) 40-41.
79. Exodus 3:14, RSV.
80. PR 343.
81. *Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976) 44-46.
82. In connection with this, process thought and Unificationism talk about another type of united dipolarity in God: masculinity and femininity. See Cobb and Griffin, 62; Kim, 53-68. Though it is an important theological issue today, I will not treat it in the present paper.
83. PR 346.
84. Alfred North Whitehead, *Religion in the Making* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1926) 154-55.
85. PR 351.
86. [Sun Myung Moon], *The Way of Tradition,* 4 vols. (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 1:73.
87. *The Way of Tradition* 1:60.
88. *New Hope: Twelve Talks by Sun Myung Moon* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973) vi.

SECTION TWO:
UNIFICATION THEOLOGY
AND BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

THE SEXUAL INTERPRETATION OF THE HUMAN FALL

by Andrew Wilson

A significant feature of Dr. Kim's theology has been her willingness to utilize the findings of historical-critical biblical scholarship. While *Divine Principle* was written by people in dialogue with fundamentalist missionary Christianity and either interprets the Bible assuming a hermeneutic of biblical literalism or, in some cases, disputes with an audience which holds to that hermeneutic, the metaphysical truth which that text expounds can hardly be constrained to that particular approach. Dr. Kim's writings have exhibited a notable openness to a wide range of expressions of Christianity, from orthodox to liberal. *Divine Principle* itself gives the theological basis for recognizing the value of a multiplicity of approaches to scripture, including the modern scientific approach of biblical criticism, to uncover a meaning beyond the literal sense:

> The Bible, however, is not the truth itself, but a textbook teaching the truth. Naturally, the quality of teaching and the method and extent of giving truth must vary according to each age.... Therefore, we must not regard the textbook as absolute in every detail. (*DP,* 9).

Rarely is historical-critical research more supportive of Unification theology than in its interpretation of Genesis 3 as a basis for a sexual interpretation of the human Fall, as Dr. Kim herself has realized.[1] There is a growing consensus among biblical scholars that a polemic against Canaanite fertility cults with their rites of sacred prostitution is a substratum of the narrative in Genesis 2-3. While some recognize this polemic to shine transparently through in the Yahwist's rendition, there are many who understand the Yahwist to have attenuated many of the polemic's

sexual themes when he took it up into his epic narrative. I would contend that although the symbolism in the narrative appears somewhat opaque to us, the people of ancient Israel readily understood the story's polemical intent and its sexual connotations because the fertility cult was a living part of Israelite culture.

After reviewing the ancient Near Eastern background of the Fall narrative in Genesis in order to illuminate its original meaning, my second task will be to relate this to the Unification teaching on the Fall. As revelations by the same God, there is a theological assumption of continuity between the revelation in Genesis and the teaching in *Divine Principle*. Perhaps we can show that *Divine Principle* is retelling the original sin of the Fall for our contemporary situation, where the idolatry of fertility cults has been replaced by other expressions of the same sin. Unification theology approaches the Fall with a renewed seriousness in an age that has come to idolize casual sexual relationships as a way of love, happiness, and maturity—the very promises of the fertility cult which the Genesis account had called into judgment.

1. Interpretations of Genesis 3

The range of modern interpretations of Genesis 3 can be quickly grasped by considering the range of possible meanings for the crux "knowledge of good and evil." The verb "to know" *(yāda')* has a wide range of semantic meanings. First, some have understood it to mean knowledge in the moral sense.[2] This view, popularized by psychoanalysis, views the Fall as that primordial event where humankind lost its innocence and was for the first time capable of making moral decisions. In other words, attaining knowledge of good and evil means to reach the age of maturity or adulthood. Two biblical parallels which could support this interpretation are Deut 1:39, where the children of those who made the exodus are called those "who to this day have no knowledge of good or evil," and Isa 7:15, where the child Immanuel will eat curds and honey once he grows out of childhood—"when he knows how to refuse the evil and choose the good." Yet these parallels do not require a moral interpretation, and could equally be construed as denoting maturity in a physical, intellectual, or sexual sense. In the Genesis account, the couple in Genesis are already treated as moral agents when God addresses them and imposes the commandment upon them. Furthermore, if this "knowledge," which God purposefully hides from humanity, were moral

sensibility, it would contradict the entire sweep of biblical thought with its repeated emphasis on God as the *revealer* of moral law.

Second, the "knowledge of good and evil" can refer to all the secrets of nature, the totality of knowledge,[3] or knowledge of the magic arts.[4] Adam and Eve are offered knowledge of everything in creation, or in other words, divine knowledge. Thus according to the words of the serpent in Gen 3:5, repeated by God in 3:22, by their eating the fruit they become like God. This sense of knowledge of good and evil as the totality of wisdom, knowledge in the experiential, moral and intellectual senses, is the meaning preferred by the majority of scholars today. Yet this proposal appears to be contradicted by the text, where Adam already has the power to give names to all the animals, hence to rule over them. Adam already had considerable knowledge about the world.[5] The wisdom of Adam before the Fall is explicit in the variant of the Garden of Eden story in Ezek 28:12 where the king of Tyre is likened to unfallen Adam in the Garden of Eden: "You were the seal of perfection, full of wisdom, perfect in beauty." Similarly in Ps 82:6, the judgment upon the divine beings, who presumably already possess divine knowledge, is likened to the fall of Adam: "I said you are divine beings, sons of the Most High all of you. Nevertheless you shall die like Adam, and fall like one of the angels."[6] However these parallels should not be overdone; Adam in the Genesis account is clearly *not* a divine being but rather aspires to divinity. The fabled knowledge of primordial man[7] may be a variant tradition to that in Genesis 3, which intentionally portrays Adam as a weak-willed and inexperienced person who seeks knowledge but is not yet wise. As we shall see, there is merit to understanding the cryptic phrase "knowledge of good and evil" as encompassing the totality of wisdom, but this is not its only meaning, nor is this meaning the key to interpretation of the text.

Third, the verb "to know" in Hebrew often denotes a man having sexual relations with a woman. In Gen 4:1 Adam "knew" his wife, and she conceived and bore Cain; Gen 24:16 describes Rebekah as "a virgin who no man had known," and in Gen 19:5 a mob of Sodomites demands that Lot and the angels be given to them that they may know them, that is, rape them. A frequently cited parallel is 2 Sam 19:35, where the aged but sagacious Barzillai declines David's offer of hospitality at the court and bargains on behalf of his successor:

> I am now eighty years old; can I discern between good and
> evil? Can your servant taste what he eats or what he drinks?
> Can I still listen to the voices of singing men and singing
> women? Why then should my servant be an added burden
> to my lord the king? . . . but here is my servant Chimham;
> let him go over with my lord the king.

Here Barzillai's inability to know good and evil cannot refer to lack of
moral sense or to senility; Barzillai is only mentioned here because he was
a powerful leader of Gilead. In the context of a list of the pleasures of the
court, it likely refers to the missing element of the triad "wine, women
and song."[8] The sexual interpretation can also encompass the references to
maturity in Deut 1:39 and Isa 7:15; the age at which children can know
good and evil is then the age of puberty. In this regard Gordis adduces a
passage from the Qumran text *sereḥ ha'êdah* QSa 1.9-11:[9]

> He shall not come near to a woman, in order to have sexual
> relations with her, until his completing twenty years, when
> he knows good and evil.

Obvious sexual elements are woven into the Genesis story.[10] The couple
are at first naked, but they are ashamed following the act and cover
themselves with fig leaves—a dress which was connected with sexual
orgies. The expression to eat a fruit was itself a common euphemism for
sexual intercourse, thus *Gilgamesh* 6.1.8 has Ishtar trying to seduce the
hero: "Come, Gilgamesh, be thou my lover/Do but grant me of thy fruit."
The Hebrew has wordplay of the roots *'wr* "arouse," *'ry* "nakedness", *'rm*
"cunning" and *'wr* "skin." The curse on the woman involves the sexual
domain of life.

Our understanding of the sexual nature of the Fall narrative is
illuminated by a number of extrabiblical parallels, notable among them
the Mesopotamian epic of Gilgamesh.[11] There the story of Gilgamesh's
companion, the wild man Enkidu, shows many parallels to the Genesis
account of Adam's creation and fall. Enkidu, like Adam, was made out of
clay and given the "essence" of a god (1.2.34-35). He goes about naked,
lives in the wild among the animals, waters with the beasts at the watering-
places, and knows nothing of humanity or civilization. Gilgamesh sends a
temple-prostitute to seduce him and alienate him from his life in the wild
so that he will come into the civilized world:

> The lass freed her breasts, bared her bosom,
>   and he possessed her ripeness.
> She was not bashful as she welcomed his ardor....
>
> After he had had his fill of her charms,
> He set his face toward his wild beasts.
> On seeing him, Enkidu, the gazelles ran off,
> The wild beasts of the steppe drew away from his body.
> Startled was Enkidu, as his body becomes taut,
> His knees were motionless—for his wild beasts had gone.
> Enkidu had to slacken his pace—it was not as before;
> But now he had wisdom, broader understanding.
> Returning, he sits at the feet of the harlot,
> He looks up at the face of the harlot,
> His ears attentive, as the harlot speaks;
> She says to him, to Enkidu,
> "Thou art wise, Enkidu, art become like a god!
> Why with the wild creatures dost thou roam over the steppe?
> Come, let me lead thee to ramparted Uruk..." (1.4.
> 16-36)[12]

The result of their lovemaking was that Enkidu, like Adam, was forced to leave his wilderness paradise and bend himself to the task of civilized life. Yet this act also gives Enkidu wisdom, and he becomes like a god—the very words Gen 3:5,22 uses of Eve's and Adam's wisdom which they gain upon eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Here wisdom is both the knowledge of sexuality and knowledge of human affairs and civilization, to which Enkidu now repairs. Enkidu's next acts reflect this two-fold aspect of his new knowledge: he puts on clothing, a piece of the woman's garment (2.2.27-30) and then goes to live with shepherds to learn the ways of men. Finally it is Enkidu's lot to die, and he curses the harlot for enticing him to a path that had such an unfortunate outcome (7.3.10-30). Like the curse on Adam in Gen 3:19, Enkidu turns to the clay from whence he came (10.2.12).

However, the difficulties of the sexual interpretation should not be overlooked. Sexuality *per se* is not prohibited by God, who sanctions the marriage bed in both the J and P creation accounts (Gen 1:28, 2:18,23-24). The Fall is not about divine displeasure over sex in marriage, which is

rightly viewed by the Jewish and Christian traditions as God's blessings to humanity.[13] Rather, the narrative must be referring to sexual relations outside of marriage. In the ancient world, we know of an institution which required extramarital sex, which promised life, fertility, and communion with the divine, and whose symbols included serpents and trees, namely the Canaanite fertility cult. Genesis 3 finds its proper historical context as a polemic against the fertility cult and its claim to be a way to participate in the life of the gods.[14]

2. Asherah and the Serpent in the Fertility Cult

We know that the fertility cult persisted in ancient Israel by its frequent condemnation by the prophets. Throughout the ancient world it venerated the agricultural goddess of fertility, known in different locations by various names as Aphrodite, Asherah, Ishtar, Astarte, etc.[15] It was thought that the fertility of humans, crops and cattle was the result of the sexual union of the gods, the *hieros gamos*. The blessings of their union were communicated through its ritual reenactment by the worshipper and a temple prostitute. The Bible associates these male and female prostitutes, called "holy ones" *(qādēs* and *qedēsah), with the goddess Asherah.[16]

The cult of Asherah was ubiquitously associated with trees or wooden posts called Asherahs.[17] In Punic iconography, Asherah, there called Tannit, was often depicted beside a fruit-bearing palm tree. According to the testimonies of Hosea and Jeremiah, her cult of ritual sex was practiced underneath the shade of trees or beside her wooden standards.[18] A tree is similarly the setting for the sin of Genesis 3.

Asherah was also symbolized by the serpent. Her various names included Ugaritic *'atiratu yammi,* "treader on the sea-serpent," Punic *tannit,* "serpent goddess," and in the Proto-Sinaitic inscriptions *b'lt dt btn,* "lady of the serpent."[19] She was also called *qudsu,* "Holiness," *'ēlat,* "the goddess,"[20] and *rabbat,* "the lady." Archaeologists have found a series of Syrian and Egyptian plaques and statuettes of Asherah under the name Qudsu. There she is a nude goddess, her hair in flowing curls, standing on a lion and holding one or more serpents (Figure 1).[21]

Asherah as the chief goddess in the fertility cult is also the figure alluded to in the Fall narrative's depiction of Eve. Eve is called "the mother of all the living" (Gen 3:20) which resembles the role of Asherah as mother goddess. Even more revealing are Eve's words upon the birth of Cain:"I have procreated *(qnyty)* a man with Yahweh" as if she, like Ashe-

rah, was the high god's consort. Asherah was similarly called at Ugarit "creatrix *(qnyt)* of the gods." In Hebrew Eve's name ḥawwâ is related to an Aramaic word for serpent *(ḥiwyat)*, leading *Genesis Rabbah* to make a play on words with Eve's name, "the serpent is thy (Eve's) serpent, and thou art Adam's serpent." *Ḥawwat* is even a name for Asherah in an intriguing Punic inscription which begins "O Lady *ḥawwat*, Goddess."[22]

Although Genesis 3 makes every effort to portray the serpent as simply an animal, its intelligent speech makes it transparent that the Yahwist is demythologizing and debunking a divinity well-known from Canaanite myth. Indeed, this denigration of a god(dess) to the status of mere animal is part of the narrative's message. But for such a conceit to work, the author assumed that his listeners would know well the myth to which he was alluding. In the religious lore extant both in Israel and among the pagan Canaanites, the serpent appears in two different contexts. He is the primordial chaos dragon, personified as Sea, who challenges the gods for control of the cosmos but is defeated. This is the biblical dragon Leviathan (Isa 27:1, Job 41). But the wiley serpent in Genesis 3 is hardly a warlike monster. The other serpent in Canaanite lore is a wise and benign animal symbolizing healing and immortality. The bronze serpent of Moses was used to heal victims of a plague in the desert (Num 21:6-9). The Greek Caduceus, symbol of medicine, was a pole with entwined serpents which several scholars have connected to the Canaanite-Phoenician serpent.[23] In the Gilgamesh epic, the serpent became immortal after stealing the plant of life, and his immortality is evident because he renews himself whenever he sloughs his skin. This is in character with the serpent in Genesis 3; he holds out the promise of immortality. It is also in character with the purpose of the fertility cult, to elicit life and healing by imitation of the gods (cf. Num 25, where the licentious rites of Baal Peor were performed to avert a plague).

We now turn to an Ugaritic text which illuminates the connection between serpents and the fertility cult, RS 24.244.[24] A birth-goddess or horse-goddess named *pḥlt* addresses each of the major gods and instructs them to perform an incantation against snake-bite:

> "Incant the bite of the serpent,
> the strike of the serpent, the slougher.

> From it let your charm destroy,
>   from it let it dispel the venom."

Each God then prepares a couch and sits down for a purpose that may correspond to the scene at the conclusion. Then the birth-goddess goes to the god Horan and makes the same request, but he either refuses or is unable to carry out the charm. The spurned goddess casts a spell on Horan which renders him infertile, and Horan, in order to overcome her spell and regain his potency, seeks out a sacred tree, the "tree of death":

> Against the Horan she turns her face,
>   and bereaves [him] of his progeny,
>   profaned is the precinct of the Ancient One.
> Lo, he set his face
>   to the fertile Tigris region,
>   the abundant Tigris region.
> He dispells with a tree, the tamarisk,
>   with a shrub, the tree of death.
> "Let the double tamarisk shake it off,
>   the double palm shoot remove it,
>   the double adornment make it pass,
>   the double fruit carry it away."
> Horan arrives at his house,
>   he reaches his court.
> His potency is strong like a torrent,
>   it streams like unto a stream.

This "tree of death," like the biblical tree of life, is located at the source of the Tigris river, the place of Eden (Gen 2:14). With this tree he does a fertility ritual which restores his potency. The ambiguity of life and death brought by these plants is evident here as in the Bible: the fruit of the tree of death here brings renewed potency, the fruit of the biblical tree of knowledge of good and evil brings death.

Fresh and revived, Horan now returns to the goddess and can overcome her spells in order to consummate the sacred marriage. The sequence and the role of serpents is instructive:

> But she had incanted herself in the house,
>   she had shut herself in the house,

she had latched herself in.

[Horan] "Open the house that you incanted,
   open the house so I can enter,
   the temple that I can come in."

[phlt] "Give as a marriage price serpents,
   'the stinger' give as my marriage price,
   a young snake as my love pay."

[Horan] "I have given serpents as your marriage price,
   a young snake as your love pay."

The goddess will not let Horan enter until he has given her snakes as a marriage price *('tnn)*. In the Bible *'etnān* is the term for a harlot's hire, which is again bound up with the rite of sacred prostitution; it is dedicated to a deity[25] and is mentioned as a form of idolatry and apostasy.[26] Coote suggests that the bronze serpent figurines which are found at many Canaanite sites might have been a form of *'etnān* for the cult prostitute (Figure 2).[27] Upon paying this price of tamed serpents, Horan can enter his temple and together with the goddess fulfill the sacred marriage to bring healing and fertility.

The role of the serpent is here ambivalent, as the source of death through snake-bite or the source of life as a phallic symbol. This text describes sacred marriage as the consequence of taming the serpent's powers of death. Hence the fertility cult was used to elicit healing of diseases, represented by the god's power to incant the serpent. It could neutralize the threatening aspect of the serpent, its powers of treachery and death, which are apparent both in the epic of Gilgamesh where the serpent steals the plant of life and in the Genesis story of the Fall where the serpent tempts Adam and Eve to sin and consequently to their death.

3. Genesis 3 as Generalizing an Israelite Polemic against the Fertility Cult

In Genesis 3, the Yahwist generalizes a polemic against the fertility cult and attributes to it the source of all human corruption. In these chapters he is setting the stage for the description of God's redemptive work beginning with Noah and Abraham. The scene in chapter 3 contains all the elements of the *hieros gamos:* the setting on the sacred ground of the garden of God, the tree as cult-place of Asherah and source of healing and

immortality, the serpent as symbol and mediator of the fertility cult, the woman called by one of Asherah's titles, and the man. Together they do something which is supposed to make the couple like God, allowing them to partake in divine life. They seek what all those engaged in the ritual sex of the fertility cult were promised: participation in the numinous power of the *hieros gamos*. The serpent's words "you will be like God" express this very action of sexual ecstacy and sympathetic magic which was thought to temporarily mingle human and divine energies to bring healing and fertility into the human world.

But the biblical account turns these blessings into curses; the fertility cult's promise of divinity is revealed to be a cheap deception that creates a barrier to attaining the tree of life. The results of the sacred act are not the blessings of fertility, progeny and eternal life, but rather the curses of infertility, pain in childbirth, and death. The curse on the woman is that she will multiply—not children but pains in childbirth. Instead of dominating the powers of procreation through the fertility cult, woman would be ruled by her desire for her husband. The ground would not yield crops in easy abundance as promised by the fertility cult; no ritual technique could substitute for human sweat and toil. Finally, as Coote points out, the curse upon the serpent destroys its role as mediator of the fertility cult by placing eternal enmity between it and humanity.[28]

The biblical account also demythologizes the deities of the fertility cult; the actors are human or animal. In the world of myth the gods live in a garden paradise on the cosmic mountain by the tree of life. On that sacred ground, represented by earthly sanctuaries such as the temple at Mount Zion, they perform the rite of sacred marriage. But although the persons in Genesis 3 live in the garden of God and represent Asherah and her consort, they are not actual gods. Each is a creation of God and subject to his decree. The Yahwist draws a fundamental distinction between Yahweh and the non-gods of the fertility cult. The two trees in the story similarly function to distinguish Yahweh from the false gods.[29] The tree of life representing the life offered by Yahweh is distinct from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil representing the false life of the fertility cult.

The specific promises made to Adam and Eve were that they would become like God and have wisdom, yet each of these promises is perverted by their participation in the false and sinful ritual sex of the fertility cult. As we noted, the fertility cult promised divinization through participation

in the sacred marriage and its mystic mingling of divine and natural energies, but in Gen 3 the couple is driven out of the garden of Eden, the divine realm, and no longer has easy access to God who habitually walked through the garden (Gen. 3:8).

The wisdom which Adam and Eve gained through their transgression was similarly perverted. Like Enkidu's wisdom it encompassed more than just carnal knowledge; it led Adam and Eve to the toilsome and ambiguous life of human society. Yet this wisdom, originating with the serpent, was deceitful because it was not based upon God, or in the words of the proverb, "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Throughout the book of Proverbs there is an explicit contrast between true wisdom which brings life[30] and the folly represented by the prostitute which brings death.[31] The cult of Asherah may lie in the background of these wisdom traditions, which Israel had taken up and restored by depicting Lady Wisdom and the cult prostitute as mirror-images of one another. In Prov 7:6, Wisdom looks out her window onto the street—a typical image of the prostitute,[32] and in Wis 6:12-16 she herself goes out on the street soliciting customers. In the Dead Sea Psalms Scroll, 11QPsa 21.11-17, which parallels Sir 51:13-19, uses imagery of sexual intercourse to depict a young man's experience with Lady Wisdom, now understood metaphorically as a transcendent divine attribute. These traditions suggest that the fertility cult advertized itself as a source of wisdom, a worldly wisdom which Israel condemned as a path to death. For the Yahwist, the wisdom gained by the first couple led to banishment from the tree of life and ultimately to the murder of Abel and humanity's progressive decadence, violence, and corruption.

Finally, the Yahwist placed the Fall at the beginning of human history as the original sin that caused humanity to be driven out of paradise. In the fertility cult the *hieros gamos* was the primordial act of creation, repeated continually in the yearly agricultural cycle. But in contrast to the cyclical time of Canaanite cult, Israel lived with a linear sense of time born out of its epic tradition, where God acts to save his people in the events of history. Accordingly, while the Yahwist also put his account of the sacred marriage at the creation, at the beginning of time, this corrupted sacred marriage, now the human Fall, no longer functioned as a primordial saving event continually represented in the agricultural year. It became rather the primordial sin, which he juxtaposed against Yahweh's very different saving providence to be enacted in history

beginning with Noah and Abraham. The Yahwist recognized Eden to be the original home for humankind, signifying humanity's original fellowship with Yahweh. That fellowship would be renewed through Yahweh's particular historical providence with Israel which could overcome humanity's general tendency towards idolatry. For the Yahwist it would be manifest at the fulfillment of the new blessings to Abraham (Gen 12:1-3) at the time of the Davidic monarchy with its temple on Mount Zion as the dwelling place of God and the new Eden (cf. Isa 11:6-9, a description of the peaceable kingdom on Mount Zion where once again the serpent is tame). As Christians, we recognize the truth in the biblical portrayal of the Fall at the beginning of human history; it explains humanity's alienation from God which would be solved only in the course of history, to be consummated at the coming of the Messiah.

4. A Unification Interpretation of Genesis 3

Divine Principle is based upon new revelation. Yet it has continuity with the Biblical account of the Fall as it was originally understood. But why is there any need for a new understanding of the Fall? Why should Unification theology recall those ancient images and themes which had long been repressed in the Christian subconscious? Perhaps the traditional Christian position, that the Fall consisted of disobedience as Adam and Eve sought in their *hubris* to become like God, is not adequate to get at the root of the mystery of sin.

It is not our task here to evaluate traditional Christian theological positions on the Fall and original sin. We note that at least for Paul, the nature of sin is sufficiently complex that on the one hand, the obedience of Christ unto death overcame the power of sin brought on by Adam's disobedience (Rom 5:18-19), but on the other hand, the Christian must continue to fight the power of sin which still resides in the flesh by a determined struggle to live according to the Spirit (Rom 7:14, 21-25; 13:14). Thus, even the most obedient saints, those fully justified before God, still experience the effects of the Fall as a life and death struggle within their own souls. These internal struggles will continue until a future day of redemption (Rom 8:23-35). The Unification Principle, as a revelation proclaiming the day of the complete liquidation of sin's power over humanity, necessarily looks anew at the problem of the human Fall and at the original sin whose effects are still very much with us.

Unification theology describes the human Fall as an act of adultery, an illicit sexual relationship between Eve and the archangel Lucifer. Human love, which Principle considers to be the central spiritual force of life, was thereby derailed and distorted. The first human pair were meant to grow as brother and sister until the time of their maturity, when they would marry under God's blessing, and thereby the full love of God would dwell in their union. However, in violation of God's commandment, Eve and Lucifer united in a false relationship, and then Eve, her desire awakened, subsequently united with Adam prematurely and against the will of God. Their resultant family was bonded together apart from God and under the dominion of the false god Lucifer. This archangelic being, created as a servant of human beings, came to exercise dominion over them through the force of love in his triangular relationship with Adam and Eve, and hence he left his position in God's world to become Satan, "ruler of this world." Human love, which was meant to be holy and an expression of God's *agape* love, became degraded, self-centered, and far inferior to the divine love as incarnate in the true man, Jesus Christ.

The Unification Principle's view of the human Fall is largely in agreement with the historical-critical understanding of Genesis 3 as a polemic against the adulterous idolatry of the fertility cult generalized into a description of the origin of humanity's alienation from God. Yahweh had ordained marriage as the proper sphere for human sexuality (Gen 2:24). But Adam and Eve did not respect Yahweh's commandment; instead they prostituted themselves to false gods through idolatrous sexual intercourse. The sin which disrupted the original bond between God and humanity was more than disobedience of Yahweh's commandment; it was that act of illicit love euphemistically termed eating the "fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil."

We can recognize the hand of revelation in the Yahwist's characterization of the primordial human sin as idolatry through ritual intercourse. The fertility cult was a particularly pernicious form of idolatry because it bound the worshipper to its gods with the most powerful emotional force in human life, the force of love. The Priestly writer would remark that by ritual sexual intercourse, Israel "yoked itself" to the gods of the fertility cult (Num 25:3). Through this sexual communion the powers and characteristics of these gods infused the worshipper. For moderns the fertility cult appears to be merely a deification of nature. But for the prophets it was something far more sinister, namely idolatry that broke

the Mosaic covenant and severed the worshipper from fellowship with God. If Israel was in covenant with God and under God's gracious dominion, then it would live righteously according to the laws of the covenant and would enjoy God's blessing. But an Israel committing fornication with other gods—and fornication was a typical label for idolatry for Hosea and Jeremiah—acted corruptly, oppressed the poor and lived according to the false values of the polytheistic nations which had formerly enslaved Israel. For such practices, Israel could expect God's judgment.

Similarly, Unification theology understands the essence of the Fall to be the redirection of human love from God to the false god who is called Satan. The fall is fundamentally an act of idolatry that sets up a lasting allegiance, motivated by the force of love. Since love is the most powerful force, the illicit sexual act "yoked" humanity to Satan's dominion and set up a false family manifesting fallen love. Humanity was meant to live under the gracious dominion of God and thereby express the divine image. But beginning with Adam and Eve, humanity under the dominion of Satan has manifested a flawed nature, unable to fully love, habitually acting out of self-centered desire.

Unification theology also builds upon the Genesis account of the false wisdom gained through the idolatrous love at the Fall. Love is the occasion for the most intimate communication of values and attitudes from one partner to another. At the Fall the first couple, and through them all humanity, acquired a "fallen nature," a mind which inverted humanity's true attitudes and values. This wisdom was not mere intellectual knowledge which could be unlearned by an enlightened teaching; it is grounded in the intimacy of family and seated in the deepest inheritance of the race—humanity's lineal relationship to Satan incurred at the Fall. This wisdom is fundamentally an idolization of the self and the flesh implicit in the fallen act which sought to attain divinity by human striving and sexuality. It brings with it a fundamental insecurity about the self due to the rejection of God, the ground of human existence and source of true love and happiness. The flesh is placed over the spirit, selfish desires over concern for others, love of self over love of God, selfish pride over honest humility and respect. From this set of false attitudes and values, the "fallen nature," Unification theology traces the multiplicity of human sins, including murder and war.

In sum, while the fertility cult may be viewed as an archaic biblical practice and the biblical polemics against it a curiosity of another age,

Unification theology recognizes the contemporary pursuit of pleasure and fulfillment through adultery and casual sex to be its modern equivalent. The pursuit of sexuality outside of its proper sphere of marriage is still a most destructive violation of God's pattern for human life, one with serious consequences for one's capacity to give unselfish love. The Genesis narrative is not only about an event that occurred at the beginning of time; the initial alienation was repeated continually in the fertility cult. Similarly, for Unification theology the original sin is repeated and reinforced in the daily life of millions of people who engage in adultery and casual sex. Just as for the Israelites the fertility cult held out the false promises of divinity, fertility, and wisdom, so in the contemporary world there is a prevalent notion that casual sex and a series of romantic loves will bring happiness, maturity of life experience, and ultimately love. The Unification doctrine of the Fall condemns this lifestyle as the pursuit of a mirage, as fundamentally alienating from the true self and from God, and as begetting irresponsibility, lovelessness, and violence. In modern society, as in ancient Israel, the correct path to the blessings of love and wisdom is through a primary relationship to God and fidelity in family relationships which have God at their center.

In addition, those who realize how deeply stained is the tradition of love out of which they have come will embark upon a religious path that will include a life of self-denial and abstinence from fallen sexual relationships in order to purify the self of the inherited effects of the Fall. However, it should not be thought that sexuality *per se* is base and sinful. It is rather part of the order of creation, and had it not been for the Fall, it would be a most holy and beautiful communion of divine love. The goal of the religious life is to enable one to receive God's pure love and then to share it with others and to form a God-centered family.

FOOTNOTES

1. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 113-114.
2. E.A. Speiser, *Genesis,* AB 1 (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964) 26; U. Cassuto, *Commentary on the Book of Genesis 1: From Adam to Noah (Genesis I-IV, 8)* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961) 111-113; L. Köhler, *Theologie des alten Testaments* (Tubingen, 1953) 158.
3. Good and evil can form a merism, a Semitic idiom of stating the extremes to include everything between them. On "good and evil" as a merism see Gen 24:50, Jer 41:17-18; 42:2-3; Lam 3:38; Eccl 12:14, etc. This is the view of von Rad (*Genesis,* OTL [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972] 86-7), Wellhausen (*Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel* [Edinburgh, 1885] 297ff.), and many others.
4. Cf. the *Book of Enoch,* chs. 7-8, 69. But Enoch is based upon the tradition of the fallen angels (Gen 6:1-4) rather than the story of the Fall. As one of the fallen angels who come down and cohabit with the daughters of men, a certain Gadreel who led Eve astray (69.6) and taught men how to make weapons of war. The sexual motif of the story of the fallen angels and the sexual motifs in the Fall in the garden of Eden may be related, but the nature of their relationship is unclear.
5. Robert Gordis, *Poets, Prophets, and Sages* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1971) 199-201.
6. On "angels" as a translation of *śārim,* see Dan 10;13,20,21; 12:1. At Ugarit the *śārim* were the astral deities who fell from heaven, a mythic representation of the eclipse of the stars at the sun's rising.
7. In rabbinic literature, see *B. Shabbat* 119b.
8. Gordis, 207.
9. Gordis, 198f. Alternatively, since the Qumran passage is preceded by a description of ten years of study of Torah prior to age twenty, the marriageable age could be construed as at the age of reason. See Howard N. Wallace, "The Eden Narrative," diss. Th.D., Harvard, 1972, 145-55.
10. For further biography of scholars favoring the sexual interpretation, see J. Alberto Soggin, *Old Testament and Oriental Studies,* Biblica et Orientalia 29 (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1975) 102.
11. These parallels are now generally acknowledged, but when they were first suggested by Morris Jastrow (*Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* [New York, 1898] 475ff. and W.F. Albright ("Adam and Eve in Babylonian Literature," *AJSL* 15 [1899] 200-14), they were not well received.
12. Translation by E.A. Speiser in J.B. Pritchard, ed., *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament,* 3rd ed. with suppl. (Princeton, 1969), 75.
13. Against Engnell, " 'Knowledge' and 'Life' in the Creation Story," in *Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East,* Vestus Testamentum Supplements 3 (Leiden: Brill, 1955) 103-119, who sees the fall as due to human powers of procreation.
14. Soggin, 102. J. Coppens, *La connaissance du bien et du mal et le peche du paradis* (Louvain, 1948).
15. See. W.F. Albright, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel,* 73-74, 91.
16. Deut 23:17-18; 1 Kgs 14:23-24; 15:12-13; Hos 4:14. Tamar dressed as such a cultic prostitute to entice Judah in Gen 38:15,21-22. 2 Kgs 23:6-7 speaks of the houses of the cult prostitutes where women make weavings for Asherah. The accusation in

Amos 2:7 that "a man and his father go into the same maiden" refers to these cult prostitutes. Herodotus I.199 describes the Mesopotamian institution of the sacred prostitute or *qadistu* holy to Ishtar as the one time obligation of every woman prior to marriage:

> Every woman must once in her life go and sit in the temple of Aphrodite and there have intercourse with a stranger. . . . Most seat themselves in the temple precincts wearing a band of plaited cord around their heads . . . Gangways are marked off in every direction through the crowds of women, by which the men may pass along and make their choice. Once a woman has taken her seat she may not return home until some stranger has cast a silver coin into her lap and taken her outside the temple to lie with her. As he throws the coin, the stranger has to say "In the name of the goddess Mylitta." [The word represents Akkadian *mu'allitu* "the one who brings to birth," a title of Ishtar.] The piece of silver may be ever so small, but it may not be refused, and that coin is considered sacred. The woman is not allowed to be choosy—she must go with the first man who throws her the money. When she has surrendered herself, her duty to the goddess has been rendered and she may return safely home; from that time it will be impossible to seduce her, no matter how large a sum you offer her.

The "plaited cord" may be related to the weavings for Asherah in 2 Kgs 23:7. Quoted in H.W.F. Scaggs, *The Greatness that was Babylon* (New York: North American Library, 1962) 334-35.

17. See Deut 16:21, "plant a tree for Asherah." 2 Kgs 21:2-7 and 23:4-7,14 uses the term Asherah in both senses, denoting the goddess and her cult object. The LXX often translates Asherah as *alsos*, a sacred grove of trees.

18. Hos 4:12-14; Jer 2:20.

19. F.M. Cross, *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1973), 32-34.

20. See A. Herdner, *Corpus des tablettes en cuneiformes alphabetiques* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1963) 14.197-199 where Keret "approached Qudsu, Asherah of Tyre, and Elat of Sidon." These three names are of course poetic parallels for a single goddess.

21. These are collected in J.B. Pritchard, *Ancient Near East in Pictures Relating to the Old Testament* (Princeton, 1969) pl. 469-477.

22. H. Donner and W. Röllig, *Kanaanäische und aramäische Inscriften* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1979) Nr. 89.1.

23. See Robert Oden, *Studies in Lucian's De Syria Dea*, HSM 15 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977) 151-155.

24. *Ugaritica V*, ed. J. Nougayrol et al. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1968) 574-580. This translation and commentary is taken from Robert Coote, "The Serpent and Sacred Marriage in Northwest Semitic Tradition," Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1972.

25. Deut 23:18; Hos 2:14; Isa 23:18.

26. Mic 1:7; Hos 9:1.

27. Coote, 52-55.

28. Coote, 85-91.

29. The existence of two trees has long caused concern among scholars. Only one tree would be required for the drama of the fertility cult (shorn of its biblical inversion).

Some have suggested a conflation of two stories, but no attempt to dissect out separate sources has been successful. For a critique of this approach, see Wallace, 117-121.

30. Prov 3:18,22; 8:35; 9:11, etc.

31. Prov 5:5-6; 7:22-27; 9:18.

32. In the Samaria and Nimrud Ivories the fertility-goddess is often depicted gazing out a window, sometimes wearing a cloth braid, the mark of a prostitute (Jer 3:3), on her forehead. Note the similar image of the Canaanite Jezebel in 2 Kgs 9:30. See Michael D. Coogan, "The Woman at the Window," paper presented at the Harvard Old Testament Seminar, October 1980.

A bronze serpent unearthed by Rothenberg at the excavation of Timna, a Midianite late bronze age mining center near the Gulf of Aqaba at the eastern edge of the Sinai Peninsula. Found near the altar of the sanctuary, it was evidently a cultic object. Such bronze serpents were symbols of the divine power to heal disease, e.g. the bronze serpent of Moses in Num 21:6-9. Their use in a Midianite sanctuary suggests a connection with the incident at Baal Peor in Num 25.

The Woman at the Window is one of the Nimrud Ivories carved in the Canaanite style, and similar carvings have been found among the ivories from the palace at Samaria. These ivories decorated a bed and are thought to depict Asherah or her votaress gazing invitingly out of her window in the role of a sacred prostitute.

A Mesopotamian cylinder seal depicting a god sitting behind a sacred tree, facing a woman and a serpent. It may be an illustration of a fertility ritual as that depicted in the Ugaritic text RS 24.244. Note that Semitic deities were frequently depicted with horns: horned representations of Baal may have contributed to the later iconography of Satan.

The goddess Asherah (Qudshu) standing on a lion and holding two serpents. This plaque was carved by Syrians living in Egypt in the 7th century B.C. (Drawn from original photo)

APPLICATIONS OF AFTERLIFE CONCEPTS AND IMAGERY IN COMMUNITY LIFE: THE NEW TESTAMENT AND THE UNIFICATION CHURCH[1]

by Whitney Shiner

A community's understanding of the afterlife has a direct bearing on its approach to a number of social situations and relationships in which death or the dead play a role. This paper will discuss ways that concepts and images of the afterlife are applied in specific situations in two different but historically related religious communities, the early Christian church as it is reflected in the New Testament and the present-day Unification movement. As the Unification movement recognizes the Bible as scripture, there is necessarily some overlapping of concepts and imagery in the two communities, but the eschatological understandings of the two groups, while related, are quite distinct and are reflected throughout their use of afterlife imagery and language.

Three aspects of community life will be taken up in turn: consolation of community members for the death of friends and relatives, moral exhortation, and the definition of the relationship between the members of the community and the dead. The understanding of the afterlife plays a role in other situations as well, but these three are representative enough to illustrate how the belief in the afterlife concretely affects people's lives in the two communities and how the larger understanding of the dealings of God with humanity directs the conception of the afterlife in both groups.

Both the early Christian church and the Unification movement are eschatological communities. Members of both communities believe that they are living in the "last days," when God is acting, or will act in the immediate future, to radically alter the nature of existence, and the

consciousness of living at the eschatological moment is a dominant organizing factor for both thought and behavior in the lives of community members. Beliefs about the afterlife in the early Christian community were inextricably linked to eschatological beliefs, since for the most part the resurrection of the dead was understood as taking place at the eschaton and was linked to other events such as the return of Christ, the destruction or recreation of the world, the last judgement, and the eschatological tribulations. The intermediate state of the dead between death and resurrection seems to be only a minor concern.

The eschatology of the New Testament can be described by and large as apocalyptic in character. While there is no scholarly consensus on the definition of apocalyptic literature or worldview, apocalyptic eschatology is generally recognized as including such features as a radical separation between an old and new age, a predetermined plan of God for history which is rapidly drawing to a close, a decisive intervention by God or his designated representative to destroy or transform the world, future rewards and punishments that will vindicate the elect of God, and a period of suffering for the elect which will precede the end.[2] Early Christianity inherited this apocalyptic view of history from its Jewish environment, understood Jesus as the divine representative ushering in the new age, and reinterpreted the historical scenario so that the end of the age was separated from the initial appearance of Jesus, the Messiah, and postponed to the time of his second coming.

Throughout most of the history of the Christian church, there have been both apocalyptic and non-apocalyptic strains of thought, and this paper does not intend to portray the apocalyptic view as the only true Christian view. Within modern biblical scholarship and theology there has been a great debate over how the apocalyptic language of the New Testament is to be understood today. Within traditional Christian churches, New Testament afterlife imagery has often been reinterpreted in a non-apocalyptic framework, or the apocalyptic framework has been de-emphasized. Nevertheless, for most of the New Testament church, afterlife and apocalyptic were closely intermeshed.

In the *Divine Principle,* the apocalyptic aspects of New Testament thought are generally interpreted as symbolic of God's activity at the eschaton. For example, the destruction of the world envisaged by some apocalyptic passages such as 2 Peter 3.12 is interpreted as symbolic of the passing of the old moral order dominated by evil, which will be replaced

by a new moral order centered on God and God's purpose (*DP*, 114). The return of the Son of Man on the clouds (Mark 13.26) is understood as symbolic of God's providing a new Messiah to make possible once again the moral transition to the world of God's ideal (*DP*, 512-14). The temporal aspect of apocalyptic eschatology is retained—the eschaton is still seen as an event in history—but the apocalyptic scenario of physical transformation is demythologized.

The apocalyptic vision of the New Testament is understood in Unification theology in terms of a restorationist eschatology. Restorationist understandings of eschatology can be traced back to the New Testament (e.g., the Adam/Christ typology of Paul in Romans 5), but in the New Testament restorationist thinking is clearly subordinated to the apocalyptic vision. In Unification theology it is the dominant category for salvation (*DP*, 103-4). Salvation is understood as the restoration of the true moral order envisaged by God and intended by God as the outcome of creation. Salvation means the restoration of the individual's ability to participate in true relationships of love and society's ability to order itself according to such relationships. In the Unificationist account of history, such a society never existed and such an individual has only existed in Christ, but the potential for the natural development of such individuals and societies existed in the beginning and was lost, and it is this potential which can only be restored through the Messiah and the act of God.

In Unificationism, a continuation of life after death is understood as a natural part of the order of creation (*DP*, 61, 168). Physical death is not a disorder of the creation but, like birth, a means of passing into a new realm of existence. Immortality, then, is not the result of a special intervention by God; it is rather a part of the natural structure of God's creation within which God's redemptive activity takes place. Resurrection is understood not as a resuscitation or transformation of the physical body, but, as in those passages in the New Testament where life and death refer to the spiritual state of an individual (e.g., Luke 9.30; John 5.24), the new life granted through the resurrection is understood as a restoration of true relationship with God and the resulting infusion of spiritual vitality from God (*DP*, 165-72). The spirit of an individual which continues to exist after the death of the physical body is understood as having a bodily form and to be molded by the activity of the person during his or her physical life (*DP*, 60-63).

Consolation

The concept of the afterlife is often used to help people to come to terms with their own impending death or the death of those they love. This is certainly true in the Christian tradition, though in some other traditions the existence of an afterlife is not seen as a comforting idea. Lucian, the second century Greek satirist, sees the excessive grief exhibited by his contemporaries at the death of their loved ones as arising from the pagan belief in a rather unpleasant afterlife in Hades,[3] and the Epicureans denied the existence of an afterlife in order to reduce anxiety and grief associated with death.[4]

An example of early Christian consolation material is found in Paul's first letter to the Thessalonians 4.13-18:[5]

> But we would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope. For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep. For this we declare to you by a word of the Lord, that we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord, shall not precede those who have fallen asleep. For the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel's call, and with the sound of the trumpet of God. And the dead in Christ will rise first; then we who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the Lord in the air; and so we shall always be with the Lord. Therefore comfort one another with these words.[6]

In this passage, Paul makes several points concerning the Christian attitude toward death. First, Christians should not grieve "as others do who have no hope." Second, the death and resurrection of Jesus guarantees the Christian's resurrection. Third, the living will not precede the dead into God's kingdom, but both will enter the kingdom at the coming of Christ. Fourth, the future life includes constant companionship with Jesus. When this passage is compared with approximately contemporary consolation material from Greek and Roman culture, several striking features can be noted.[7] The standard consolation format includes a section on the happy state of the deceased in the afterworld, but that is only one of

several means of consolation, and generally only a small fraction of a consoling letter or oration is concerned with the afterlife. The bulk of the standard consolation argument is concerned more directly with the sense of loss experienced by the survivors and how that loss can be overcome.[8] Because of the early Christian belief in the imminence of the return of Christ and the accompanying resurrection, the loss of a loved one would be understood as a temporary situation and may not have placed such a great role in the psychology of mourning as it did in pagan culture. Several centuries later, however, when the imminence of Christ's return must have become more doubtful, the bishop Cyprian, while a severe plague was ravaging his congregation, forbade mourning on the basis of the Christian hope in a joyful afterlife.[9] A similar prohibition of mourning is attributed to the Egyptian priests of Isis in Heliodorus's romance, *Aetheopica*,[10] but given the setting of that novel long ago in a strange and foreign land, it is hardly certain that the prohibition has any basis in fact. The Stoics' prohibition of mourning was well known in the Greco-Roman world, though it was generally rejected as overly severe, but their prohibition was based on their understanding of human virtue rather than their conception of the afterlife.[11]

The second unusual aspect of Paul's consolation in 1 Thessalonians is the severe restriction of the community to which it applies. In general, the Greek and Roman consolation material was written for those who had lost relatives or friends. The family unit was the most important social structure, and loss of parents or children induced the most severe grief. Paul's consolation in 1 Thessalonians, in contrast, has no force whatsoever in relation to the death of those outside what was then a very tiny Christian community. Since the relatives of many if not most Christians at the time would have been outside the Christian community, it is striking that there is no mention of non-Christian relatives. Admittedly, the passage is concerned with the community's grief over the recent death of one of its own members and Paul's immediate concern is to provide consolation for that situation, but the corollary to his statement of consolation seems to be that there is no hope for those outside the community. It is quite apparent that there has been a radical restructuring of communal ties so that the church rather than the family has become the primary social unit.[12]

The Unificationist attitude toward death is best exemplified by Rev. Moon's reaction to the death of his son early in 1984. Heung Jin Moon,

the second son of Rev. and Mrs. Moon, died from injuries received in an automobile accident at the age of seventeen. Members of the Unification Church understand that his death, while certainly unintentional, was, nevertheless, a sacrifice freely given for the continued progress of the process of world restoration.[13] When members of the Unification Church gathered to pay their last respects to Heung Jin Nim, Rev. Moon made the following short statement:

> In the secular world, death signifies the end of life. However, in our world, death is like a rebirth or a new birth into another world. Particularly those who gave their life for the purpose of the Kingdom of Heaven and for the sake of the movement are special heroes.
>
> For that reason, we must not make those occasions gloomy or sad or feel discouraged. Instead we shall rejoice in the victory of the spirit in which that life was given for the mission.
>
> If we here on earth become very mournful and gloomy it is like pulling the person who is going up to the heavens down to the ground.
>
> Heung Jin Nim entered the spirit world; if he sees us mourning and sorrowful, he will not be happy and comforted. Instead he just will not understand why we are sad.
>
> Therefore, this kind of occasion we no longer will call a funeral.... Again, this is a new birth from the second universal mother's womb (i.e., the physical world) into another world, just like when a baby emerges from its first mother's womb.
>
> A funeral is actually comparable to a wedding, when men and women get married. It's not a sorrowful occasion at all. It's like an insect coming out of its cocoon, getting rid of the shackle and becoming a new body and a new existence, a new entity.
>
> In our way of life and tradition, spirit world and physical world are one, and by our living up to that kind of ideal, we bring the two worlds together into one.[14]

While Rev. Moon made a point of not outwardly mourning for the death of his son, his attitude is not so much that we should feel no sense of personal loss when someone we love passes from the physical into the spiritual world[15] but rather that we should not focus our attention upon that loss. Instead, our attention should be focused on the well-being of others, especially the well-being of the deceased. The departed spirit is comforted if we rejoice in his or her good fortune; he or she is confused and concerned if we mourn. Furthermore, an attitude of mourning would seem to belie the value of the sacrifice made by Heung Jin Nim. If his death is noble, he should be honored rather than mourned.

One can also see Rev. Moon's concern to make use of the death for the purposes of restoration. According to Unification theology, there should have been no separation between the physical and spiritual realms in the ideal of God's creation (*DP*, 62, 169). As people living in the physical realm also have a spiritual body with the capacity to communicate with those living in the spiritual world, death would not have caused separation. The distortion of the ideal through human sinfulness, however, has caused a separation between the two realms, and part of the process of restoration is to reunite the two. Living as if the two realms were united helps to restore the harmonious interaction between those who inhabit the two worlds.

The ceremony honoring Heung Jin Nim was called a Seung hwa (ascension and harmony) ceremony. It consisted of eulogies for the deceased, the offering of flowers and incense before his casket, and the singing of hymns celebrating the joy of God's kingdom.[16]

Moral Exhortation

Immortality language and concepts are commonly used in moral exhortation. The concept of rewards and punishments resulting from obedience and disobedience to God was an important part of the Old Testament understanding of the relationship between God and Israel. In the apocalyptic forms of Judaism which developed in the second century BCE, the rewards and punishments associated with obedience and disobedience were transferred to the afterlife, as in Daniel 12.2:

> And many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to everlasting contempt.

The concept of rewards and punishments in the afterlife was elaborated into a formal scene of judgement where the deceased's fate was determined by God or some figure appointed by God for that purpose. This imagery of the judgement was a central part of the apocalyptic worldview underlying much New Testament moral exhortation. It is explicitly described in Matthew 25.31-46:

> When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations, and he will separate them one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he will place the sheep at his right hand, but the goats at the left. Then the King will say to those at his right hand, 'Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink.' . . . Then he will say to those at his left hand, 'Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink.' . . . And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.

The various Jewish and Christian apocalyptic works written at this time present quite varied views of the judgement in terms of its timing, the person of the judge or judges, and the process involved.[17] In the New Testament, the twelve disciples are sometimes given a role as judges (Matthew 19.28; Luke 22.30), sometimes Jesus plays the role of the judge (John 5.22, 27; Acts 17.31; Romans 2.16), sometimes all the saints share the role of the judge (1 Corinthians 6.2). Again, the judgement is sometimes portrayed as a more internal phenomenon rather than an actual court scene (John 12.48).

The exact form in which the judgement is imagined is clearly less important than the fact of judgement, and the idea of judgement lies behind a great deal of moral exhortation in the New Testament. Lists of virtues and vices can be incorporated into a judgement scene, as in the example from Matthew above, or a vice list can be followed by a warning of judgement: "Those who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of

God" (Galatians 5.19-21; cf. 1 Corinthians 6.91). The two ways of moral action and consequent judgement can also be concentrated on the single characteristic of faith and endurance (Hebrews 10.32-39) or of preparedness (Matthew 24.45-51; 15.2-13), or the threat of judgement can be held up to those who are misbehaving (Jude 5-7, 13-15).

Within the Unification Church, the eternal consequences of one's behavior on earth are frequently mentioned in the context of moral exhortation. These are two typical examples from Rev. Moon's sermons of the use of the concept of the spiritual world in moral exhortation:

> When you go to the spirit world, that world works like this: The person who has lots of love toward his own parents, toward his own brothers and sisters, husband or wife, and children, that is, the person who experiences a deep sense of love in family life will have much, much freedom to maneuver. He can go horizontally in all directions, everywhere without any limitation. In contrast, a person who has no experience of love is narrow-minded. He isolates himself in spirit world and has no freedom at all.[18]

> Unless you become the embodiment of the love of God then in spirit world you have no right to even look at nature or to enjoy food. In hell in the spirit world you will have no right to eat and even though you hear of certain places that are very beautiful and glorious, you will not be free to go there. . . .

> The love you will receive in heaven will be as much as the love you have felt for this world, humanity and God while on earth. You will not be able to receive even one iota more or less. This is the law of cause and effect and God's justice is absolutely carried out in that respect. The higher realms of spirit world are reserved for those who gave their lives in service to others. Those who live here on earth with a self-centered way of life, regardless of their positions as noted religious leaders, will end up in the lowest realms of hell.[19]

While the promise of reward in the afterlife for proper behavior on earth has a function similar to that in the examples of moral exhortation

from the New Testament, a number of distinctions can be made. The two ways of life and their consequences are clearly presented as a continuum rather than an either/or. Rather than a simple division between elect and damned, each individual's position in the spiritual world closely reflects that person's behavior and character. Even the most saintly person can strive to improve his or her future situation in the spiritual world by loving and serving more. Concentrating too much on one's future position, however, is actually counterproductive, since it reflects a basically self-centered motivation, as pointed out in the following quotation:

> You can tell God, 'Father, you don't have to send me to Heaven; that's not what I'm here for. I may go to hell, but I will be satisfied as long as mankind and You are liberated.' Will such a person be sent to hell? Never. That is the standard of the true Moonie.[20]

Another distinction between New Testament and Unificationist moral exhortation is that the two ways of moral action are almost never presented as lists of virtues and vices in Unification exhortation. While Rev. Moon will often condemn a specific vice, he seldom, if ever, lists virtues and vices to delineate the life of good and evil. Spiritual consequences for present activity are almost always presented in terms of the extent to which the individual fulfills the heart of love which is God's ideal of creation.

Finally, it should be noted that the apocalyptic time framework has disappeared. One enters the spiritual realm immediately after death, and one's state in the spiritual world is a natural result of one's character. There is no mythical judgement scene and no active intervention by God (DP, 63). Rev. Moon can on occasion use a modified judgement imagery, with the individual's ancestry testing the quality of his or her family love, for example,[21] but the point in that case is not so much the judgement scene but the fact that our situation depends on the judgements of other individuals concerning the quality of our love.

The restorationist theology of the Unification Church does allow for the eventual salvation of spiritual persons after death, but as it is understood to be very difficult to change without a physical body and restoration of oneself in the spiritual world is understood to take thousands of years,[22] the prospect of eventual restoration does not undermine the use of afterlife categories for moral exhortation.

Relationship With The Dead

Finally, the communities' views are expressed in their relationship to deceased persons, whether the recently deceased or more remote ancestors: what do they understand as their responsibility to such people, and what, if anything, can they expect from the world of the dead?

In the New Testament, this is not at all a central concern, and apart from the special position of the risen Jesus within the church, there are only a few isolated statements regarding the church's relationship to the dead. A probable concern with the salvation of the dead is apparent in 1 Peter 3.18-20, where the spirit of Christ is said to have preached "to the spirits in prison, who formerly did not obey," and 4.6, which states that "the gospel was preached even to the dead."[23] In 1 Corinthians 15.29, Paul speaks of people "being baptized on behalf of the dead." We have no other information on what the rite he refers to might be, but if the baptism for the dead is in any way parallel to the baptism of the living, there appears to have been an idea current among some early Christians that the living could intervene to assist in the salvation of the dead.[24]

In Hebrews 11.39-40, the conviction is expressed that the righteous people of pre-Christian Israel will be included in salvation. Since apocalyptic generally seems to have conceived of resurrection and judgement as applying to people from all of history, it is somewhat surprising that references to past saints being included in salvation do not occur more often than they do. A concern for a future relationship with deceased Christians was illustrated in the Pauline consolation material quoted above (1 Thessalonians 4.13-18). There appears to be no expectation of the dead interacting with living Christians (other than the special case of Jesus), though on certain occasions the dead do testify to Jesus (the transfiguration, Mark 9.2-13 and parallels; Matthew 27.52-53). Generally, apocalyptic literature centers speculation about the afterlife on the separation of the righteous and the unrighteous and the meting out of rewards and punishments. In the light of these apocalyptic concerns, the New Testament's general lack of interest in the salvation of the dead is not surprising.

The restorationist viewpoint of the Unification movement, on the other hand, necessitates a mechanism for the restoration of the dead so that they, too, can come to reflect the heart and love of God and enter into true relationship with God. As the Unification movement takes responsibility for the restoration of the original ideal of creation, the restoration of deceased persons in the spiritual world is understood to be part of the task of the movement:

> The destiny of the entire spirit world and humanity rests on
> your shoulders. If you become idle and weak, the
> consequences will affect not only you but the rest of the
> world and the entire spirit world.[25]

Certain conditions fulfilled by the movement are understood to reduce
the barriers between individuals in the spiritual world which result from
the divisions between cultures and religions that those individuals
experienced on earth.[26] It is more common in Unification piety, however,
to think of the restoration of the spiritual world as one of the results of the
restoration of humanity on the earthly plane. According to the *Divine
Principle*, "The primary purpose of the providence of salvation must first
be realized on the earth" (*DP*, 63), and, "The Kingdom of God in heaven
can be realized only after the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth"
(*DP*, 62).

The restoration of individuals in the spiritual realm is accomplished
through their cooperation with individuals in the earthly realm to advance
the course of restoration (*DP*, 181-87). When individuals on earth fulfill
their responsibility and establish characters reflecting the love of God and
fulfill ideal relationships, they assist those cooperating with them in the
spiritual realm to benefit equally (*DP*, 185). The cooperation of spiritual
persons with persons on earth is most often conceived of as an influence on
the thoughts and emotions of the person or persons with which they are
interacting. The person on earth does not have to be aware of the presence
of these spiritual persons or be consciously trying to assist them, and the
extent to which the intention of giving such assistance to spiritual persons
plays a role in the motivation of Unificationists varies widely. Individuals
are understood to have special responsibility for the restoration of their
ancestors in the spiritual world.[27]

A corollary of this mechanism for the salvation of individuals in the
spiritual world is the belief that the movement and members of the
movement can expect help from deceased persons in the fulfillment of
their tasks. The unification of Christianity and of all world religions is
expected to take place through the influence of spiritual persons (*DP*,
188-91). Many spiritual persons are believed to be assisting each member
in the accomplishment of his or her tasks for the restoration of the world.[28]

Thus while the afterlife is, for the most part, a future reality in New
Testament writings, in the Unification movement there is much more

consciousness of being part of a cosmic drama which includes not only the earthly realm but also the world inhabited by persons of the past. The two worlds interact quite closely, and the individual's responsibility extends beyond the world which he or she inhabits to include also the persons living in the other realm.

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FOOTNOTES

1. This paper was originally presented at the conference, "God: The Contemporary Discussion," held in Seoul, Korea, August 9-15, 1984, in the section entitled "Death and Immortality in the Religions of the World."
2. For an overview of Jewish apocalyptic, see D.S. Russell, *The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964). The current scholarly discussion of apocalyptic is well represented in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East,* ed. David Hellholm (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1983).
3. Lucian, *On Funerals,* 1-15.
4. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Philosophers,* 10.125.
5. On the nature of this passage as a consolation, see Abraham J. Malherbe, "Exhortation in First Thessalonians," *Novum Testamentum* 25 (1983) 254-56.
6. All biblical quotations are from the Revised Standard Version.
7. On Greco-Roman consolation, see R. Kassel, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen und röischen Konsolationsliteratur* (Munich, 1958) and Robert C. Gregg, *Consolation Philosophy,* Patristic Monograph Series, No. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1975).
8. Ps-Menander, *Concerning Epideictic,* 419-21 Spengel; Ps-Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Epideictic Speeches,* 283; Gregg. 58.
9. Cyprian, *De Mortalitate,* 20.
10. Heliodorus, *Aethiopica,* 7.11.49-50; in Moses Hadas's translation *Heliodorus: An Ethiopian Romance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1957) 172.
11. For the Stoic attitude toward grief, Diogenes Laertius, 7.110-18; Cicero, *De Finibus,* 3.9.32.
12. For examples of social restructuring which includes the redefinition of the family, Mark 3.20f, 31-35 and 10.28-31, and the discussion of those passages in Howard Clark Kee, *Community of the New Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977) 109-10.
13. Mrs. Sun Myung Moon, "In God and True Parents We Never Die," *Today's World* 4 (Jan/Feb 1984) 25.
14. Angelika Selle, "Belvedere Ceremony," *Today's World* 4 (Jan/Feb 1984) 33-34.
15. Sun Myung Moon, "Day of Victory of Love," *Today's World* 4 (Jan/Feb 1984), 27.
16. "The World Seung Hwa Ceremony of Heung Jin Nim Moon," *Today's World* 4 (Jan/Feb 1984) 35, 37; [Chung Hwan Kwak], *The Tradition, Book One* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1985) 204-10.
17. On the judgement in Jewish apocalyptic, Russell, 379-85. For comparative studies, S.G.F. Brandon, *The Judgement of the Dead* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967); J. Gwyn Griffiths, *The Divine Tribunal* (Swansea: University of Swansea, 1975).
18. Sun Myung Moon, "The Kingdom of God on Earth and the Ideal Family," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 1 Jan 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 9.
19. Sun Myung Moon, "The Spirit World and the Physical World," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 6 Feb 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 18.
20. Sun Myung Moon, "Emergency Time Period," trans. Sang Kil Han, 12 Dec. 1982 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1982) 8.
21. Sun Myung Moon, "Ideal Family and Ideal World," trans. Sang Kil Han, 6 June 1982 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1982) 11.

22. "The Spirit World and the Physical World," 22-23.
23. There is some dispute whether these passages actually refer to the dead. Since Friedrich Spitta, *Christi Predigt an die Geister* Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1890), 3.18-20 has often been interpreted as refering to the fallen angels rather than the dead. A concise outline of both positions is found in C.E.B. Cranfield, "The Interpretation of I Peter iii. 19 and iv.6," *Expository Times* 69 (1957-58) 370. The force of both passages together makes the dead appear to the be the most natural understanding.
24. This understanding of the passage is also disputed, e.g., K.C. Thompson, "1 Corinthians 15,29 and Baptism for the Dead," in F.C. Cross, ed., *Studia Evangelica*, vol. 2, part 1, Texte und Untersuchungen, 87 (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964) 647-59, but the reading of baptism on behalf of the dead is accepted by most scholars. Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, trans. James W. Leitch, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 275-77.
25. Sun Myung Moon "Who Am I," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 23 Jan 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 10.
26. "Who Am I," 11.
27. Sun Myung Moon, "Our Family and the Dispensation—Part I," trans. Sang Kil Ham, 1 March 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 9; "Our Newborn Selves," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 1 Nov 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 14; "The Resurrection of Jesus and Ourselves," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 10 April 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 15.
28. Sun Myung Moon, "23rd Anniversary of the Unification Church and the History of God's Dispensation," trans. Bo Hi Pak, 1 May 1977 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1977) 9.

THE WILL OF GOD AND THE CRUCIFIXION OF JESUS

by Anthony J. Guerra

Although for the last fifteen years her endeavors have been primarily in the field of systematic theology, it is appropriate to honor Prof. Young Oon Kim in this essay which considers the Unification interpretation of the earthly ministry of Jesus in the light of contemporary New Testament Studies, for this was the area of her graduate theological study and her first Professorship at Ewha University in Seoul was in New Testament. One of the central points of contention between Unification theology and particularly conservative Christian theologies is the former's assertion that the crucifixion of Jesus was not the primary intentionality of God for Jesus' earthly ministry.[1] It is this issue which I wish to engage in the following essay.

Let me begin by saying a few words about some presuppositions in my work at this point. I am convinced that the laborious task of reconstructing the teachings of Jesus as opposed to general descriptions of the times of Jesus is essential to advance our appreciation of the self-understanding of Jesus. The endeavor to determine the authentic sayings of Jesus firstly and then to interpret those sayings in an historically responsible manner has occupied many of the best minds of NT scholarship for well over a century. In presenting the teachings of Jesus, I have restricted myself to those sayings which the consensus of form critical scholars identify as most likely to be the words of Jesus. Before the task of exegeting can begin, then, the material that we can be reasonably certain was spoken by Jesus needs to be decided.[2] On this basis a claim that the post resurrection church's formulation of the intention of Jesus differed from that of Jesus may be evaluated. I am aware that the theological claim that the Will of God is/was that Jesus be followed rather than rejected and murdered by those to whom he came to serve two thousand years ago or

for that matter its converse can never be fully verified or denied by the findings of the historical critical methods which I embrace. It is, nevertheless, my conviction that the historical results can suggest the relative plausibility of such claims, and on this question I think that Unification theology fares rather well.

I. THE TEACHING OF JESUS

The Unification understanding of the mission of Jesus is to be found in chapter three entitled *The Purpose of the Messiah* in *Level Four of the Divine Principle*[3]. In an earlier version of the *Divine Principle* on which the present *Level Four* is directly based, the first subsection of the same chapter is entitled *The Purpose of Jesus' Coming as the Messiah*.[4] In both cases the answer to the implicit question raised in these titles namely of the task of the Messiah is given by reasserting the theological context of Creation and Fall. Thus, it is affirmed that God is good and also that God's creation is good. The good purpose of God's creation was to have been realized when the first parents of the human race fulfilled the three blessings: individual perfection, a God-centered family life, and the responsibility of becoming loving caretakers of creation.[5] At this point, God, humanity, and all things would have felt the joy which God originally intended at the creation.

However, because of the fall of the first human parents, humanity has been separated from God, and ever since has suffered estrangement from the self, from other selves, and from the entire created order both during earthly life as well as in the afterlife. Thus the purpose of Creation has never been realized.

According to the *Divine Principle,* God's will for the fulfillment of the purpose of the creation, although frustrated for a time, will not be left eternally unrealized. Quoting Isaiah 46:11: "I have spoken, and I will bring it to pass, I have purposed and I will do it," Unification theology teaches that God will accomplish God's purpose of creation. The same love which was the motive of God's creation remains the motive for God's salvific work throughout history, and the fulfillment of this love on both the individual and cosmic levels is the eschatological deed and not a cataclysmic dissolution of the natural order.

The affirmation that God's eschatological activity will realize the purposes of God's creative activity is a *sine qua non* for the defense of the sovereignty of God. In the *Divine Principle,* the term 'salvation' is equivalent

to the term 'restoration.' God's salvation work means God's restoration of fallen and sinful humanity to the originally intended state of goodness. The full human potential for love and creativity is to be realized on the individual, family, societal, national, world and cosmic levels.

At the same time, however, I would maintain that salvation or restoration cannot be realized by simply undoing the original sin and rectifying the first moment of fallen human activity, because history has continued so as to complexify things between that beginning and the time of eschatological fulfillment. Thus salvation or restoration, I would affirm, necessarily entails more than a Paradise regained. Further, the *Divine Principle* asserts along with Irenaeus that Paradise was never actually achieved, as the first Adam and Eve, born infants, never realized their God-given opportunity for Sonship and Daughtership. Thus the second Adam brings into creation a love never before experienced.

The quality of God's love is to be manifested first in human relationships on earth and thereby the same quality of love may be experienced in the afterlife. The Kingdom of Heaven (or the Kingdom of God) is to be established on the earth and then and only then may it be experienced in the spirit world. Religion has been rightly critiqued in the modern era for directing attention to an other-worldly bliss instead of encouraging present spiritual and social reform.

In contrast to the *Divine Principle's* approach to the Jesus question, a great deal of 20th century theology has displaced emphases on creation and eschatology and retreated into Christomonism. It should be said, however, that a growing movement of biblical theologians who affirm the import of the canonical shape of the Scriptures would seem to support the form, if not the content, of the *Divine Principle's* theological program. The theological order of Creation, salvation history centered in Christ, and Eschatology is sustained by the canonical order of the Scripture—namely *Genesis* with its opening chapters asserting God as Creator, the historical books of the *Old Testament* which are seen by Christians as the *preparatio evangelium,* the gospels and their proclamation of the Christ followed by a description of the work of the Spirit in history or the Church—as in the *Book of Acts* and the *Pauline Epistles,* and finally the *Book of Revelation* with its apocalyptic and indeed millenialist orientation.[6] In other words, the order of the appearance of Old Testament and New Testament writings in the canon is itself adduced here as one warrant for the creation-fall-salvation history-eschatology theological program.

I want now to move from the more or less formal question of the theological context in which to understand the mission of Jesus to the more material question of the *Divine Principle's* understanding of the content of that mission. If, as the *Divine Principle* wants to maintain, the intentions of God and Jesus for the messianic mission were different from the results of Jesus' earthly work, then the efforts to recover the authentic sayings of Jesus, as distinguished from the post-Easter early Church proclamation, are of major interest to the student of the *Divine Principle*. It is axiomatic that the early Church was left with the inevitable task of interpreting and proclaiming what Jesus Christ had done and not what Jesus intended to do. As the difference between Jesus' proclamation and the proclamation of the early Church is crucial to the *Divine Principle's* evaluation of Jesus' earthly ministry, it is important to provide the necessary background to an analysis of Jesus' teaching.

Since the publication of Johannes Weiss' *Die Predigt Jesu Vom Reiche Gottes,* the theological world has been reawakened to the centrality of the Kingdom of God in the preaching of Jesus.[7] In the ancient Jewish setting the symbol 'Kingdom of God' emerges with the marriage between two traditions, namely the Ancient Near Eastern myth of the Kingship of God and the amphictyonic *Heilsgeschichte.*

Although the language of the symbol is derived from the myth of the Kingship of God, for malkuth—reign or kingdom—is the noun derived from the root M-L-K 'reign' or 'to be king,' the material reference of the symbol is taken from the myth of salvation history. Ps. 145:11-13 expresses this conviction that it is the mighty deeds of Yahweh that manifest that he is indeed King:

> They talk of the glory of the Kingdom and tell of thy
> might, they proclaim to their fellows how mighty are thy
> deeds, how glorious the majesty of thy Kingdom.

The Israelite prophets were to reexpress the myth that God is guiding his people in history. Catastrophes were judgment upon his people and their Kings for failing to be faithful; the temporary reprieves were signs that God continued to act on behalf of his people. In accord with this conviction, the Babylonians' conquest of Jerusalem and the resultant exile of many of its people and then the later decision of Cyrus, King of Persia, to allow the captives to return to Jerusalem and rebuild their temple were

interpreted by the Prophets. Later, when Israel fell prey to several foreign powers in the few centuries before Christ, the apocalyptic movement was born, which sustained the conviction that God is "for" his people even under the dire circumstances of the age. The intensity of the apocalypticists' hope that soon evil was to be abolished and God's kingdom established is expressed in such writings as *Daniel* and the *Assumption of Moses,* which were written shortly before the time of Jesus.[8]

> And as I looked, the beast was slain, and its body destroyed and given over to be burned with fire. And to him one like a son of Man was given dominion and glory and kingdom, that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom one that shall not be destroyed. (*Dan.* 7:11b-14)

> And then his [God's] kingdom shall appear throughout his creation,
> And then Satan shall be no more,
> And sorrow shall depart with him

> For the Most High will arise, the Eternal God alone,
> And he will appear to punish the Gentiles
> Then, thou, O Israel, shalt be happy.
> (*Assumption of Moses 10*)

In the light of the long tradition of ancient Jewish myth and the immediate context of apocalyptic fervor which had seized many of Jesus' contemporaries, we must view Jesus' proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Whereas the nineteenth century had exalted the notion of the kingdom of God as a great ethical ideal, Weiss demonstrated that Jesus' conception of the kingdom of God was convergent with that of Jewish Apocalypticism albeit with a few significant modifications. Although Weiss never explicitly says so, I take it that he reasons to this conclusion along the following lines: if Jesus uses language and concepts of a tradition well known to his hearers, then he must agree substantially with it, or otherwise he would need to state his differences with the same. In this

section, I proceed directly to examine the relevant sayings of Jesus from the Synoptics which are thought to be genuine by the consensus of form critics (see appendix). From this material, I shall describe the characteristic features of Jesus' teaching.

Jesus' teaching on the Kingdom of God has both continuities as well as discontinuities with that of the prevalent apocalpytic thought of his age.[9] Take, e.g., *Luke 17:20-21:*

> The Kingdom of God is not coming with signs to be observed
> (meta paratereseos) nor will they say, Lo, here it is! or there,
> for behold, the kingdom of God is in the midst of you
> (entos hymon estin).

Bultmann has pointed out that this is an authentic logia of Jesus which is now found in the secondary form of the Greek philosophical apophthegms.[10] The exegete of Luke 17:20f must take into account that the affirmation in this saying is a counterpoint poised against a negation.

The words "with signs to be observed" of the RSV translate the two Greek words *meta parateresos.* The noun parateresis, RSV "signs to be observed", is a term often used in ancient astronomical texts and is best translated as "observation."[11] Further, the preposition *Meta* here has the sense of "by means of" (i.e. its instrumental usage) rather than "with."[12] Thus the Greek phrase is more properly rendered in English as "by means of observation". It refers in the Lukan verse to the action of those awaiting the coming of the Kingdom rather than to the manner in which this kingdom is to come. Hence the negation in Luke 17:20 is directed against the notion that the kingdom of Heaven is in any way advanced by disinterested observers. Jesus is critiquing the aloof and unsympathetic attitude of his inquirers here rather than polemicizing against the apocalyptic view of history.[13] The emphasis is placed upon the internal state or attitude of the individual which is a condition for the reception of the kingdom of God. In this sense, it may be granted that Jesus is objecting to the apocalypticists' penchant for divining the time of the eschaton by external signs and pseudo-historical calculations.[14] Jesus, however, emphatically sustains the polarity of divine and human activity. Jesus objects to the superficiality of attitudes towards the kingdom, but he denies here neither responsible human behavior nor the view that the kingdom of God will have temporal and tangible manifestations.

It may be helpful to recall Weiss's suggestion that Jesus holds to a cosmological dualism. The division is between the invisible cosmos which includes God and good and evil spirits on the one side, and the visible or historical plane on the other. Weiss speculated that Jesus believed that the kingdom of God has come in the invisible world, and as proof he adduces the healings which were the consequence of his powers of exorcism. This power is the evidence of God's reign which Jesus has now proclaimed and manifested.[15] The transformation of the historical order, however, is not completed, and thus the kingdom is not seen by all as having arrived. The conservative or traditional exegesis of Luke 17:20-1, which has made them a mainstay for an exclusively spiritualized concept of the Kingdom of God, cannot be sustained by a critical reading of the same. Exegetes today who in no way affirm Unification theology concur with this conclusion.

An important aspect of Jesus' teaching on the Kingdom is revealed by analysis of *Luke 11:2b-4,* the Lord's prayer:

> Father, hallowed be thy name. Thy Kingdom come. Give us each day our daily bread; and forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive every one who is indebted to us; and lead us not into temptation.

The similarity between this prayer of Jesus and the Kaddish prayer, which was in use in the Jewish synagogues at the time of Jesus, is striking.[16]

> Magnified and sanctified be his great name in the world that he has created according to his will. May he establish his kingdom in your lifetime and in your days and in the lifetime of all the house of Israel, even speedily and at a near time.

It appears, however, that Jesus consciously modified this last mentioned prayer in accordance with his own stylistic and theological inclinations, i.e., shortening the petition of the prayer and changing from the formal third person to the intimate second person singular.[17] In Jesus' prayer, the opening petition for the coming of the Kingdom is followed by three personal, concrete petitions for bread, for forgiveness of sins, and for

protection from temptation. Perrin has described them as follows: "the petitions . . . are, as it were, explorations of fundamental possibilities for the experience of God as king in human life." The prayer assigns a positive role to the petitioner before God and the intent here is " . . . to link the experience of God to the response of man."[18]

The extraordinarily confronting and radical dimension of Jesus' teaching is best illustrated by his so-called proverbial sayings:

> *Luke 9:60a:*
> Leave the dead to bury the dead.
> *Matt. 5:39b-41:*
> If anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; and if anyone would sue you and take your coat, let him have your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go with him two miles.

These passages comprise two of the radical proverbial sayings of Jesus. William Beardslee has spoken of the diametrically opposed intention of the synoptic proverbs to that of the traditional proverb:

> . . . the characteristic thrust of the synoptic proverbs, however, is not the cautious and balanced judgment so typical of much proverbial literature . . . . Such a middle-of-the-road style has as its presupposition the project of making a continuous whole of one's existence.[19]

As can be seen from the parallel Matt 8:22, the evangelist has added the clause "but as for you, go and proclaim the kingdom of God" in order to diminish the radicalness of the demand. The setting of the original saying is impossible to determine, but its message is clear: absolute devotion to the will of God is required, and all other commitments, including those most respected and intimate social responsibilities (such as the proper burial of a deceased family member) are to be denied or at least subordinated to the ultimate cause. Luke specifies this cause as the call to evangelize (9:60b), and Matthew understands Jesus' command to be a call to discipleship ("follow me"). Similarly, the saying of Matt 5:39b-41 calls for a radically new disposition of mind towards oppression. It demands the hearer to transcend the instinctual responses of revenge and hatred. In

the historical context where Roman soldiers held the privileges of impressing local inhabitants into immediate, temporary service, Jesus makes the demand concrete: "let him have your cloak as well" and "go with him two miles." He calls for more than a change of heart or attitudes but for changed behavior which reflects the internal transformation.

Critical to an understanding of the difference between Jesus and the apocalypticists contemporary to him are Matt 7:13-14 and Mark 10:15:

> *Matt. 7:13-14:*
> Enter by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide and the way is easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it are few.
> *Mark 10:15:*
> Whoever does not receive the Kingdom of God like a child shall not enter it.

These two Jesus sayings, as well as Luke 9:62, Mark 7:15, and Matt. 5:44-48, have been called paranetical or exhortatory sayings.[20] In each of these sayings the importance of the hearer's response is stressed by Jesus.

A commonplace exegetical remark on Matt. 7:13-14 is that Jesus believed that the majority will be punished with eternal destruction. Jesus, however, exhorts his listeners "to enter the narrow gate" and assumes their capacity to do so. In Mark 10:15, the entry into the kingdom of God is connected to the condition of becoming like a little child. The verbs used in Mark 10:15, "receive" and "enter," are co-ordinated and underscore the significance of the human response. The simile of the child here enhances the understanding of the divine-human relationship and counters the political language of kingdom.

A minimalist statement of Jesus' understanding of the Kingdom of God would permit the following summary. Jesus proclaimed the Kingdom of God as present in one sense and pointed to his exorcisms and healings as evidence for this claim. Jesus apparently thought that the coming of the Kingdom of God was directly related to the destruction of the Kingdom of Satan. Jesus considered his own victorious battles with the demonic as manifestations of the reign of God. Jesus also spoke of the Kingdom of God as a future event. The total transformation of the historical and cosmic order, which Jesus envisioned most probably from a modified

apocalyptic perspective, necessitated this element of futurity. These contradictory temporal assertions concerning the coming of the Kingdom of God should be construed within the theological framework of the emphasis in his sayings on the factor of human response, which we have noted throughout our exegesis. To be sure, the possibility or opportunity of the Kingdom of God involves a prior act of giving which is entirely of God. Nevertheless, Jesus' demand for his listeners' response, described as entering, receiving, etc., leaves open the moment of realization, of acceptance.

One final observation before I turn directly to the question of the *Divine Principle's* understanding of the crucifixion. That Jesus' understanding of the Kingdom of God is distinctive from that of his contemporaries can be evidenced further by his address to God as *'Abba,'* 'Father.' As a parent, God is profoundly concerned for the well-being in an inclusive sense of God's children. When the *Divine Principle* says that the Messiah proclaims God's Kingdom and seeks to provide the way for others to become the children of God, i.e., the first blessing, to create a human society which lives in accord with the radical demand of the love of God, i.e., the second blessing, and finally that God's will and rule includes economic well-being for all people and ecological harmony—dimensions of the third blessing—I believe that it is doing no more than making explicit the implications of a God who is the maker of heaven and earth. To sever the relationship between God the Creator and God the Redeemer is a momentous error. God as Parent can by no means signify less than our highest conception of the human as Parent who seeks the spiritual, intellectual, as well as material well-being of his/her children.[21]

II. SALVATION THROUGH THE CROSS
A. The Crucifixion of Jesus

It is a commonplace in the Christian tradition that an understanding of the Old Testament is necessary to understand the significance of Jesus. The Israelites were a people who were especially prepared to receive the Messiah. The Old Testament is the record of the religious history of this special people among whom Jesus was born. The immediate context of Jesus' advent was one in which apocalyptic expectations were heightened. There were indeed a sufficient number of messianic cults in the time of Jesus to rival the religious pluralism of our own day.[22] The *Divine Principle* interprets the *Old Testament* traditions as well as the immediate context just mentioned as the providential preparation to receive the Messiah.

context just mentioned as the providential preparation to receive the Messiah.

Now from a common-sense point of view (and *Divine Principle* often argues in this mode) this preparation is understandable. The Messiah should come to an environment and a people who are prepared to understand and welcome him. Now the fact is that Jesus was not accepted by the people whom we say God prepared. According to the *Divine Principle* God's will is not accomplished by the fulfillment of God's portion of responsibility alone, but only in conjunction with the fulfillment of the human portion of responsibility. Indeed, I have pointed out above how Jesus himself presented the Kingdom as a possibility given wholly by God but that his message was insistent on the need of human response in order for this possibility to be realized. God and Jesus were clearly not culpable, but there was rejection and jealousy on the part of some leaders of Judaism and the Roman authorities. Both the *Synoptics* as well as the *Fourth Gospel* testify unanimously to such antagonism.[23]

It is one of the most historically reliable assertions concerning Jesus that he was crucified, which was a Roman form of execution. Now, Jewish polemics against the incipient Christian faith adduced the fact of Jesus' crucifixion as proof that Jesus was not the promised Messiah whom Israel awaited. At least partly in order to counter this Jewish polemic, early Christian traditions were developed which advanced Jesus' death on the cross as predestined and as the original plan of God.[24]

The *Divine Principle* itself proposes a mediating position between that of Judaism and orthodox Christianity in terms of its interpretation of the cross, and of course—like most mediating positions—it is offensive to both the extremes against which it stands. Jesus is the promised Messiah, but the way of the cross is necessitated by the critical failure of the centrally prepared forerunner and disciples to love and fully cooperate with Jesus.[25] The prophet's failure to cooperate with Jesus led to the misunderstanding and enmity which resulted in the death of Jesus. Certainly, misunderstanding and enmity cannot be the will of the loving parental God which Jesus proclaimed. Furthermore, understanding and love on the part of Jesus' contemporaries would *not* have brought him to crucifixion.

This sentiment is echoed in *I Cor. 2:8*—"None of the rulers of this age understood this, for if they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory." Under these circumstances of rejection it was God's will

that Jesus walk the path of suffering through the crucifixion. But again, the *Divine Principle's* perspective is that these very circumstances reflected a defiance of the Will of God. The way of the cross is seen as a secondary course, an expression of the circumstantial will of God. God never violates the realm of human responsibility, but God's infinite love and creativity works goodness even in the most evil circumstances.

B. The Extent of Salvation Available Through the Cross and the Purpose of the Second Coming of Christ

Unlike the case for historic Christianity, for Unificationists death on the cross was not the mission that God had originally intended for Jesus. Also, unlike the position of historic Judaism, for Unificationists Jesus is the Messiah who had fulfilled God's painful secondary dispensation through the cross. According to the *Divine Principle,* God's will was for all of Israel—and, indeed, for the entire world—to welcome, love, and follow Jesus, the Christ. Complete salvation would have been realized—the fulfillment of the purpose of creation, the restoration of the historical order as well as the created (or natural) order; the Jewish and Christian worlds would never have been divided. Furthermore, there would have been no embarrassing delay of the *parousia* because the Messiah would have completed his mission 2000 years ago, and thus there would have been no need for a second coming.

Nevertheless, the *Divine Principle* asserts that "spiritual salvation" was provided by the secondary course of salvation which was accomplished through Jesus' crucifixion. I quote here the *Outline of The Principle, Level 4:* "Jesus' blood on the cross became the price for the redemption of mankind. By resurrecting the crucified Jesus, God opened up a way of spiritual salvation, a way to a realm free from Satanic invasion."[26]

Now, I for one have been perplexed for several years in trying to understand what the *Divine Principle* means by the term "spiritual salvation." At the Evangelical-Unification dialogue in 1978, I first suggested that spiritual salvation may be equivalent to the traditional notion of the justification of the individual before God.[27] Sanctification, however, is not achieved, and the *New Testament* itself contains excoriations against the sinful behavior of baptized Christian communities. The saved Christian is still a sinner. Further, the children of saved Christians inherit original sin and therefore require baptism. According to the *Divine Principle,* not only the sanctification of the individual must await the second advent of

Christ, but also both the justification and the sanctification of the family *qua* family, the nation *qua* nation, and the world *qua* world.

To put it yet another way, the first blessing is restored through Jesus, but the realization of the second and third blessings awaits the time of the second coming.

Unificationists' valuing of sacrificial love is widely underestimated by critics from mainstream Christianity because of the former's espousal of the belief that the crucifixion was only the second best way for Jesus to do the will of his Father. The prevalence of this misunderstanding, no doubt, arises, in the main, from Unificationism's own failure to point out clearly that it understands Jesus is the "one who came to serve and not to be served," and that it further holds that even if Jesus had received sufficient support to allow him to have pursued the original course of salvation, he still would have undoubtedly lived each moment of his natural life in the loving service of God and other human beings. Indeed, Jesus' love for God and humanity was of the same quality and intensity during his entire earthly ministry as at the scene of the cross. I believe and most other Unificationists, I think, would also agree, that if a longer life had been possible, Jesus would have continued to walk in the shoes of the servant, but with the heart of the Father.

Nevertheless, with Jesus the possibility had been given for the Kingdom of God on earth and in heaven; but its realization awaited the response of his contemporaries, and was frustrated by their recalcitrance. And yet, there could be no coercion to elicit the genuine response to Jesus' radical demand to love.

POSTSCRIPT

A few years ago, after listening to my lecture on the Mission of Jesus, Prof. Hans Schwarz, Universität Regensburg, suggested an interesting reformulation of the Unification position. He proposed that Unificationists simply affirm that Jesus was sent by God to fulfill the first blessing (see above) and then, they could proceed to state that the fulfillment of the second and third blessings await the second coming of Christ. The attractiveness of this proposal is that it would relieve Unification theology of accusations from those who think that the assertion that less than the entire Will of God was accomplished in the death and resurrection of Jesus somehow impeaches the integrity of God and Jesus. The most attractive feature of the proposal, however, is that it does accurately state

the Unification understanding of what did happen in Jesus and also what
should happen at the Second Coming. Nevertheless, both historical and
theological objections may be raised against this alternative formulation.
The evidence suggests that Jesus did envision a total transformation of the
historical and cosmic order and most importantly of the quality of human
social relationships as well as the God and human relationship. There are
no genuine sayings of Jesus that clearly state that the Will of God required
that Jesus should be rejected and crucified, and certainly there is no way,
on the basis of the historical data, to affirm that Jesus thought the crucifixion
was the predestined, original Will of God as some quarters of the post-
resurrection Church proclaimed. On the theological level, the cost of the
proposal would also be high. For one thing, an affirmation that betrayal
and murder is mandated by God seriously undercuts the prophetic moral
and social ethical edge of Unification and all Christian theology. Moreover,
a central emphasis in Unification theology is on affirming the polarity of
God's gracious activity and human responsibility. It is therefore certainly
important to allow for the possibility of human failure to respond to the
Will of God in the assessment of even the most momentous of providential
events.

APPENDIX

The following list includes the material which the competent scholarly opinion would consider as authentic. It is reproduced from Norman Perrin's *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom, p. 41:*

(a) The *Kingdom sayings,* Luke 11:20; 17:20-21; Matt. 11:12.

(b) The *Lord's Prayer* in a version close to Luke 11:2-4.

(c) The *proverbial sayings,* Mark 3:27; 3:24-26; 8:35; Luke 9:62; Mark 10:23b, 25; Luke 9:60a; Matt. 7:13-14; Mark 10:31; 7:15; 10:15; Luke 14:11 (cf. 16:15); Matt. 5:39b-41; 5:44-48.

(d) The *major parables:*

The Hid Treasure and The Pearl, Matt. 13:44-46.

The Lost Sheep, Lost Coin, Lost (Prodigal) Son, Luke 15:3-32.

The Great Supper, Matt. 22:1-14; Luke 14:16-24; Gos. Thom. 92:10-35.

The Unjust Steward, Luke 16:1-9.

The Workers in the Vineyard, Matt: 20.1-16.

The Two Sons, Matt. 21:28-32.

The Children in the Marketplace, Matt. 11:16-19.

The Pharisee and the Tax Collector, Luke 18:9-14.

The Good Samaritan, Luke 10:29-37.

The Unmerciful Servant, Matt. 18:23-35.

The Tower Builder and King Going to War, Luke 14:28-32.

The Friend at Midnight, Luke 11:5-8.

The Unjust Judge, Luke 18:1-8.

The Leaven, Luke 13:20-21; Gos. Thom. 97:2-6.

The Mustard Seed, Mark 4:30-32; Gos. Thom. 84:26-33.

The Seed Growing by Itself, Mark 4:26-29; Gos. Thom. 85:15-19.

The Sower, Mark 4:3-8; Gos. Thom. 82:3-13.

The Wicked Tenants, Mark 12:1-12; Gos. Thom. 93:1-18.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although the question of theological intentionality under consideration here is not unrelated to the issue of the messianic consciousness of Jesus, this latter concern so much debated in earlier decades of this century will not be discussed here.

2. The Jesus Seminar has set itself the task of re-evaluating all material attributed to Jesus in the New Testament and related literature and intends to offer a statement of the current consensus of scholarly opinion on this significant question. (see Robert W. Funk "The Issue of Jesus" in *Forum*, 1.1. (1985) 7-12. In this essay, however, I rely on the consensus which had been achieved by the last generation of New Testament students (cf. appendix) and eagerly await the results of the present effort.

3. *Outline of the Principle: Level Four* (NY, NY:HSA-UWC, 1980).

4. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973) 139-163.

5. *Divine Principle*, 140.

6. The foremost representative of this movement is Brevard S. Childs. See his seminal book *Biblical Theology in Crisis* (Philadelphia: Westminister, 1970) 105 and more recently *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) and the companion volume on the New Testament soon to be in circulation.

7. Johannes Weiss, *Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1892).

8. The Ascension of Moses is usually dated in the first century c.e. but the traditions used for its composition are probably from the second century b.c.e. See Helmut Koester, *Introduction to the New Testament* (2 vols. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982) 257.

9. See Norman Perrin's exposition of the relationship between apocalpyticism and Jesus' teching on the kingdom of God in *Jesus and the Language of the Kingdom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976) and further Paul Volz, *Die Eschatologie der Jüdischen Gemeinde in neutestamentliche Zeitaler* (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1934).

10. Rudolf Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition,* tr. J. Marsh (New York: Harper & Row, 1963) 25.

11. See Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other early Christian Literature* (2d rev. ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1979) 622.

12. W. Grundmann, *TDNT* 7 (1968) 722.

13. I disagree with Norman Perrin, *op. cit.* 44.

14. See R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* (New York: Scribners, 1951) 6.

15. cf. Luke 11:20 (par Matt. 12:28) on Jesus' imminent eschatology.

16. Perrin, 28.

17. Perrin, 47-48.

18. Perrin, 48.

19. W.A. Beardslee, "Uses of the Proverb in the Synoptic Gospels," *Interpretation 24* (1970) 71.

20. Perrin, 53f.

21. A premise of analogical discourse about God is, of course, that God is transcendent and cannot be adequately described by human language and concepts. My hermeneutical presupposition is that for analogical language to be applied meaningfully to God it must signify at least as much as when used of human or other beings.

22. No doubt, this traditional perspective needs to be significantly nuanced. From the

apocalyptic literature of the time there are very few direct references to a single messiah figure but rather more often to two or more figures. See John J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination* (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 113, 122.

23. It is absolutely impermissible, however, to use the historical actions of a few individuals as grounds for anti-semitism. See Andrew M. Wilson, "A Unification Position On The Jewish People", *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 20:2 (Spring, 1983) 191-208.

24. Nevertheless, the Christian theologian may not escape the full implications of the creedal affirmation that Jesus is truly man. These implications must include the fact of the human person's vulnerability to social and historical contingency. Every person is confronted with the contingency of the other's actions and reactions toward him- or herself, and there is no truly human person who can evade the consequences of the social forces which impinge upon him or her. Perhaps I should be most blunt here as the theological resistance to accepting the social contingency of a truly human Jesus is inveterate. To accept the implication of Jesus as truly man entails the acceptance of the possibility of the murder of Jesus by his contemporaries as a possibility grounded in the human condition. I cannot say that I accept the full implications of the assertion that one is truly man unless I accept that today other(s) may choose to destroy this one with the means at hand. Christian theologians have been extremely loath to acknowledge the social contingency which accompanies the full force of the affirmation that Jesus is truly man.

25. For a discussion of the Unification understanding of the relationship between Jesus and John the Baptist see Thomas Boslooper—"Unification and Biblical Studies" in Henry O. Thompson *Unity and Diversity* (NY, NY: Rose of Sharon, 1984) 297-323, and Anthony J. Guerra "The Historical Jesus and *Divine Principle*", in Frank K. Flinn *Hermeneutics and Horizons: The Shape of the Future* (conference series 11; New York: Rose of Sharon, 1982) 49-59.

26. *Outline* p. 82. This quotation raises the question whether it should be understood as assenting to the classical ransom theory of atonement. I think that a reading of the entire source makes such a conclusion unwarranted. A dominant theme in the so-called second part of the *Divine Principle* is, nevertheless, that God allows Satan his influence over humanity which he has gained by the first ancestors' willing submission.

27. See Richard Quebedeaux and Rodney Sawatsky (eds.) *Evangelical-Unification Dialogue* (Conference Series 3, New York: Rose of Sharon, 1979) 137-8.

SECTION THREE:
UNIFICATION PRACTICAL THEOLOGY: POLITICS AND ETHICS

THE CAIN-ABEL TYPOLOGY FOR RESTORING HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS

by Gordon L. Anderson

I. INTRODUCTION

The *Divine Principle* uses a Cain-Abel typology in interpreting the history of human relations. Such a typology has been out of fashion in modern theology for several reasons. First, Augustine's use of a Cain-Abel typology, which has dominated Western thought on the subject, is exclusivistic and opposed to the ecumenical desires of Christian theologians. Secondly, this typology is based on a narrative; and, modern philosophy has sought logical, empirical, and historical, not narrative, foundations for truth. Thirdly, since the nineteenth century theology has become increasingly Christocentric, it has become popular to read biblical history in the light of Jesus Christ rather than Old Testament figures. The Cain-Abel typology of Divine Principle is thus a novel and resisted concept in modern theology.

Regardless of the obstacles to the use of a Cain-Abel typology, the *Divine Principle* provides valuable insight into the nature of human relationships and the restoration of broken human relations. The problems with the reception of the paradigm in the West can be overcome as the importance of narrative in providing foundations for truth becomes accepted, as it becomes clear that the Unification view is not an Augustinian dualism, and as theology shifts back to theocentric as opposed to Christocentric foundations. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to penetrating these theological barriers and explaining the value of the Cain-Abel typology as used in the *Divine Principle* for illuminating the process of restoration of broken and embittered human relationships.

II. CAIN AND ABEL
The Genesis Account

The story of Cain and Abel is found in the Old Testament in Genesis 4. Cain and Abel were the first sons of Adam and Eve, born after they were expelled from the Garden of Eden. The main part of the story is quoted from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible below:

> (2)Now Abel was a keeper of the sheep, and Cain a tiller of the ground. (3)In the course of time Cain brought to the Lord an offering of the fruit of the ground, (4)and Abel brought the firstlings of his flock and of their fat portions. And the Lord had regard for Abel and his offering, (5)but for Cain and his offering he had no regard. So Cain was very angry and his countenance fell. (6)The Lord said to Cain, 'Why are you angry, and why has your countenance fallen? (7)If you do well, will you not be accepted? And if you do not do well, sin is couching at the door; its desire is for you, but you must master it.'
> (8) Cain said to Abel his brother, 'Let us go out to the field.' And when they were in the field, Cain rose up against his brother Abel, and killed him.

Then it happened that the Lord put a curse on Cain, and Cain went away from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the land of Nod (v. 16). To Adam and Eve a third son was born and named Seth; Eve took this child to be God's replacement for Abel (v. 25).

The Interpretation in the *Divine Principle*

The *Divine Principle* interprets this story as the beginning of a universal story of the struggle between good and evil among human beings; it was the first war. It is the result of the "fall" of Adam and Eve, where the first humans originally created by God, became influenced by a new master, Satan. Cain and Abel represent two attitudes or two characters who illustrate human responses to the two masters.

In the story, Abel's offering was accepted by God and Cain's was not. The *Divine Principle* uses the verse, "If you do not do well, sin is couching at the door." (Gen. 4:7) to illustrate that Cain was "placed in a position to deal with Satan" (*DP*, 242). The *Divine Principle* states that "it was not

because God really hated Cain that He rejected Cain's offering." In fact, it argues that the event was intended to show that "God is ready to accept any man, though fallen, if a favorable condition is formed" (*DP*, 243). Cain, the oldest son, was put into the position of being able to remove his "fallen nature" by reversing the response of his parents to Satan. He could have loved Abel and sought to come closer to God through Abel, rather than attempting to dominate the situation by illicitly taking Abel's life (*DP*, 244).

The *Divine Principle* gives examples of Cain- and Abel-type impulses on several levels of human life. It explains that there is an "original human nature" and a "fallen nature." The first is the nature endowed by God which has ontological validity, the second is an acquired nature which resulted from the separation from God. Fallen nature keeps human beings under the dominion of sin, in conflict with each other as a result of attempting to establish similar forms of false dominion, and prevents them from realizing their full potential. Restoration involves liberation from this type of dominion and a return to "original value" by living according to God's purposes.

On the level of the individual, the mind and body should be in harmony. The *Divine Principle* uses Saint Paul's saying that "I delight in the Law of God, in my inmost self, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind ... " (Rom. 7:22-3), as an example of the Cain and Abel conflict within an individual (*DP*, 245).

On the social level, the *Divine Principle* finds it a virtue to seek good leaders and good friends who can lead us closer to God. Cain could have sought God by becoming closer to Abel and this would have required the virtue of humility on Cain's part. On all social levels, from the family to the world, the two types of attitudes of Cain and Abel can be found. The solution is to disconnect from fallen nature and follow those "Abel figures" who can lead us closer to God. This will finally lead to restoration of original human nature and human relationships. In short, it will lead to the Kingdom of God.

Cain could have established the condition to remove fallen nature if he could have initiated God-centered give-and-take with Abel rather than killing him. Together, Cain and Abel could have erected a God-centered society, even though their parents had fallen. Tragically, Cain allowed resentment and anger, and jealousy to dominate his being. His fallen nature led to murder, an even more violent act than that of his parents.

With Abel gone, there was no possibility for Cain to get to God (*DP*, 249-50).

That same fallen nature revealed by Cain has, in the viewpoint of the *Divine Principle*, repeatedly taken the lives of God's prophets, saints and people. The crucifixion of Jesus Christ is a manifestation of the fears, jealousies, and vindictiveness of human beings who have not been liberated from fallen nature and have realized their real and far greater potentials.

Augustinian Dualism

One of the most common criticism of the Cain-Abel typology is that it reveals a dualism in Unification teaching.[1] While the *Divine Principle* does have passages which refer to Abel as "relative good" and Cain as "relative evil," it does not intend to promote an ontological dualism. Western theologians often hastily make this charge because of the impact of Augustine's use of Cain and Abel in his philosophy of history. Thus, the charge of dualism is often erroneously imputed to the *Divine Principle's* teaching of Cain and Abel.

In *The City of God*, St. Augustine spoke of Abel as saved and Cain as damned.[2] Augustine saw two different eternal destinations for the human soul after death, heaven or hell.[3] In Augustine's view the Abel type represented a faithful pilgrim, who because of his spiritual superiority, had a certain right to utilize Cain's earthly world.[4] This view is dualistic with reference to human destiny and led to a type of spiritual arrogance and paternalism in some church doctrines, such as "outside the church no salvation."[5] "Judgement day" came to symbolize a day of separation rather than reconciliation.[6]

Conflict-Based Dualism and Complementary Dualism

In response to Unification eschatology, a distinction has been made between "conflict-dualism" and "complementary-dualism."[7] This distinction is illuminating for an understanding of the principle of restoration in the *Divine Principle*. Barbara Reed has suggested in her criticism of *Divine Principle* that both types of language are used. The language of conflict is used in the discussion of good and evil, while language referring to complementarity is used in discussing the harmony of mind and body, man and woman, religion and science, and so forth. This harmony is related to an essential yin-yang type relationship in God.

Reed is correct in her reading of the *Divine Principle,* for there these two distinctions are made. However, she comments after her analysis that "the application of a conflict dualism to the political sphere is inherently dangerous. It obscures any good aspects of one's opponents and destroys the possibility of seeing evil within."[8] This criticism should be taken seriously, for there is no shortage of bigotry, persecution, and war built on the premise that a person or group is inferior and therefore can be controlled, manipulated, dominated or eliminated. The warning not to engage in this type of activity applies to Unificationists as well as anyone. However, the abuse of the language of good and evil is not a sufficient reason to avoid facing real conflict constructively. This is precisely what the *Divine Principle* intends to provide in its use of the Cain-Abel typology.

When the *Divine Principle* discusses the Cain-Abel typology in the complementary mode, it is referring to ideal human relationships and ontological reality. On the other hand, the conflict mode is discussed in relationhip to the unfortunate way things are. Cain killed Abel, A hates B, and so forth, are statements referring to human behavior which is not ideal; the conflict exists because one person wants to destroy another. When this situation occurs it is wise to acknowledge it as such. In other words, if one person is oppressing another, that is conflict and that fact should be acknowledged.

The dangerous aspect of conflict language is when the conflict gets raised to an ontological or sacred status as in the case of a cosmic dualism over which neither God nor human beings have any control. This leads either to resignation and defeatism on the one hand or fanatic opposition which disregards human life on the other. I think that *Divine Principle* is critical of these extremes and realistic in its concern about human relationships and happiness. There is a very real sense in which there is hope that evil can be overcome without doing violence to people in a "Cain" position. Rather, "Abel's" self-sacrifice is required to win "Cain" through love, not violence.

Perhaps the *Divine Principle* can be made more clear by distinguishing between two complementary natures and the fallenness with respect to those natures. For example, in the marriage relationship we can speak of a bad woman or a good woman, a bad man or a good man. Because some people are mean, insensitive, irresponsible, selfish, and dominating, many marriages do not work. This does not imply that marriage itself is bad or that nobody should enter a marriage relationship. It does help to know

about those attitudes which can be destructive and it is important to make an effort to overcome them if we are to expect the marriage to work. The point is that only a good woman and a good man can have a good marriage. In this example, the term good has been defined by the capability of entering into the complementary relationship of marriage in a harmonious way.

This same principle applies to Cain and Abel who had complementary natures. The *Divine Principle* makes the comparison of an Abel-type character to the person of religious faith and the Cain-type character to a person of reason and science. This does not mean that a faith orientation is good while a scientific orientation is evil; rather, that the first stands in a position to receive religious revelation from God. Further, both Cain and Abel types can manifest fallen nature. The fallen nature of Cain is typified by resentment, anger, revenge, and violence. Abel's fallen nature, on the other hand, manifests itself in self-righteousness, arrogance, exploitation, and lack of sensitivity.

Unification's Unitive Principle

The *Divine Principle* takes a very different view from Augustine's theory of double predestination. It is a view similar to some of the other church fathers like Origen who held that ultimately, not only all men, but even Satan would be saved.[9] This concept of universal salvation leads to the idea that all, including Cain and Abel who are really brothers of one family, will be reconciled to God and the original order of things.

Unification teaching agrees with Augustine that Abel represents the brother who was more faith-oriented, while Cain was more earth-oriented; the first pursues the fulfillment of "original nature" by internal means, while the latter through external means (*DP*, 459-63). *Divine Principle* differs from Augustine in that it speaks of the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth; whereas, Augustine spoke of it as the soul's destiny after the death of the flesh. In the Unification view, Cain is as essential as Abel for the establishment of the Kingdom of God, while in the traditional view Cain is forever cursed, expendable, and not to be included in the kingdom. Therefore, while there may be problematic elements in the *Divine Principle* in its teaching on Cain and Abel, it must be recognized that the dualism common in the Western usage of the concept is improperly imputed to the Unification doctrine.

It should be remembered that the *Divine Principle* was revealed in

THE CAIN-ABEL TYPOLOGY

Korea where the Bible was read by eyes conditioned with Confucian family ethics.[10] The Augustinian worldview was not a part of this tradition. Unity of the family under the will of the parents is the Confucian norm. From this perspective the Unification view of Cain and Abel as brothers is more clear.

Narrative, Virtue, and Character Ethics

The Cain-Abel typology of restoration ethics fits into the category of character ethics or virtue which is being developed by Christian ethicists such as Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Goldberg. Its mode of transmission is in the form of narrative, the classical foundation for integrating human approaches to situations. This is a distinct contrast to the deontological or rule ethics popular in the modern era.

The modern era has been characterized by analytic and empirical methods of study. It was the period shaped by the Newtonian world view of matter in motion, popularly now called the "billiard ball" model of the universe. Ethical laws were sought from this viewpoint but were never adequate. Today it is felt that such a task is in vain because the premises are wrong. Michael Goldberg has written:

> Neither 'the facts' nor our 'experience' come to us in discreet
> and disconnected packets which simply await the appropriate
> moral principle to be applied. Rather they stand in need of
> some narrative which can bind the facts of our experience
> together in a coherent pattern and it is thus in virtue of that
> narrative that our abstracted rules, principles, and notions
> gain their full intelligibility.[11]

French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard has come to much this same conclusion in his post-deconstructionist thinking. In *The Post-Modern Condition* he states that it is philosophy's task to restore the place of narratives about the good human life. For the narrative dimension of human life is essentially related to social bonds.

> Philosophy must restore unity to learning, which has been
> scattered in separate sciences in laboratories and in pre-
> university education; it can only achieve this in a language

game that links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them to rational narration or metanarration.[12]

Christian ethicist Stanley Hauerwas argues that modernism had an aversion to narrative because of the reaction to the Medieval imposition of dogma through the biblical narratives. However, narrative is the medium where images of character and virtue are transmitted; and these reveal the unified response of a person to a situation.

Many have tried to free the objectivity of moral reason from narrative by arguing there are basic moral principles, procedures or points of view to which a person is logically or conceptually committed when engaged in moral action or judgment. . . .

Our argument put in traditional terms is that the moral life must be grounded in the 'nature' of man. However, that 'nature' is not 'rationality' itself, but the necessity of having a narrative to give our life coherence. The truthfulness of our moral life cannot be secured by the claims of 'rationality' in itself but rather by narrative that forms our need to recognize the many claims on our lives without trying to subject them to a false unity of coherence.[13]

Aristotle quite appropriately defined virtue as a disposition of the human soul[14] which could balance the competing forces and claims on human agency. Virtues are not easy to pigeonhole, they are elusive. This fact made talk about virtues unpopular and perhaps impossible in the modern era. In his book *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre noted the confusion which could result from pre-modren uses of virtue.[15] Nevertheless, he gives virtue a general definition which is independent of any particular teleology:

A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.[16]

MacIntyre takes this notion a step further and explains the relationship between the virtues and virtue. Virtue is that aspect of the human disposition which corresponds to the wholeness or integrity of the person, what Tillich would call the personal center.[17] This unity can best be achieved when the individual frees himself from lesser attachments by *purity of heart*.[18] This type of virtue ethic, in contrast to rule ethic, is most appropriately expressed in narrative form.

The Cain and Abel typology used in the *Divine Principle* is such a narrative which provides insight into a flaw of human nature which prevents the establishment of harmonious human relationships which are required as the foundation for a non-violent and just society. The Cain and Abel story is a failure of human relations; it is a tragedy which leads to separation from God and the possibility of acquiring those virtues necessary for restored human relationships. The story of Jacob and Esau, as interpreted by *Divine Principle,* is another narrative, this time an account of the successful overcoming of "fallen nature" and the unity of two brothers based on the transformation of the human heart and the subsequent virtuous activity which led to reconciliation.

III. JACOB AND ESAU

In the Jacob and Esau story the problems of resentment and hatred over not receiving a blessing once again occur. This time, however, through a "course of restoration" the killing of one brother is avoided and Jacob acquires a character which enables the brothers to be reconciled. The *Divine Principle* lists this as a paradigm story for the overcoming of resentment and the establishment of a foundation of unity upon which a God-centered society can develop.

The Biblical Account of Jacob and Esau

The lives of Jacob and Esau are discussed in far greater detail than Cain and Abel. The birth of Jacob and Esau is found in Genesis 25 and Jacob's death is reported in Genesis 49-50. We will highlight a few major events.

Isaac, Abraham's son, married Rebekah, who did not bear children in twenty years. After prayer to the Lord, Rebekah conceived twins who struggled within her womb. A prophecy was received from the Lord: "Two nations are in your womb, and two peoples born of you shall be divided; the one shall be stronger than the other, the elder shall serve the

younger" (Gen. 25:19-23). When the boys were young, Jacob tricked Esau into exchanging his birthright for bread and lentils when Esau was famished (Gen. 25:27-34).

When Isaac was old and was prepared to give his blessing to Esau, Rebekah schemed to deceive Isaac by having Jacob dress as Esau and receive the blessing instead (Gen. 27: 5-17). Isaac gave Jacob the blessing; "Be lord over your brothers, and may your mother's sons bow down to you" (Gen. 27:18-30). When Esau found out about this, Isaac would not bless him but told him to serve his brother. Esau hated Jacob for this and planned to kill him. But Rebekah sent Jacob away to her brother Laban to flee from Esau's wrath and find a wife not of the Canaanites (Gen. 27:30-28:5).

Jacob, enroute to his uncle Laban's house in Haran, had a dream that God would protect him and bring him back to his father's house in peace (Gen. 28:10-22). Jacob was welcomed by Laban and worked seven years to receive Rachel as a bride. But after the wedding, when Jacob awoke, behold, Leah had been given to him instead. He had to work another seven years for Rachel. He had several children and prospered with many flocks, servants, and camels. Laban's own sons became jealous and the Lord told Jacob to return to his homeland. After a series of harrowing events Jacob succeeded in gaining Laban's blessing (Gen. 29:31-31:55).

Jacob was afraid to return to Esau directly. Therefore he sent ahead messages of wealth and gifts he would share with Esau; he sent ahead over 500 animals and servants instructed to say that they were a present from him. If only he could appease Esau and be accepted! Then Jacob wrestled with a man sent by God all one night. When he was victorious the man blessed him with the name Israel. At that moment Esau was coming. Jacob bowed down seven times to him as he approached and Esau embraced him and they wept (Gen. 32:1-33:12).

The Interpretation of *Divine Principle*

The *Divine Principle* interprets this story as a victory for the unity of two people based on God-centered give and take activity. It was a foundation upon which the Messiah could be born of the nation of Israel. The conditions at the time of Jacob's departure to Haran were parallel to when Cain killed Abel. A price had to be paid to restore this relationship. The *Divine Principle* terms this payment "indemnity."

The *Divine Principle* says that Jacob went through a period of

purification, of "separation from Satan." This is a course through which all Abel-type people, including Jesus, have to pass (*DP*, 281). Jacob was wise while Esau was irresponsible and thought of himself. God was behind Jacob's receiving his father's blessing for this reason. Through his faithful perseverance and his humility despite Laban's tricks Jacob established a "foundation of faith" through which God could work (*DP*, 278). His successful reunion with Esau established the "foundation of substance," a substantial human relationship, upon which the national level foundation to receive the Messiah could be built (*DP*, 278-84).

The narrative account of Jacob and Esau is an acount of a world of separation from God, immaturity, violence, resentment, mistrust and sin which is transformed into a world of harmony, brotherhood, peace and sharing. It is a story about the transformation of fallen human attitudes and character traits to a world of virtue. Jacob was transformed from a youngster who engaged in trickery to a man of faith, humility, wisdom, compassion, and integrity. He came to learn to share his blessings and talents with his brother. The anger, resentment, jealousy and self-pity of Esau were melted away by Jacob's love, wisdom, and desire to live in peace.

Manipulation of Resentment

One of the most universal human responses to trickery, deceit, or exploitation is resentment aginst the oppressor. This sentiment is frequently played upon and maniuplated by Marxists in fomenting violent revolution. It is also played upon by politicians in a democracy as they campaign against adversaries by promising an end to their misdeeds, rather than a constructive solution to social problems. Resentment is a negative way to respond to someone who frustrates our goals; it is a response to a feeling of betrayal, of broken trust.

It has been all too common in Christian history for oppressors to tell the oppressed that they must be patient and forgiving. Oppressors have done this to keep the downtrodden down and their own exploitative structures intact. This has only served the interests of power struggle, division, and violence. *Divine Principle* argues that we cannot rest content with asking the oppressed to forgive their oppressors; rather, it wants to restore the original betrayal in the "fall of Adam and Eve" and create God-centered men, women and societies, people with a new character.

Liquidation of Resentment

While Unification theology would agree with Marx that the exploitation of one human by another should cease, it does not agree with manipulating or increasing the resentment of the oppressed. As Jesus, Gandhi and many religious leaders have taught, we should love and pray for our oppressors.[19] The idea of wanting to save even Hitler, Stalin, and Lucifer, the greatest oppressors of the human race, is rooted in a spirituality which seeks freedom from resentment. Unificationism disagrees with the position of seeking violently to liquidate those who cause one resentment. Cain violently killed Abel, who represented the source of his resentment. Esau sought to kill Jacob when he was tricked. It is clear that unity between any two brothers will not come about on earth if one of them is dead. Likewise, a parent will have no joy if one child kills another over such an issue.

What can be considered evil in Cain or Esau is not the fact that they are oriented toward earthly things, rather it is the attitude, disposition, or heart that wishes to end one's resentment by eliminating one's brother. It is a direct violation of the will of the divine Parent and therefore sinful. Further, it is clear that Jacob's trickery and insensitivity could only increase Esau's resentment.

Violence is not the only response possible to resentment. Recent research in social-psychology confirms that positive responses are possible and indeed preferable. Learning non-aggression and non-vindictiveness are essential ingredients in a peaceful world. In his book *The Social Animal,* Elliot Aronson described the predicament of perpetuation of prejudice and resentment common in society. He calls on the need for a new spirit in the educator which can inspire an environment of community in the classroom, rather than alienation for the students.[20] Someone must pay the price to lead the way.

Jacob revealed a constructive and virtuous response to resentment. He voluntarily paid the price to restore a relationship full of hatred, mistrust, and violence by force of love, patience, and wisdom. This is the source of his victory and the reason why the *Divine Principle* refers to his life course as a model.

The Transformation of Heart

Unity between Jacob and Esau did not come about until their attitudes, or "hearts," had been transformed. At the time of the deception,

the fallen attitudes of both brothers were irreconcilable. Jacob had acted in total disregard of the future of their relationship. However, he soon came to realize that he had not fulfilled his own goal of inheriting his father's land by tricking his brother. The resentment of Esau was ultimately liquidated only after Jacob first transformed his own attitude. Jacob's experience in Haran with his uncle Laban had enabled him to identify with Esau's suffering. By being deceived several times, Jacob had likely come to understand the feeling of Esau when he had been deceived. However, Jacob did not seek the violent death of his uncle Laban but was patient and sought creative ways to earn Laban's blessing on his family and property. In this regard, his response to frustration was superior to Esau's "fallen" reaction.

We might say that Jacob's heart was transformed by gaining a certain "solidarity" with his brother. As such, he had the power to transform his brother's heart so that the two could be reconciled to each other and Esau could finally be connected to God, restoring Cain's banishment.

The direction of this process can also be found in Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Freire noted that revolutionary leaders emerge from the oppressor class with a transformed attitude and desire to end dehumanizing action and organize with the oppressed:

> Revolutionary leaders must avoid organizing themselves apart from the people;... Revolutionary leaders commit many errors and miscalculations by not taking into account something so real as the people's view of the world: a view which explicitly contains their concerns, their doubts, their hopes, their way of seeing the leaders, their perceptions of themselves and of the oppressors, their religious beliefs, their fatalism, their rebellious reactions.... The oppressor elaborates his theory of action without the people, for he stands against them. Nor can the people—as long as they are crushed and oppressed, internalizing the image of the oppressor—construct by themselves the theory of their liberating action. Only in the encounter of the people with the revolutionary leaders—in their communion, in their praxis— can this theory be built.[21]

For Freire, revolutionary transformation into the ideal world involves the transformation of people of the oppressor class who, in gaining a feeling of solidarity with the oppressed, risk their privileged positions and enter into liberating actions with the oppressed through a method of non-coercive problem-posing education. Such a leader might be viewed as the one given by grace of God. The *Divine Principle* also has a revolutionary view of transformation that begins with a transformation of attitude on the part of the one identified with the oppressor class, in this case Jacob who subsequently risked all to reconcile himself to his brother.

The Use of "Blessing" and "Chosen"

There is a problem with dividing the world up into good and evil and then identifying oneself with the good; it is the problem of arrogance and self-righteousness. The Christian Crusades against the "infidels" is an example that is hard to forget. The words "blessing" and "chosen" have frequently been used to justify one's privileged position. The Bible has been exegeted so as to justify slavery in the United States, apartheid in South Africa, and countless crusades and wars. As a result, the use of these words has been condemned along with the evil policies they have tried to justify.

The *Divine Principle* in no way intends to justify self-righteousness or oppression when it uses these terms. "Blessing" refers to God's acknowledgement of one's potential as a responsible person and a bestowal of trust in that person. The three blessings which are at the core of Unification ethics are "be fruitful, multiply and have dominion." They refer to personal integrity, family responsibilities, and environmental consciousness, respectively. Receiving a blessing can be compared to rites of passage in traditional societies; it signifies liberation and new responsibilities simultaneously. Inheriting these blessings in the Unification movement, unlike most traditional societies, involves global consciousness transcending one's own society. In this regard it should be an integrative factor, rather than a divisive one, in the quest for global community.

Being "chosen" by God does not mean that one has the right to sit in splendor and opulence at the expense of others. Rather, one is chosen for a mission of service. As a result one is asked to sacrifice some of one's personal goals for the sake of one's society, nation, and world. One wins loyalty through love and service rather than force of arms. This ideal is similar to the ethical commonwealth which Immanuel Kant envisioned in

his late work *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. Kant maintained the distinction between a juridical-civil political state of affairs which required coercion and an ethico-civil state which is united under the non-coercive laws of virtue alone. He further believed that this commonwealth could only appear in the form of a church since it represents the city of God, a voluntary, universal, and enduring union of hearts.[22]

Abel as a Loyal Servant

American philosopher Josiah Royce's concept of loyalty is a further development of the notion of community in the direction of Unification thought. For Royce, loyalty is something given as devotion rather than obedience extracted by force. His religion of loyalty defined salvation for the individual in the devotion to a genuinely real and universal community related to the divine being. The community must be a union of loving members before it can elicit the love of an individual.[23] He considered the big historical mistake to be the equation of Christian love with self-abnegation or pure altruism. Love does not merely stem from one's own subjectivity; if we do not know the heart of our neighbor, unilateral love can lead to offense or paternalism. In Royce's words, "It is not love's task to set the whole world right—rather to act in the Father's spirit."[24] This distinction is helpful in understanding the actions of a "fallen Abel figure" as opposed to a "true Abel." The true Abel figure attempts to act in God's spirit, not control the events affecting the destiny of other people.

At this point in his argument, Royce recognized the human predicament which I have mentioned. In other words, true community cannot exist without true loyalty, and true loyalty cannot exist without true community.[25] Royce concluded that loyalty needs for its beginning the inspiring leader who teaches by example of his spirit. This can only begin by some miracle of grace.[26] Christ, through his death and in his resurrection became one with the spirit of the Christian community. Royce recognized the *Problem of Christianity* in making the universal spiritual community and the ascended spirit of Christ concrete. These problems were to be explained by the doctrines of the church, trinity, and christology. However, the Christian cannot find the universal and beloved community in concrete existence. Royce thus concluded that other personal examples do not provide a code of morals, but rather serve to inspire our own creative contributions.

If loyalty is the positive force that binds together and motivates human relationships and communities, then betrayal is the sin which shatters a community. Royce was concerned to describe how the betrayed and betrayer could be reconciled. His answer is that of the traitor being redeemed through trust. Even though the past cannot be retrieved, new deeds of service and repentance can transform the meaning of the past.[27] Royce's view of healing scarred relations is similar to the Unification doctrine of indemnity. He argued that the real heroic deed is when one suffers personal pain and yet takes it as an opportunity to serve the community.

Royce argued that the moral mandate of the Christian was to create the beloved community through loyal service. Since loyalty is a virtue, Royce argued against the modern notion that Christians could follow a set of dictates or personal examples. Royce believed that the objective study of certain narrative illustrations could prove the validity of the life of loyalty to the universal community. He used the narrative about Joseph's loyalty even after his brothers had betrayed him: "God's providence sent Joseph into captivity... God rewarded his patience and fidelity..."[28] Royce wanted to offer up such examples to science for scrutiny as to their value, thus making his philosophy of religion a scientific social theory.

The Image of Hero as Loving Servant

What we have in the *Divine Principle,* as is the case with Royce, Aronson, and Freire, is a new vision of authority and leadership. Authority is not dispelled but works hand in hand with freedom because it is non-coercive in nature. Rather than rejecting the concept of heroism, *Divine Principle* seeks to eliminate its perversions. Jacob is seen as a hero, not because he tricked Esau, but because he was able to overcome his separation from Esau's feeling and transform their relationship to one of unity.

The *Divine Principle* warns however that the unity of two brothers, or the solidarity of one people with another, is not enough. The unity must be centered on God's ideal and not unity for its own sake. The unity of Jacob and Esau, from the perspective of the *Divine Principle,* only acts as a foundation which can inspire unity in an ever expanding set of human relationships. The preparation of the nation of Israel involves the creation of a people with the ability to receive Jesus as an Abel figure who could lead to the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth (*DP,* 369-70).

IV. THE MISSION OF JESUS

In the *Divine Principle,* Jesus is seen as the hero *par excellence* as he gave his life for the purpose of liberation of God and all people. But Jesus, in solidarity with the Divine Being, was ultimately crucified by the people. Using Freire's language, this was a case when the oppressed could not gain confidence in their revolutionary leader as a result of the divisive action of the oppressor class, in this case the Sanhedrin and the Roman procurator Pontius Pilate. Jesus' loyalty to the people was not understood until the crucifixion and resurrection made it more clear who he was. *Divine Principle* maintains that the people, in a Cain position to Jesus, should have united with Jesus, who could show them the way of the Kingdom of Heaven (*DP,* 355-7). This means that the people should have had faith in the revolutionary One *before* his crucifixion. The foundation of faith is prerequisite to the foundation of substance. The crucifixion of Jesus only delayed the establishment of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth.

Unfortunately, many times the oppressed have been deceived by false leaders who promise salvation but then go on to become new oppressors. This situation led Freire to acknowledge that it is easy for the revolutionary leader to turn his back on the people after taking power. This fact also leads a person of the status quo to use this as an excuse to prevent any revolutionary leader, true or false, by force if necessary, from taking power. *Divine Principle* stresses the importance of following true Abel figures in order to get closer to the Kingdom of God. This requires discernment and conditions of faithfulness. A true Messiah, Abel figure, or revolutionary leader will not use physical force to keep people in their place, but move people through God-centered inspiration. The crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ signify the possibility of such a true, universal Abel figure entering human existence.

V. NATIONAL LEVEL CAIN AND ABEL TYPES

The *Divine Principle* gives importance to the modern "Abel-type democracies" which makes it less likely that a leader in the spirit and power of Christ will be nailed to the cross another time.

In its lengthy discussion of providential history, the *Divine Principle* places democracies in which there is religious freedom in the Abel camp (*DP,* 467-8). While I grant that there are many problematic elements in *Divine Principle's* exposition, I want to argue that there is an important point to be made in this discussion. Such democracies open the way for a

revolutionary leader, inspired by the word of God, to transform the hearts of the people and change their fallen activity into God-centered activity without being killed by the government, but in fact be protected from mob action by the government.

By saying that the United States is in an Abel position, the *Divine Principle* is not affirming the fallen Abel-type characteristics of national self-righteousness and exploitation of third world peoples exhibited by the United States and other powerful nations including the Soviet Union; on the contrary, it is critical of such attitudes. The true Abel nation is the one which is capable of connecting others to the will of God by paying indemnity for them. Thus the *Divine Principle* is in effect saying that without a fundamental transformation of the "heart" or "spirit" of the United States, it is a fallen nation, even if it is in an Abel position.

From the story of Jacob and Esau we can make the analogy of contemporary America to the time where Jacob had been given the blessing of his father, but before he had transformed his heart in Haran. The message of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon to America has been that "we need a spiritual revolution in America." "A revolution of heart must come to America...." "All of your pride, your wealth, your cars and your great cities are like dust without God." "America doesn't seem to care about the rest of the world." "When America helped others,... she enjoyed her golden age." "Unless this nation, unless the leadership of this nation, lives up to the mission ordained by God, many troubles will plague you."[29] Attacking the United States *per se* is dangerous if it leads to the destruction of liberty at its core. What should really be attacked are the fallen Abel-type attitudes displayed in the policies of the United States.

The Soviet Union and other human-centered, or Cain-type nations, on the other hand, are not condemned by the *Divine Principle* for their concern for human welfare; rather, they are considered evil if their methods of and the attitudes behind their ideas of justice involve the fallen Cain-type characteristics of envy, jealousy, resentment, or revenge. Typically, communist revolutionaries manipulate the victims of injustice and move them to revolutionary violence precisely by encouraging these fallen attitudes. They are criticized for attempting to build a utopia through coercion; to seize a blessing by force, as did Cain. Marxist polemic against the United States is often loaded with the rhetoric of resentment and reveals fallen Cain-type attitudes, or we may say fallen Cain-type spirituality. The typology the *Divine Principle* employs is thus primarily

directed at the spirituality of the ideologies, not nations or peoples *per se*.

From the Unification perspective, the real issue between democracy and communism in the twentieth century is the ability of the people under such systems to receive Abel-type figures and to transform society into a God-centered society. The freedom in the United States allows such a possibility, while the perpetuation of power and the system of communism prevents such a radical transformation.

The issue of capitalism vs. socialism, so prominent in the rhetoric of the two superpowers, is an ill-founded debate from the perspective of virtue or character ethics, of which the *Divine Principle* is an exponent. These two economic theories are of the rule or principle oriented type, characteristic of the modern era. However, most holistic perspectives and theories of virtue recognize competing forces in human life, the integration of which is necessary for existence. From this perspective, freedom and economic justice are both desired ends. A pure theory or pure economy of either the capitalist or socialist type is unable to be virtuous by definition. Rather, it would seem that the Kingdom of Heaven would involve some type of mixed economy and the real virtue will be found in the character of the mix. The *Divine Principle* talks about a socialist society centered upon God (DP, 444). However, the importance of human creativity and freedom as part of "original human nature" in the *Divine Principle* runs against any notion of a centrally planned and controlled economy.

Conservatives are critical of the liberationist content of Marxist thought; however, the *Divine Principle* advocates a thoroughgoing philosophy of liberation in its understanding of restored human relationships. Jacob did not seek to dominate Esau; and, after the foundation of substance was established in their relationship, Esau no longer sought to dominate Jacob. Both were liberated from the oppression that comes from the brokenness of a relationship, from suspicion, fear, anger, jealousy, and resentment. The *Divine Principle* sees this as part of the liberation of original human nature to a God-centered order of society. The *Divine Principle* is neither critical of social justice nor liberation but rather the spirituality of the forms of Marxist-Leninist power groups. It is critical of motivation based on division and resentment, of action based on violence and coercion, and of the human arrogance of social planning not open to the free intervention of God through God's messengers in our day. It is also critical of the pretensions of a fallen Abel-type of spirituality which are expressed in the United States democracy.

Divine Principle gives the credit for democracy to the blood of the saints and martyrs of Christian history rather than to the intellectual genius of a few philosophers (*DP*, 467). This marks off the distinction between the treatment of religion by the revolutionary National Assembly in France and that given in the constitution of the United States; it has nothing to do about whether American people are better than French people. The National Assembly sought to construct a religion to its own glory, to deify itself. The founding documents of the United States, on the other hand, recognize the ultimate authority of God over all beings and the relative independence of the church from the state.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Cain-Abel typology used in the *Divine Principle* is a useful narrative form of description of human relations which conveys attitudes conducive to the integration or disintegration of human relationships centered upon God. It focuses on the transformation and development of the heart. The typology has generally been misunderstood because of earlier (Augustinian) uses of the typology. It has often been ignored because of the modern propensity to seek rules and models rather than to develop virtues. However, the typology used in conjunction with the story of Jacob and Esau provides hope for the healing of the wounds which separate people all over the world.

An obstacle to the acceptance of the Cain-Abel typology is the inability of Christians, including Unificationists, and other religious people, to live according to the norms it reveals. The desire to control and dominate others, whether it is economic exploitation, political oppression, slavery, or charismatic power, is fallen; as is the revolutionary seizure of power by force. Today there are many reasons why the Unification Church is persecuted rather than studied, however it's founder, the Reverend Sun Myung Moon, has provided a precious gem in the *Divine Principle* in the Cain and Abel typology. It contains a clue to the restoration of broken human relationships and to the peace of the world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Barbara Reed, "A Response to Unification Eschatology: Conflict Dualism in the Last Days" (Xerox copy, presented at the summer seminar on "Unification Theology and Lifestyle," June 10-17, 1984, Athens, Greece). Nicholas Piediscalzi, "Christian-Marxist Dialogues: a Proposed Alternative for the Unification Church" (Xerox copy, presented at a conference on "Unification Social Teaching and Practice," April 5-8, 1984, Barrytown, New York).
2. Augustine, *The City of God* (New York: Image Books, 1958) 26, 324-35.
3. Augustine, 361, 496-506.
4. Augustine, 464-65, 480.
5. *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* was uttered by the Council of Florence (1438-45). See John Hick and Brian Hebblethwaite, eds., *Christianity and Other Religions* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1981) 178.
6. Augustine, 483.
7. Reed, 1.
8. Reed, 3.
9. Origen, *De Principiis, 1.6.1-4.*
10. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 3-7.
11. Michael Goldberg, *Theology and Narrative* (Nashville: The Parthenon Press, 1982) 242.
12. Jean-Francois Lyotard, *The Post-Modern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) 33.
13. Stanley Hauerwas with David B. Burrell, *Truthfulness and Tragedy: Further Investigations into Christian Ethics* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press) 16-7, 27-8.
14. Aristotle, *Ethics,* II, 6 (London: Penguin Classics, 1973) 66.
15. Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981) 169.
16. MacIntyre, 178.
17. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology,* Volume Three (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) 27-8.
18. MacIntyre, 189.
19. M.K. Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance* (New York: Schocken, 1961) 383; "Wherever you are confronted with an opponent, conquer him with love . . . I have found, however, that this law of love has answered as the law of destruction has never done." Also from the words of Jesus (Mt. 5-44), "But I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."
20. Elliot Aronson, *The Social Animal* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1980) 226-34.
21. Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970) 183-6.
22. Immanuel Kant, *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960) 93.
23. Josiah Royce, *The Problem of Christianity* (New York: Macmillan, 1913) 67-8.
24. Royce, 90.
25. Royce, 152-9.
26. Royce, 182-4.
27. Royce, 309.

28. Royce, 367.
29. Sun Myung Moon, *Christianity in Crisis, New Hope* (Washington: HSA-UWC, 1974) 62-5.

A UNIFICATION LIBERATION THEOLOGY

by Anthony J. Guerra

This paper articulates the beginnings of a Unification liberation theology. Section I sets out the eschatological frame of reference of Unification theology which is common to theologies of liberation, and discusses Unificationists' understanding of God as suffering over as well as with humanity. The implications of the Unificationist concept of God as Parent for its understanding of salvation or liberation is drawn. A debunking of the notion of God as Santa Klaus is demanded, as is the consequent revolutionizing of prayer to escape the limitations of a purely passive role for the human in the divine-human relationship. The emphasis on the role of the prayerful revolutionary as comforting the long-suffering Parent renders a spiritual praxis that is complementary/symmetrical with social activism. Reverend Moon is seen as the paradigmatic case for Unificationists who proclaim worldwide social activism as compelled by the longing to end the suffering of both God and humanity.

Sections II and III express some reflections on perhaps the two most well-publicized aspects of the Unification movement, namely its anti-communism and its unique style of marriage.[1] Both of these facets are responsible in large part for the virulent opposition which the movement has experienced in its now three decades of existence. Anti-communism is sufficient reason to inspire the wrath of much of the political left, and the radical critique and new valuing of the family makes Unificationism, for different reasons, the target of both conservatives and liberals. My decision to concentrate on these two aspects of Unificationism, however, is based on my observation as a member of the movement since 1971, that these two aspects have constituted and are likely to continue to constitute constant and significant emphases of Unificationism as core members understand and experience it.

My comments on communism in Section II will do nothing to win the favor of either the vociferous protectors of vested interests or of those who believe that Unificationism will outgrow its opposition to communism as it is exposed to the more elevated Western spheres of culture and education and thus is separated from its South Korean origins where anti-communism is assumed to be part of the national gene pool. My presentation of Unification anti-communism seeks to subordinate the ideological critique to religious and humanitarian concerns, and thus is a constructive or corrective construal rather than merely a description. I do believe that Unificationism's opposition to communism is consonant with its progressive social teaching and practice.

In the final section, in accord with the eschatological orientation as well as with the norm of creating a theocentric world family, the non-communist society is found desperately in need of transformation. The Unificationist alternative marriage and family system is understood as a program for transforming selfish and harmful patterns of human society. In Unificationism, the family comes to have a primary soteriological function in the resolution of such problems as racism, nationalism, and poverty.[2]

The question of the appropriateness of the title "Unification Liberation Theology" should be addressed. The word "liberation" is so much a part of the daily parlance of Unificationists, that while its definition differs somewhat from that of contemporary liberation theologians, it still seems not only justifiable but also necessary to use the term in a Unification context.

Perhaps that point which most strongly identifies the Unificationist with those liberation theologians stemming from Latin America is the emphasis on human responsibility to effect the reign of God. This implies social commitment on all levels of life. The basic difference between the two approaches, however, is in the proposed mode of dealing with the relationship between the rich and the poor. Liberation theologians generally affirm a sociological dualism (marxist class analysis), which tends to despair of the transformation of the whole of humanity.[3] Unificationists, on the other hand, take a different route. According to Reverend Moon:

> A new approach must absorb and digest these two ideologies, [communism and democracy]. In this new approach, the upper class should come down and be a servant of the lower

> class... Christian sympathy with the Communist view often
> causes them to completely join "the other side" and cut
> themselves off from the channels by which they could lift
> the people up... God's way is always unity. God's thought
> can embrace both the upper and lower classes and elevate
> the entire society to a higher standard of living.... The
> Unification Church declares no enemy; it embraces everyone
> (... The means it uses is love; God's love).[4]

This statement is entirely consonant with the assertion in the introduction of the *Divine Principle* that the cause of the success of communism is the failure of Christian society to live in accordance with Jesus' ethic of love.[5]

I

For both liberation theology and European political theology, eschatology is the central category of reflection.[6] Eschatology, traditionally, has to do with the final transformation of the cosmos and/or human history, and the contemporary theological appropriation of the category maintains this focus. Unification theology, however, shifts fundamentally the focus of eschatology in its proclamation that it is the liberation of God from God's own suffering which is the central event of the Last Days. Unification theology understands that the eschaton brings an end not only to the suffering of humanity and all creation but also to that of the Creator. More precisely, the mutual suffering is overcome by the reconciliation of God with humanity and humans with each other. From the Unification perspective, liberation theology has not been radical enough in re-interpreting the tradition in order to make this central affirmation that the eschatological task is the liberation of a suffering God. Liberation of God is most radical because it extends human activities to their ultimate limits, to the source and end of life.[7]

Unification theology takes seriously Jesus' address of God as *Abba*.[8] God is the Father, the Parent of all people.[9] God suffers the internal pain of grief because of the frustration experienced in attempting to realize God's ideal for a world of love and goodness,[10] and as well God suffers compassionately in the suffering of God's children. The end of God's suffering will come only with the fulfillment of the divine ideal, i.e., the ideal of perfect love and goodness. The mature believer in God will pray

and act with the awareness that his/her parent, God, is suffering in the depths.[11]

The inner logic of Unification theology lies in the circular statement that God is parent to all humankind and that each person is a child of God. Unification theologizing is the reasoning of the heart of a parent. If with Jesus, I am to affirm God as Abba, then my assertion should entail minimally that God's intentionality vis à vis humankind is commensurate with the intentionality of a human parent who is concerned with the spiritual, intellectual as well as physical well being of his/her child. One may wish to affirm far more than this, but to affirm less than this is to falsify the address to God as parent. Further, implicit in the statement that God is parent of all humankind is the avowal of the now familiar concern of Unificationism for one world family.[12] The double love commandment in Unification theology is in keeping with its familial relational ontology.[13] The Heart of the parent yearns for both the direct expressions of filial as well as sibling love. The failure to achieve both kinds of love is the chief cause of divine and human suffering.

By proclaiming that the liberation of the suffering God is the first task of theology, Unification theology will not lose its activist orientation. Above all else, the suffering of God must be comprehended, experienced, and felt as the real condition of the living God and not merely as a novel theological construction. The heart of the believer must meet with the heart of the suffering God. In this encounter the birth of the new "revolutionary" will occur. The paradigm case for Unificationism of this religious experience is that of its founder, the Rev. Sun Myung Moon, who describes his relationship with God during his two and a half year sentence in a North Korean concentration camp:

> I never complained; I was never angry at my situation; I never even asked His help, but was always busy comforting Him and telling Him not to worry about me. The Father knows me so well. He already knew my suffering. How could I tell Him about my suffering and cause His heart to grieve still more. I could only tell Him that I would never be defeated by my suffering.[14]

The religious experience of the suffering of God is the true ground of motivation for the acts of sacrificial love that liberate God and humanity

from their suffering and oppression. The context for the concern and activity of the individual who is in communion with the suffering God is the real world and its oppressed inhabitants. Otherworldly mysticism forgets that God is the Parent whose greatest concern is not for Godself but for God's children. Indeed, the true lover of God must discern where are the people of greatest suffering and oppression and be devoted to their liberation.[15] Thus, for Christians of Nazi Germany or even of the United States or Great Britain to have devoted all of their energies during the time of World War II to the reform of, for example, the dictatorship in Argentina, would have been a serious misunderstanding of the dimensions of the demonic in that historical epoch.[16] Nazism was an historical expression of the demonic which demanded the active opposition from the world religious community.

Although at any given moment in history the believer may decide to stand with one nation or bloc of nations against another nation or bloc of nations as e.g. in WWII, it should be acknowledged forthrightly that in history no nation has yet fully represented the Heart and Will of God. Unification theology asserts that the present eschatological time (see Section III) allows for the emergence of one inwardly renewed individual and then stage by stage, a family, clan, tribe, nation, and world whose members repeat this authentic religious experience.[17] This authentic religious experience is the existential encounter with the suffering God who becomes known as the Parent of all people, including one's historical enemies. The true revolutionary should represent the theology and praxis that all people are brothers and sisters; God's ideal is the realization of one world family centered on God's love. Then, who is the historical enemy of such a person? The enemy, the demonic in history, is constituted by those who profess and practice the extermination of a race or class of the human family. Nazism and Communism are manifestations of the demonic in history. From the perspective of the true revolutionary, although such an enemy must be prevented from realizing its will, this enemy must nonetheless be restored in time to the family of God.

II

It is well known that Unificationism promotes anti-communism. In this regard, my exposition of Unificationism is radical and no doubt will evoke the displeasure of both ideological communists as well as ideological anti-communists, for I maintain that opposition to communism is mandated

firstly by religious and humanitarian concerns, and then by ideological concerns.[18] My own commitment to oppose communism is intimately related to personal experiences and friendships with several refugees of various communist states. My initial encounter was with refugees of Cuban extraction; I was greatly troubled by the testimonies of two men who had fought with Castro against Batista and then were imprisoned when they objected to the totalitarian Marxist regime which Castro abruptly imposed on Cuba after winning the revolution.[19] Subsequent encounters with Latvian, Polish, Vietnamese, and Afghan refugees have deepened the conviction that the toll of human misery demands a response.

Unification theology would agree with Karl Barth that the Kingdom of Heaven can be identified with no existing earthly national sovereignty, and yet nevertheless that religious people are not exempted from the responsibility of either supporting or opposing respectively the relatively good or evil temporal powers. Unlike his stance against Nazism, Barth refused to oppose communist Russia.[20] Today, however, the voice of human suffering has spoken against communist statehood in its more than sixty years of history. Mere ideological critiques of Marxism-Leninism may serve only to anesthetize further an already lethargic social conscience of the West. Since the Soviet and Polish regimes' scorning of Poland's union of ten million workers as the trojan horse of capitalist imperialism, the hypocrisy of the Soviet type systems ostensibly dedicated to the salvation of the proletariat class has become apparent to even the most "liberal" circles in the West.[21] This same hypocrisy has been exposed in the Castro regime with the latest arrival of 120,000 Cuban refugees (from April to August 1980)[22] Castro himself described these refugees as the scum of his society, and the majority of the new arrivals represented the lower class of Cuban society. Yet the rhetoric of communist revolution promised liberation to precisely this class of people. Such rhetoric is the justification for the bloodshed in the period of revolution and throughout the time of "re-organization" subsequent to the success of the revolution.[23] Further, the barbaric cruelty of the Vietnam Communist government was broadcast to the world most dramatically in the plight of the "boat people" in 1979,[24] and even more alarming reports of extensive use of chemical warfare perpetrated by this regime throughout South East Asia[25] as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan[26] has brought at long last the final stage of the demythologization of communism in liberal Christian circles. It should be noted that these current reports of oppression are no less

savage than those acts against the Baltic peoples in 1941, or against the Hungarian people 25 years ago who were violently suppressed in their quest for self-determination.[27] Now, the pattern of violent oppression expressed by the Soviet and related national communist movements is so extreme as to warrant fully the theological category attributed earlier in this century to Nazism, namely of the demonic in history.

I have presented my humanitarian concerns first because too often many self-serving anti-communists casually slide over the toll of human misery caused by communist governments and inveigh against the atheistic materialism or the new elitism inherent in the class conflict theory of Marxism-Leninism. Such critiques often fail to take seriously enough the fact that we are speaking of individuals, peoples, and nations whose suffering must be accounted as the suffering of our own brothers and sisters. The religious basis of Unification anti-communism is essentially of the same nature as the humanitarian basis—that is, it stems from the motivation to alleviate suffering, the suffering of God. The Unification theologian must take seriously the suffering of God, our Parent, which is increased by regimes that indoctrinate all citizens in a state philosophy which explicitly ridicules belief in God. As the heart or feeling of a human parent images the intense heart of love which God bears for each human person, one can approach an affective appreciation of God's pain analogically. One of the most distressing of human experiences is that of parents' rejection by their children. It is too monstrous to imagine parents enduring a state that would separate them from their newborn children and then proceed to tell the children in their formative years that they were born as a result of test tube experiments.[28] Constant and decided reflection upon the heart of the suffering God is required if the committed believer, especially one assuming the task of the articulation of the symbols of belief, is not to fall into a practical atheism. Kierkegaard's critique of Hegelianism is always instructive in recalling that the all-important existential dimension of the God-human relationship can be easily edged out of even the most self-consciously religious philosophical system. This temptation I have here endeavored overcome.

The communist states' utter disrespect of individuals' rights and life is buttressed by an ideology which sustains the believer in executing the most heinous acts against others for the sake of a greater good yet to come. Whereas some traditions of Christian theology have rightly been critiqued by Marxism for an otherworldly emphasis which distracts the individual

from the hope and concern for change in the here and now, Marxism-Leninism itself has offered the delayed parousia of the perfect communist society, and this concept functions similarly to that of the religious concept of a heavenly reward in the afterlife.

While it must be acknowledged that Christianity has functioned to legitimize oppression, particularly in South America, the all important difference between the theistic worldview and that of communism is the practical reality that the critique of oppression comes from within the theistic faith, whereas there is no possibility within Marxist ideology to critique murder. For this reason, an ideological critique of communism is required.

In the case of Marxism-Leninism, current injustice and inhumanity is condoned for the sake of a future earthly workers' paradise. The distinctive sin of communist ideology is that it teaches the extermination of a designated "enemy class" of people; it advocates a type of eschatological social dualism. The congruence between this basic tenet of Marxism and its accumulated history of violence and slaughter must be considered seriously. In the Last Days, the evil class-capitalists and reactionaries are to be eliminated by the righteous working class. The historical returns from this guiding ideological tenet, however adapted, of communist governments, are now painfully obvious. In the final analysis, the new ruling classes of the national communist regimes have used this dualistic concept in order to justify any whimsical expression of the will to absolute power. The new language of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism has been employed to rationalize the violence against old antagonistic factions. Communism has failed to transform world history, but rather has exacerbated the resentments among peoples of this unregenerate human history.

III

The gravity of the communist threat to civilization is surely as great as that of Nazism in the previous epoch. Yet, it would be unconscionable to engage in an all-out war against communism, especially in light of the dreadful uniqueness of the weapons now available to us. When we contemplate the historical fact that men have consistently employed fully the weapons at their disposal (be it spear, bow and arrow, musket, cannon, etc.) to destroy each other, we would conclude now either to doomsday or posit a radical departure from the spirit and conduct of past humanity.[29] Simply put, the eschaton in the age of nuclear weapons is in sight of both

believer and non-believer. Further, although we can critique communism for betraying the *Geist* of this age which is directing the hearts and minds of people towards world liberation, we cannot easily affirm the so-called free world or democratic world. This latter system offers no basis for the hope to end the suffering of God and humanity. Indeed, the callous self-centeredness of western culture has spawned despair and resentment, and may be the single major reason for the success of communism around the world. At best, the democratic system, acknowledges the principles of religious freedom in particular and civil rights and liberties in general. In such an atmosphere, it is possible for an eschatological movement initiated by the true revolutionary (see Section I) to be born and grow within its midst.

Reverend Moon is seen by Unificationists as this true revolutionary. His eschatological movement begins with the vision of one person who encounters the suffering of God and takes as his purpose to comfort God. This movement will in turn be motivated by the desire to comfort God and humanity—the children of God.

In the remainder of this paper, I will discuss how a central social teaching and practice of Unificationism, i.e. "blessed marriages", addresses some of the problems liberation theology speaks to. Several scholars have noted the similarity in the patterns of oppression brought to light in sexism, racism, and classism.[30] There are several Unification feminists who have pointed to the compatibility of Unification theology with the feminist claim that the "root of sin is sexism".[31] Two aspects of blessed marriages should be discussed: 1) the basic teaching concerning the problem of the male/female relationship and the mode of relatedness expressed in the Unification movement, and 2) the significance of the mass marriages and in particular of the large number of mixed marriages.

At the heart of the Unification social teaching and practice is the understanding that the proper male/female relationship has not been realised in human society. The central theologoumena is that men and women, having failed to ground their mutual love in the love of God, create a disordered love in which one of the couple becomes the idol (i.e. surrogate for the transcendent) and the other the idolator. In the first three years after a Unification engagement, the couple focuses almost exclusively on mission as the foundation for their life together. During this time in particular (at other times as well) women and men undertake roles of public service resulting in the fact that the husband is helped to recognize

that his wife is capable of carrying out responsibilities beyond the domestic sphere. (Often this is a new insight for the woman as well). When the Unification couple begins to live and function as a social unit, they understand their responsibility to create a "Home Church" community wherein they actually seek to serve 360 homes in the immediate neighborhood. This service ranges from activities such as babysitting and grocery-shopping for shut-ins to marriage counselling and the holding of prayer meetings. The theology of Home Church is that the "blessed family" (family of couples blessed in marriage) create a family of service to other families.[32] Thus the divine telos under which both members of the couple live serves to help overcome idolatrous impulses.

It is well known that Rev. and Mrs. Moon conduct mass wedding ceremonies, but the self-understanding of Unificationists regarding the significance of these ceremonies has generally been ignored.[33] For each such wedding ceremony (including those of 36, 72, 120, 210, 430, 777, 1800, 2035, and 5,837 couples and others), specific social objectives were envisioned which were to expand Unification programs to national and global levels.

Rev. Moon believes that a representative number of people in this age should volunteer to marry across racial and national divides. In the 1960's, while working primarily in Asia, he encouraged Korean and Japanese members of his movement to intermarry. The two nations are extremely homogenous and further have deep seated animosities towards each other. These animosities were intensified through a nearly forty year period of Japanese colonization of Korea, ending only in 1945, during which time the Japanese required Koreans to learn the Japanese language and to worship at Shinto shrines.[34] When, beginning in the early 1970's, Rev. Moon pursued his ministry in the United States, he likewise encouraged Unification members in the West to marry across racial boundaries. As a result, the majority of marriages since 1975 have been interracial and/or international.[35] Rev. Moon believes that the historical resentment between races and nations will not simply vanish, but must be reversed by a representative number of women and men taking up the historical challenge to reverse the tradition of hatred between races and nations. Thus, a central part of Rev. Moon's mission has been to encourage people to create a tradition of inter-racial and international couples who love each other more intensely than their ancestors hated each other. In a not rare poetic moment, Rev. Moon expressed the thought that when a

white woman holds her black baby in her arms, a baby born of the love between members of the two races, the tears of resentment arising out of racial oppression will be wiped away. Unificationists hold that there will be no magical, instantaneous resolutions of deep seated human problems, but that there can be a slow, steady historical process of righting wrong relationships. From the Unification perspective, these marriages signify the beginning of an era of love between races and nations and are necessary for the internal renewal of humanity.

From the start, then, the Unification couple expresses concerns which reach beyond the family level. A large number of those married in the 1800 couple blessing (1975) were sent as missionaries to over 120 countries.[36] As an expression of the international harmony which is to be achieved through the blessing, missionary teams were composed primarily of a Japanese, European and American member, who were to overcome barriers of language and culture among themselves and then, together, work to establish unity with the country to which they were sent. A further example of the same type of thinking can be found in the International One World Crusade (IOWC).[37] The international composition of each of these teams has been insisted upon by Rev. Moon even in face of arguments put forth by Unification leaders in the 1978 IOWC campaign in England and in some American campaigns that evangelism would be more successful were this practice abandoned. Rev. Moon's priority of fostering international and interracial cooperation within Unificationism, however, is definitely not reversible for pragmatic arguments. In the short term, the arguments are probably correct, but as the long term goal of the movement is to create a world consciousness in Unification members, Rev. Moon has not succumbed to this reasoning.

The Unification ideal of the family, then, should not be understood to mean simply the traditional nuclear family. Such a family, however strong religiously, may of itself contradict the will of God for a global family by asserting its will over against the wider society. The love of God cannot be expressed by a family which simply claims itself pious or by sacramental guarantees, however traditionally sanctioned or innovatively created. God's love is expressed by travelling the path of sacrificially loving; by opening the self up to the family, the family to the society, the society to the nation, and finally, by willingness to go beyond the nation and embrace the world. For the Unificationist who undertakes this training course of love, this formula, which could be an easy platitude, translates

into voluntary periods of separation from spouse and children to work for movement goals, into a church policy which allocates an overwhelming percentage of its hard earned resources to national and ecumenical projects rather than its own maintenance, and into the pattern of leaders of national Unification projects spending several years working in foreign lands (usually seven or more years.)

In the final analysis, I believe that there is nothing cheaply sentimental about the love of God espoused by Unificationism. Indeed, I suspect the reader is cringing over the conjured image of a church militant which marches relentlessly to its goal, but I prefer you to cringe over the reality of Unification life and not the fabrications of the media. Unificationists voluntarily practice a rigorous disciplining of the heart and, in Unificationism's understanding, the goal of this praxis is to mirror (incarnate) God's own inclusive love for humanity. This is no sentimental universalism wherein loving all humanity may mean to love no one in particular. I choose to use the word "sacrifice" in spite of some problems of connnotation because it best expresses the situation of the Unificationist who chooses to care for the other rather than the one which she/he may feel more naturally inclined to love, i.e. the neighbor before the family or the foreigner before the compatriot. In order to reverse the historical pattern of the "inbreeding" of love, a painful volitional loving of the other, which one might be prone to ignore or even hate, is demanded.

FOOTNOTES

1. The term used in the Unification Church is "blessed marriage", or "the Blessing", which denotes the theocentric understanding of the married state as a way of realising the God-given human potential for experiencing love.

2. Frederick Sontag points out similarities and contrasts between the Marxist and Unificationist understanding of the family as a vehicle for social change in "Marriage and the Family in the Unification Church", *The Family and the Unification Church*, ed. Gene G. James, Conference Series No. 15, (Unification Theological Seminary, 1983) pp. 217-234.

3. An example of this despairing attitude toward the possessor of wealth can be found in Enrique Dussel's *Ethics and the Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1978), pp. 36-37:"Historically, to pass from one order to another, it has been necessary for the subjugators to cease subjugating; without their wealth, they could even stop sinning. But before being dispossessed the subjugators would rather give up their lives, so identified are they with the devil."

4. Notes taken from an unpublished speech given by Reverend Moon to church members at his home, April 27, 1980.

5. *Divine Principle*, 5th ed. (N.Y.: HSA-UWC, 1977), pp. 6-7.

6. The centrality of eschatology in the teaching of Jesus was noted by Johannes Weiss in *Die Predigt Vom Reiche Gottes*, tr. R.H. Hiers and D.L. Hollard (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971). Several decades later both liberation theologians and theologians of hope are among the first to confront head on the implications of this discovery of N.T. scholarship for systematic theology. So see, e.g. Jon Sobrino, *Christology at the Crossroads*, trans. John Drury (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1978), and Jurgen Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, trans. James Leitch (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1967.)

7. The interrelation of the suffering and liberation of God and humanity has its ontological foundation in the four position foundation of Unification Theology. See *Divine Principle*, 31ff.

8. See e.g. Joachim Jeremias, *The Central Message of the New Testament* (N.Y.: Scribner's Sons, 1965), pp. 9-30.

9. Note that Unificationism allows equal force to the metaphor of Mother as well as Father for God. See Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (N.Y.: HSA-UWC, 1980), pp. 53-54. I favor the inclusive term Parent.

10. The concern expressed by some theologians that a suffering God cannot be efficacious enough to provide hope for the transformation of the world can be met with the realization that tears of compassion are more likely to bring results than are violence and threats of eternal damnation.

11. See S.H. Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought* (N.Y.:Unification Thought Institute, 1981), pp. 222-223. Lee speaks of three "moments" of the Heart of God: 1) "the Heart of joy and expectation" as the Creator; 2) "the Heart of grief and sorrow" at the sight of fallen humanity; and 3) "the Heart of pain and suffering" during the providence of restoration. In this paper, I refer primarily to the third moment of the Heart of God, although it should be obvious that these are distinguishable but not separable moments of God in relation to the creation and human history.

12. Social dualism is particularly destructive in the hands of ideologues, be they religious fundamentalists, Nazis, or Marxists. The concept of God as parent leads to theological and practical universalism. See below in text.

13. See Herbert Richardson's insightful exposition of the four position foundation as the ontological grounding of the double love commandment in the *New Era Newletter,* Vol. III, No. 2, 1983.

14. *Official Biography of Sun Myung Moon* (N.Y.: HSA-UWC). Reports from inmates concerning his behavior in this barbaric prison include Rev. Moon's sharing of his limited food with other prisoners—all of whom were kept on starvation diets. Similar reports of his concern for others are provided by inmates of Rev. Moon during his present incarceration in Danbury, Connecticut. See Ed Farmer, "Rev. Moon was One of Us", *Unification News,* Vol. 4, No. 3, March, 1985, p. 5-6.

15. On the other hand, the authentic religious encounter with the suffering God should not be reduced to social activism. In Unificationism, there is seen to be a necessary interrelation between spiritual praxis and social activism.

16. My use of the term "the demonic" is close to Jewish and early Christian apocalypticism and indicates an extra-human power which impacts the historical realm such that human responsibility is fully affirmed but nevertheless the historical effects may exceed the intentionality and power of human agency.

17. Strictly speaking, from the point of view of members of the Unification movement, the eschatological event which completes the work of Jesus is the marriage between this individual fulfilling the role of "returning Christ" at the parousia, and a woman who fulfills the role of God's true daughter. Together they create the "true family". This true family makes possible the reconciliation of families, and stage by stage all levels of human societies including national and global communities. In Unification theology, Jesus Christ reconciles all individuals qua individuals to God, and this work does not need to be repeated. It is the reconciliation of the family qua family to God which is the eschatological event which makes possible the realisation of the Kingdom of God. This theological understanding should be kept in mind by the reader, especially in light of section III of this article. (Cf. my comments on justification and sanctification in Unification understanding in *Evangelical-Unification Dialogue,* eds. Richard Quebedeaux and Rodney Sawatsky (N.Y.: Rose of Sharon, 1979), 301.

18. Ideology is the rational expression of the fundamental life-values and concerns of the human person/community. At times in this paper, however, it will be obvious that I have used the adjective "ideological" to refer to a rationalistic justification of self-interest. Nevertheless, my fundamental view is that the religious, humanitarian, and ideological aspects are interdependent and ultimately grounded in human nature.

19. I invited one of these gentleman who, as a result of prison torture, walks about with the aid of crutches, to speak at Harvard in April, 1981.

20. The World Council of Churches has followed this lead resulting in an almost solid liberal Protestant aversion to anti-communism—an aversion further enhanced in the U.S. by the paranoid investigations of McCarthy et. al. For Barth's discussion, see Eberhard Busch, *Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts,* trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia:Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 355-57.

21. See Susan Sontag, "Communism and the Left" (address, Feb. 6, 1982), *Nation* 234:

229-32, Feb. 27, 1982.

22. See Lorrin Philipson and Rafael Llerena, *Freedom Flights* (N.Y.: Random House, 1980), wherein reports of interviews from the various phases of Cuban refugee exodus since 1961 are provided.

23. Cyril E. Black in *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers,* ed. Thomas T. Hammond (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975) xiv states: "It is significant that, of the 90-100 countries that have undergone revolutionary transformation since 1917—some 10 in Europe, 8 or 10 in Latin America, 25-30 in Asia, and as many as 45 in Africa—no more than 7 have been successful spontaneous Communist revolutions. The imposed Communist governments were successful as takeovers and had revolutionary consequences, but they belong in the category of power politics or imperialism rather than of domestic revolutions."

24. See Anthony Lewis' article which quotes a Red Cross official's estimate that up to 70% of the boat people have died at sea. The Vietnamese Government forced out of the country people of Chinese extraction. *New York Times,* June 14, 1979, 29:1.

25. See *New York Times,* Nov. 4, 15 and Dec. 12 and 13, 1979.

26. See *New York Times,* Dec. 31, 1979, 5:2.

27. See Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary,* (Cambridge:Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 265-79.

28. It should be mentioned that to the extent that communist states allow freedom of religion, religion is defined as a privatistic phenomenon and the legitimacy of religion's prophetic or social conscience role is denied.

29. The advocacy of unilateral nuclear disarmament is highly irresponsible, for this position contradicts one lesson of history on the matter, which is that the U.S. employed these weapons when it was their sole possessor. The unilateral possessor can employ the weapon in moderate measure to attain political, economic, and territorial objectives without the enormous risk of self-destruction which the present situation entails. Mutual total disarmament, which is the only rational solution, still cannot prevent retrogression, which is a constant option now that the secret of the atom has been unlocked. In the end, there are no failsafe technical resolutions, but only a spiritual, i.e. a truly human resolution of this man-made problem.

30. It is significant that the laws devised for the treatment of slaves brought to America during the 17th century were patterned on the laws which pertained to women and children. See Mary Ryan, *Womanhood in America* (New York: Watts, 1975), pp. 4-25.

31. See Patricia Gleason, "Die Miterlösenschaft der Frau im Heilsverständnis der Vereinigungskirche", paper delivered at the 1982 Herbstkonferenz; "Schaffen neue Religionen eine neue Welt?", Marburg, West Germany; also, Sarah E. Petersen, "Feminist Speculation on Unification Theology", paper delivered at conference on "Feminist Perspectives in Theology and Philosophy", Nassau, the Bahamas, March 15-18, 1984.

32. Cf. Joseph H. Fichter, "Home Church: Alternative Parish", in *Alternatives to American Mainline Churches,* ed. Joseph H. Fichter (N.Y.: Rose of Sharon, 1983), pp. 179-199.

33. Gordon Melton's article, "What's Behind the Moonie Mass Marriages?", *Christianity Today,* Dec. 16, vol. 27, no. 19, pp. 28-31, is a good example of how misleading "objective scholarship" can be, for in failing to represent the Unificationist's self-

understanding regarding the Blessing, it conveys a false image.

34. As a result, some of the most hostile opponents of the Unification Church in Asia were the embittered parents of members married across Japanese and Korean lines, as well as critics sympathetic to the parents' view.

35. Openness to interracial and international marriage is generally assumed for all Unificationists, even for those for whom spouses of the same nationality were suggested.

36. In 1975, Unificationism expanded from a primarily Far East Asian, North American, and Western European movement to a truly global movement.

37. The International One World Crusade (IOWC) was initiated in the USA by Rev. Moon in 1972. These first international teams were comprised of Europeans and North Americans. By 1973, Japanese Unification members arrived in the USA to join teams. In 1974, members from the several international teams in the States were selected to travel in Japan and Korea where they were joined by members from the national movements.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY IN THE AFTERMATH OF MARXISM: UNIFICATIONISM'S "THREE BLESSINGS" THEOLOGY

by Thomas Walsh

Among contemporary theologians, consideration of the relationship between theory and practice has caused a shift in theological attention, a shift away from preoccupations with either hermeneutics, on the one hand, which seeks to bridge the historical distance between the truth of ancient texts and contemporary settings, or, on the other hand, transcendental-epistemological foundations for theological affirmations. While not effecting a total eclipse, there is little question but that the questions of praxis have taken the high ground in relation to the traditional concerns of both dogmatic and foundational theologians. In many respects this shift has been precipitated by the force of Marxism, as exemplified in the "Theses on Feuerbach," wherein Marx charges that not only is it more important to change the world than it is to interpret—the task of hermeneutics—the world, but also that the question of truth is essentially a pratical question, and, furthermore, practical questions are essentially social questions.[1] In keeping with this shift, the issue of "right action" comes to be understood not merely as an outcome of correct theology, i.e., as a function of hermeneutics or dogmatics. Rather "right action," it may be said, functions as a kind of foundation or even criterion for correct theology. Or, as Gustavo Gutierrez would tell us, the time has come for theology as *wisdom* and theology as *rational knowledge* to give way to theology as *critical reflection on praxis.*[2] And in the words of David Tracy, practical theology has the task of "articulating praxis criteria of human transformation."[3]

Of course the move from hermeneutics or philosophical theology to practical theology is itself fraught with peril. Not only does one not easily escape the hermeneutical circle, but one also finds that, even having made the move from traditional theology to ethics and social analysis, fundamental questions still remain. Even though it may be granted that all thought has a ground in practical action in the world, one still has the problem of judging those practices most adequate and most conducive to the creation of a true consciousness or even a good and just society. Any theory of practice, be it political, economic, or theological, must have some criteria in terms of which to assess the adequacy or promise of practice. If this is true, then it would seem that ethical reflection on the adequacy of practice becomes the criterion for theology. However, unless there is some reason to believe that ethics is something about which we all agree, or, more importantly, about which we can achieve some greater certainty, there is really little hope that the move from theological reflection to ethical reflection will necessarily advance the discourse in any significant way. In effect, taking on the task of being "critical" of practices may be less promising a project than appears at first glance, for about practices we can be no more sure than about theologies. In sum, just as all theory may be laden with practical—e.g., biological or economic or political—interests so too are practices laden with theories and beliefs.

Ultimately, then, one must face up to the hermeneutical issues insofar as there exists no theory-independent way in which to interpret the value of any particular set of practices. In other words, even if we move from the level of theological theory to the consideration of practices, we are still confronted with the problem of securing a foundation for "critical reflection," if we are to avoid the danger of arbitrariness being masked by an idiom of critical protest and righteous indignation. If there is anything that the contemporary discussions in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences has taught us, it would seem to be that social analysis—and not only Parsonian social analysis, but Marxist and neomarxist as well—has no more an epistemologically privileged standpoint than has theology.[4]

Practical theologians seek to accomplish their task by appeal to one or another of the classic frameworks for the analysis of society and moral decision-making. Marxism, for many, holds promise as a sociological framework for the assessment of concrete social practice, just as Kantianism, among many liberal theologians, held promise as a philosophical framework for moral deliberation which could proceed without the heterono-

mous constraints of dogmatic theologies. As philosophy has traditionally provided resources for the formulation of both fundamental and systematic theologies, philosophical ethics and sociology have served the task of formulating a practical theology. For example, theology has never been the same since Marx, particularly insofar as the "class struggle" image has become central to the whole notion of being critical and being political. Both liberation theologians and political theologians employ revised Marxian, i.e., neomarxian, perspectives in their attempt to develop theologies which are practical in attending to the conditions of concrete social existence. As Thomas has deferred to "the Philosopher," contemporary political theologians defer to neomarxists such as Ernst Bloch, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas. To quote Alfredo Fierro, "Political theology is a theology operating under the sign of Marx, just as scholasticism was a theology operating under the sign of Aristotle and liberal Protestant theology was one operating under the sign of Kant."[5]

In this essay I will examine Unification theology insofar as it may be understood as a practical theology, i.e., in the sense that theological reflection is integrally related to practices. However, Unificationism departs from the idiom of practical theology as articulated by, say, Gutierrez or Moltmann, in that it lacks a neomarxist sociological imagination. Therefore, if one is required to be sociologically or politically neomarxist in order to speak meaningfully of practical theology, Unificationism would seem to fail as a candidate. On the other hand, if, as Unificationists hold, the Marxian legacy is not only politically and theologically problematic but sociologically unpromising, then there may be room to suggest that Unificationism may be understood in the mode of a practical theology.

The practical and indeed political character of Unification theology implies a form of social organization governed by a vision of family. Such a vision is neither individualistic nor abstractly collectivist. I argue that Unification theology is practical in its stress on a doctrine of sanctification, its theology of the family, and its communitarian social vision. As will be demonstrated below, such characteristics derive from Unificationism's three blessings theology. For many this communitarian, if not utopian social vision represents little more than a blueprint for a community set apart from the world, i.e., the sect. I hold, however, that the Unification perspective offers promising resources and principles of organization not only for the sectarian community, i.e. *Gemeinschaft*, but for complex modern societies as well, i.e., *Gesellschaft*. That is, grounded in a "three

blessings theology," Unification ethics has a trinitarian structure which integrates an ethics of agency and action with an ethics of community and an ethics of society or social system. In this way Unification practices are related to the individual, the life-world, and society.

Of course, inasmuch as Unification theology is understood essentially as a "confessional" theology—one which grounds itself in a claim to special revelation—it would seem to commend a "teleological suspension of the ethical."[6] Insofar as its morality is governed by its theological vision, Unification ethics must be understood as holding to either a heteronomous or perhaps theonomous morality, but not an autonomous ethics. Ethics remains largely under the "tutelage" of theology. At the same time Unificationism is illustrative of the same ambiguity regarding specific social and political practices that has characterized Christian social ethics traditionally. One can be reminded of Ernst Troeltsch's description of the early Christian community: "It is clear therefore that the message of Jesus is not a programme of social reform." Rather, according to Troeltsch, the social form which the Christian community was instrumental in shaping was more a "by-product," for "the fundamental idea was solely that of the salvation of souls."[7]

That is, theological ethics, while not being *primarily* ethical, is essentially practical. Max Weber, too, Troeltsch's mentor and friend, argued that the tremendous social impact of Calvinism was not so much a result of its explicit theory of social practice, than it was a product of character formation governed largely by the first order concern with salvation. In the case of Puritanism, according to Weber, its socially revelant *Wirtschaftethik* was an outgrowth of a particular conceptualization of God's nature and relationship to history. In effect, the Weber-thesis attempts to stand Marxism on its head by pointing to both the autonomy and practical relevance of ideas, in this case theology or theodicy.[8]

In considering Unification theology as a practical theology, it must be admitted that ethics is understood as operating under the sign of the Reverend Moon's Asian-Christian theology, hence, theological ethics. Of course, one may argue that the theology is sociologically conditioned, particularly by Korean-Confucian culture, and therefore Unification theology is little more than the sacralization of a particular cultural way of life, i.e., the theology of the family is nothing more than the exaltation of Confucian family ethics to the status of an "order of creation." Some might also suggest that Unificationism's insistence on a post-marxist future is

merely representative of the Reverend Moon's disaffection with the communists following a series of brutal beatings and a nearly three year imprisonment-cum-re-education experience in the Hung Nam work-camp just prior to the Korean War. And certainly the historicity and contextual character of knowledge must be taken into account in the consideration of any text or community. At the same time, reductionism must be avoided. However, a defense of Unificationism in the face of a "sociology of knowledge" theory of theology is not my present task. Rather, I will attempt to offer an exposition of Unification theology which accents its practical dimension not as a retreat from the idiom of neomarxism, but as a position wrought not only in the crucible of a "divided nation," but one wrought in the "aftermath of Marxism."[9]

According to David Tracy's understanding of the task of a publicly relevant practical theology as one of "articulating praxis criteria of human transformation," such a theology is, by this definition, to be concerned with the historical and practical conditions of and for redemption. Whereas traditionally such an understanding may have, as Troeltsch points out, been concerned exclusively with the cure of souls, post-Enlightenment understandings, evidenced initially in the emergence, during the industrial revolution, of a sociologically-conscious Christianity—the Social Gospel, British Christian Socialism, the Catholic Social Encyclicals—payed serious attention to the empirical conditions of social existence. Stated in another way, practical theology witnessed a shift from the concern with an other-worldly redemption, i.e., the cure and salvation of souls, to a concern with this-worldly emancipation, i.e., the achievement of *Mundigkeit* as understood by Kant, or the achievement of non-alienated labor as understood by Marx. These Kantian and Marxian notions of emancipation, and their respective "praxis criteria of human transformation" are treated with great respect by a number of Protestant and Catholic theologians.

Kantian presuppositions are evidenced whenever the ethical serves as a foundation or criterion for the theological, as was the case among liberal Protestants such as Albrecht Ritschl and Adolf von Harnack. In effect, the generalization of moral maxims, derived by impartial and autonomous reason, becomes the rational criteria in terms of which theological utterances are to be evaluated. Under the conditions for practical theology established by Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason,* reason unsullied by tradition and formation, assesses the adequacy of theology. For Kant, "absolutely no [moral] incentives can be

attributed to the divine will."[10] In effect, theology must be measured against the categorical imperative. Furthermore, only such theology which meets these standards, i.e., which shows itself to be in compliance with Kantian deontology, may be judged as rational and moral.

Unlike the Kantian reliance on autonomous rationality, the Marxian theory of practice stresses the impossibility of actual autonomy insofar as the social conditions on inequality persist. The adequacy of Kantian morality is viewed as possible only under particular historical and social conditions, and as long as these social conditions do not obtain, morality is merely a mask for power, as Nietzsche has told us. Those "praxis criteria for human transformation" which Marxists accent are those of the social, and particularly the economic conditions of a given society. Insofar as any theory is praxis-conditioned, and insofar as society is characterized by systematic oppression and inequality, no theory is to be trusted which does not have as its *first* priority the elimination of alienating social conditions.

I have stated that the central difficulty one faces in presenting Unification theology as a practical theology derives from the fact that it departs in large part from these conventional frameworks—the Kantian and neomarxian—for presenting a practical theology. In other words, if the Kantian and the Marxian positions are the only adequate perspectives available, and if I wish to argue that Unificationism is a practical theology, then I am required either to demonstrate that indeed it subscribes to either one or both of these orientations, or it must be demonstrated that these two options do not exhaust the possibilities for practice. In sum I will attempt to follow this latter tack, arguing as well that something approaching a *theistic-Aristotelian cum Confucian-family-ethics* framework most adequately serves Unificationism, and, furthermore, is more adequately suited to the integrity of a *theological* ethics than are the Kantian and Marxian perspectives. In fact, I would contend that a subscription to either the Marxian or Kantian frameworks will only predicate the theological impoverishment of the understanding of practice.

A THEISTIC-ARISTOTELIAN OPTION

In his essay, "Theologies of Praxis," David Tracy distinguishes between, on the one hand, the classical, Aristotelian formulation of praxis that characterizes the work of thinkers such as Bernard Lonergan and Eric Voegelin, and, on the other hand, Hegelian-Marxist formulations which inform the positions of both "political" and "liberation" theologians. The

former, according to Tracy, stresses the primacy of "radical and enduring personal transformation,"[11] while the latter underscores the need for "ideology-critique."[12] Tracy says that whereas in both Aristotelian and neomarxist positions "personal transformation" is primary, there are nevertheless differences:

> Far more than alternative Aristotelian formulations of the same basic position, the liberation and political theologians will, of course, ordinarily demand explicit analysis of the infrastructural and suprastructural realities affecting any possibility of personal authenticity.[13]

Although Tracy neither spells out what he means by "infrastructural and suprastructural" nor suggests which "realities" might be considered primary, he argues that "all theologies of praxis will ordinarily be concerned with society as their primary referent group."[14]

Speaking of Bernard Lonergan as representing an Aristotelian approach to practice, Tracy says, that, "he joins the Aristotle of the *Ethics* and the *Politics* to insist upon a transformative ethic of agency, character, and *phronesis* and joins the mainline Christian tradition in understanding the transformative reality of faith as first a matter of orientation, trust, and loyalty *(fides qua)* that grounds all right beliefs *(fides quae)*."[15] What Tracy's distinction seems to suggest is that the Aristotelian position, on the one hand, stresses the praxis of the subject, while the neomarxian position, on the other hand, stresses the systematic conditions of the social environment. Tracy, in effect, seems to suggest that the Aristotelian and neomarxian perspectives may be joined together in developing an adequate theology of praxis. In fact, Tracy has argued that a classical position is "not retrievable save through the kind of historical and social-scientific mediations effected by the Hegelian and Marxist traditions in Europe or the Peirce-Dewey tradition in North America."[16]

Tracy's position, which calls for either a neomarxian or liberal-democratic mediation of Aristotelianism, amounts to a kind of both/and position which tends to distort the integrity of both positions involved in the synthesis. That is, I would argue that an Aristotelian or communitarian understanding of character formation and politics cannot be so easily mediated through a neomarxian or pragmatic-democratic theory of society. If, for example, one appeals to a pragmatic-democratic theory—essentially

an appeal to the presuppositions of liberalism—one seeks to transcend particular theological perspectives in the hope of achieving trans-theological, moral consensus. While theologies divide, one argues, pragmatism unites. As a result theology is marginalized, except insofar as theological positions reinforce positions derived without theological assistance.

Marxism, on the other hand, may be understood essentially as a form of anti-liberalism, and particularly anti-capitalism, i.e., as an effort to correct the errors and unmask the alienating structures believed to be constitutive of liberalism. In its promise to correct the weaknesses of liberal societies, Marxism has been a beacon of hope to those disaffected with liberalism. Marxism, however, in order to implement and enforce its ideal of a post-liberal just society, has resorted to unparalleled measures of domination and control. In fact, Marxism's insistence on the decisiveness of the material conditions of existence, particularly labor, has resulted in a profound distrust of theology and religious community. Marxism's anti-theological stance, indeed, may be understood as a largely ethical and practical stance, i.e., ethics and compassion require the colonization of religious communities.

While liberalism presents itself as neutral in regard to religion, the conditions of public discourse in liberal societies generally require the marginalization or secularization of religious language and practice. Marxism, on the other hand, openly penalizes religious practice (except, as is the case with the U.S.S.R.'s Muslim population, when the threat of rebellion calls for caution). I contend that a religious community which seeks to mediate itself publicly through a neomarxian or pragmatic-democratic framework will only impoverish itself of the resources for transforming the human condition. That is, the medium employed for the creation of the conditions of relevance only serves to effect the attenuation and erosion of those not easily renewable resources, such as church and family and community, without which life—be it Marxist or liberal-democratic—may not be worth living.

Unificationism, with its emphasis on the development of character, standards of excellence, and practical wisdom *(phronesis)*, stands more closely allied with neo-Aristotelian theories of practice. Furthermore, Unificationism, like Aristotelianism or Thomism, is not merely a theory of the moral agent and those virtues constitutive of true agency, but is also a social philosophy, which, in the case of Unificationism, underscores the primacy of the family, not as a "haven in a heartless world," but rather as

that primordial and specific mode of practice which is believed to be basic to the well-being of society. In this sense the family is a mode of practice more basic than labor, understood in the Marxian sense, and more basic than linguistic sign-interpretation in the Peircean, liberal-democratic sense.

The Trinitarian Structure of Unification Ethics

The doctrine of creation forms the theological foundation for Unification ethics, though this is not to suggest that Christology is unimportant. Unificationists, however, would argue that Christology becomes intelligible only in light of a doctrine of creation, i.e., a doctrine of God and a doctrine of the purpose of creation. In this way, however Christocentric Unification ethics may be—that is, however much Unification practice may involve an "imitation of Christ"—Christ is understood according to a particular theologic. As described in the *Divine Principle,* the "three blessings" form the framework in light of which Unificationism develops both its Christology and its theology of practice. As these blessings are thematized, they form the basis for understanding the trinitarian structure of Unification ethics, i.e., the integration of self, community, and society.

Within the first chapter of the *Divine Principle,* the "Principle of Creation," there is a third section entitled, "The Purpose of Creation." In this section is explicated, based on the passage in Genesis 1:28, the "three great blessings."[17] On the face of it the blessings, "to be fruitful, to multiply and fill the earth, and to subdue it and have dominion," lack substance. Fleshed out, however, in accord with a Doctrine of Creation, this simple passage serves as the governing image in terms of which theological ethics, within the Unification tradition, may be understood. Furthermore, this "three blessings" framework gives a three-tiered structure to Unification ethics, a perspective which, as mentioned above, integrates individual, family, and social ethics, i.e., a micro-ethics, a meso-ethics, and a macro-ethics.[18] To quote Unification theologian, Young Oon Kim,

> Unification theology claims that God created Adam and Eve. He gave them three blessings: 1) to be fruitful, 2) to multiply, and fill the earth, 3) to subdue the earth and have dominion over the entire creation. This threefold blessing signifies God's original and continuing purpose for mankind.

However, such an interpretation of man's role seems to be a distinctive teaching of *Divine Principle*. No other modern theology, Jewish or Christian, has so clearly focused upon this particular passage of scripture in working out a doctrine of man.[19]

The meaning of a "blessing" in Unification theology, while entailing the notion of God's grace, is understood as inclusive of human responsibility. That is, a blessing, or promise, is only fulfilled relationally, and is thus not to be understood as capable of being fulfilled by heavenly fiat. Grace is resistable, hence the Fall. The fulfillment of the three blessings is historically contingent, and in fact, due to the Fall, there has been no fulfillment. As a result, the way in which eschatology is understood within Unification theology is directly related to the potential for the historical fulfillment of the three great blessings. Given that the three blessings concept is essentially ethical, it follows that Unification theology is both thoroughly ethical/practical and thoroughly teleological, with its telos being the restoration of the Fall. In considering the "three blessings" I will attempt to bring into relief the underlying practices which are embedded within the Unification theological framework. I will demonstrate the way in which these practices differ from contemporary Hegelian-Marxist or neomarxist understandings of practice so popular among political and liberation theologians.

First Blessing Ethics: Theological Virtue

On a certain level it appears that Unificationism has no ethics, only a religion. That is, there is no differentiated morality which operates with autonomy, e.g., in Kantian fashion. Rather more in keeping with Karl Barth's prohibition of an ethics outside the sphere of dogmatics, Unification ethics is wholly theological. Theology thus provides the foundation for practice. While it may be argued that Unificationism begs questions of social justice by reducing ethics to personal spirituality, Unificationism views such a mode of practice as fundamentally publicly relevant and socially effective. This publicity and social relevance, however, are consequences external to the internal pursuit of certain "foundations of faith."[20] The spiritual entails the social. Stated in another way, the social, absent the grace of God paves an unpromising path to emancipation.

In other words, as I would interpret the Unification position, theologi-

cal practice entails a sociology, but not such that theology must be understood merely as "functioning" within a particular social system, e.g., as performing what Niklaus Luhmann would refer to as a "complexity-reducing function." That is, theological practice only maintains its integrity insofar as such action is not understood primarily as performing a social function, but as being faithful to God's will, i.e., not as "seeking to save one's life" but as "seeking to lose one's life." The ministry of Jesus is therefore viewed not as primarily political or social, but as primarily faithful. Faith, however, is socially relevant. To quote H. Richard Niebuhr, faith might be understood as "trust or distrust in being itself." Furthermore, "Faith as trust or distrust accompanies all our encounters with others and qualifies all our responses."[21]

Apart from the theological virtue of faith, Unificationism accents the virtue of heart, a theological virtue of the affections. As Augustine has said, "We must seek after God with supreme affection." He states that, "I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect love of God." And of the moral virtues, Augustine suggests that temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence are "four forms of love,"[22] each of which has a direct bearing on the perception of truth. Stated in another way, the first blessing has to do with the doctrine of sanctification, i.e., the formation of character in response to a relationship with God. As Young Oon Kim has stated it,

> According to *Divine Principle,* a perfected individual feels as God does, as if God's feelings were his own. He has fully united with God's heart. In unrestricted give and take, he loves God with all his heart, soul, mind and strength.[23]

This position is certainly not without precedent among Protestants such as John Calvin, Jonathan Edwards, and John Wesley. Stanley Hauerwas has said, in reference to Calvin, Wesley and Edwards, "the most striking idea is that sanctification involves the determination of a man's 'person,' his most basic thing. It is not a shallow or surface change of a man's way of life, but rather it affects a man at the very heart of his existence."[24] That is, the capacity for agency and even the capacity for responsibility are powers which must be cultivated and formed in relation to God. Autonomy is not that which is given with existence, but that which is both given—justification— and achieved—sanctification—as a kind of theonomy. This is not to say that Unification is Pelagian, having no

doctrine of grace or justification, but only that within the context of grace and God's action there is a realm of autonomy which may give way to either heteronomy or theonomy.

The "first blessing" dimension of Unification ethics may be understood in terms of both conversion and discipleship. Insofar as Unificationism stresses conversion, there is required a fundamental grounding in faith, akin to what Jonathan Edwards understood as *"true virtue."*

> True virtue most essentially consists in *benevolence to being in general.* Or perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is the consent, propensity and union of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will.[25]

Edwards was exceedingly sceptical of any promise for social transformation that was not grounded in regeneration through conversion. In his essay, "Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England," Edwards says:

> The work of God in the conversion of one soul, considered together with the source, foundation, and purchase of it, and also the benefit and eternal issue of it, is a more glorious work of God than the creation of the whole material universe.... More happiness and a greater benefit to man, is the fruit of each single drop of such a shower, than all the temporal good of the most happy revolution in a land or nation amounts to, or all that a people could gain by the conquest of the world.[26]

Edwards speaks of the disposition of love. Calvin spoke of a "turning of life to God,"[27] i.e., repentance. For Unificationism the first blessing signifies the development of the self as "the image and likeness of God," with the primary trait being that of love or heart. This requires grace, nature *and* responsibility. While conversion is not an acquisition, so much as it involves the infusion of God's grace, the agent nevertheless takes responsibility in certain respects for the creation of the conditions which would make such an infusion intelligible for what it is. With Thomas, Unification holds that theological virtues are infused virtues, i.e., not habits acquired merely by one's own power. At the same time, Unificationism understands the theological virtues relationally, and in this

sense human agency is involved in the generation and maintenance of theological virtues, as indicated by the notion of a "foundation of faith."

A second dimension to Unificationism's first blessing ethics—one closer perhaps to the ethics of monasticism—involves the notion of discipleship and a following of a way of life, guided by elders, including, in the case of Unificationism, not only the Reverend Moon, but predecessor saints who have sought to imitate the way of Jesus Christ. This would include elder church members who have demonstrated both their loyalty to that way of life, and who have come to exemplify, to some degree, Unification virtues of heart, loyalty, and filial piety.

The problem which an ethics of virtue presents to the post-Kantian moral theologian lies in the dependency on a notion of the good way of life, in terms of which the virtues are intelligible. As such, *the right* is dependent upon a vision of *the good,* and moral obligation is understood within a teleological framework. Virtues are integrally related to particular practices and disciplines which require the appropriation of particular traditions, be they archery, stonemasonry, or spirituality. The capacity for critical reflection upon such practices is only realizable upon the foundation of one's having mastered a particular tradition. In this sense, viewed from a Kantian perspective and its interests in absolute autonomy, Unificationism may be understood with suspicion as a heteronomous practice. Indeed, a number of members of the mental health establishment, not to mention members of the legal profession, have concluded that Unificationist practices are not only heteronomous, they are forms of "brainwashing." Such diagnoses may speak less of Unificationism than of the poverty of various "expert cultures" in their attempt to explain the persistence of religion in the face of all "reason."[28]

The neomarxian discomfort with virtue ethics derives from the apparent privatization, and thus its begging the question of social injustice. It is worth mentioning also that the neomarxists have the same problem with the individualism of Kantian ethics. What Marxists and neomarxists alike have failed to appreciate, except in the form of lip-service, is the social relevance of micro-ethics, particularly virtue ethics, and theological virtues. I would concur with Charles Davis who, in his consideration of political theology, charges that, "Clearly, in one sense, that mystical element is apolitical. As transcendent, it is not enclosed within the political order. But I suggest that it is eminently political in as much as it is the deepest source and ground of politics. In releasing human persons into

individual freedom as subjects, it makes possible the process of communi-
cation among free and equal participants, which is the essence of emanci-
pated politics."[29]

Neomarxists, in their attempt to get *behind* society by uncovering
conditions of labor, have neglected the role which individual characters
play in the determination of society. Furthermore, there has been a failure
to fully appreciate the power of theological virtue as a socially relevant and
transforming force. There has also been a failure to recognize that an ethics
of virtue is far removed from individualistic ethics. Virtue ethics only has
intelligibility when understood within the context of a particular *polis,
oikos, republic,* community or practice. That is, virtues are intelligible in
the context of a shared vision of the good life which practitioners seek to
achieve, maintain, and transmit over time. As understood within the
Unification context this shared vision of the good life has to do with the
family, the school of virtue.

The Second Blessing: The Family as Mediator of Micro- and Macro-Ethics

In Unificationism, to some extent, ecclesial existence is eclipsed by
an emphasis on familial existence. Regarding the second blessing the
Divine Principle states the following:

> In order for man to realize God's second blessing, originally,
> Adam and Eve, the divided substantial objects of God, after
> having perfected their respective individualities and thus
> fully reflecting God's dual essentialities, should have be-
> come husband and wife, forming one unity.[30]

Within Unificationism the family is the central category for ethical
reflection, even more so than the individual. For the family is the location
where abstract and universal love may be most concretely focused: achieved,
maintained, and transmitted. In effect, within Unificationism the notion
of grace is directly related to God's willingness to bless historical, human
families. Young Oon Kim says that, "For *Divine Principle* the God-centered
family represents the best example of how God works in history," wherein
is synthesized the fundamental patterns of "human relatedness and
responsibility."[31] While appreciative of human sociality, Unificationism
avoids the abstraction of considering the human being as such, condi-
tioned by the abstract society or system. Instead, Unificationism under-

scores the theological and social relevance of the familial matrix or life-world. Kim argues that, "Only if . . . kinship relationships are positive and creative is it possible to manifest the full give and take of love with God and our fellowmen."[32]

The emphasis on the family is unmistakably Confucian in character and represents perhaps Unificationism's most significant contribution to contemporary practical theology. Kim suggests that due to Reverend Moon's cultural heritage he "was able to recognize an aspect of the Biblical heritage often overlooked in the Christian West, because of the predominantly individualistic nature of Protestantism and the church-centeredness of Catholicism."[33] Central to the Confucian understanding of ethics is the accent placed upon the relationship between family ethics and social ethics. The virtue of *jen* or "human-heartedness" is cultivated not within society as such, nor from public education alone, but within the intimately relational matrix of the family. The "fundamental law of reciprocity" is learned in the context of the family. To quote Kim at length,

> Confucianism has special merit today because it uses the family as a model for society at large. In the West, people often speak of the "machinery" of government as if the nation is regulated impersonally, almost mechanically. Or they refer to the "business" of government, as though society was a purely commercial matter, merely collecting and spending money. Is it not better to see society as an extended family? This concept implies that we should treat all men with the affection, care and honor with which we treat our kinsmen. To look at society from this perspective, say the Confucianists, will prepare the way for the Great Commonwealth *(ta tung)*, a state of world-wide harmony and happiness. For this reason, there is merit in recognizing the similarities between Unification theology and Confucian wisdom.[34]

As Kim also points out, Unificationism's theology of the family relates not only individual ethics (micro-ethics), but family ethics (meso-ethics), to the telos of reconciliation with God. Hence marriage and sexuality, within Unificationism, represent a virtual synthesis of the seven sacraments within the Catholic tradition, and is undertaken with the same seriousness as

characterizes many Protestants in approaching Baptism. In fact, the Unification marriage involves aspects of Baptism, Confession (repentance), Eucharist, Confirmation, and Holy Orders, and of course the exchange of marriage vows. But apart from its being viewed in a sacramental and soteriological perspective, the Unificationist view of family is also decidedly social. The family is the matrix for the mediation of personal ethics and social ethics.

The family may seem to be a flimsy basis upon which to develop a social ethics. For the simplicity and potential for human-heartedness that may characterize families and, by extension, tribes, offers little in the way of guidance for a complex, pluralistic, and metropolitan society of strangers. However, a brief comparison with Marxism may be helpful in communicating the intelligibility of this position. Marx, as is well known, saw social labor as the foundation for the creation of individual consciousness and character, on the one hand, as well as the foundation—depending on the forces and relations of production—for the alienation or emancipation of society, on the other hand. In a similar way, Unification presses the significance of the family as a basis not only for the reproduction of individual consciousness and character, but as the paradigm for sociality in general. The family is to serve as a basis—to relate Unification family to Marxian labor—for the emancipation of the relations of re-production, which, in turn, are to provide the model for the emancipation of the relations of production, i.e., labor. Thus the notion of family, in Unification, has a social, and emancipatory thrust analogous to the Marxian ideal of labor.

Third Blessing Ethics: Social Ethics

In the *Divine Principle* one reads that the third blessing points to the "Kingdom of Heaven on earth."[35] We also learn that this Kingdom will be characterized by a "politics according to the will of the people," and, moreover, this society will be "socialistic," though perhaps the use of this latter term is misleading, and is better read as indicating some form of mixed economy.[36] Also within the *Divine Principle* there is generous employment of an organic metaphor for speaking of the social order, even comparing an economy to the harmonious inter-relationships among "the stomach, heart, and lungs of the human body."[37]

We also learn from Dr. Sang Hun Lee, author of *Explaining Unification Thought*, that,

The third blessing refers, not only to dominion of creation, but also to abilities such as statesmanship and business management. In the Unification Thought view, the standard of conduct necessary for realizing the third blessing is nothing but an extension and application of the standard of conduct in family life—i.e., ethics. When these ethical standards are applied to business, they become *business ethics;* when applied to a nation, they become *national ethics.*[38]

Certainly, a tremendous burden is placed on the role of the family, for Unification views the family as the basis for its global vision, macroethics. Certainly the weight which the family is expected to carry must be questioned. At the same time, however, one must consider the expectations which have been placed, by Marxists, on the role of *labor* and the conditions of labor, or by Enlightenment thinkers on the role of *science* and *rationality* delivered from theological encumbrances. In this light, the emphasis on the family does not appear so scandalous.

Family ethics has often been indicative of a tribalistic or totalistic ethics, i.e., a closed society. Family economics or family politics (nepotism) has meant preferential treatment for those within, and discrimination toward those not sharing the blood-line of the tribe, thus constituting what Benjamin Nelson has referred to as a "tribal brotherhood."[39] Family models for society also appeal to notions of organic solidarity, with a concomitant tendency toward a coerced consensus. In short, family ethics is generally viewed as an unacceptable basis for ethics with a modern, pluralistic society. Family ethics is thus viewed as a form of "private ethics" which is only marginally relevant to the political and economic life of modern metropolitan societies, for these societies operate in accord with principles that are to hold not between family members, but between strangers. Hence the preeminence of notions of rights and of procedural and distributive justice.

Such notions of justice and of rights become central categories for ethics in inverse proportion to the degree of substantive solidarity that exists within a moral community. While the concern with rights might be interpreted as indicative of humanity's moral development, it might also be indicative of a certain moral impoverishment. Rights become central when trust and a shared sense of participation in the common good have eroded. When solidarity is reduced to the concern for rights and procedur-

al rules, the social fabric is held together strictly by a via negativa. In many respects, that is a feature of the neomarxian legacy, and its protest idiom. Alasdair MacIntyre, for one, has charged that "Neo-Marxisms of the present" are sorely limited by a post-Enlightenment ideology which "has fatally infected much of modern protest and rebellion with the idiom of abstract universality."[40] By its reliance on abstract universal ideals, neomarxism has neglected the mundane task "of creating practices and institutions which will actually enable the children of the hitherto deprived and the hitherto arbitrarily excluded to learn . . . to play baseball or cricket and to listen to and to play string quartets and to value excellence in all these areas. It has instead encouraged them to pursue fictions of rights and of equality so that everybody in the end will have equal right to an education that it is worth nobody's while to have."[41]

The aspect of Unificationism's social ethics which has been most public is its anti-communism, so some clarification is in order. First of all, the central underpinnings of Unification anti-communism are ethical, and do not derive from "bourgeois" interests. In this respect, Unificationism's anti-communism is best understood, I would contend, as of the same order, or at least formally analogous to other more popular forms of moral outrage, e.g., the "moral equivalent of war" against racism, nuclear proliferation, or sexism. Unification anti-communism is relevant to its constructive social ethical thrust insofar as communism is viewed as making a promise, i.e., emancipation, which it is unable to deliver. It is not the employment of moral discourse which Unificationists object to, nor the use of social analysis, but only that such employment is understood to be wrongheaded, and destructive. Furthermore, the history of the Marxist treatment of particularly minority and emergent religions is depressing to say the least. Marxists have tolerated only religions with traditions too pervasive to stamp out within a few generations, e.g., the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muslims in the U.S.S.R.; toward minority religions they do as they will.

The emphasis on anti-communism, as evidenced in the Unification-sponsored CAUSA movement exists not as a raison d'etre for Unification, but as a regrettable task that needs to be done, in the same way that racism needs to be combatted. Unification appreciation for the liberal democracies derives primarily from not only their tolerance for religious expression, but their providing an environment encouraging the flourishing of religion. At the same time Unificationism's disaffection with liberal

democracies is related to the erosion of that environment conducive to the emergence, maintenance and transmission of religion.

In what follows, I will suggest features of Unificationism's third blessing ideal. This projection involves more than mere speculation, for I hold that a Unification society exists in embryonic form, evidenced in present practices. By extrapolation I will briefly—and with no pretense of having exhausted the possibilities—sketch features of the third blessing ethics. In particular, I will address the issues of politics and economics within the framework of a Unification ethos.

The Possibility of Politics Within the Unification Ethos

A cause of great concern for many who come to know the Unification Church, and the intensity of its commitments, has to do with the extent to which Unification communities are political in the democratic sense, i.e., open to dissent, criticism, loyal opposition, and collective will-formation. If we were to rely on the media accounts from the seventies it would seem that within Unificationism the political—like the ethical—is collapsed into the religious. Unificationism would then seem to represent a form of religious totalism with few resources for political existence.

While often exaggerated, such concerns are not wholly without warrant, for there is indeed a tension between a community which holds "the truth," and the pluralistic interpretation of truth that seems to ground liberal, pragmatic societies. Liberal political societies, as I understand them, are constituted on a conviction that, in politics, procedures are more important than truth. Furthermore, truth is acceptable only insofar as, on the one hand, it is kept privately at home or in the church, synagogue or mosque, or, on the other hand, accommodates itself politically to the established procedures and laws of a larger community that does not share some particular holder's understanding of the truth. Politics, then, is unburdened of questions of truth, and may proceed to represent the public interest—generically understood, and short of ultimate goods and goals. Politics deal, in a context of pluralism and dissension, with basic possibilities and necessities. Religion, however, deals with ultimate values and goals and potentials. Hence the need for the differentiation of these spheres.

As I understand Unification there is no aversion to, rather an acceptance of the inevitability of politics. Certainly, while the church itself remained a small face-to-face community, politics was only remotely

considered. As the church moves from its "tribal stage" to its "society stage," differentiation occurs. As a result, the relevance of the political comes to the fore. To apply a phrase of Max Weber's, there occurs the "routinization of the charisma." However, what distinguishes the Unification ideal of politics, from politics within the context of pluralistic liberalism, is that political existence is to operate as embedded within the context of *ethos,* i.e., politics, though differentiated, is not disembedded or uncoupled from the ethos of the religious life-world. In sum, there is an ideal of consensus at the level of *ethos,* and not merely at the level of law. In this respect, then, Unification implies a political ethics that differs from post-theistic or post-Christian liberalism. At the same time, this is not to suggest that Unification anticipates the establishment of a totalitarian theocracy. Not at all, for within the Unification notion of "God's rule" there is no place for totalitarianism. Politics within the context of Unificationism is affirming of the principle of open expression, competing interests, and compromise. The purpose of politics is to allow for the provision of basic public goods; furthermore, politics requires that public goods be determined publicly, though participatory democracy, and not merely—as characterizes Marxist societies—determined by a Party of the elite *nomenklatura.*

Politics, if we take, for example, the perspective of Reinhold Niebuhr, involves a system of checks and balances which prevents the centralization of power, and thus prevents the possibility for the centralization of the powers of injustice and sin.[42] There is much wisdom in Niebuhr's anti-utopian Christian realism, and much with which Unification agrees. However, his perspective is governed too much by the doctrine of sin, and little appreciation is given for the possibilities of goodness and redemption. Hence, his political ethics omits the questions of the good. Unificationism, in a way that would respect, yet differ with Niebuhrian realism, accents the positive role of politics, i.e., as grounded and devoted to a vision of the good life. The good is vitiated, however, if derived by means of coercion. The Unification understanding of God prohibits the employment of strategies of coercion in an effort to establish the good. That is, rights are not to be violated, and that violation justified by appeal to a goal. As such, politics must employ methods of open argumentation and persuasion, i.e., speech and rhetoric. Of course, coercion is necessary at that point when the most basic laws of community, i.e., those the violation of which renders the existence of the community endangered, e.g., rape or burglary, are violated.

In sum, I contend that politics is possible within the context of the Unification ethos. Politics is not defined negatively, i.e., as that which prevents the war of all against all, but positively as having to do with the realization of the good. While the image of the family governs the Unification conceptualization of society, that image thins out, both naturally and necessarily, in accordance with the development from nuclear family to extended family, to tribe, to metropolitan society, and to national society. In this sense, a city or nation is not to be governed like a household in any literal sense. Aspects of familial care and harmony, however, are fundamental to the ethos in respect to which political power is to be acquired and exercised.

The Unification Economy, Embedded in its Familial Ethos

Unificationism seems theologically committed, in many respects, to a form of socialism. At the same time, Unificationism underscores the significance of individual responsibility and the justice involved in the reward due to those who contribute in extraordinary ways to the society as a result of their labor and creativity. Political intervention into the affairs of the market seems warranted for the purpose of attending to the basic needs of the people. At the same time, the government is not to interfere with individual initiative and creativity. It would seem, therefore, that Unification is supportive of some form of mixed economy.

As stated earlier, in regard to Unificationism's political ethics, the affairs of the market place, as with the affairs of the polis, are not to operate independently of *ethos*, i.e., in accordance with a wholly independent "reason of state" or market. The Unification economy is an embedded economy which subordinates the pursuit of wealth to the generation and maintenance of the good. Within the Unification movement at present there are businesses, such as Happy World in Japan and Tong Il Enterprises in Korea, which are very prosperous. At the same time, the aggressive accumulation of wealth is not divorced from the ideal of providing a service to the public, i.e., the consumer, nor is it divorced from the ideal of the creation of a good society. A large percentage of the profits from Unification businesses are directed back into the non-profit activities of the movement, e.g., to subsidize conferences and publications. In this way Unification's "economic miracle" differs in certain respects from other "Pacific Rim" economic miracles which might thrive merely on the incentive of self-interest, or nationalism.

At the same time, business activities are not "means" to be justified by the "ends." For example, Unificationists would not enter the lucrative pornography industry, in an effort to gain wealth for "the Kingdom." In this sense, there is an understanding of "tainted money." While Unificationists do seek to accumulate wealth, and with bravado, both the relations of labor, as well as the products of labor are to be identifiable in accordance with the *ethos*. Wealth is accumulated not for the sake merely of the individual or the family, but in consonance with and for the sake of a larger goal. Wealth is not to be pursued as an end in itself, in the same way that (political) power is not to be a means of self-aggrandizement.

The way in which the Unification Church allocates its resources is indicative of its commitment to using wealth purposefully, and unselfishly. While truly there are many "domestic" needs of the growing membership, most money is put to use for a variety of projects such as the "Little Angels" Fine Arts Academy in Seoul, Korea; the I-Shin Hospital in Tokyo, several daily newspapers in Japan, Korea, the United States and Latin America, and numerous conferences and academic associations sponsored by the International Cultural Foundation or the International Religious Foundation. These projects are not profitable in any pecuniary sense. The use of money, however, is based on something more than merely a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, principles govern the use of money. Conferences, for example, are funded in an attempt to create contexts for dialogue and communication among scholars, religious, journalists, and others dedicated to human well-being.

In regard to the distribution of wealth, it does not hold that the practices as currently existing in the Unification Church U.S.A., i.e., a form of communalism or socialism, will be normative as the church grows. In fact, the communalist system is eroding rapidly as families must "make their own way." Indeed there is evidence of a distrust of too much reliance on a literal familial theory of economics. The familial model does not seem to require that a Unification society administer to the needs of its people. However, policies of the redistribution of wealth should be developed in ways which do not provide disincentives for either creative entrepreneurship or industrious participation in the labor force.

One factor that merits consideration in this discussion of economics, has to do with the affinity between market economics and political democracy. In this sense, given that there is indeed a high correlation between democracy and capitalism, it would seem consistent that

Unification, in its support of democracy, would also support capitalism. Indeed, I hold that Unificationism does support not only political activism and participation, but economic activism and participation. The opposition to communism is based on a progressive view of history and social change that views the Marxist-Leninists as not only politically and economically regressive, but also, in their anti-religious attitudes and policies, culturally regressive.

Unificationism's economic ethics affirms creativity and industriousness. However, such ambition is to be constrained by ideals of character, of family, and of the common good. Labor, and here Unificationists are in agreement with Marx, ought not to be alienating. Labor, rather, ought to involve the shared participation in a common and profitable project. The products of labor ought not to represent values antithetical to the achievement of the good way of life. And the relations of labor ought not to be adversarial, but familial.

Once again the notion of family has to be qualified. As I view this image and its relevance to the conditions of labor, I stress not the relationship of parents to children, though this image, with qualification, is helpful in some cases, but instead I consider family as an association of adults, familially related, and thus caring for one another, and sharing a common quest. And while families are not always united in profound sentiments, families often do care for one another despite differences. This is, I believe, a way of understanding the ideal of Unification economics.

Conclusion

The real promise of Unificationism does not lie in its particular political or economic platform. Such strategies are necessary, of course. However, as I see the Unification role, it lies more in the area of culture, i.e., the attempt to initiate a religious revolution similar to those revolutions effected by Judaism and Christianity. The politics and economics of such a cultural project will have to be worked out in the context of particular nations. The Unification identity is centered around its theology, and the kind of character its people and families come to possess. There is, as yet, no Unification nation which may be pointed to as exemplifying a Unification polity or economy. And in this sense it is a bit premature and hypothetical to speak of a Unification city or national government. History, after all, has a way of working on the abstractness of ideas. Unification, in this way, will be no different. All the more reason, I would suggest, to

commend an ethics of character and family. The Unification accomplish-
ment, if forthcoming, is not something that can ever be taught merely as
an idea. Rather, it is a form of practice that comes to be known as the
Unification character.

FOOTNOTES

1. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Easton and Guddat, eds., *The Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967)* 400-402.

2. *Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1973) 3-19.

3. David Tracy, "The Foundations of Practical Theology," in Browning, ed., *Practical Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983) 61.

4. See, for example, Karl-Otto Apel, *Towards a Transformation of Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980), or S.C. Brown, ed., *Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities, 1979). Also the discussion among Hans-Georg Gadamer, Rudiger Bubner and others in *Cultural Hermeneutics* 2 (February 1975) 4, and Mary Hesse, *Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science* (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana, 1981). Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970), and Helmut Peukert, *Science, Action, and Fundamental Theology: Toward a Theology of Communicative Action* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1984). Finally, Bryan Wilson, *Rationality* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981), and Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1977).

5. Alfredo Fierro, *The Militant Gospel* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1975) 108.

6. In *Fear and Trembling* Soren Kierkegaard develops the notion of Abraham's "suspension of the ethical" as a kind of religious supercession of ethics.

7. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1976) 62-63.

8. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958).

9. This term, "aftermath of Marxism," I borrow from Alasdair MacIntyre whose use of it I came across in reading his, "Bernstein's Distorting Mirrors: A Rejoinder," in *Soundings* 67 (Spring 1984) 1, 33. See also MacIntyre's *After Virtue* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1981).

10. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans., Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956) 74.

11. David Tracy, "Theologies of Praxis," in *Creativity and Method*, ed., Matthew Lamb (Marquette, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin, 1981) 40.

12. Tracy, 41.

13. Tracy, 42.

14. Tracy, 48.

15. Tracy, 39.

16. Tracy, "The Foundations of Practical Theology," 75.

17. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973) 41-45.

18. Karl-Otto Apel uses the term "micro-domain" to refer to family ethics, "meso-domain" to refer to national politics, and "macro-domain" to refer to "the fact of mankind." See "The Communication Community and the Foundation of Ethics," in *Toward a Transformation of Philosophy* (Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1980) 225-300.

19. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 70.

20. *Divine Principle,* 228.
21. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978) 118.
22. Augustine, "Of the Morals of the Catholic Church."
23. Kim, 71.
24. Stanley Hauerwas, *Character and the Christian Life* (San Antonio, Texas: Trinity University, 1975) 210.
25. Jonathan Edwards, *The Nature of True Virtue* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1969) 3.
26. This passage from Edwards' *Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New England* was taken from Norman S. Fiering's essay "Benjamin Franklin and the Way to Virtue," in *American Quarterly* 30 (Summer 1978) 2, 219.
27. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* Vol. II, ed., John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960) 597.
28. Herbert Richardson, *New Religions and Mental Health: Understanding the Issues* (Toronto: Edwin Mellen, 1980). See particularly Richardson's "Introduction" to the volume.
29. Charles Davis, *Theology and Political Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1980) 180.
30. *Divine Principle,* 43.
31. Kim, 76.
32. Kim, 76.
33. Kim, 77.
34. Kim, 78.
35. *Divine Principle,* 46.
36. *Divine Principle,* 444.
37. *Divine Principle,* 444.
38. Sang Hun Lee, *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981) 233.
39. Benjamin Nelson, *The Idea of Usury: From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal Otherhood* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969).
40. MacIntyre, "Bernstein's Distorting Mirrors," 40.
41. MacIntyre, 40.
42. See Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York: Seabury, 1979).

ASSESSING UNIFICATION ETHICS HERMENEUTICS, THEOLOGY AND NORM

by Franz G.M. Feige

Preliminary Remarks

The development of the Unification Church has taken place under different social and religious contextual influences.[1] Any interpretation of the Unification movement which neglects these various influences is prone to oversystematization or one-sidedness. Being mindful of the impossibility of taking all these difficulties into account, I see, paradoxically, in the plurality of perspectives one key to an understanding of Unificationism.

The method of this paper is defined by the theological ethical task and, since I am a student of the history of Christian ethics, it is developed mainly from within that tradition. I must thus acknowledge my limitations in not being able to adequately account for and assess the relationship of the Unification teachings to other traditions.

In the first part of this paper I am concerned with hermeneutical, structural and rudimentary considerations of Unification theology and ethics, especially in light of the Christian tradition. The questions I seek to address regard the Unification approach to ethics, the theological structure and the undergirding ethical orientations. The main aim of this part is the development of an interpretive theological framework.

In the second part, following the established interpretative framework, I am attempting to describe and analyze Unification theological ethics proper, within its basically dual normative framework of creation and restoration and in the order of its metaphysical, anthropological, and ethical principles.

Finally, in the last part of this paper, I am turning from the descriptive to the critical and advocative task in a discussion of some of the weaknesses of Unification ethics and of the possible routes that might be

taken in order to attend to them. Questions regarding the family ideal, ethical consequences of the Unification understanding of salvation, and the dualism of ends and means and church and society take the center stage. In a final conclusion I try to point both to the resources for flexibility, development, and critical potential within the Unification teachings and to the need for Unificationism to be open and to employ modern analytical methods in order to meet the internal and external challenges.

I. HERMENEUTICS: THEOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL STRUCTURE

Ethical Discourse as Theological-Ethical Discourse in Unification Theology

That ethics is of some importance in Unificationism is expressed through its explicit treatment in some of the original sources of the Unification teachings, *Unification Thought*[2] and *Unification Theology and Christian Thought*.[3] Some of the books on Unification theology and life-style are based on conferences of scholars with members of the Unification Church. They include discussions, inside views and testimonies that close-ly relate to ethics, thus documenting the moral reflection of Unification Church members on a practical level. The discussions illustrate that mem-bers in their moral deliberations frequently transcend the strictly rational (philosophical) ethical level by turning ethical discussions into theological deliberations. The ethical question, "What shall we do?," is shifted to the theological and philosophical formulation of the question, "What is the meaning of human activity, life and being?" The reference is not to specific ethical norms but to spiritual, theological and philosophical meanings within the theological frame of the Unification teachings. For example, the fundraising practices of the movement are explained by a theology of fundraising and those of evangelization by a theology of witnessing.[4]

The same method, or rather the lack of attention to the philosophical ethical dimension, may be detected in the more systematic treatments of ethics in the literature of the Unification Church. A German scholar finds: "It is surprising when considering the rather high level of theological rationalization in the Unification Church that the discussion of theories of ethics is rather underdeveloped."[5] Unificationism shares this lack of strictly ethical reflection with other young movements in the history of Christianity. Since its sphere of life is still so self-evident, it sees no need for rational grounding or independent ethics.[6]

Protestant Ethics and the Radicalization of the Ethical Formulation of the Question Today

The attempt toward interpreting all action, not only religious action, in a religious way, i.e., the connecting of all life and even of day-to-day occurrences with God, brings to mind the Pietism of Spener and the Puritanism of England and America. More basically, though, it is the result of the general orientation of the Reformation theology, which on the one hand, especially with Luther, turned the ethical question into a theological one, or, on the other hand, especially with Calvin, put everything under the sovereignty of God.[7] For example, Luther shifted the moral problem of *sins* to the theological problem of original *sin* and interpreted the mundane vocations as callings, extending the priesthood to all believers. Accordingly, the Roman Catholic division between a natural and a Christian ethics was abolished in Protestantism and ethics was henceforth treated within the theological frame.[8]

Today, the formulation of the ethical question is becoming radicalized again by its pushing towards its roots. The German theologian Trutz Rendtorff remarks: "The special sign of ethical discourse today is that ethical questions are no longer limited to questions about the individual's conduct to his/her context of life but are concerned with the conditions of the context of life itself."[9] The nomenclature and method of Unification lifestyle theologies fit well into the modern theologico-ethical chorus: theology of sexuality, political theology, ecological theology, etc.

The transcending of the strictly philosophical ethical mode of reasoning in Unificationism expresses its concern for addressing its new understanding of reality and in no way means that *Divine Principle*,[10] the primary source on Unification teaching, is not interested in the ethical question. It only emphasizes that the answer may not be rightly understood without the prior understanding of the new theological context. More specifically, it is its interest in change and transformation which seemingly puts the strictly ethical question in second place. In this sense, modern ethics and Unificationism share the experience of historical and social change. The concern is with the transformation of values and presumptions which are at the heart of any Christian ethics. From the point of view of Unification ethics, then, *Divine Principle* is an *ethical* theology which creates a relational framework for the discussion of ethical questions.

The Structure: Eschatology, Creation and Restoration

The good news of the Unification Church consists in the exhortation to build the Kingdom of God since the path to its realization has now been revealed.[11] This weight on eschatology brings Unification theology into close proximity with the Kingdom of God theology of the left-wing Reformation[12] and with the new eschatologically oriented theology,[13] notwithstanding their dissimilarities. This eschatological vision probably contributes most to Unificationism's activism, the element characterizing the Unification Church in the public's eye. Similarly, the more recent theology focuses on the eschatological vision of the Kingdom of God with the hope that it may bestow upon Christian hearts new zeal to move present society a bit closer toward the end.[14] Although both focus on this-worldly activity, their eschatological vision and theological structure differ markedly in kind. While the Theology of Hope assumes a radical distinction between creation and the eschaton,[15] Unification theology stresses their continuity through the concept of restoration.

Like Irenaeus, Unificationism sees the eschaton as the fulfillment of the original ideal of creation.[16] Accordingly, the basic structure of Unification theology is built around the doctrines of creation, the fall and restoration. In short, the story of Unification theology runs like this: The principle of creation describes God's original ideal, plan, purpose or will, that is the establishment of his Kingdom on earth with the human family as its center. But this original intention was frustrated by Satan and for the ancestors, causing the fall. Nevertheless, this did not change God's ultimate ideal to set up his/her Kingdom of earth. It did change the path of its realization, in terms of the necessary time and means. This path is described through the principle of restoration and is carried out in human history which is the story of God's and humanity's activity of restoring God's Kingdom on earth. In *Divine Principle* there is an elaborate account of history which links the fall with the eschaton. It describes the norm of restoration through its interpretation of the Genesis account, the history of Israel in the Old Testament, the mission of Jesus in the New Testament, and the events of the history of Christianity in relation to world history up until today.

The purpose of creation furnishes the common theme and continuity of Unification theology, which causes its eschatology to be intimately linked to the doctrine of creation. History is at the same time the radical break (fall) from and the path (restoration) to God and his/her ideal

(Kingdom of God on earth and in heaven). Hence, also History in its purpose is related to the doctrine of creation. For example, Unificationism evaluates the ministry of Jesus from the point of view of whether it fulfilled the purpose of creation.[17]

We may safely conclude that Unification theology knows three fundamental reference points: creation (the beginning), the fall and history (the restorative struggle), and the eschaton (the fulfillment). Since the eschaton will be the fulfillment of creation, their norms will show the basic continuity of promise, beginning and fulfillment. The difference between the ethical norm of creation and the eschaton will only be one in terms of development— not a radical one, since that would destroy the oneness of God's purpose. The only other substantially differing material norm is the principle of restoration, an interim norm. But even the purpose of this norm is directed towards *restoration* and fulfillment. We are thus left with essentially two, but not unrelated, material norms, the ethical norm prescribed by creation and eschaton, and the one prescribed by restoration.

Creation and Restoration versus Law and Gospel

The division of ethics into two norms, if not the rule, is at least very common in the history of Christian ethics: the Roman Catholic conception of the supernatural or Christian virtues on the basis of Natural Law shared with the non-Christians, the usual Protestant separation of ethics into the individual ethics of the Gospel (justification by faith) and the social ethics of the Law (the natural orders and the Ten Commandments), and the Anabaptist antithesis between the ethics of the Christian community and of culture.[18] In my view, the ethics of the Calvinist tradition approaches most closely, both in structure and transformational thrust, the ethics of Unificationism. It also avoids the stark division between individual and society. As will be seen, however, Unificationism shares also much with both the Catholic and Lutheran position.

As has already been stated at the outset, Unification theology has been largely misunderstood because of a misreading of its different hermeneutical presuppositions. For example, what might seem to be utterly wrong from the perspective of a theologian of Hope, namely, Unification's emphasis on the prefix "re" and, consequently, its stress on the doctrine of creation, boils down to a misapprehension of Unificationism's conception of creation. As a result of the Barthian legacy, much of theology after World War II has covertly been directed against Liberal theology's easy

identification of the Kingdom of God with the kingdoms of this world and the creational emphasis of a particular Lutheran theology which built much of its ethics around the orders of creation. Since the Barthian battle against these theologies has ended in a Christonomism and proven to be inadequate in the realm of ethics,[19] a shift to the eschatological dimension was thought to provide an answer. Any theology built on creation is then still considered as belonging to the same sort as that of the Lutheranism of the 1920s and '30s.[20] It is my view, though, as will have to be pointed out in a moment, that Unification theology does not fall into the same category just by virtue of being creational.

While Lutheranism has always stressed a dualism or dialectic between law (including creation) and Gospel, Calvinism assumed a closer unity between the two consisting of the third use of the law, that is, the Ten Commandments.[21] Similarly, there is a unitary approach in Unification theology, which is, however, conceived between the two quite different concepts of creation and restoration. More precisely, Unification theology uses a *heilsgeschichtliche* approach in its understanding of history coupled with a progressive view of revelation.[22] Law (if creation is included) and Gospel are events in that *Heilsgeschichte* whose conceptions become re-evaluated as new revelation and insights are introduced in history. Thus, the Unification view of creation is continuously re-evaluated in light of *Heilsgeschichte* and thus not, as might be assumed by some Christian theologians, fixed by a certain Old Testament interpretation or as reinterpreted by the Gospel. While it is true that historical events are judged in light of the purpose of creation in Unification theology, as mentioned previously, they are at the same time theological hermeneutical presuppositions of the doctrine of creation. The link between the two doctrines of creation and restoration is quite intimate and resembles that of a hermeneutical circle that is extended in time. The resultant Unification view of creation may, thus, be described as a dynamic process.

Thus, the Unification idea of creation may not be judged at faith value, i.e., from some other theological reference point, but requires an understanding of its own underlying theological and hermeneutical presuppositions which are at the heart of Unificationism's new interpretation of the Bible.[23]

The Kingdom of Jesus and the Kingdom of God on Earth

The upshot of this new interpretation, as radical it may be, is not so

radical on the ethical level. The extent of the social relevance of the Christian revelation, especially Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, has always been a hotly debated question. The specifically Christian message has largely been limited to the private sphere, or was modified under the influence of the Old Testament perspective of law, as in the case of Calvin. In this century, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr chided the attempts at Christianizing society by the Social Gospel movement and held that Jesus' idea of love is an impossible possibility.[24] Thus, the relative containment of Jesus' place in society has been the majority view in Christianity, especially of the large European denominations. It is my opinion that the ideal of Jesus is a spiritual one which operates in the lives of individuals as spiritual salvation (justification).[25] Without doubt, its social influence has been felt throughout history and its ethical ideal or sacrifice has given inspiration to individuals and groups. Yet, the Sermon on the Mount is not a blueprint for society. With Niebuhr, Unificationism may affirm that the Kingdom of Jesus is one that stands at the end of history; it remains an impossible possibility.

It is important to recognize that when Unification theology talks about the Kingdom of God on earth it does not talk about the realization of Jesus' Kingdom of God on earth (the impossible possibility of selfless love on the social level); it talks about a different concept for society at large which I like to call "the possible ideal." The use of the notion of the Kingdom of God on earth refers to that possible ideal, the notion of the Kingdom of Heaven may refer to Jesus' Kingdom or the spiritual Kingdom— though, these concepts in *Divine Principle* may be used rather inconsistently and without the conceptual clarity called for here. It is the purpose of the first section of the second part of this paper to delineate Unification's possible ideal, the Kingdom of God on earth. I suggest for the sake of conceptual clarity to call that ideal a "possible ideal," or even better, an "earthly ideal" in order to avoid the utopian notions for which Unification theology, in this context, has sometimes been unjustly accused.

It has become obvious that Unificationism has not as much in common with Anabaptism as some might have assumed, since it does not uphold a biblical ethicism. In at least one important aspect, though, it shares their feeling of eschatological urgency, hope and ethical thrust. It is exactly this heart which the newer Kingdom of God Theology seeks to capture, but which its apocalyptic "primitive Christian eschatology" prevents: "consequently, the great emphasis placed on eschatology by

present-day theologians seems to us to be likewise abstract and theoretical—mere 'academic eschatology,' like the earlier academic socialism."[26]

II. UNIFICATION ETHICS

1. Creation: The Earthly Ideal
Cosmology
    Unification teaching always considers humanity in its cosmological context—a purposive universe governed by metaphysical principles. These principles are general and universal, applicable to all that exists, even to God. It may even be said that evil depends on their existence, for instance, on the principle of Give and Take.[27]
    The most basic commonality shared by the universe is polarity and duality which is expressed in two ways: the relativity of internal character and external form (inner and outer aspects of things) and the relativity of masculinity and femininity (also called positivity and negativity).[28] "These polarities show that every created thing manifests the 'image and likeness' of God, its creator."[29] It is important to notice that these polarities are not to be understood dualistically, that is, antithetically. They are similar to the Oriental concepts of Yin and Yang and thus connote relative difference and similarity, interdependence and complementarity, and are only definable in relationship to one another as, for instance, subject and object, vertical and horizontal.[30] The potential for relationships lies in the existence of such dual characteristics, and since every relationship is maintained by the give and take of its parts, it is called "give and take action."[31] Existence is thus the result of polarity and relationship of differentiation and unification (the image of a periodic wave may best describe the dynamics involved). This fundamental metaphysical principle is the basis for the relational thinking within Unification theology, the web of its fabric.
    The two other metaphysical principles are derivatives or developments of the first through the inclusion of purpose, cause and result. They are the temporal and spatial interpretations of Give and Take and explain the process and growth-like character (temporal order) and the structural organization (spatial order) of the universe.[32] The harmony between both sets of polarities and of the hierarchically structured universe is due to them. This purposive order starts on the lowest level with formless energy and gradually increases in complexity: elementary particles, atoms,

molecules, plants, animals, and humanity as the final purpose in the visible universe. Each level and its subsystems is oriented towards its higher one through the internal telos, and the whole temporal and spatial order is regulated by those principles of the temporal and structural telos into a related whole.

To be precise, these metaphysical principles are not ethical principles in the proper sense. They are ontological constructs, explaining the *natural* order of the cosmos. As I understand them, they are not the direct epistemological basis of ethics; they are correlatively related to ethics as external form (order) is to internal character (ethics).

Anthropology

It has become apparent that the universe is oriented toward humanity in Unification theology. Humanity, on the other hand, is oriented toward God. It is created uniquely in God's image. Henceforth, humanity's nature, life, task, in brief, its purpose, is not merely determined by the automatic workings of natural law, but demands freedom in responsibility.

> However, man is created to attain his perfection not only through the dominion and autonomy of the Principle itself, but also by accomplishing his own portion of responsibility in passing through this period.[33]

This co-responsibility signifies the sharing in God's creativity. It occupies a central role in Unification theology.

Unification theology points to the Bible in explaining the meaning of co-creativity: "Therefore, when God created Adam and Eve, He gave them three great blessings: to be fruitful, to multiply and fill the earth, and to subdue it and have dominion (Gen. 1:28)."[34] This threefold blessing, in one sense, may be understood, like Bonhoeffer's concept of the mandate, as a "divinely imposed task."[35] In a more specific sense, it is the purpose of creation which assures the happiness of humanity—thus, the term "blessing." More concretely, the three blessings mean the maturity of the individual, the family and the universe; and as expressed in relational terms, the establishment of the harmonious correlation of the individual's mind and body, of husband and wife, and of humanity and nature.

It is important to note that *Divine Principle* explains this all by correlating the three blessings to the temporal and structural (Four Position Foundation) metaphysical principles. Thus, the harmonious relationships which comprise the three blessings are always related to God as the origin of that purpose, on the one hand, and the fulfillment of that purpose, on the other. That means that the blessings can only be realized as intended by God when those relationships are pursued with an orientation towards God and his/her purpose (God's heart), on the one hand, and their earnest fulfillment through the multiplication of fruits (e.g., having children), on the other.

The family occupies the central role because it is the place where humanity's co-creativity and thus the *imago Dei* is most essentially revealed. It is, so to speak, the place of the institutionalization of God's children. Furthermore, it is the place where God's love can qualitatively be realized on the smallest level through the different familial relationships. Even in society, "all the love that man manifests is applied, changed or combined family love."[36] The way God expresses his/her love is through the different roles that men and women take in relation to one another. The three basic forms of God's love are the unconditional love of parents for their children, the conjugal love of husband and wife, and the filial piety of the children for their parents.[37] By growing and passing through the different roles in the family, men and women mature to know the heart of God, the ground and source of motivation for the different forms of love. Everyone is to inherit this heart so that he/she may be able to act with appropriate love in any situation: "Consequently ethics should be established on the basis of the relations of Heart among family members."[38]

Through the gradual extension of the family to a society, nation and world, over many generations, a one-world-family and culture should have originally been erected on the model of the family. This leads to the third blessing through which humanity attains the realization of lordship over creation. In this function, humanity becomes "the mediator and the center of harmony" and "the microcosm" of the universe.[39] This blessing includes the attainment and practice of techniques and skills in the spheres of technology, administration, art, science, etc.[40]

In conclusion, the religions, individual, familial, social and natural spheres are all aspects of being human. Any reductionisms, such as naturalism are to be rejected. The human being is essentially polyspheric (living in different spheres at the same time) and interdependent.

Ethics

Unificationism's temporal polyspheric ideal (the Kingdom of God or the three blessings as the true, the beautiful and the good life) includes more than the ethical dimension. At the same time, the ethical sphere is an important part of that ideal in which the three blessings imply an ethics with an individual, social and universal component. In the following, several rudiments of the Unification approach to ethics may be delineated.

a) The Christian *imago Dei*

Unification theology echoes fully the Christian idea of the unique worth of every person because of his/her creation in God's image. But it modifies this approach by regarding the fully harmonized image of God as the harmonized relationship of husband and wife and their relationship to their children and the creation.

b) The Familial Norm

In addition to the biblical influence on Unification ethics, the social-ethical ideal is, without doubt, closely related to Confucian ethics and is even regarded in *Unification Thought* as a "modern Confucianism." Dr. Lee intends to give Confucianism a new religious basis: Unification theology.[41] From the point of view of society, the family is to serve as a model to insure the moral standard. Dr. Lee even goes so far as to argue that the ethics of special sectors of society belonging to the third blessing, such as economy, work relations and politics, are to be primarily regulated by family ethics.[42]

The intention of *Unification Thought,* to combine the Christian tradition, centering on the worth of the individual in relation to God, with the Confucian tradition, centering on the worth of the individual in relation to the family, must be valued as a sincere and creative effort that seeks to overcome the shortcomings of both. Unificationism's theocentrism and teleology have to be considered as an important modification of traditional Confucian ethics. In turn, its family-centered hermeneutics introduces a novel approach into Christian theology and ethics.

c) Philosophical Meta-Ethics

Western and Taoistic, as well biblical and Confucian, elements are synthesized in the metaphysics of Unification theology. This synthesis still awaits further conceptual clarification in light of those traditions.[43] The extension of the more horizontally constructed yin-yang philosophy of interdependence through the teleological and dualistic elements of inner character and outer form, reminiscent of Platonic and Aristotelian

philosophy, should not be underestimated. What could possibly prove to be the most important contribution to Western philosophy is the stress on a relational and complementary view of an interdependent reality based on the harmony and interdependence of material and spiritual elements in society and the quest for harmony and mutual appreciation between religion and science.

According to the fundamental principle of interdependence, individual ethics and social ethics are to be congruent parts with family ethics as the outer norm and with its expression through the conscience as the individual standard.[44] Through the centering of our conscience on God, i.e., his/her heart and purpose, and on responsible action (the individual's own portion of responsibility), harmony between mind and body is supposed to be achieved. The crucial environment for the gradual attainment of that harmony is the family context, providing both guidance in the process of growth for the interiorization of purpose and responsible action. If one follows this argument to its logical conclusion, the search for the ultimate norm will finally lead to God's logos. A certain similarity of Unification theology with Plato's thought cannot be denied.[45] Yet, the distinction from Plato lies in the positive view of the world as the substantial reflection of God's logos. The family is to be the incarnation of this logos and family ethics its ethical dimension. The logos in God, the ethics in the family, and the metaphysical principles in the cosmos are nothing but the same principle in different forms of abstraction in the different dimensions of Unification reality. The three blessings, realized through the family, are only the concrete unification (harmonization) of these dimensions.

d) An Ethics of Heart and Love

Rainer Flasche already mentioned that Unificationism's use of heart in conjunction with the search to insure happiness is based on a long tradition in Korea.[46] These elements determine the eudaemonistic character of Unification ethics. It may thus never be construed as a pure ethics of duty in the Kantian sense. It rather parallels Augustine's ethics of love and its underlying eudaemonism.

Ultimately, Unification ethics traces everything back to love and heart as the ground of motivation and the essential meaning of life.[47] This also applies to God: "God's purpose in creating the universe was to feel happiness."[48] Here, Unification theology goes beyond Augustine, and yet, with him, it is concerned with the object of love.[49] In Unification

ethics, this object is the family. The keeping of the right position in relation to parents or elders, husband and wife, and children or peers is paramount.[50] It makes for the three essential forms of love, filial piety, fidelity, and parental love—again, elements of the Confucian tradition.

e) An Ethics of Social Harmony and Justice

The philosophical basis of love in Unification theology is interdependence and purposiveness. Every existence in the universe is seen to have a dual purpose corresponding to inner character (purpose of the whole) and external form (purpose of the individual). On the human end, the individual purpose is directed toward the maintenance of the individual and the wholistic purpose toward the well-being of the whole. Since the purpose of the whole corresponds to internal character, it is meant to assume a guiding role without destroying the basic complementarity. "Therefore, there cannot be any purpose of the individual apart from the purpose of the whole, nor any purpose of the whole that does not include the purpose of the individual."[51]

To that end, a harmonious society is comprised of harmonious relationships which consist of harmonious actions of give and take in which the individual purposes are in harmony with the purpose of the whole society. Again, harmony and order in society occur when the giving in the give and take actions of society becomes the leading aspect of orientation. This element of altruistic love is to be maintained through the God-centeredness of individuals.[52]

Because of the principle of interdependence, however, Unification theology does not posit unconditional love or selflessness to be the moral norm of harmonious society, though it may be considered an ideal, a guiding light toward which individuals and groups should be inspired to strive. This ideal may be closely resembled by the saints' faith and striving for selflessness, by the parents' unconditional love, by the spouses' fidelity, by some friends' total trust, and perhaps by a scientist's devotion to the search for truth, to name only a few pertinent examples. Most naturally, the unconditional dimension of love may be developed and experienced through the raising of children by parents. In that sense, it could be spoken of as a moral principle. However, the moral principle for society at large, or justice, is rather harmonious giving and taking (receiving).[53] Consequently, the Unification idea of the Kingdom of God on earth is, ethically speaking, also a polyspheric kingdom, that is, one of interdependence, mutuality and complementarity permeated by unconditional

love, by faith, fidelity, devotion and other altruistic ideals, but most essentially one that is oriented around the earthly ideal of love in the family.

f) An Ethics of Tradition

It is a well-known fact that the Far Eastern tradition has put the family in the center of ethics, whereas a large part of the Western tradition has acknowledged the individual or the state in its place. While Unificationism shows some similarity with Plato's idealism, it, nevertheless, focuses on the incarnation of the ideal in the family as the verification of the norm for ethics. The parents are to pass on this norm through the education of their children. It becomes obvious here why Unificationism emphasizes education as much as it does.[54]

There remains, however, the problem of the first incarnation of that ideal. It appears logical then that Unification theology attributes great weight to the mission of the first ancestors which were to incarnate that norm in order to establish a heavenly tradition and pass it on to their successive generations. Again, it becomes obvious why Unification theology views the Fall of humanity as such a great tragedy and history in light of the missions of central figures who have the aim of restoring the original ideal of True Parents. To that theme, we must turn our attention now.

2. Fall and Restoration: An Interim Ethics

Anthropology and the Fall

Unification theology explains the Fall of our first ancestors by drawing upon the anthropological elements mentioned in the previous section, namely, the process of growth, responsibility and the power of love. This responsibility consisted in obedience toward God, to keep his/her commandment not to eat of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil. In a positive sense, Unification theology interprets this to mean that God wanted to protect Adam and Eve from having sexual relations before attainment of their spiritual and physical maturity, their first blessing (oneness of mind and body). That implies that God's commandment had only temporal significance.[55]

As has been pointed out before, the main element in Unification ethics is ordered love through the family. The concern in this familial order is to first insure the growth of vertical love of filial piety toward God and the parents, that is, to nurture the altruistic element in the child. This pious orientation should guarantee the maturity of the individual

before the sexual union between a man and a woman, for without this vertical relation there would exist the danger of the misuse of the horizontal love between the sexes and consequently the corruption of family relations and order. Thus, piety, faith in God's word, was originally to secure the temporal and structural order of love.

The Fall consisted precisely in the breaking of this commandment during the growth process. The result was the destruction of the divine familial order and the establishment of a tradition influenced by Satan, the former archangel. In essence, the originally intended piety toward God became bent toward the self. *Divine Principle* speaks in this connection also about the corruption of humanity's original nature due to the Fall. In contrast to the Reformation, Unification theology, as I see it, does not teach the total corruption of the original nature of humanity. Humanity has, rather, fallen into a state of conflict with the fallen nature, acquired by the Fall. In this state of conflict, humanity desires to be good, but is continuously drawn to do evil, and thus not able to reach its ultimate goal; humanity remains in conflict, that is, in a position between God and Satan.

The crucial question here concerns the degree to which humanity, according to Unification theology, is still able to discern truth and goodness. While Frederick Sontag thinks it not possible for the average person to reach the right understanding of God by way of natural knowledge, Sebastian Matczak believes that Unification theology, in this respect, is reconcilable with Roman Catholic teaching.[56] In my view, Unification theology is not as much concerned with rational knowledge as with "knowledge" of the heart (of God), that is, with love and will.[57] It is also anxious to point out the supernatural imprisonment of humanity by the forces of Satan.[58]

In spite of that, Unification theology will have to face up to these crucial questions about the natural knowledge of God. I am not ready to align myself with either position. I am more prone to accept the ambiguity and tension within Unificationism at this point; that is, the conviction in humanity's potential for responsibility, as well as humanity's need for the crucial help of God and his/her prophets to release and focus that potential.

Restoration

The Fall did not change God's purpose, but rather altered the way of its realization, since a great obstacle had been put between God and

humanity and the fulfillment of God's Kingdom. In essence, restoration is the reversal of the fall: the separation of humanity from Satan, the re-creation of humanity's original nature and, finally, the realization of the Kingdom of God.[59]

The principles in the process of restoration consist in the principles of creation and in some special principles of restoration necessitated by the fall. The principles of growth (temporal) and of structure (spatial) are reflected in providential time periods and the Cain-Abel dialectic. Restora-tion is, thus, the history of temporal and structural reordering oriented around the purpose of creation as the partial means and telos.[60] On the other hand, the history of restoration is tied to anthropology, especially to responsibility. The history of restoration teaches us today that responsibili-ty consists in the restoration of the lost conditions by the Fall through indemnity.

Filial piety and the actualization of the purpose of creation—concepts of the doctrine of creation—return here as faith and the laying of conditions. That faith and those conditions are indemnity, because it is now more difficult to have faith in God, in consequence of a loss of spiritual perception, and it is now necessary to put a greater emphasis on the leading aspect of love, that is, selfless love or even sacrificial love, in consequence of the selfishness of humanity. Restoration is, therefore, the building of God's Kingdom through indemnification by faith and sacrificial love.

The differentiation of faith and works, so crucial to Reformation faith, is thus also known in Unificationism. Unification theology's under-standing of faith, however, is not as specifically focused on the concept of "justification by faith," since it understands restoration as a gradual proc-ess (the importance of the notion of process in Unification thinking!), as a *Heilsgeschichte*. I do think that the aspect of faith clarified by Luther is one stage in the development of faith true to Unificationism. The less dichoto-mizing view of faith by Calvin is even closer to the heart of Unificationism.

The conditions of faith, which are to restore the vertical orientation toward God, involve, for example, prayer and fasting.[61] We find here many of the ascetic practices of the Unification lifestyle. But nothing of that kind will be sufficient to truly unite God and the individual. God will only be fully known by the person's becoming enclosed into God's heart. The correlative basis to that end, a "foundation of substance" on the human side, is accomplished by service for reconciliation. Unification employs here the dynamic of the Cain-Abel paradigm: The person in the

Cain position is to serve from a subordinate position the person in the Abel position. The latter, in return, has the responsibility of reconciling with Cain, so as to lead him to God. This is nothing but the attempt to restore the rebellious nature of Cain (representing symptomatically the fallen nature of humanity), on the one hand, and the broken heart of God (the Abel position comes to appreciate the condition of God's heart of sacrifice through loving and seeking reconciliation with the rebellious one), on the other.

This principle of the central figure, of Abel, determines the course of history.[62] The person(s) chosen by God as the Abel figure serves God as mediator and prophet who has the mission to lead the person(s) in the Cain position back to God. It is thus important to know the *who, when,* and *where* of Abel.

The teaching of restoration is mainly an interpretation of history, the development of which is clarified through the Cain-Abel dynamic. Cain is always the person or group relatively more distant from God, and Abel the person or group relatively closer to God. The work of reconciliation under Abel's leadership is supposed to advance goodness. It began with Adam's family and extended socially into the people of Israel who as the chosen ones in the Cain position were to welcome and follow Christ in the Abel position. The Christians, taking up the unfinished task, were to unite the whole world with God and usher in his/her Kingdom.[63]

This typology also embraces secular realms. The battle between God and Satan reaches from the divided heart of the individual to the different areas of today's society, culminating finally in the struggle between the democratic and Communist world.[64] This is different from Augustine's teaching of the two kingdoms in that this battle will eventually end on *earth* by the victory of God's greater love. The end is theologically secured, but the duration depends on the degree of humanity's response-ability.[65] The Messiah is not able to change that fact which contributed to the incompletion of Jesus' mission.[66]

Ethics

As already anticipated in Part I, the ethics of restoration is not essentially different from the norm of the earthly ideal. It is primarily an ethics of ordering, though reordering during restoration, and an ethics of love, though sacrificial love during restoration. There is the vertical aspect of love, piety then and faith now; and there is the horizontal aspect,

mutual love then and sacrificial love now. The purpose is the same, one world family; only the means have shifted relatively away from the individual concern toward reaching God and the other more intensely. Most importantly, though, faith and sacrificial love are not to be ends in themselves, falling into danger of becoming static concepts, but their purpose is the restoration of the fallen relationship to God and humanity through the building of God's Kingdom. Although there is an ascetic dimension in Unification practice, it very often has a social end; e.g., prayers are offered as prayers of intercession, and conditions, such as fasting, are offered for the reconciliation between Cain and Abel. The same is true in regards to love. Sacrificial love is not an end in itself.

The Cain-Abel patterns, mostly accounts of stories from the Old Testament, are also employed as ethical models for the behavior and action of Unificationists. They are in the back of the Unificationist's mind, available as means of interpretation, analysis and ethical reflection about events on any level.[67] It is readily understandable that these different Cain-Abel interpretations include a broad spectrum of behavior patterns and strategies. Selfless love may mean absolute discipleship, obedience, heroic endeavor, spiritual and even physical struggle.[68]

In actuality, the question, "What shall we do?", is not so much answered by way of individual reflection, but rather in the concrete context of the actual relationship to the local church leader as Abel. This is exactly the reason for the charismatic character of the Unification movement as also for its tendency towards a sectarian mentality in practice— the importance of discipleship and the orientation on personal models and patterns in place of an ethics petrified into laws. If this understanding of the inherent logic of Unification ethics is correct, the question about today's central Abel figure must be of momentous importance.

In one sense, *Divine Principle* considers itself as the interpretation and determination of the who-where-and-when.[69] Its detailed and intricate theology of history seeks to bolster the contention that it is now possible to build the Kingdom of God on earth on the foundation of the love and direction of the Messiah as True Parent. A relationship of filial piety with the True Parents will bring forth the rebirth of True Children of God, and the building of true marriages and families will bring the three blessings to fruition. Furthermore, the extension of these blessed families, centering on the Messiah, will lead to the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth.[70] The more religiously oriented democratic societies will prove to

be a much more fertile ground for the fulfillment of that purpose than the atheistic Communistic societies. In fact, the latter societies, being on the Cain side, are the ones most likely to thwart God's plan. Thus, the opposition against Communism.

Of course, such an ethics is open to a great many dangers, as well as it may be the cause for genuine idealism and enthusiasm. But the primary concern must be with the possible safeguards built into its system. These and other aspects will need much more attention than is warranted by the little space left for discussion.

III. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF UNIFICATION ETHICS

The Family Ideal

It has become plain that the Unification ideal seeks to synthesize the individual ethics of the *imago Dei* with the Confucian tradition by positing the union between man and woman as the full image of God.[71] The concept of the vertical and horizontal interdependence in Unification ontology is developed to harmonize these strands as expressed in the structural and temporal metaphysical principles (Four Position Foundation).[72] On the human level, this is a rotating subject-object relationship, with God as the origin and the children in the position of object, i.e., a monogamous and God-centered nuclear family, ordered by the three types of love. Although this ideal is quite specific in one sense, ruling out other historical and contemporary forms of family, there remain questions, for example, about the particular roles of husband and wife—a sensitive question in contemporary society.

Following the implications of *Unification Thought*, the concept of the Unification family leans definitely towards a Confucian type, especially in light of the prevalent strain of the ethics of tradition in Unification theology. Yet, when looking at the practice of the Church—I am speaking of my own observations—various interpretations abound. There are patriarchal, puritanical and egalitarian types, Japanese, American and German expressions of families, to name only a few. The ideal of fidelity leaves a wide range of interpretations; or does it? My question, thus: Is the movement's intent basically to emphasize the God-centered family, which would allow for a pluralism of family norms within the defined parameters? Or, is it interested in establishing a more specific Unification family ethics which is perhaps still to emerge?

Certainly, in comparison to other theologies, Unification theology possesses a solid theological foundation for the family, since the idea of the family is rooted hermeneutically in the theology. However, it is not possible to have a family that transcends culture. The specific ethical content of the Unification family—and, indeed, that matters very much—will depend on the wider frame of the surrounding culture.[73] On the one hand, Unification theology is right in avoiding the individualistic bias of some Christian theologies. On the other hand, it needs to be careful not to limit its interpretation of the family ideal to one specific cultural expression by looking at it through the spectacles of some existing culture. As for now, all Unification theology may say about its culture is that it should be familial and God-centered and that it should be unified and universal. The questions as to what "universal" and "unification" specifically mean are crucial for the assessment of Unification ethics. They will become more pressing as the Unification Church moves sociologically into its second generation worldwide and as the centrifugally growing national interests within the church gain in momentum. I would, thus, like to emphasize that much attention will have to be directed toward addressing these concerns in future deliberations.

A related question is that of the adequacy of the family as an ethical model for society. Some of the assumptions in *Unification Thought* seem strikingly naive. For example:

> The numerous labor problems in capitalist society for
> example, can be solved, if family ethics are applied to the
> economic world.[74]

Such contentions may have transformative value, but would prove wholly inadequate by closer ethical analysis.[75] There is, however, also the model of the organism in Unification theology which could be used in conjunction with the paradigm of the family, in order to prevent a naive and perhaps dangerous familism.[76] It is thus a quintessential task for Unification ethics to clarify the relations between family and state and other parts of society, if for no other reason than to protect the individual and the family itself.[77]

Social Justification and the Messiahship of all Believers

In Unification theology, justification is no longer confined to the individual's relation to God, but includes social reconciliation. The union

between God's heart and the human heart is not an individual matter, but closely related to social action. It is largely through the dialectic of prayer and action, or life experience, that God is understood as the loving and suffering parent. There is a radical concern with the transformation of this world and the responsibility of humanity and the salvific elements contained therein. That dynamic, again, is most clearly worked out in the area of preparation for the family and in the family itself. The marriage partners are also to be each other's "messiah," so that salvation may be attained through the helping of one another in working toward a "perfect" family and, hence, as well a "perfect" individual.[78]

I think the crucial idea of Unification theology can be summed up in a modification of one of Luther's most innovative concepts, namely, the priesthood of all believers: Unificationism elevates the concept of messiahship to the messiahship of all believers. This conception endows every member with the feeling of significance and responsibility—God and humanity depend on me! This is not to mean the dethroning of God or his/her Messiah. Unificationism rather seeks to restore the potential of divinity in humanity. It is clear, however, that this conception harbors the potential of opening tremendous resources both in the positive and negative sense. We may, thus, summarize both the possible revisions and the internal resources available for the guidance and containment of the elements of perfectionism, utopianism, self-righteousness, and sectarianism within the system of Unificationism.

SUMMARY

A realistic evaluation of the concept of the Kingdom of God on earth led us to understand the humaneness of the Unification idea of perfection based on mutuality rather than selflessness. One problem for the Unification approach rests on the tendency towards the simple identification of family ethics with the ethics of the greater society. Another possible problem may lie in the restorative fervor and the demands made upon the individual by an overly dualistic understanding of reality. The criticisms and suggestions, above, towards the correction of these problems consist essentially of rigorous social analysis and emphasis on relativization. The question of ideology and cultural bias in Unificationism may be contained through the rigorous analysis of its own presuppositions as indicated in regards to its concept of the family. The possibility of too narrow a focus on any leader, prophet or messiah, may be countered by Unificationism's concept

of the messiahship of all believers and with the concept of unification.

Other elements built into the structure of Unification theology, which fortunately limit any radical utopianism, such as Marxism, are: the affirmation of inalienable orders in society (individual, family, vocation), the *heilsgeschichtliche* view of continuity between Judaism, Christianity and other religions, the transcendent ultimate ideal of the Kingdom of God in Heaven, the compatibility of revelation and reason, and the idea of redemption through unification and reconciliation centering on love.

FOOTNOTES

1. This argument was already introduced by Herbert Richardson at the "Frankenthaler Gespraeche" in Germany in 1982. He differentiated several phases of the Unification movement which he saw intimately linked with the perspective and experience of its founder, Sun Myung Moon. Herbert Richardson, "Theologische Aspekte der Vereinigungskirche,'' in *Neue Religionen—Heil oder Unheil?*, eds. Kurt E. Becker and Hans-Peter Schreiner (Landau, Pfalz, Germany: Pfaelziche Verlagsanstalt, 1982) 39-43; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Neue Religionen*.

2. [Sang Hun Lee], *Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1973). Its expanded new edition, *Explaining Unification Thought* (New York: Unification Thought Institute, 1981), has been left almost unchanged concerning its chapter on ethics. Only the added chapter on the theory of education may be of further relevance to ethics.

3. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology and Christian Thought* (New York: Golden Gate Publishing Co., 1975). The revised edition of 1976 shows virtually no changes concerning ethics. In her completely reworked version, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) the chapter on ethics is dropped.

4. E.g., see Richard Quebedeaux, ed., *Lifestyle: Conversations with Members of the Unification Church* (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1982) ix, 125-139, 7, 93-102; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Lifestyle*.

5. Guenter Kehrer, "Ethos und Handeln im System der Vereinigungskirche," in *Das Entstehen einer neuen Religion. Das Beispiel der Vereinigungskirche*, ed. Guenter Kehrer, (Muenchen, Germany: Koesel-Verlag, 1981) 193; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Vereinigungskirche*.

6. C.f., *Taschenlexikon Religion und Theologie*, 1971, vol. 1, s.v. "Ethik," by Trutz Rendtorff, 260-261.

7. For a concise delineation of Lutheran, Calvinistic and Roman Catholic ethics see James M. Gustafson, *Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978) especially 1-29.

8. C.f., Wolfgang Trillhaas, *Ethik*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Toepelmann, 1965) 12. Later, especially after Kant, other movements within Protestantism established again divisions between natural and revealed ethics.

9. Trutz Rendtorff, *Ethik. Grundelemente, Methodologie und Konkretion einer ethischen Theologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1980) 12.

10. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973); from hence on abbr. as *DP*. It contains the revelation of Sun Myung Moon and may thus be considered the official summary of the dogma of the Unification Church. It is a translation from the Korean original which is actually a discussion or elaboration of the original revelation received by Sun Myung Moon. A better translation of the Korean title may be: "Discourse on the Principle." For further clarification see especially, Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* 50; *The Principle of Creation*, The Principle Home Study Course, no. 1 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1979) vii; and Darrol Bryant and Durwood Foster, eds., *Hermeneutics and Unification Theology* (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1980) 63-5; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Hermeneutics and Unification*.

11. E.g., see: Young Oon Kim, *Divine Principle and Its Application* (Washington, D.C.:HSA-

UWC, 1968) iii-xi; DP, 16; *Lifestyle,* 4 and 6; and Frederick Sontag, *Sun Myung Moon and the Unification Church* (Nashville: Abington, 1977) 29, 30, 33, 38-39 and in the words of Rev. Moon himself: 132, 134, 136, 140 and 144.

12. C.f., Rainer Flasche, "Die Lehren der Vereinigungskirche," in *Neue Religionen,* 124.

13. C.f., the two articles by Dagfin Aslid, "Unification Theology as History" and "The Future of God," in *Hermeneutics and Horizons: The Shape of the Future,* ed. Frank K. Flinn (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1982) 251-259 and 399-407 and the following discussion in the same volume; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Hermeneutics and Horizons.*

14. C.f., Wolfgang Pannenberg, *Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981) and *Theology and the Kingdom of God* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977).

15. In one of the clearest forms this appears in Juergen Moltmann, *The Future of Creation.* Collected Essays (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979) 164.

16. For parallels of Unification Theology and the Greek tradition see especially Constantine Tsirpanlis, "The Blessed Virgin's Place in God's Redemption According to the Church Fathers and Unification Thought," in *Orthodox-Unification Dialogue,* ed. Constantine Tsirpanlis (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1981) 103-107.

17. *DP,* 140-142.

18. C.f., H. Richard Niebuhr, *Christ and Culture* (New York: Harper & Row, 1951).

19. See, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr's attacks on K. Barth's ethics, in D.B. Robertson, ed., *Essays in Applied Christianity* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959) 141-96.

20. Gustaf Wingren has been advancing a formidable argument from a Lutheran perspective trying to point out the neglect of the doctrine of creation within Barthian theology and other recent theologies and their general misconceptions about the function and interpretation of a doctrine of creation within theology. See his *The Flight from Creation* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1971).

21. C.f., Gustafson, 12-20.

22. Kim, *Unification Theology* (1980), 43-50.

23. The publication of two books on the hermeneutics of Unification Theology and Miss Kim's ample attention to the concept of revelation in her recent book demonstrate the relevance of the hermeneutical formulation of the question. See *Hermeneutics and Horizons; Hermeneutics and Unification;* and Kim, *Unification Theology* (1980).

24. Reinhold Niebuhr, *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York: Seabury, 1979) 71.

25. *DP,* 142, 148.

26. Heinz Zahrnt, *The Question of God: Protestant Theology in the Twentieth Century* (London: Collins, 1969) 201.

27. Herbert Richardson, "A Lecture to Students at the Theological Seminary in Barrytown, New York," in *A Time for Consideration,* eds. M. Darrol Bryant and Herbert Richardson, (New York: Edwin Mellen) 302. This volume is from hence on abbr. as *Consideration.*

28. Positivity and negativity do not stand for good and evil. *DP,* 20-27.

29. Warren Lewis, "Is the Reverend Sun Myung Moon A Heretic?," in *Consideration,* 182.

30. [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought,* 14.

31. *DP,* 28-31.

32. As space and time are actually always interrelated in beings so are the temporal and spatial forms of Give and Take. But for the sake of conceptual clarity, spatial order

(structure) and temporal order (process and growth) are distinguished.

33. *DP*, 55.
34. *DP*, 41.
35. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1955) 207.
36. [Lee], *Unification Thought*, 230.
37. *DP*, 27.
38. [Lee], *Unification Thought*, 226.
39. *DP*, 59.
40. [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought*, 226-27.
41. [Lee], *Unification Thought*, 231-32. See also Miss Kim's statement in her *Unification Theology* (1980), 77-80.
42. [Lee], *Unification Thought*, 233.
43. In my judgment, the glaring disparity among some scholars concerning the interpretation of *Divine Principle* has its cause in the tension created by this innovative synthesis. For example, because of his emphasis on the influence of Chinese philosophy on Unificationism, Rainer Flasche concludes that Unificationism is a natural religion and theology of creation; Rainer Flasche, "Hauptelemente der Vereinigunstheologie," in *Vereinigungskirche*, 41. Frederick Sontag contrasts this view most, rejecting the idea of *Divine Principle* as natural theology: "The 'average man' cannot discern God's nature simply by empirical observation." "It is the core of the Principle of God's action in history that is normative;" Frederick Sontag, "The God of Principle: A Critical Evaluation," in *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church*, ed. Herbert Richardson (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1981) 117, 112; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Ten Theologians.* Obviously, the present form of Unification theology still lacks precise articulation. Thus, these contrasting interpretations may be viewed as expressions of different moments that may eventually be weaved into a more tightly coherent fabric.
44. [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought*, 232.
45. [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought*, 232-33.
46. Flasche, in *Neue Religionen*, 108-11.
47. E.g., the first sentence in *Divine Principle* reads, "Everyone, without exception, is struggling to gain happiness."
48. *DP*, 41.
49. George Wolfgang Forell, *History of Christian Ethics*, vol. 1 (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1979) 165.
50. [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought*, 235.
51. *DP*, 42.
52. Kim, *Unification Theology* (1980), 78.
53. See: Richardson, in *Consideration*, 300; *The New Future of Christianity* (Washington, D.C.: Unification Church International, 1974) 26-27; and c.f., Charles Hartshorne, *Reality as Social Process* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1953) 139.
54. E.g., the continuous emphasis on all kinds of workshops in the life of Unificationists, the fact that the Church established already an elementary and secondary school in Korea and a graduate seminary in Barrytown, New York, and its tremendous effort in support of conferences in all kinds of areas.

55. For notes throughout see the doctrine of the "Fall of Man," *DP*, 65-97.

56. Matczak, 327; Sontag, in *Ten Theologians*, 117.

57. The emphasis on knowing God's heart is a central aspect of Unification teaching e.g., *DP*, 238.

58. Kim, *Unification Theology* (1980), 123.

59. See especially the "Introduction" to Part II of *Divine Principle*. *DP*, 221-238.

60. See also "The Laws of History" in [Lee], *Explaining Unification Thought*, 291-315.

61. E.g., see *Lifestyle*, 51-71.

62. Almost the whole of Part II of *Divine Principle* is dedicated to the analysis of history in light of that concept.

63. The relativity of the positions needs to be mentioned: The same group may serve in the Cain and Abel position on different levels or may even slide from one into the other position due to failure or success.

64. An entire book published by the Unification Church seeks to refute the teachings and practices of Communism, Sang Hun Lee, *Communism: A Critique and Counter Proposal* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom Leadership Foundation, 1973) 77.

65. See the chapter on predestination in *DP*, 193-203.

66. See the chapter on the mission of Jesus and the historical section in *DP*, 139-163 and 342-363.

67. The Rev. Moon's speeches are full of such analogies and reflections. See also the historical part of *Divine Principle*.

68. Stanley Johannesen's contribution is especially illuminating in this regard, "Historical Narration in *Divine Principle:* The Ideology of Religious Story," in *Hermeneutics and Horizons*, 281-314.

69. See the "Introduction" to Part I and the last chapter on the second advent of Part II of the *Divine Principle*. *DP*, 1-16, 497-536.

70. See also the interpretation of Rainer Flasche in *Neue Religionen*, 134-37.

71. The Unification doctrine of the trinity and logos are thus substantially modified by the inclusion of feminine as well as masculine aspects in the concept of God and the logos. *DP*, 205-218.

72. *DP*, 32.

73. This problem was the concern of the article of Johannesen, 281-314.

74. [Lee], *Unification Thought*, 236.

75. The history of ethical analysis is full of arguments against that simple identification of family and society. Even sociologically and anthropologically, there are natural limitations for familial association. See Reinhold Niebuhr, *Man's Nature and His Communities* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965); Young Oon Kim's remarks in her *Unification Theology* (1980), 65; and Gene G. James, "Family, Spiritual Values and World Government," in *The Family and the Unification Church*, ed. Gene G. James (New York: Rose of Sharon, 1983), 255-268; this volume is from hence on abbr. as *Family*.

76. Franz Feige, "Die Betrachtung von 'innen.' Familie und Gesellschaft in der Vereinigungskirche," in *Vereinigungskirche*, 244-246.

77. This complex of problems raises an even more urgent question concerning the compatibility between the Unification ideal and the means of attaining it; see the sociological evaluation of this very problem by Eileen Barker, "Doing Love: Tensions In the Ideal

Family," in *Family*, 35-52.

78. Hugh and Nora Spurgin, "Blessed Mariage in the Unification Church: Sacramental Ideals and Their Application to Daily Marital Life," in *Family*, 121-137.

SECTION FOUR:
UNIFICATION PERSPECTIVES ON SOME CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD

by Lloyd Eby

Introduction: God and Evil

Many people seem to think that the question whether God exists is the most important of the many philosophical questions connected with theology, with philosophy of religion, and with religious practice. For quite a long time, however, I have felt otherwise; it seems to me that a far more important question is *whether the God who exists is good*. My having grown up within an overwhelming and oppressive religious tradition—Mennonitism—has left me with an abiding fear that the God who I am sure exists may not be good.

The question of the goodness of God has at least these parts: (1) is it really true that God is the source or cause of the evils that seem to come from divine activity or from religious systems, doctrines and practices; (2) can or could God do away with the evils that befall mankind if He chose to do so, and if He has that ability, then why does He choose not to use it, and (3) does God overlook these things and sacrifice them in favor of his own (supposedly superior) interest and will? I will not be able to answer all those questions thoroughly here, but I will explore one of the most important aspects of the problem, the abiding question of theodicy.

I. The Problem of Theodicy

The problem of the goodness of God in light of the evil in the world, known in theology and philosophy as the problem of theodicy, can be expressed as a series of assertions about God and the existence of evil. These assertions about God seem to be components of an adequate doctrine of God— adequate at least from the point of view of the received tradition for monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. Thus if:

(a) God exists, and

(b) God is the Unique Creator or First Cause of the existing universe, and

(c) God is fully good and/or fully loving, and

(d) God is omnipotent or fully powerful and competent, then how can it be that

(e) there is evil in the world.[1]

It seems, intuitively at least, that logic requires that the conjunction of all those clauses cannot be true, i.e., logic seems to require that at least one of those clauses is false.[2] Solutions to the problem of theodicy, then, have nearly always been attempts to argue for the denial of at least one of those clauses, coupled with an argument that the denied clause is not really a necessary component of an adequate doctrine of God or of the world.

One possible solution is atheism, the denial of clause *a*, and many people have concluded on the basis of the existence of evil that God does not exist. This solution is obviously not available to believers. Metaphysical dualism solves the problem by denying clause *b* by claiming that there are indeed *two* sources of existence, a "good" source and an "evil" source, or a principle of light and a principle of darkness. The ancient Greeks and the Gnostics, for example, held that matter is evil, but that God did not create the material world. But this solution too is unavailable to orthodox monotheistic religions, especially Judaism, Christianity and Islam, all of which are committed to the existence of just one Original Creator. Another possible solution is to deny clause *e* by asserting that evil is not real; this solution is adopted by Christian Science and by Vedanta Hinduism, which claims that evil is *maya*, an illusion. But the monstrous crimes of the twentieth century, such as wholesale mass murders of millions of people, seem to be clear evidence of the existence of genuine evil, so I and most other people are convinced that evil is not just an illusion and that clause *e* is true. In any case, claiming that evil is an illusion does not solve the problem of our suffering brought about by the illusion.

It is clear from this that Judaism, Christianity and Islam cannot really deny clauses *a b* or *e* without denying basic foundations of their beliefs. The only other candidates for denial are clauses *c* and *d*, which means denying either the *goodness* or the *power* of God in some manner, and most theodicies connected with those religions have tried to work out a solution in just that way. Because of that, the problem of theodicy is often put in terms of a conflict between the goodness and the power of God.

Most Christian attempts to solve the problem of theodicy have attempted to deny or weaken clause d in some way, claiming that God's power is in some way restricted, curtailed, or self-limited. But theologies or philosophies which attempt to maintain that there is a limitation of divine power, while at the same time asserting the doctrine of divine creation of the universe, meet with a problem. The simultaneous assertion of these two claims--that God is the Creator of heaven and earth, and that God is limited in power—seems to lead to contradiction. The power to create in an absolute way (which the received orthodox traditions in Judaism, Christianity and Islam all imply or assert that God has) seems to imply that the Creator has the power to do whatever He chooses to do. The doctrine of divine creation of time and the universe seems to imply that God's power in the act of creation is an unlimited power.

Some theologians attempt to understand or explain God's creation by reference to the model of human creativity, and explain limitations of divine power by analogy to limitations in human power, but this hardly works. God's creative power cannot be compared with any human power exercised in a human act of creation. Human creation operates only within limitations—human creativity makes something from other things, or generates children, or performs other creative acts, none of which are absolute creations, but only creative acts within the parameters of existence and creativity already established. But God's creation of the universe (according to the received doctrines of creation held to by Judaism, Christianity, and possibly Islam) is absolute in that there is no previous existence or universe which it operates "inside" of; it brings existence out of non-existence (this is asserted, at least, in the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*), and at the same time it *makes the rules and parameters of time and existence itself.*

We can express this contradiction between creation and limitation of power in terms of our clauses given above. To do this we should note that clause b really contains *two* claims; that there is *only one* Creator God or First Cause, and that this Creator God brought the universe into existence out of nothing, i.e., that God by His action caused the absolute beginning of time and the universe and gave the universe its characteristics. It is the second of those claims contained within clause b that we are concerned with here. Clause b, understood in this way, seems to imply clause d (i.e., creation by God implies that God is all-powerful). But then, by the logical principle of *modus tollens*, the negation of clause d (i.e., the assertion that God's power is limited or curtailed in some way) implies the negation

of clause *b* (i.e., that it is in some way false that God by His action created the universe). It seems, therefore, that if God is indeed the creator in the way Judaeo-Christian monotheistic religions claim, then God's not changing things (i.e., His failure to eliminate evil by a divine act) must be due not to his lack of power to do so, but to His interest in having the evil condition or situation exist. This divine interest may operate without regard for human interest; in other words, God's interest may be a selfish interest.

Interestingly enough, in the most pointed discussions of the problem of theodicy in the Bible—the discussions in *Job* and *Romans*— the power of God as manifested in creation is given as the (non)answer to the problem. When God finally deigns to respond to Job, instead of answering Job's questions, God refers to the mysteries of creation as demonstrating God's power and as showing human (Job's) insignificance and unworthiness to question divine action and purpose.[3] So Job is forced to fall mute before divine assertion and action. Therefore *Job* does not really answer the question of theodicy except negatively, holding that God as sovereign creator is of surpassing power and is not subject to any requirements of having to answer human (Job's) questions about his activities. In the *Epistle to the Romans* Saint Paul likewise asserts that God's activity is both decisive and beyond human question.[4] God shows mercy to whomever He wishes, "So it depends not upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy."[5] Paul appeals to God's activity in creation as justifying this and as compelling human silence and acquiescence: "But who are you, a man, to answer back to God? Will what is molded say to its molder, 'Why have you made me thus?' Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use?"[6]

One quasi-Christian theological movement that has had a great deal of influence in recent years (at least in America) is process theology, developed by Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, Jr., David Ray Griffin and many others, based on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, especially as developed in Whitehead's major work, *Process and Reality.* Process theology explicitly denies divine omnipotence, and therefore has little trouble developing a theodicy.[7] But also, interestingly enough, process theology gives up the traditional doctrine of divine creation in favor of a doctrine with a very curtailed or weak notion of creation (if it indeed has a doctrine of creation at all), differing very much from the traditional Christian creation *ex nihilo* view. In the process view, there is no unique,

divinely-willed act that brings into existence time and the universe. Process theology therefore avoids the logical problem mentioned above, because it gives up both clauses *b* and *d*. (The problem, as we saw above, is that if clause *b* implies clause *d* then it is contradictory to simultaneously assert the truth of clause *b* and the negation of clause *d*. But if clauses *b* and *d* are both denied, then no contradiction arises.) The adequacy of process theology on other points, however, must be left for other discussions.

One of the best and most thorough accounts of theodicy as it has been developed in (traditional) Christian theology has been given by John Hick.[8] Hick divides Christian theodicies into two types, which he calls Augustinian (after St. Augustine) and Irenaean (after Irenaeus). The Augustinian-Latin answer has been adopted by the majority of Christian thinkers, but Irenaean theodicy, which was developed by Irenaeus and the Greek fathers prior to the work of Augustine, has had its (smaller) share of adherents.

Augustine, after his conversion to Christianity, abandoned his earlier Manichean dualism, and asserted that the universe (including matter) and its Unique Creator (God) are unambiguously good. Evil, according to Augustine, is the privation, corruption or perversion of something that was (previously or otherwise) good. Evil has no substantial being in itself, but is always parasitic upon good. Evil, then, entered the universe through the culpable free actions of otherwise good beings—angels and humans. Sin consisted not in choosing evil (because there was no evil, as such to choose), but in turning away from the higher good of God to a lower good. Natural evils (which will be discussed more thoroughly later) are held by Augustine to be consequences of the fall, and thus also consequences of (human or angelic) free will. When we ask what *caused* man to fall, Augustine answers through his doctrine of deficient causation. There is no positive cause of evil will, but rather a negation of deficiency; Augustine seems to mean by this that free volitions are, in principle, inexplicable—free willing is itself an originating cause, with no prior cause (or explanation).

In addition to this, Augustine has another theme, which we can call the aesthetic conception of evil. According to this view, what appears to be evil is such only when seen in an isolated or limited context; when viewed in the context of the totality of the universe it is good because it is a necessary element in that good universe. This view comes from the principle of plentitude (derived from Plato's *Timaeus*, 41 b-c) which holds

that a universe in which all the various possibilities of being are realized—a universe containing lower and lesser, as well as higher and greater beings— is greater than a universe which contains only the highest type of beings. In other words, the universe, to be as great as possible, must contain a hierarchy of forms of created beings, each good in its own place in the scheme of things. Lower beings are not, therefore, evil, but merely different goods. As an application of this principle, Augustine holds that the universe must contain mutable and corruptible beings. It is better that the universe contain free beings who can (and do) fall, than that it should fail to have them. Augustine, therefore, brings even moral evil within the scope of the aesthetic conception of evil. (The distinction between *moral* and *natural* evil will be discussed later.)

The two principle theses of Augustine's view (evil as privation and the aesthetic conception of evil) were adopted by Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa Theologica* (I, 47-49), and by Leibniz in his *Theodicee*. Employing these concepts, Leibniz argued that this is the best of all possible worlds, by which he means the best of all possible universes—a view which Voltaire satirized mercilessly in *Candide*. It is the best not because there is no evil in it, but because any other possible universe would not be as good (i.e., would contain fewer possibilities, which means more evil). Since all the possibilities of existence are eternally present to the Divine Mind, God surveys all these possibilities and selects the best, and then brings those particular possibilities into existence.

This traditional (Augustinian) theodicy has been criticized on primarily two points: its accounts of the origin of evil and of the final disposition of evil. According to the Augustinian view, a finitely perfect being willfully fell into evil. But that seems to be self-contradictory. If a being is indeed perfect, then it seems that such a being could not fall, because perfection seems to imply the lack of capability for evil or falling. To assert otherwise seems to imply that evil has created itself *ex nihilo*. Furthermore, Augustine's doctrine of the fall seems to be in conflict with his view on predestination, which in effect, sets man's activities within the purpose and responsibility of God (cf. Saint Paul's assertions in *Roman's* quoted above); it seems to follow therefore that evil and the fall were predestined by God. The problem of the final disposition of moral evil can be put in terms of a conflict between clauses *c* and *d:* If God desires to save all human creatures but is not able to do so (i.e., clause *d* is false), then he is limited in power, but if he does not wish to save all, but has created some for damnation,

then he is limited in goodness (i.e., clause c is false). In any case, the doctrine of eternal damnation, when it is held, makes it impossible to make any Christian theodicy.

Irenaean theodicy differs from that of Augustine in that Augustine held that the pre-fall Adam was in a state of original righteousness and that his sin constituted the inexplicable turning away from good by a wholly good being, whereas Irenaeus held that the pre-fall Adam was more like a child than a mature and responsible adult. In this Irenaean view, Adam stood at the beginning of a long process of development; he had been created as a personal being in the "image" of God, but he had to develop into the "likeness" of God. Adam's fall, then, was not a disastrous transformation and ruination of man's situation so much as it was a delaying and complication of his development from the "image" into the "likeness" of God. In this view, man is seen as not having fallen from so great a height of original righteousness, nor to so profound a depth of depravity as in the Augustinian view. In Augustine's view, man was spiritually fully perfected before the fall, but in the Irenaean view man fell in the early stages of his spiritual development, and now needs greater help than would otherwise have been required in carrying through that development.

The Irenaean theodicy also differs from the Augustinian in its view of the purpose of the world. The Irenaean account sees the world as a place for "soul-making," an environment in which the human personality may develop and grow. Nature, as an environment for man, has its own autonomous laws, which man must learn to obey. If God had created a world in which natural laws were continually changed to fit human desire, then there would be no opportunity for humans to grow through subordinating their desire to external laws. There would be no occasions in which humans could do any evil or harm, and consequently there would be no occasions for moral choice. In this view, the making of such choices is the primary means by which human growth—the growth that God intended this world to be the arena for—is made. Therefore it was necessary that God create the world and humans in such a way that humans would be faced with moral choices in order that humans might develop the moral virtues.

It is clear that the Irenaean account of the origin of evil avoids some of the problems and consequences of the more traditional Augustinian

accounts.[9] One of the possible difficulties of such a view, however, is that it may not take sufficient cognizance of divine sovereignty (i.e., it seems to go against at least some parts of the Bible, such as *Job* and *Romans*), and it is difficult to harmonize such an account with any strong doctrine of creation. More importantly, we can ask why man could not have been created by God already perfect, having the virtues that are supposed to be developed through those moral choices. One answer to that question is that a developed virtue is more valuable than one created by divine fiat, and that God is not content to have creatures with only ready-made or ready-created qualities. That reply seems not to be completely satisfactory, however, because the connection between gaining virtues and going through trials is not a direct one; there is no one-to-one correspondence between having overcome some potential evil and having developed a virtue, in fact the evidence for any such correspondence is vague at best. At least as many people (probably more) have been crushed by life's challenges as have developed virtues through overcoming them. It would seem that those who have been crushed would have reason to say that what they were faced with was *not* something that was a good placed before them by the Creator. Discussions of these points tend to trail into discussions of eschatology, claiming that in the final eschaton, all will be made good, and it will then be found that Divine Purpose was fully good and fully provident after all. Such eschatological discussions, however, place the solution to theodicy beyond discussion because they depend on what cannot be known (at least to finite creatures) because it is future.

In more recent developments of Irenaean-type theodicy there is a tendency to give up the notion of the fall as a primordial historical event or occurrence, and to see it as a mythological account of a general human difficulty and tendency—a general impediment to development existing within all human life. This view also tends toward assuming that the fall (considered either as a primordial historical event, or as an impediment existing naturally within human life) was an inevitable consequence of human existence.

As Young Oon Kim has noted, one possible way of handling the problem of evil is to drastically reduce or qualify the goodness of God, and any theology which asserts the existence of divine predestination of evil and damnation, or of an eternal hell implies a limitation of God's goodness and love.[10] In these views, God is sovereign, Lord of nature and history. What right do we humans have to question God's acts, and

especially what right do we have to judge Him by our finite ethical standards? (The references above to *Job* and to Saint Paul's claims in *Romans* argue precisely this way.) In addition to Job and Saint Paul, the reformers—Luther, Calvin and Zwingli— tended to attempt to solve the problem of evil in this way. Those who attempt this solution argue that whatever God wills is right because God, as Sovereign, wills it. But that answer commits or leads to a logical absurdity: in asserting that divine sovereignty makes whatever God does good, there is an implicit assertion that what would otherwise not be good is good only because God does or wills it. This implies that 'good' does not have any independent meaning or status, and if 'good' means something different depending on who is saying or doing whatever is in question, then no logical discussion seems possible. If what God wills is good simply because God wills it, then there is no independent meaning to 'good,' and discussions of goodness will become impossible because there is no logical way of understanding or defining goodness. This solution, moreover, turns Christianity into a rigid form of determinism, makes God into a despot, and makes the (seemingly arbitrary) exercise of divine power more important than moral or ethical standards.

This problem of God versus man is a central problem of western monotheistic theology and culture, i.e., of Judaeo-Christian and Islamic life, religion and culture. In fact, it is possibly the dominant problem of these cultures and religions. The God-versus-man problem, however, seems to be much less severe—and possibly even nonexistent—for the life, religion and culture of Oriental societies (I have in mind primarily Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, and their various offspring) because those cultures and religions do not really have a personal, sovereign, creator God. Instead they have a more naturalistic god, a god that is everywhere and is expressed in nature and in human events and life, a god that is not really a person who says "I am." The orthodox Judaeo-Christian tradition, however, has a God who is a sovereign person in a strong sense, who describes Himself in the great assertion, "I AM WHO I AM" of the Old Testament,[11] a God who is so holy that His name cannot even be spoken by humans. In other words, God asserts his own "I-ness" from the beginning. In order then for humans to relate with this God, they must submit or bow down or humble their own "I-ness" below God's "I-ness." Human existence and well-being therefore seem to be circumscribed by— or even compromised before—God's existence, while God's existence or

"I-ness" is not circumscribed by or compromised before human existence in the same way.

Attempts, such as those of Plantinga and others,[12] to argue that God's creation of free beings means that they must have the real ability to choose evil seem to me to be problematic also. The doctrine of divine creation seems to me to imply that whatever characteristics any created person has—whether those characteristics be faith or lack of faith, perseverance or lack of perseverance, love or lack of love, or whatever—all those characteristics themselves are ultimately the characteristics that were given to the person by God. God is the Ultimate Cause, and hence the ultimate cause of the personality and character, the will and abilities, the desires and needs of each individual also. Each person is a resultant being, and hence not the cause of himself, or of his characteristics.

Most Christian attempts to account for such a God-human split or tension claim that it came about because of the fall of man. That account, however, is not fully convincing. If there was a fall (either a primordial disastrous one, or a general one that happens naturally to all in the course of human development), it seems that the divine-human split must have existed *before* that fall; if there had been no such split—if human interest were not sometimes in conflict with divine desire, as an inevitable result of human existence—then there would hardly be any possibility of any fall. A fall, if it happens for any reason other than divine predestination (and note that some theologies, such as that of Augustine, hold that the fall was predestined), could only come about because humans chose it because they were motivated by a human desire. (The only other possibility is that it was a purely random accident—but in that case it is impossible to see how there could be any human responsibility for it, and any just account would require that God solve the problem by his fiat). Such human desire, at least in the case of the primordial fall, can be accounted for (assuming a non-Manichean doctrine of creation) only as a desire that arises as an inevitable result of the facts of divine creation. But such a desire must also be contradictory to God's desire. So the conclusion seems to be that some conflict between God's desire and human desire seems to arise inevitably from creation, which implies that the divine-human split or tension must be inherent, in some fashion, in creation. The choice confronting humans even before the fall, therefore, must have been between choosing God's way or denying their own happiness (or at least what they perceived as their present happiness—in other words, they had to deny their perceptions in favor of divine law).

In some accounts of the origin of evil, Satan figures prominently as the seducer or deceiver of humans, and the primary onus or responsibility for causing evil is placed on Satan. This may be of great help in developing a demonology and an adequate theology and piety of evil and it may help toward an adequate theory of human responsibility, but it is of hardly any consequence for the problem of theodicy. It merely shoves the problem back one step earlier, to accounting for why Satan chose evil instead of good, which brings us only to the same set of questions as discussed above. Satan seems to be merely another victim in this drama, a character who is himself a created being, and who therefore faces a similar dilemma as the humans. In other words, the being who became Satan was caught in the same bind or dilemma of having either to submit to God, which meant to give up some perceived good, or else defying God, which meant his downfall. In either case, he lost something.

Anselm discusses the fall of Satan, and tries to account for it on the basis of a distorted will. Anselm tries to use this account to place the onus for Satan's fall on Satan himself, removing any onus from God. Anselm discusses the problem in terms of whether Satan was given perseverance and a will sufficient to resist falling. According to Anselm, God gave Satan a will and perseverance sufficient for him to avoid the fall, but Satan nevertheless fell. Anselm seems to suggest that it was Satan's failure to receive, and not God's failure to give, that caused the problem. It seems to me, however, that Anselm's answer does not accomplish his purpose of removing the onus of Satan's fall from God. It is obviously false to claim that Satan was given a sufficient will and perseverance to avoid turning to evil, as Anselm claims, for if Satan had had these sufficiently to avoid falling, then he would in fact not have fallen. The fact that he fell proves that his will and perseverance were not sufficiently strong to avoid falling. Since the will and perseverance he had were given to him by God, then the conclusion must be that God did not give him a sufficient will and perseverance to avoid falling, and if God offered but Satan did not receive, then this came about because God did not give Satan a sufficient desire or will to receive. I do not see that Anselm has really answered this problem.[13] Another possible way of attempting to solve the problem of the origin of Satan may be to see Satan as a formerly good but imperfect being—an angel who, like the pre-fall Adam, was growing toward some fuller state of existence—who fell from that state, and then (or thereby) induced the human fall. In other words, it may be possible to adapt an Irenaean-type

theodicy for the fall of Satan also, and in that way account for the Biblical suggestion that an evil being induced the human fall.

As can be seen from this discussion, the arguments and discussions about the problem of theodicy seem inconclusive in that there seems to be no solution (or at least no solution from logic or from theological speculation) that is not open to serious and seemingly unanswerable questions about its adequacy and accuracy. Young Oon Kim notes that some theologians and philosophers have concluded that the origin of evil may be a mystery that is beyond powers of human comprehension. But she also notes—and she is surely correct in this observation—that more and more Christian theologians tend towards a view that limits God's sovereignty in some way,[14] despite the Biblical claims otherwise, and despite what seem to be the requirements for divine power inherent in a doctrine of creation. (But also, as noted above, many theologians, especially process theologians, tend also to give up those notions of creation that imply sovereign divine power.)

II. The Problem of Natural Evil

In most theological and philosophical discussions, evil has been divided into two types: *moral evil and natural evil.*[15] Moral evil includes all the evils that pertain to human morality and includes such things as murder, immorality, theft, hate, envy, gluttony, exploitation of one person by another and so on. Natural evil is evil or suffering that comes about through the activity of nature or natural events, and includes such things as disease, natural disasters such as earthquakes, storms or tidal waves, plagues of animals such as locusts, big fish eating little fish, and so on. These so-called natural evils are problems for the question of divine goodness because some of them lead to unwarranted, unnecessary, or gratuitous suffering for sentient beings, especially humans. A solution to the problem of moral evil does not necessarily also mean that the problem of natural evil has been solved.

Many devout theodicies, whatever account they may have given of moral evil, have tried to solve the problem of natural evil by denying clause *e* through asserting that natural evils are only apparent and not real. Other views, such as Augustine's mentioned above, have tried to maintain that even natural evils came about through human choice or agency. Another possibility is to adopt a form of the aesthetic conception of evil (mentioned above in connection with Augustine) and apply it to natural

events, claiming that the seeming evils are parts of one grander divine scheme (this is a form of denial of clause *e* for natural evils). Still another possibility is to attempt to divide natural evils into two groups, assert that one group is not really evil (i.e., deny clause *e* for that group), and then assert that the other group came into existence because of the culpable acts of human agents. For example, one might assert that there is no evil when big fish eat little fish, or when poisonous snakes attack and kill children (because these are just the normal workings of nature, and nature is neutral), and also assert that if humans had not fallen and were fully perfected (i.e., if they had the divine "likeness" spoken of by Irenaeus) then either the natural evils would not occur or humans would have the ability to avert bad consequences from them (for example, by being able to predict earthquakes and by moving the inhabitants from the region to be affected, or by controlling or averting all diseases that result in unwarranted suffering). In other words, those views assert that although the results of *some* natural events are genuinely evil, even those evils came about because of the human fall.

This (last suggested) solution has a number of deficiencies or problems: (1) It tends not to be open to falsification[16] because it insists on re-explaining any proffered counterexample by reference to its theory in such a way that the theory itself is never challenged. (2) It does not really take natural evil sufficiently seriously because it refuses to call it truly evil. (3) It takes too optimistic a view of human ability to predict and control the actions of nature. One of the results of the overthrow of the Newtonian world-view and its replacement with an Einsteinian and quantum-mechanical view is that natural events become, in principle, not fully knowable or predictable because the world is not a deterministic world. (4) This solution works only if for *every* case of so-called natural evil that results in gratuitous suffering, it can be shown that this suffering came about because of a (moral) failure by some agent (e.g., human or angel) other than God. In other words, even if it is shown that *many* or even *most* cases of gratuitous suffering from natural causes occur because of human (moral) failure, this is not sufficient to show that *all* such examples are thereby accounted for. It seems fair to say, then, that views which deny clause *e* for natural evil do not give a convincing solution to the problem.

Those views which try to deny the existence of genuine natural evil seem to me to be Pollyannaish. One can hardly see the natural order as

only beneficial or benevolent unless one lives in an extremely mild and sheltered environment. The natural environment is frequently a threat to human life and well-being: this environment contains drought, poisonous plants, animals and water, life-threatening floods and storms, and unforeseeable malevolent changes in terrain, weather and other conditions. Other clear cases of problems arising from nature are widespread incurable disease such as cancer and sudden heart attack, inherited disease such as diabetes and birth defects, and diseases caused by unpreventable and unforeseeable accidents.

It seems clear that any doctrine of divine creation requires that God be the origin of the natural order along with its principles of operation. The existence of so-called natural evils seems to imply that the creation made by God cannot be wholly good, at least in any simple way. This suggests a deficiency in the Creator in that He has made a world in which there exists gratuitous suffering. In other words, the existence of natural evil tends to argue strongly that clause c is false. For this reason, devout persons attempting a theodicy tend to find themselves driven toward some solution that denies clause e for natural evils. But this attempt, as suggested above, is confronted by objections that seem overwhelming. Here, as before, discussions of the problem for devout theologians or believers tend to trail into discussions of eschatology, with a view that the eschaton will also be an eschaton for natural events and beings, as in the Biblical assertion that (presumably sometime in the future) "the wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat straw like the ox . . . ."[17]

We can conclude our discussion of so-called natural evil, then, by asserting that it seems to present special obstacles for anyone who wishes to argue for divine goodness, that natural evil seems to be so prevalent and so powerful that it resists attempts to deny its existence as truly evil, that it *may* come about because of (human or angelic) moral failure but that this seems not to be the cause of *every* instance of human suffering because of natural events, and that attempts to account for natural evil on the basis of some claim that having a universe with these evils (or seeming defects) in it is better or more complete than one without the defects seem trite and banal especially in light of the enormous suffering that humans have in fact gone through at the hand of nature. I do not feel that any of the solutions ever offered for the problem of natural evils is really satisfactory.

III. Toward an "Existential" Theodicy:
Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*

Since we seem to be left without a real solution when we reach the end of the various discussions, suggestions, and arguments connected with the various attempts at a theodicy for either moral or natural evil— none of the arguments seems strong enough to overcome the various objections and counterarguments—a different approach to the problem of evil seems to be called for. Such an approach would go beyond or outside the questions or arguments of theology, philosophy and logical form into the realm of lived human experience. An investigation of that kind seems to me to offer better prospects for offering something more conclusive and more convincing on the topic.

What we might call the "existential" problem concerning evil, as I see it, is whether evil and rebellion against God may be preferable to union with God, even if this rebellion leads to damnation. It seems to me that one strong strain in twentieth-century western intellectual and cultural life is just such a rebellion against God (and/or religion).[18]

In my view, many important issues, especially issues dealing with things that, following Aristotle, we might call matters of practical wisdom— ethics, political affairs, matters of art and creativity, matters of human life-choices, and so on—are handled much better in literature, drama and film than they are in philosophical discourses. I do not think that this means that I am advocating non-answers to those questions. I suggest, instead, that those issues are especially well presented by means of thought experiments, and that dramatic, novelistic, and film presentations are really exercises in thought experimentation of a particularly subtle and profound kind. Attempting to solve a problem by story or even by mythology is acceptable and necessary for novels, drama, film and other arts. Whether it is satisfactory as a philosophical answer depends, at least partly, on the philosophical temperament of the presenter and the reader. It seems to me that much of philosophy (and theology) has been hampered by over-attention to what Stephen Toulmin calls "questions of logical form," along with insufficient attention to lived human experience or what he calls "collective reason" and "matters of function and adaptation."[19]

The best "existential" discussion of the problem of possible divine evil that I know of occurs in Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov* and in various commentaries on that novel, especially the one by Albert Camus in his *The Rebel*.[20] Dostoevsky's novel should be understood, I

believe, as an elaborate thought experiment, in which the natural consequences of various views and ways of life are shown in the life developments and life movements of the various characters.

Dostoevsky also speaks to a number of other concerns in this novel. One is the question why indictments against God and religion have been so numerous and so persistent in this century. Another is that through his example and practice in producing what is really a dramatic novel, Dostoevsky implicitly gives his answer to the question of whether a dramatic art that is of great intellectual merit and aesthetic pungency can be constructed on a God-affirming or religion-affirming basis.[21] Because this novel speaks to these questions so well, I think it is worth examining in some detail.

The indictments against God and religion in this novel occur primarily in Ivan's speech in a long conversation with his younger brother Alyosha.[22] Ivan begins by declaring his love of life, despite whatever might occur, and despite logic. He then states that the eternal questions—God and socialism—must be settled first. He affirms belief in God and in an underlying order and meaning to life, but he quickly moves from that to a declaration that he cannot accept God's world because that world is unjust.

To support his charge of injustice, Ivan gives many harrowing and heartrending stories of the mistreatment and suffering of innocent children. These stories are so moving that finally Alyosha—a novice—agrees that he too would want the perpetrators of these injustices shot. Ivan pounces on this admission, and declares that it shows that the world is absurd. He demands retribution, and not in some infinite time or space, but here on earth (i.e., Ivan rejects any eschatological solution to the problem). He rejects the view that there is some higher harmony that these things serve (i.e., he rejects any aesthetic conception of evil), declares that he could not accept any harmony that required the intense sufferings of such innocent children, and ends with a statement of rebellion against God, saying:

> "It's not God that I don't accept, Alyosha, only I most
> respectfully return Him the ticket."[23]

The force of Ivan's indictment of the world's injustice is so great that he compels even Alyosha to admit that the situation as described requires rebellion.

"Rebellion? I'm sorry you call it that," said Ivan earnestly. "One can hardly live in rebellion, and I want to live. Tell me yourself, I challenge you—answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature—that little child beating its breast with its fist, for instance— and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth."

"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly.[24]

Alyosha tries to protest that Christ—because He gave his innocent blood for all and everything—is the Being on whom a foundation for the edifice of justice and forgiveness is constructed. Ivan rejects this possibility too, in the well-known chapter entitled "The Grand Inquisitor." Although this chapter should be understood in terms of Dostoevsky's Slavophile attack on the Roman Catholic Church, it can also be seen as an attack on organized or institutional Christian religion in general. Religion has rendered ineffective Christ's attempt at liberation, replacing it with central planners who understand that the masses of people are too weak and too desirous of comfort, regularity and material well-being to be able to follow and benefit from Christ's work and teaching. The Church (churches) have gone over to the devil but for good reasons; that side gives the bread, the peace and the power over kingdoms of the earth that Jesus rejected. The Grand Inquisitor has gone over to that side not for personal gain, but out of love for humanity because he realized that this way was the only way that could truly offer benefit to the struggling and unruly mass of people.

Albert Camus' comments on this novel are particularly astute and instructive. He notes that Ivan's rebellion goes beyond that of previous rebels against God, whose rebellion was primarily individualistic. Ivan changes the tone, goes beyond reverential blasphemy, and puts God Himself on trial.

If evil is essential to divine creation, then creation is unacceptable. Ivan will no longer have recourse to this mysterious God, but to a higher principle—namely, justice.

He launches the essential undertaking of rebellion, which is
that of replacing the reign of grace by the reign of justice.
He simultaneously begins the attack on Christianity.[25]

Ivan makes these attacks not because he does not believe in God, but
because he feels that God is unjust, and hence evil; he ranks justice above
the divinity, and refutes God in the name of moral value. Ivan attacks the
interdependence in Christianity between suffering and truth. His rejec-
tion is so total that even if offered salvation or eternal life he would refuse,
because to accept it would mean acquiescence to the injustice of the world.
The problem with Ivan's total rejection of divine coherence, however, is
that this stance leads to recognizing the legitimacy of murder and the
condoning of crime. Once he has taken this step of rebellion, he must go
to its bitter end, which is to replace God with man—to the metaphysical
revolution in which man occupies the place formerly held by God.[26] But
Ivan's rebellion leads to contradiction; there is now no basis on which to
distinguish between what is permissible and what is crime. One man's
view of what is permissible becomes as legitimate as any other man's view.
Dostoevsky may be, as Camus claims, the prophet of the new religion of
atheism and socialism, but Dostoevsky did not welcome or champion this
development.

Dostoevsky replies to Ivan's devastating indictments throughout the
novel, but especially in the account of the Russian Monk Zosima. As
Nathan Rosen points out, Dostoevsky himself saw Ivan's indictments and
the account of the monk as *pro* and *contra* on this issue of divine goodness
or evil.[27]

The question of the genuineness of sainthood is not answered
philosophically, but with the living example of Father Zosima; we see his
virtue by observing his life, his teaching and his activity. His saintly
example is contrasted with Father Ferapont, who possessed the trappings
of genuine religion (fierce asceticism, fervent prayer, wearing chains under
his robes to mortify his flesh), but who nevertheless spread discord and
dissension among the monks. Ferapont represents, I think, Dostoevsky's
admission that some religion is indefensible and even destructive—religion
of forms and trappings and even personal sacrifice without the essential
heart.

Dostoevsky presents many things from Zosima's life and from the
lives of the other characters that reply to Ivan's indictments. I think it may

be instructive and worthwhile to list and comment on some of the more important of them.

1. Zosima gives three stories about his life before his conversion— the story of his brother Markel, the story of the duel, and the story of the murderer's confession. Each story contains an element of mystery, which suggests that all human life has a mysterious dimension encompassing the mysteries of faith, conversion and cosmic justice.

2. Zosima tells the story of Job, but ignores Job's claim about his innocence, focusing instead on the fact that the lost children were later replaced, and on the mystery that the new children erased from Job's memory the pain of the earlier loss. This is an indirect answer to Ivan's concern about the suffering of children. It is also implicitly a kind of eschatological solution to the problem of suffering, and perhaps a tacit claim that only an eschatological solution is available.

3. Although accorded the status of a saint by the common people, Zosima neither mocked them nor was obsequious toward them, but mere-ly served them with dignity, giving blessings and counsel, thereby contrib-uting to their genuine well-being. As a man of religion and tradition he embodies what is best in life and contrasts dramatically with the lives of other non-religious characters, especially the Karamazovs.

4. Zosima brings together the father Karamazov with his sons so that the father's buffoonery and despicableness temporarily subside. Yet the meeting is ultimately unsuccessful; although Zosima is a saint, he does not work miracles that go beyond or usurp the responsibility of others who meet with him. This suggests that, in practice, the power of true good is circumscribed by or responsive to human choice and the contingencies of human existence.

5. Zosima recommends that Alyosha, the novice, leave the monas-tery and marry, a recommendation in striking contrast with Ivan's trou-bles with the women in his life. Ivan cannot achieve intimacy for any extended time, but Zosima sees intimacy as part of Alyosha's salvation.

6. Zosima's faith is neither uneducated nor blockheaded, though simple and elemental. He wears it with good humor and good feeling for all, and spreads goodness to all who will accept it. This contrasts with the gloom and nervousness Ivan spreads to his companions. This suggests that Ivan's concern with justice does not translate, in practice, into an increase in goodness, but rather into an increase in a kind of evil.

7. When Zosima dies, his body decays and begins to smell, denying

to others the supernatural miracle they expected. But a greater miracle happens in that Alyosha and Grushenka go through several stages of inner transformation, culminating in the "Cana of Galilee" episode. Zosima brings the true miracle of inner change of heart; this miracle comes when one follows true insight and prefers doing good to doing evil.

8. Despite the brother Mitya's passion, his hatred of his father, his need for money, his vow to kill his father, and even the opportunity and the weapon, he runs away from the temptation to parricide. If the Grand Inquisitor were right, these psychological and material causes should have compelled him to the deed. But every reader realizes the genuineness of his refusal and his self-restraint. His example shows that people have the inner capacity to overcome those forces. This is a kind of proof (or at least very strong evidence) that psychological and material causes (or forces) are not compelling or overwhelming, and that they are subservient to human will and choice. This amounts to a strong refutation of all forms of materialism and of psychological theories, such as Freudianism, which affirm psychological determinism.

9. Ivan goes away profoundly depressed after reciting his tale to Alyosha, and finally recognizes that this depression is caused by the revolting familiarity and impiousness of Smerdyakov. Even though Ivan hates his father and would like to see him dead, Smerdyakov's lack of piety toward the father grates on Ivan. Also, Ivan himself confesses complicity in the murder in the end, even though this is irrational and ridiculous because he knows no one will believe him. So even Ivan operates at the personal (which is to say, real) level by a different ethic than the one he expressed earlier in his speech to Alyosha. We might call it an ethic of human relationships and human love, as opposed to an ethic of justice.

10. Ivan goes mad in the end, while those who follow the way of life of Father Zosima undergo inner transformation to a higher state of consciousness and way of life. This suggests that rebellion against God and against divine notions of goodness leads to psychological, social and even physical degradation, whereas saintliness of life—following the divine order—has the opposite effect.

11. The atheistic socialism that Dostoevsky and Camus see (correctly, I believe) as the alternative to the religious view does not solve the problem of justice, but in fact ultimately promotes much greater injustice, even in the economic realm where it is supposed to be paramount; we have observed this dramatically in the last decades. So rebellion in the name of

justice does not work even for its own ends.

Through all these episodes Dostoevsky has presented an answer to the existential problem I mentioned above. He has shown both the consequences of rebellion against God and against the divinely-created cosmos, as well as an alternative to this rebellion, and has presented all this in the form of an elaborate thought experiment. The novel can and should be seen as presenting a kind of theodicy. It is not a theodicy given in terms of theological or logical investigation or presentation, but what, for want of a better term, I have called an "existential" theodicy.

In addition to that, by his own work of art, as well as through the contrast between Fathers Zosima and Ferapont, Dostoevsky offers an answer to the question about whether a non-trivial and important dramatic art can be constructed on a basis other than a God-indicting one.[28] Dostoevsky himself does not shrink from criticizing religion in his dramatic novel (he does it through his presentation of Father Ferapont), but presents even that criticism on a religion-affirming basis (an affirmation of the genuine goodness of Father Zosima). This novel demonstrates a possible way in which true religion can both do away with the need for rebellion and lead to greater things: to a superior dramatic art and to the kind of human well-being furthered by Father Zosima.

IV. Unification Theodicy as an "Existential" Theodicy

Unification theology, as presented in the *Divine Principle* and elsewhere, gives an elaborate account of the origin of evil. It asserts that evil originated in the fall of man, and claims that this fall was instigated by the being who became Satan through the process. *Divine Principle* discusses the question of God's role in the origin of evil, but does this in a novel way: it presents a number of reasons why God did not intervene in the process of the fall to prevent the occurrence of evil. Unification theology does not, however, present an explicit theodicy, although it has a basis on which a theodicy can be constructed, and Unification theologians have presented many reflections on and developments of this matter. Unification theology *does* modify or limit the power of God, or at least limit God's power to contravene human choice and action, and in that it has affinities with process theology. It also asserts that the humans were immature and growing toward perfection when they fell, and that their growth to perfection was something for which they were partly responsible. Their situation presented them with moral choices which they had to resolve in the

right way in order that their growth could take place. In this, Unification theology is quite similar to Irenaean theodicy.[29]

Unificationism's handling of the problem of theodicy seems to me, however, to be at its core and in its motivation much more like what Dostoevsky gives us than what is given in any of the received Christian (or other) theological or philosophical accounts. Unification piety based on the oral tradition and common practice seem to me to adopt something very much like Dostoevsky's solution to the problem of seeming divine evil. This piety and oral tradition present many stories of people and their lives and actions —especially stories about Rev. Moon and his faithful disciples—and shows that they have overcome adversity, empathized with the suffering of God and of humans, and have accomplished many feats of faith and action, and thereby spread goodness and well-being. These lives have had that effect in spite of adversity and of seemingly hostile circumstances.

It is accurate to say, in fact, that the *dramatic story* of God's desire, His suffering, His hope, and His history (i.e., the history of His interaction with humans, with Satan, and with the world) is the central matter of Rev. Moon's preaching and teaching, and that this preaching and teaching forms the core of Unification piety and the impetus for the dynamism of the Unification Church and its members and activities. Most Unification members would probably testify to having had some personal experience of God's suffering, suffering that came about because of the fall and because of repeated instances of evil. This gives Unification piety an enormous impetus toward working to relieve God's suffering through solving, eliminating, or doing away with evil and its consequences. In addition, Unification doctrine and piety have an enormous emphasis on and certainty of the imminent eschaton, an eschaton, however, which can be achieved only through human work, effort and sacrifice. The stories of people who have achieved something in advancing this present immanent eschaton are, then, of very great importance both in assuring Unification Church members that the eschaton is at hand and can be brought about, as well as in spurring them on to more and greater feats of faith, sacrifice, endurance and accomplishment.

Unification theology claims that God is not responsible for the moral evils that befall us, and indeed that God does all that is possible to avoid them, but God is bound by the choices made by humans. It asserts that God's creation of man and His giving the characteristics and circum-

stances that were given to humans was an act of love, love which would also risk being hurt. Much of this doctrine is, in practice, conveyed in the form of stories about Biblical and other characters, and about God. This has been called a process of "re-mythologization."[30] The task of Unification piety and practice, then, is to persuade humans to make the choices that will lead to God's victory, which will, it is asserted, also lead to human well-being. Those choices must conform to God's will and principle in order that goodness result. Unificationism asserts that God's heart and will and purpose *can* be known—it seems to say that this can be done through God's prophets, through divine revelation, and so on, but it is somewhat vague about how we may distinguish between veridical and false representations of the divine—and that religions have the task of truly apprehending these and of making them known to all people. It also asserts, however, that to do this and to carry out the divinely appointed task and mission, people and religions must unite on and work on and achieve a higher dimension than has heretofore occurred. The stories told in the oral tradition have the function of reinforcing these challenges and possibilities.

Conclusion

The existence of evil often seems to be such clear evidence of either the evil or the powerlessness of God and/or religion that many people have concluded that God and/or religion cannot or should not be defended. But the alternative to alliance with God is rebellion, and rebellion, as Dostoevsky suggests and as historical events in the twentieth century seem to demonstrate,[31] leads to much worse consequences, even in the dimension over which the rebellion took place. So we are warranted in concluding, I think, that God's goodness is at least greater than the goodness of any person who presumes to base goodness on some human perception, i.e., we can conclude that theistic humanism is better and offers greater hope than anti-theistic or atheistic humanism.

In this paper I have not discussed the problem of good or acceptable versus bad or unacceptable religions, except incidentally in connection with Dostoevsky's contrast of Fathers Zosima and Ferapont. It is surely clear to everyone that some religions, or even some things from all of them, must be rejected as indefensible. A fuller discussion of the problem of theodicy would need to separate between indictments of religion and indictments of God, discuss the issue of how to distinguish or separate

good from bad religions or religious practices, and discuss the problem of whether the existence of false or bad religion and religious practices means that God should be charged with evil or failure. Solving that problem would almost certainly require discussion of the problem of revelation, with an attempt to answer the question of how we might distinguish between true or reliable revelations and false or unreliable ones.[32]

A thorough solution to the problem of theodicy and the goodness of God and religion may not be possible. The problem of natural evil seems to me to be especially resistant to solution. I do think that Unification theology—or, more accurately, an extended Unification doctrine based on Unification theology and other Unification doctrines, offers some promise of being able to answer many of the most serious and important indictments of God and of religion. For the most part, however, this still remains as a task to be achieved, rather than an accomplishment to be celebrated.

FOOTNOTES

*. Parts of this paper are revisions of sections taken from my earlier papers: "Is God Good and Can God be Defended?" presented in Theme Group Three, "In Defense of God," at the New ERA Conference "God: The Contemporary Discussion, III," Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, December 30, 1983, to January 4, 1984; "Dramatic Art and Religion," presented in Theme Group Three, "Religious Art; Images of the Divine," at the New ERA Conference on "God: The Contemporary Discussion, IV," in Seoul, Korea, August 9-15, 1984; and "Unification Thought and Religious Knowledge," presented in Committee VII of ICUS XIII, Washington, D.C., September 2-5, 1984.

1. Young Oon Kim presents an excellent introduction to the problems of theodicy in her *An Introduction to Theology* (New York: The Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, 1983), pp. 67-71.

2. A few philosophers and theologians, such as Alvin Plantinga, have argued otherwise, claiming that there is not any necessary logical contradiction in asserting the conjunction of all those claims or clauses. What is at stake in those discussions is an investigation of how the rather cryptic and compressed assertions in each of those clauses is to be understood or "unpacked." In particular, those discussions usually argue that for God to be fully loving and powerful and competent does *not* necessarily logically require Him to solve every evil that exists. See Alvin Plantinga, *God and Other Minds* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1967). Among other discussions of these issues are the various papers in Nelson Pike, ed., *God and Evil* (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, *Evil and the Concept of God* (Springfield, Il: Charles C. Thomas, Publishers, 1968); Nelson Pike, "God and Evil: A Reconsideration," *Ethics*, LXVIII (1958), p. 119; Terence Penelhum, "Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil," *Religious Studies*, II (1966), p. 107; Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, "Evil and Inconclusiveness," *Sophia*, XI (1972), pp. 10 ff.; Austin Farrer, *Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961); and Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., "Logic and the Problem of Evil," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, IV (1967), pp. 121, 122.

3. See *Job* 38:1 to 42:6.

4. *Romans* 9:14-26.

5. *Romans* 9:16 RSV.

6. *Romans* 9:20-22 RSV.

7. The most thorough presentation of the process account of limited divine power occurs in Charles Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes* (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 1984); see also David Ray Griffin, *God, Power and Evil: A Process Theodicy* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976).

8. John Hick, *Evil and the God of Love* (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1977); see also Hick's article, "The Problem of Evil," in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. & The Free Press, 1967), 3:136-141. My account here of Augustine, Leibniz and Irenaeus is based on Hick's presentation.

9. Hick, for one, favors the Irenaean account.

10. Kim, op. cit., p. 68.

11. *Exodus* 3:14 RSV.

12. Plantinga, et al., op. cit.
13. Anselm's discussion of this is contained in *De Casu Diaboli*. An English edition is Anselm of Canterbury, *Truth Freedom and Evil: Three Philosophical Dialogues*, trans. and ed. by Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Harper Torchbooks, 1967), pp. 145-196.
14. Kim, op. cit., pp. 69, 71.
15. Some philosophers and theologians have questioned whether there really is or should be such a distinction. Without entering into that discussion, I will assume here that the distinction can be upheld.
16. The term 'falsification' is used here instead of a reference to lack of verification because the verificationist program has been shown conclusively to be defective, but the requirement for falsifiability, while it has been attacked as also untenable, may be considered to be a minimum requirement for something to be truly scientific. The *locus classicus* for discussions of falsifiability as a counterproposal to verifiability is the writings of Karl Popper, especially his *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1959; New York: Basic Books, 1959). All of Popper's subsequent books have dealt with this issue at length and expanded or refined his previous views. The best introduction to and summary of Popper's work occurs in his own "Autobiography of Karl Popper," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. XIV, in two books (La Salle, Il: Open Court, 1974), bk. 1, pp. 3-181. An excellent account—so good that I consider it essential— of the downfall of the verificationist program and its replacement with a critical (falsificationist) theory is given in Walter B. Weimer, *Notes on the Methodology of Scientific Research* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 1979). A seminal discussion of and expansion of Popper's falsificationist program occurs in Imre Lakatos's article, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (London & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
17. *Isaiah* 65:25 RSV.
18. Evidence for this claim seems to me to be ubiquitous and overwhelming. Darwin, Marx (with Lenin) and Freud are the most important intellectual fathers of modernity, and each of them rejects religious answers or solutions to the problem at hand; Marx and Freud also seem to reject God. Much of the film and drama of the twentieth century is explicitly anti-religious, cf. Christopher Durang's drama, *Sister Mary Ignatius Explains it All For You*, and the films of Eisenstein, Bunuel, Cocteau, Hawks, Bergman, Fellini, Coppola, Altman, Fassbinder, and many others, including all the current "youth-market" films coming from Hollywood. The whole tenor of Western culture in the twentieth century is overwhelmingly secular, despite some important counter examples.
19. Stephen Toulmin, *Human Understanding*, vol. 1 of proposed 3 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. vii.
20. One edition of the Dostoevsky novel is the Norton Critical Edition: Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, ed. by Ralph E. Matlaw (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976); all citations here are from that edition. This edition also contains critical commentaries on the novel, including that of Camus. An English edition of Camus's

work is Albert Camus, *The Rebel,* trans. from the French *L'Homme Revolte* by Anthony Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1956).

21. Dostoevsky's work is parochial and anti-modern, however. For that reason it is not really a good answer to the dramatist's problem in the twentieth century. In this century it is almost impossible to produce a dramatic work—theater, film, or novel—which is of great intellectual and aesthetic merit and at the same time religion-affirming or God-affirming. Most religion-affirming or God-affirming drama in this century has been sappy and embarrassing.

22. *The Brothers Karamazov,* part II, book 5.

23. Ibid., p. 226.

24. Ibid.

25. Albert Camus, *The Rebel,* trans. by Anthony Bower (New York: Knopf, 1956). The section of *The Rebel* dealing with *The Brothers Karamazov* is reprinted in the Norton Critical Edition, op. cit., and my citations are from that edition, pp. 836, 837.

26. Ibid., pp. 836-839.

27. Nathan Rosen, "Style and Structure in *The Brothers Karamazov* (The Grand Inquisitor and the Russian Monk)" in *Russian Literature Triquarterly,* I, (1971), 1, 352-365. Reprinted in the Norton Critical Edition, op. cit., pp. 841-851. My presentation here of Dostoevsky's points in reply to Ivan's accusations of God owes very much to Rosen.

28. But see note #21 above on this problem. Since Dostoevsky's work is from and of the nineteenth century, it may offer little help to the dramatist of the present day.

29. There is a growing literature on Unification theodicy. Besides Young Oon Kim's various books, there are presentations on and discussions of this issue in several of the conference proceedings from conferences sponsored by New ERA and the Unification Theological Seminary. One is by Stephen Deddens, "Toward a Unification Theodicy," presented at the New ERA Conference, "God: The Contemporary Discussion, II," Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, December 30, 1982 to January 4, 1983. Jonathan Wells has written an important (but unpublished) work on the topic; see also his "Fall of Man Lecture," in Darrol Bryant, Ed., *Proceedings of the Virgin Islands' Seminar on Unification Theology* (Barrytown, NY: The Unification Theological Seminary, 1980), pp. 47-55, and the discussions following on pp. 55-59, and pp. 70-79. Other Unification theologians have also written and spoken on this question. See, for example, my papers and the papers of Dagfinn Aslid, Klaus Lindner, Andrew Wilson and Anthony Guerra, as well as the transcript of various discussions in Frank K. Flinn, ed., *Hermeneutics & Horizons: The Shape of the Future* (Barrytown, NY: The Unification Theological Seminary, 1982).

30. See Frank K. Flinn, "The New Religions and the Second Naivete: Beyond Demystification and Demythologization," in *Ten Theologians Respond to the Unification Church,* Herbert Richardson, ed. (Barrytown, NY: The Unification Theological Seminary, 1981) pp. 41-59.

31. I have not discussed the history of twentieth century rebellion against God and religion in this paper. The greatest evils of the twentieth century have been perpetrated, I believe, by the Nazis, the Fascists, and the Communists, all of whom owe their paternity to Lenin, who was virulently opposed to religion and to divinity. One could say that Dostoevsky was remarkably prescient in forseeing that the rebellion he spoke

of leads directly to Leninism. It is also true that very great evils have been committed by devout religious believers, even while using religious texts or themes to justify what was being done, such as the instigation of apartheid in South Africa by devout followers of the Dutch Reformed Church. I think it is accurate to say, however, that an impartial weighing of the scope and amount of evil committed would conclude that far greater evil has been committed by those who have explicitly rejected religion and God than by those who claim to be religious or to be following the divine will. All this is, however, a topic that requires a great deal of exploration. It must be left for another time.

32. I have tried to discuss the problem of false versus true revelation and suggest how they might be distinguished in my "Millennial and Utopian Religion: Totalitarian or Free?" in Joseph Bettis and S.K. Johannesen, eds., *The Return of the Millennium* (Barrytown, NY: New ERA Books, the International Religious Foundation, Inc., 1984), pp. 119-136.

SCIENCE, RELIGION AND ORIENTALISM IN THE THOUGHT OF PAUL CARUS

by James R. Fleming

The historical interest of the thought of Paul Carus (1852-1919) lies in the valuable insights it provides into the *fin de siecle* attempts to harmonize religion and science with Oriental thought, and the powerful ecumenical impact of the 1893 Parliament of Religions in which he took an active role. Because of the Oriental sources of Unification Theology, its efforts to reconcile religion and science, and the Movement's plans to commemorate the centennial of the Parliament of Religions[1], a study of Paul Carus has immediate interest and importance. In a *Festschrift* dedicated to a theologian known for her constructive thought and sympathetic appreciation of the variety yet underlying unity of the world's religions—a theologian instrumental in expounding Unification Theology in the West, it is thus appropriate to examine the thought of Paul Carus as he constructively attempted to unify science, religion and Oriental thought.

Paul Carus, philosopher, scholar and theologian, advocated the unity of thought and the unity of religions. His philosophy of science (more broadly *Wissenschaft*) was based on a system of non-reductionistic monism which proclaimed a unitary conception of the world: the phenomena of nature are one; the laws of nature reside in things and are discovered not created by the investigator; these laws depend on God, the creator and source of natural law. Carus' monism was a creative response to the personal crisis of his loss of faith in traditional theology. His was an earnest attempt to solve the conflict between knowledge and belief—and the resulting agnosticism—implicit in the Kantian split between noumena and phenomena.

Carus' philosophy of religion was based on the methodology of science. He claimed that all the historical religions of the world could be investigated through the "science of religion"—they could be purified and their

truth claims could be extracted from their symbolism. Ethics could be placed on an objective scientific basis. Then all the world's religions—which all contain basic truths—could be interrelated in what Carus called the "religion of science" and a new religious age for humanity could be inaugurated.

Paul Carus was born in 1852 at Ilsenburg am Hartz, Prussia, the son of a prominent reformed minister. His father intended that his son prepare for a career in the clergy. Unable to subscribe to his father's stern religious tenets, Paul Carus suffered a religious crisis early in life in which he rejected reformed theology and began a life-long search for a philosophy of religion compatible with a scientific world view.[2]

He studied mathematics, natural sciences, classical philology and philosophy at the Universities of Griefswald and Strassburg and received the Ph.D. in philosophy at Tubingen in 1876. After serving in the military, he taught at an academy in Dresden for one year. Censured for his religious views and stifled by the intellectual climate of Germany, he left for England where he stayed briefly before coming to the United States in the early 1880's.

In 1885 Carus published his first book, *Monism and Meliorism,* a preliminary statement of his views, which caught the attention of Edward Carl Hegeler, a German-American industrialist and publisher. Hegeler invited Carus to join him in LaSalle, Illinois, near Chicago, as the new editor of a magazine, *The Open Court,* which, in Hegeler's words, was to represent:

> . . . an earnest effort to give the world a (monistic) philoso-
> phy in harmony with all the facts which will gradually
> become a new religion to it as it has to me.[3]

The Open Court Publishing Company also issued a series of popular and inexpensive philosophical classics edited by Carus such as translations of Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant under the name of the Religion of Science Library.[4] In 1890 a new philosophical journal, *The Monist,* was begun by the Open Court as a scholarly review of science, the philosophy of science, and the history and philosophy of religion, with important articles on Oriental thought as well. Year after year *The Open Court* and *The Monist* reviewed the pick of European works on science, philosophy and religion. Seminal articles from important writers around

the world appeared regularly: from England, Bertrand Russell and Max Müller; from France, Alfred Binet and Henri Poincaré; from Germany, Ernst Mach and Ernst Haeckel; from the Orient, D.T. Suzuki and Rabindranath Tagore; and from the United States, John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce. Each issue typically included lengthy commentaries on these articles from the pen of Paul Carus.

Ultimately, the Open Court Publishing Company espoused the philosophy of monism as a world view extending to all realms of thought and experience. *The Open Court* and *The Monist* were intended to be the organs of a movement to establish this world view. Since the activities of the Open Court Publishing Company were the embodiment of this idea, and since funds were forthcoming from Hegeler's industrial investments, financial success or failure were not of primary concern—advocacy and propaganda came first.

Carus' Monism

Monism for Carus was *not* a claim that there is but one substance, either spiritual or material, in the world. Carus, rather, proclaimed a *unitary conception* of the world:

> Monism or positivism conceives the world as a unitary reality which is knowable in its parts by the method of abstraction.[5]

Carus employed the analogy of the circle to explain the nature of the universe: the objective aspects of the universe (matter in motion) were to the subjective aspects (feeling and spontaneity) as the outside of a circle was to the inside:[6]

> Soul and body...are the two inseparable sides of our existence; they are the two abstracts made from one and the same reality.[7]

This most characteristic feature of reality, its *oneness* meant for Carus that "all elements of objective reality are inseparably united with the corresponding elements of subjective reality."[8] Because our minds and the external world have the same formal structure, we can employ what Carus called "purely formal"[9] reasoning to investigate reality. Beginning with

positive facts and proceeding deductively according to the rules of logic, human reason can self-confidently move beyond the boundaries of sense experience and still be assured of correct results. In this sense Carus' theory of knowledge is realistic, rather than idealistic or pragmatic: knowledge is the apprehension of forms that are in the world; truth consists of the correspondence of our ideas with the world. This was the basis for his philosophy of science.

In a review article for *Scientific American,* Carus argued that the meaning of the term monism had changed from a "one substance theory," as coined by Christian von Wolf in the Eighteenth Century, to the materialistic and mechanistic naturalism of the post-Darwinian scientific reductionists. Carus attempted to go beyond these definitions by adding his own: monism was "any philosophy that in one way or another sought to establish an ultimate unity of some kind."[10]

Illustrative of Carus' differences from other monists is his dispute with the Darwinian biologist Ernst Haeckel the premier spokesman for mechanistic monism. Haeckel's monism was a naturalism allowing for no other reality but matter and energy. Psychic phenomena were reducible to chemical affinities and differences among levels of organisms were merely quantitative. The only religious doctrine compatible with Haeckel's monism was pantheism in which God is the sum total of the forces and matter in the universe and immortality is merely the conservation of substance.

The basis for Carus' critique of Haeckel was that a mechanical explanation of reality could not be complete since it omitted non-mechanical phenomena such as feelings, conceptions, purposes and moral behavior.[11] Furthermore, a purely mechanical description of natural phenomena was not possible for inorganic objects, much less organic beings (particularly humans). Monism is not necessarily pantheistic since God is not merely the sum total of matter and energy in the universe, but constitutes the relational and formal structures of reality which are only partly described by natural laws. For Carus the doctrine of immortality contained a deeper truth than that taught by Haeckel: "There is a conservation of matter and energy, but there is also a preservation of form."[12]

Carus' monism then was a philosophy *of* science rather than a philosophy *from* science. Haeckel (and others like Mach) were mistaken monists, but monists still. On the other hand, if any philosophical position was "dualistic" it was by virtue of that fact alone wrong. For Carus, to

establish the inadequacy of any philosophy it was sufficient to show that it was dualistic:

> All truths must agree; there may be contrasts, but there cannot be contradictions in truth. Any dualistic conception indicates that there is a problem to be solved.[13]

It was Kant, Carus thought, who had stated the major problem of modern philosophy, but had failed to solve it; and by that failure he had encouraged the worst error in the contemporary period—agnosticism. The Kantian split between the noumenal and the phenomenal was at least as bad as the earlier Cartesian split between subject and object. Kant's use of the doctrine of the *a priori* in formal thought required the notion of the *ding an sich*—the thing in itself—which was unknowable. And the unknowable had become the bane of modern philosophy.[14] The resulting "dualism" in which God, freedom, and immortality were merely postulates of faith and no longer knowable objects of cognition at all, was unacceptable to Carus. How, after all, could one unify religion and science if the objects of religions awe and veneration are cut off from scientific scrutiny?[15]

Carus conceived of monism as a *plan* for a philosophical system, not a fully developed and articulated system. As William Hay notes: "Carus' philosophy is painted on a big canvas, but it is drawn in a sketchy way. There are no clues about how to fill in the details."[16] Indeed, the distinguishing feature of Carus' philosophy is its sketchiness. Perhaps this was intentional. The bulk of Carus' work is not a defense of his monism, but, through what he called *pragmatology,* an exposition, application and implementation of his views to other areas of concern as living convictions, e.g., through his work as the editor of the Open Court Publishing Company.

Religion and Science

No other area of concern loomed larger in importance to Carus than the field of religion:

> We advocate in the Open Court what we term "The Religion of Science," which means that scientific truth itself will be the last guide of a religious conception for mankind.[17]

As mentioned earlier, Carus' basic problem was to retain religion but make it compatible with science. He proposed to do that by treating science as a religious phenomenon while subjecting religion to the test of scientific inquiry. Science and religion were not contradictory; they were complementary:

> All scientific questions, if practically applied, are religious questions. All religious questions are, when intellectually grasped, scientific questions.[18]

In his book *Philosophy as a Science,* a summary of his mature philosophical views, he noted the influence that science exercises on religion as evidenced by the "scientific spirit pervad(ing) the present age":[19]

> There it appears as Biblical Research (sometimes called Higher Criticism), in the study of the history of Christianity and of other faiths, and in the philosophical purification and deepening of the God-idea... A sympathetic reader of my books will find that in spite of the great variety of subjects which I have treated, all are subordinate to a general plan which attempts to awaken the unconscious instincts of scientific inquiry and to organize them into a consciously apprehended and clear conception of their unity, which is nothing more or less than THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE (original emphasis).[20]

In light of Higher Criticism, Christianity was seen by Carus as a religion which became the fulfillment of ideas and aspirations which were dominant in its time. He thought that the people of the first century had gradually developed the notion (drawn from many sources) of a God who walked on the earth, unknown to the people, and intervened in their lives. Through idealization and spiritualization, Christians, especially St. John and St. Paul, grafted these pervasive ideas onto the figure of Jesus.[21] It is important to realize, however, that Carus was not calling for a renunciation of Christianity, but a purification of it in light of the developments in modern Biblical criticism.

The Parliament of Religions

Carus' active interest in ecumenical movements and Oriental religions began with the Parliament of Religions held in 1893 in conjunction with the Chicago Columbian Exposition. There representatives of Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism, Confucianism and Islam peacefully confronted western delegates from most of the Christian denominations, including the Roman Catholics. One participant called the parliament "the greatest event so far in the history of the world."[22] In an article penned immediately after the parliament entitled "The Dawn of the New Religious Era," Carus called the parliament "the most noteworthy event of this decade"[23] and saw it as analogous to pentecost in many respects:

> A holy intoxication overcame the speakers as well as the whole audience; and no one can conceive how impressive the whole proceeding was, unless he himself saw the eager faces of the people and imbibed the enthusiasm that enraptured the multitudes.[24]

At one of the parliament sessions Carus presented a paper entitled "Science: A Religious Revelation." There he returned to the theme of his own religious quest, arguing that a person must be willing to pass through all the despair of infidelity and religious emptiness before he can learn to appreciate "the glory and grandeur of a higher stage of religious evolution."[25] He ended with his now familiar plea that "science is the method of searching for the truth, and religion is the enthusiasm and good will to live a life of truth."[26]

The parliament also sharpened Carus' critique of Christianity:

> There are two kinds of Christianity. One is love and charity; it wants the truth brought out and desires to see it practically applied in daily life. It is animated by the spirit of Jesus and tends to broaden the minds of men. The other is pervaded with exclusiveness and bigotry; it does not aspire through Christ to the truth; but takes Christ, as tradition has shaped his life and doctrines, to be the truth itself. It naturally lacks charity and hinders the spiritual growth of men.[27]

After the parliament, Carus worked to keep its ecumenical ideal alive. He was the director of the World Religious Parliament Extension,

founded in 1894, whose stated purposes were 1) to promote harmonious personal relations, and a mutual understanding between adherents of the various faiths; 2) to awaken a living interest in religious problems; and above all—3) to facilitate the attainment and actualization of religious truth.[28] For Carus, the extension and fulfillment of the parliament ideal would be a confirmation of his monistic assertion of the unity of truth and the beginning of a new religious era for humanity:

> How small are we mortal men who took an active part in the Parliament in comparison with the movement which it inaugurated! And this movement indicates the extinction of the old narrowness and the beginning of a new era of broader and higher religious life.[29]

Carus was active in other organizations attempting to extend the parliament idea. He was the chairman of the Religious Parliament Extension section of the Pan American Congress of Religion and Education held in Toronto in 1895. He was also the director of the American Congress of Liberal Religious Societies from 1896 to 1898. Carus advanced proposals for a second parliament to be held in 1900 in Bombay, Jerusalem, Tokyo or Paris. When funding and the institutional support of major Christian denominations was not forthcoming, Carus reluctantly abandoned his plans. He did however attend a conference of individual scholars held in Paris in 1900 under the title "The Congress of the History of Religions."[30]

Oriental Thought and Oriental Religions

At the Parliament of Religions Carus met the noted Japanese Buddhist master Shaku Syen. Syen had a young disciple named D.T. Suzuki who had translated his master's paper into English for the parliament and who wanted to come to the United States. Carus offered Suzuki employment at the Open Court where he worked as a translator. Notable among his translations are Shaku Syen's *Sermon of a Buddhist Abbot,* Carus' *The Gospel of Buddha,* and Lao-tzu's *Tao Te Ching* (in conjunction with Carus). Writing later in life, Suzuki, by then a Zen master and leading spokesman of Buddhism in the West, recalled how impartial and just was Carus' presentation of Buddhism and how sympathetically it was received in Japan:

> I am not qualified to judge (Dr. Carus') works on Western
> philosophy, but he was a pioneer in introducing Oriental
> ways of thought and feeling to the English-reading public.
> In that respect all Oriental scholars, Eastern as well as
> Western, are deeply indebted to Dr. Paul Carus.[31]

Houston Smith evaluated Carus' Oriental scholarship in the following
favorable way:

> Paul Carus' *The Gospel of Buddha* furnishes the best study of
> Buddha the man.[32] (His) *The Canon of Reason and Virtue*
> continues as probably the best general translation of the *Tao
> Te Ching* in English.[33]

Carus' efforts towards the religions of the world were intended to
show that each of them really embodied the tenets of monism under a
mask of symbolism which, when properly interpreted, would reveal their
true meaning and bring them into alignment with the world view ad-
vanced by science. According to Carus the religions of the world could be
ranked along an evolutionary continuum according to the degree to which
they expressed the truths of science. Religion, like society and nature,
evolved from lower to higher states and Buddhism, though hoary with
age, ranked high as a faith that could "touch the heart and yet satisfy the
mind."[34]

Buddhism, as Carus saw it, was the supreme example of a scientific
religion which unified the science of religion with the religion of science.
In its empirical approach, its psychological monism, and its positivism,
Carus discovered a harmony of scientific methodology and religious
experience.[35]

Carus was also a charter member and president of the American
Maha-Bodhi Society, through which he was able to befriend several other
influential young Buddhists, among them Ananda Maitreya and H.
Dharmapala (whom he helped on his American tour). With both Maitreya
and Dharmapala, Carus felt he was dealing with enthusiastic young men
who needed some restraint if their efforts on behalf of Buddhism were to
yield maximum results. He encouraged, however, their efforts to extend
Buddhist doctrine to the western world and was an advocate of Oriental
missionaries coming to the West:

We are glad to see Christians send out Christian missionaries,
and we believe that a religion without missionaries is dead.
But, we think that at the same time Christianity would be
greatly benefited if missions from other religions were sent
out to Christian countries; for an exchange of thought on
the most important subject of life can only be salutary.[36]

Conclusion

Paul Carus, philosopher, theologian, scholar, propagandist, was an
influential advocate of a new ecumenical rapprochement of science, reli-
gion and Oriental thought. Yet he has been somewhat neglected by schol-
ars and his influence waned quickly after his death. To date only one
unpublished dissertation and three brief articles chronicle his life and
thought.[37] Why is this so? An attempt will be made to address this
problem by way of conclusion.

Carus' philosophy and the activity of the Open Court Publishing
Company were both products of a particular historical situation; and the
historical situation changed dramatically in the years following World
War One: optimistic philosophies of progress were dealt a death blow by
the world war, religion and science hardened their respective positions and
came to an uneasy truce, most importantly, science itself changed with the
radical new theories of quantum physics and relativity theory. As the
twentieth century progressed, Carus' faith in science and technology—a
vital factor in his religion of science—became suspect as the horrors of
total war, the dangers of environmental pollution, and the stresses of
modern urban society etched themselves on the twentieth century psyche.

Carus had no position within the American university system. He
left no school of thought and he taught no students. The Open Court was
isolated as well from the mainstream. Its financial independence, a virtue
in many respects, also permitted it to ignore the demands and many of the
standards of commercial publishing, contributing to its isolation. As
Sheridan concludes:

the company was devoted to the reconciliation of science
and religion and yet took a position which was not accepta-
ble to many of the advocates of either. Even among religious
people, the orthodox objected to Carus' redefinition of God
for the sake of science, while the liberal religious movement

found Carus wedded to traditional terms and unwilling to abandon concepts which the liberals deemed outmoded.[38]

It seemed that Carus' philosophy had something to offend everyone. As Meyer put it:

His ideas were too abstruse for the average man and too simple for the intellectual... he offered the world a new orthodoxy which it could not accept.[39]

Although Carus' monism was a plan for action and a plea for knowledge, not for its own sake, but for the sake of action, Carus and the Open Court were not part of a larger movement which could implement their world view.

Carus rates rather higher as a popularizer of Oriental thought and culture. Through his many books and translations, his role in the Parliament of Religions and its extensions, and his encouragement of Oriental scholars and missionaries in the West, we are indeed deeply indebted to Paul Carus, one of the chief engineers of early bridges of understanding between the Orient and the West.

The perennial attractiveness of a quest for a unified view of science and the world's religions still draws many thoughtful people, especially those confronting a loss of faith in traditional theology, to make the attempt to give form to their religious feelings. Perhaps Carus' personal motto will be inspirational for them:

Not agnosticism but positive Science,
    Not mysticism but clear thought,
Neither supernaturalism nor materialism
    But a unitary conception of the world;
Not dogma but Religion, Not creed but faith.[40]

Few have been as energetic in attempting this synthesis as Dr. Paul Carus.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Assembly of the World's Religions: Spiritual Unity and the Future of the Earth,* International Religious Foundation, 10 Dock Road, Barrytown, NY, 1985).
2. Carl T. Jackson, "The Meeting of East and West: The Case of Paul Carus," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 29 (1968) 74.
3. Edward Carl Hegeler, *The Open Court,* I (1887) 624 as quoted in Donald Harvey Meyer, "Paul Carus and the Religion of Science," *American Quarterly,* 14 (1962) 606.
4. William H. Hay, "Paul Carus: A Case Study of Philosophy on the Frontier," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 17 (1956) 500-01.
5. Paul Carus, *The Religion of Science* (Chicago: Open Court, 1893) 125.
6. Paul Carus, "Some Questions of Psycho-Physics," *The Monist,* I (1890) 403.
7. Paul Carus, *Primer of Philosophy* (Chicago: Open Court, 1896) 23.
8. Paul Carus, *The Soul of Man: An Investigation of the Facts of Physiological and Experimental Psychology,* (Chicago: Open Court, 1891, 1905) 7.
9. Paul Carus, "The Formal," *The Open Court,* VII (1893) 3679-82.
10. Quoted in James Francis Sheridan, "Paul Carus: A Study of the Thought and Work of the Editor of the Open Court Publishing Company," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1957) 34.
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12. Paul Carus, "Professor Haeckel's Monism," *The Monist,* II (1892) 600.
13. Quoted in Sheridan, 34.
14. Following Sheridan's analysis.
15. Following Meyer.
16. Hay, 510.
17. Paul Carus Papers, quoted in Sheridan, 77.
18. Paul Carus Papers, quoted in Sheridan, 79.
19. Paul Carus, *Philosophy as a Science* (Chicago: Open Court, 1909) 27.
20. *Ibid.,* 27-28.
21. Sheridan, 99-100.
22. Alfred Momerie representing Anglicanism; quoted in John Henry Barrows (ed). *The World's Parliament of Religions,* Vol. I (Chicago: Parliament Publishing Co., 1893) 160.
23. Paul Carus, "The Dawn of a New Religious Era," Appendix to *The Monist,* IV (1894) 16.
24. *Ibid.,* 17.
25. Paul Carus, "Science: A Religious Revelation," in John Henry Barrows (ed.) *The World's Parliament of Religions,* Vol. II (Chicago: Parliament Publishing Co., 1893) 978-81.
26. *Ibid.*
27. Carus, "The Dawn of a New Religious Era," 5.
28. Charles C. Bonney, "The World's Parliament of Religions," *The Monist,* V (1895) 340.
29. Paul Carus, "The Dawn of a New Religious Era" 17.
30. Paul Carus, *The Open Court,* 14 (1900) 448.
31. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "A Glimpse of Paul Carus," in Joseph M. Kitagawa (ed.) *Modern Trends in World Religions—Paul Carus Memorial Symposium* (Chicago: Open Court, 1959) xiv.

32. Houston Smith, *The Religions of Man* (New York: Mentor, 1958) 150.
33. *Ibid.*, 199.
34. Jackson, 92.
35. For more details see Jackson, 80-81.
36. Paul Carus, *The Open Court*, 13 (1899) 760.
37. Sheridan, Hay, Jackson and Meyer.
38. Sheridan, 156-57.
39. Meyer, 606.
40. Paul Carus, *Philosophy as a Science* (Chicago: Open Court, 1909) 30.

SELF AND NO-SELF IN UNIFICATION THEOLOGY

by David Carlson and Thomas Selover

Our age of heightened interreligious encounter offers the opportunity to cultivate mutual understanding and appreciation among religious persons of differing traditions. New religious developments that partake of this encounter may both enrich antecedent traditions and transcend previous boundaries. Thus, the process of articulating a new theology in this pluralistic age must involve exploring its relation to other theologies and other traditions.

The classical Buddhist teaching of "no-self" *(anatta)* forms the sharpest possible contrast to a Christian understanding of the self as an immortal soul created for companionship with God, and as a center of value.[1] Unification theology, as an extension of Christian tradition, speaks of the individual's relation to God as the core of human life. Therefore, the radical denial of selfhood in the Buddhist tradition also offers a strong challenge to the teaching in Unification theology that all the great religious traditions of the world are inspired by God. Unification theologian Young Oon Kim has written in the preface to her studies on world religions:

> However varied the doctrines and forms of worship, I see two universal features in all faiths: God is seeking His children everywhere and they are anxious to return to Him.[2]

Yet in the same volume, Prof. Kim avoids an easy harmonization of the classical Buddhist tradition with Christian theistic concerns, in favor of closer fidelity to the early texts and the Theravada tradition of interpretation.[3] Thus, we may understand her remarks in the preface as implying an imperative to take the Buddhist tradition seriously in theological work, including frankly recognizing differences. In this spirit,

the present essay is a reflection on and response to the classical Buddhist doctrine of "no-self" *(anatta)* from the viewpoint of Unification theology. Naturally, these reflections are simply a preliminary attempt, an invitation to fellow Unificationists to explore these questions further and a signal to those Buddhists who may be interested in such a discussion.

The teaching of "no-self" is a key teaching of the Buddhist tradition in all its major forms.[4] For the sake of simplicity, we will confine our remarks here to the early, or classical tradition. We begin with a brief exposition of the "no-self" doctrine. In developing a response to this classical Buddhist understanding of no-self based on Unification theology, it will be helpful to analyze it further into *dukkha,* craving, *karma,* and the path of liberation. Thus, the second section compares the early Buddhist and Unification understandings of the human condition, the third section discusses the cause of suffering and evil, the fourth section discusses the path of liberation/restoration, and the concluding section reflects back on the notion of "no-self" in the Unification understanding of human life.

A. The Buddhist Doctrine of No-self *(Anatta)*

The Buddhist understanding of the "self" is defined in contrast to other conceptions of self-hood current at the time of the Buddha and in the first period of the development of Buddhist philosophy. Among these theories were the "substantialist" and the "annihilationist" views which represented opposite extremes:

> Everything exists:—this is one extreme. Nothing exists:
> —this is the other extreme. Not approaching either extreme
> the Tathagata teaches you a doctrine by the middle [way]:
> —Conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass,
> conditioned by activities consciousness....[5]

The early Buddhists, following the teaching of the Buddha, sought to avoid metaphysical dilemmas by taking an empirical approach and redefining the concept of the human, a "middle way" between these two extremes.

The key to this middle way is the concept of *paticca-samuppada* (conditioned genesis, dependent co-origination, causality). The Buddha taught that the causal principle is operative in every sphere of existence.[6] All things, including human personality, are conditioned and come into

existence as a result of causes and conditions. The notion of causality is set forth in a brief formula:

> When this is, that is; This arising, that arises; when this is not, that is not; This ceasing, that ceases.[7]

Although this understanding of the co-dependent causal stream applies to all of reality, the primary emphasis is on the non-existence of a permanent "self":

> "To what extent is the world called 'empty', Lord?" "Because it is empty of self or of what belongs to self, it is therefore said: 'The world is empty.' And what is empty of self and what belongs to self? The eye, material shapes, visual consciousness, impression on the eye—all these are empty of self and of what belongs to self. So too are ear, nose, tongue, body and mind . . . they are all empty of self and of what belongs to self. Also that feeling which arises, conditioned by impression on the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, whether it be pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant—that too is empty of self and of what belongs to self.[8]

What we experience as our "self" is simply a temporary combination of the five aggregates *(skandas)*, a small segment of the continuous movement and flux of the universe. These five aggregates—matter, sensations, perceptions, mental formations, and consciousness—are all interdependent; any attempt to locate an "I" underlying the causal stream is rejected by the Buddhist tradition.[9]

Coupled with this rejection is the notion that the whole project of metaphysical speculation is misguided, as shown in the four-fold negation concerning the "existence" of the Buddha:

> Since a Tathagata, even when actually present, is incomprehensible, it is inept to say of him . . . that after dying the Tathagata is, or is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not.[10]

Metaphysical speculation was criticized by the Buddha as a distraction, as though a man wounded by a poisoned arrow were to refuse treatment until he had ascertained all sorts of things about the arrow, the bow, and the one who had wounded him.[11] Without getting involved in such speculation, the Buddha elucidated and emphasized the Four Noble Truths: the truth of *dukkha* (suffering, unsatisfactoriness), of the arising of *dukkha*, of the cessation of *dukkha,* and of the path to the cessation of *dukkha.*

B. All life is dukkha: we live in a fallen world

Systematically, Unification theology begins with the Principle of Creation. The degree of depravity of the present situation of the "fallen" world is understood by contrast to the original purpose of creation given by God. In contrast, classical Buddhist teaching begins with an analysis of the unsatisfactory condition in which human life is presently lived.[12]

The first of the Four Noble Truths is the truth of *Dukkha,* that all life is unsatisfactory, or suffering. It is reported that Siddhartha Gautama, who became the Buddha, began his quest for the meaning of existence due to the shock of the "four sights": an old man, a sick man, a corpse attended by mourners, and a wandering ascetic who had "left the world."[13] This is the core of the chain of suffering that the Buddha sought to unravel—sickness, death, and grief. As a result of his meditative practice, he realized that *dukkha* (suffering, unsatisfactoriness, awry-ness) is characteristic of the whole of existence. *Dukkha* has three main forms: the suffering which is easily recognized as suffering, such as pain, grief, hunger, thirst, etc. The second form results from deprivation of something pleasurable. The third form, the most basic, is known as the suffering characteristic of conditioned states. Conditioned states are those that arise through dependent co-origination *(paticca-samuppada)* as configurations of the five aggregates *(skandas).*[14] As discussed above, the Buddha taught that all life is so conditioned, and therefore that existence itself as we know it is suffering.

Unification theology also identifies the present context of human life as a world of suffering. For Unification theology, the "sight" most characteristic of the suffering condition of the fallen world is the pain and resentment resulting from the misuse, loss and defilement of love, particularly between men and women. Because human beings have been unable to fulfill the purpose of life, the desire of the original mind to realize goodness has been frustrated. Furthermore, the environment of the

fallen world means that the desire for goodness and loving relationships is also frustrated by external factors of oppression, prejudice, and violence.

Just as for the Buddhist tradition all levels of beings are involved in the world of *dukkha*, so for Unification theology even God is involved in suffering. God, as loving parent, suffers because of the disfigurement of human life, and the resultant disordering of the creation. The Buddha taught that only from a human birth can one seek enlightenment and the end to the cycle of suffering. Unification theology also places responsibility for ending the cycle of suffering on human shoulders.

C. Craving: cause of suffering and evil

The Buddha sought to explicate those conditions that co-arise with the human experience of suffering *(dukkha)*, and realized that the immediate cause of suffering is craving (thirst, *tanha*):

> The Noble Truth of the origin of suffering is this: It is this thirst (craving) which produces re-existence and re-becoming, bound up with passionate greed. It finds fresh delight now here and now there....[15]

The restless craving for sense-pleasure and for existence itself fuels the recurrent cycle of suffering.

The most characteristic forms of craving are the sexual and egoistic ones. But craving also includes all the psychological drives that lead people to seek pleasure and avoid pain. Thus craving involves all six sense organs:eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin, and mind, as manifest in craving for pleasant sights, sounds, smells, tastes, feelings, and mental images. Because the world of human experience is "on fire" with craving, the Buddha taught that one ought to "conceive an aversion" for every aspect of physical sensation and every state of consciousness:

> Perceiving this... the learned and noble disciple conceives an aversion for the eye, conceives an aversion for forms, conceives an aversion for eye-consciousness, conceives an aversion for the impressions received by the eye; and whatever sensation, pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent, originates in dependence on impressions received by the eye, for that also he conceives an aversion [and so on for ear, nose, mouth,

> skin], conceives an aversion for the mind, conceives an aversion for ideas,... and whatever sensation, pleasant, unpleasant, or indifferent, originates in dependence on impressions received by the mind, for this also he conceives an aversion.[16]

As craving is involved in every aspect of human existence, the cessation of craving involves dispassion toward all aspects of life.[17]

The Buddha taught not only that there is no permanent or immutable reality called the "self" but also that belief in such a reality (i.e., ignorance) leads to selfishness and egoism and that this is the root cause of craving and its attendant suffering. The implication of the chain of causation affirms that ignorance (to believe that one has a "self") is the cause of craving and that craving is the cause of rebirth and suffering.

This "ignorance" is not passive but active, in at least two senses: 1) We ourselves actively promote "ignorance" through feeding it with our craving. 2) The environment in which we live is the result of a stream of causes conditioning human life toward selfish craving.

Ignorance is the first link, but the causal chain can best be seen as a wheel, without beginning. This is the samsaric circle, the chain of causality out of which we must break. Once this cycle is broken, through the elimination of craving, there will no longer be a becoming process nor the arising of a false sense of "self" out of the five aggregates:

> The instructed disciple... beholds of material shape and so on: "This is not mine, this am I not, this is not my self." So that when the material shape and so on change and become otherwise there arise not for him grief, sorrow, suffering, lamentation and despair.[18] When ignorance has been got rid of and knowledge has arisen, one does not grasp after sense-pleasures, speculative views, rites and customs, the theory of self.[19]

Unification theology agrees that life under the present conditions is fundamentally characterized by the domination of our consciousness by selfish desire. One of the specific signs of this fallenness is that human spiritual senses are cut off and we are ignorant of the spiritual context in which human life is properly lived:

> Once the devil has obscured man's true situation, human
> values and moral standards seem to be only shadows, and
> what appear to be most real are concrete economic, political
> and material forces. Cut off from God's light, we become
> fearful and distrustful of others, which leads to social
> chaos.[20]

Unification theology teaches an even more active sense of "ignorance":The
fallen nature is actively promoted from two sides. Fallen human beings are
both the cravers and the craved. In Biblical terms, we live in the dominion
of Satan:

> What is Satan's foothold in man's nature? Myself, my
> ambitions, pride, passions and egocentricity. The devil
> lodges inside the heart because of a person's self-love. We
> are not simply slaves of an alien master but willing subjects.
> By loving ourselves, we deliver ourselves over to Satanic
> bondage.[21]

An original misuse of love was the process by which a false, demonic
center came to be a reality in human life.[22] This center is false precisely
because it is based upon selfishness, sacrificing others' benefit for one's
(misconstrued) self. Another characteristic of fallen selfhood is a false sense
of selflessness, because it mistakes dependency in the interest of self-
preservation for genuine self-giving.

In his sermons, the Reverend Sun Myung Moon also recommends
overcoming selfish desires stimulated by sense experience, but rather than
Buddhist aversion and detachment, he teaches that the key is to re-orient
sense experience in relationship with God:

> Can you overcome what your eyes tell you? You weren't
> given eyes so you could look at the world in a secular way,
> but so you could shed God's tears. That's the most precious
> way to use your two eyes. You like to hear sweet words,
> don't you? You have to cross over the hill of your ears
> also. . . . Overcome the hill of all your senses. . . . You have
> to transcend temptation and not do what your body wants.
> There are seven tests to go over—eyes, ears, mouth,

hands, nose, legs, bosom and hips.... But denying
temptation is only the beginning. Then you must utilize all
these organs to cry out in understanding God.[23]

D. *Karma:* inherited and collective sin

The doctrine of *karma* is common to both Hindu and Buddhist
traditions, but the understanding of how the effects of action continue
from life to life in the process of reincarnation differs. One of the main
issues discussed in Buddhist teaching is whether there is an underlying or
perduring entity to which *karma* can be referred. Affirmation of such an
entity leads to the notion of the unchanging self, or *Atman,* the basic
Hindu view which Buddhists reject. If the existence of such a substrata is
negated, however, it would seem that each moment would be totally
autonomous and cease to exist as soon as it had begun, a form of
"annihilationism." This would lead to the logical consequence that there
is no responsibility for actions committed. The Buddhist tradition is
adamant concerning the ongoing effects of volitional actions, or *karma,*
but equally adamant that what connects "lives" in the causal stream is not
an independent self or "I."[24]

Unification theology also views human life in a context wider than
just one lifetime. The Reverend Moon teaches in a sermon entitled "I":

> The individual existence of a human being is not only the
> product of his or her lifetime. Starting from Adam and Eve,
> your ancestry has flowed down to the present, passing
> through tributaries and rivers and many waterways to reach
> you....
>
> Here we are, products of the things that have happened
> to our ancestry... Dividing into many streams, we have
> discriminated amongst ourselves. If we continue to be
> divided like this, when will the time come for us to be
> united again?[25]

It would seem that an essential point of the doctrine of *karma* is that
a newly born human individual does not start with a "clean slate." This
insight is understood in Unification theology in terms of several dimensions
of sin. According to Unification theology, human bondage to sin has four
principal forms: original, collective, inherited, and personal (individual).[26]

Birth into this fallen world implies inheriting the condition of sin. Inherited sin means that each infant is born into a lineage which contains the effects of past sins.

Reflecting on the problem of *karma*, Unification theology would suggest the possibility of conceiving the continuity of "the karmic stream" as being passed on through *lineage*, primarily. In this way, the problem of the perduring substrata is overcome, but the stream is neither broken nor absolved of karmic consequences. The flow of human desires through history has created the fallen world as we know it. The path of restoration therefore entails the cutting off of the "outflows" of the consequences of past sin, the flow of untrue love. Understood in this way, restoration implies not only individuals but lineages as well. Thus, the purification of an individual family lineage is also contributing to the untying of the "karmic" web that holds in bondage all the fallen world.[27]

Collective sin indicates that the world order is such that it constantly denies the God-centered growth of human persons and fosters selfishness, not only on the individual level, but on the larger levels of social groups and societies as well:

> We have to go against the old, established desires. The whole problem is one of changing the direction of the "I"-centered family, "I"-centered nation and "I"-centered religion and world. We have to go the opposite way and live the family life for the nation, the national life for the world and dedicate the world to God.... "I" must live for the world, not for "my" sake. Judaism should exist for Islam and Islam for Judaism. Christianity should live for Buddhism and so forth.[28]

The social and historical task of liberation or restoration is the undoing of the "karmic" bonds which have created the fallen history and the fallen environment.

E. The Path of Liberation/Restoration

The fourth Noble Truth is that there is a way leading to the cessation of suffering, the Noble Eight-fold Path: right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration. These eight aspects can be summarized

in terms of the three essentials of Buddhist practice: ethical conduct, mental discipline, and wisdom. Countering charges that the classical Buddhist path is individualistic, Rahula emphasizes compassion as the basis of practice:

> Ethical Conduct *(Sila)* is built on the vast conception of universal love and compassion for all living beings, on which the Buddha's teaching is based.... The Buddha gave his teaching "for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world."[29]

For both laity and monks and nuns, the basic rules of Buddhist discipline are summarized in the five precepts:

> I undertake to observe the rule
> to abstain from taking life;
> to abstain from taking what is not given;
> to abstain from sensuous misconduct;
> to abstain from false speech;
> to abstain from intoxicants as tending to cloud
> the mind.[30]

These abstentions and the gradual development of ethical conduct can be practiced in lay life, but the most direct way to practice the mental disciplines of meditation is by "leaving the world" and becoming a monastic.

The Buddhist way is a "middle path" between self-indulgence and self-mortification, both of which are understood as unprofitable and counter-productive because they contribute to an emphasis on that very illusion of "self" that is to be cut off. The goal of following the Noble Path is to reach the point of the cessation *(nirodha)* of craving and suffering.[31]

In Unification theology the path of restoration of the original purpose of creation requires a total re-orientation of human character, including the restoration of right relations between mind and body. The improper domination of the body (i.e., sense cravings) over mind—that is, over the inherent directive purpose of human life to seek loving relations with God, other human beings, and the rest of the created order—must be overcome and transformed.

Some Unification disciplines for correcting the relationship between mind and body resemble Buddhist disciplines in some respects, stressing active challenging of selfish attitudes toward the physical body and "creature comforts." But like Buddhist practice, these disciplines are not a matter of the extreme asceticism of the yogin. Unification practice emphasizes creative self-sacrifice in the service of the greater whole, without resorting to heroic feats of physical self-abuse. It is the responsibility of each individual to maintain to the extent possible the conditions for a healthy life, for healthful give-and-take between mind and body. Furthermore, such disciplines are undertaken as "indemnity conditions" for the sake of others, rather than solely for one's own spiritual growth.

Unification theology agrees with the Buddhist tradition that the path of liberation or restoration requires mental discipline and wisdom as well as ethical conduct:

> Each person has the job of breaking down the barriers in his mind; the most basic problem is how to overcome oneself. Some people have built up a gigantic castle in their minds and they don't want to break down that tremendous ornament. . . . Without any hesitation God proclaimed that each person must deny himself, become a sacrificial person . . . and live for the sake of the public.[32]

Self-denial is necessary because the fallen self is based on a false center of love, disordered by domination of the body over mind, and perpetuated by self-centered attitudes. Through self-denial, the original human nature centered on God can be developed.

The disciplines of the Unification path have to do fundamentally with the restoration of right relationships through indemnity conditions of reversing selfish tendencies in relationships. These conditions are not simply an individual attempt to reach perfection, but are made for the sake of others. It is precisely through God-centered relationships of love that the self-centered self-consciousness can be broken down and a new sense of self-in-relation created.

The central point of Unification practice is preparation for and fulfillment of the marriage blessing. The intention is to begin marriage after a process of personal re-orientation toward God by both partners as the basis for a new direction in family life. In contrast to the Buddhist

monastic tradition, Unification practice focuses on the restoration of marriage and family; the cessation of what may be called the "karmic stream" of fallen lineage is also the point of new beginning.

Concluding Observations

In summarizing, we note at least three areas of common interest between the classical Buddhist tradition and Unification theology: relationality, the falseness of the fallen self, and a large and compassionate vision of human life.

First, like the Buddhist tradition, Unification theology views the human self as constituted by relations. For Unification theology, the human personality is properly the result of God-centered give and take between mind and body. The actual personality, and with it the "sense of self," is also the result of interaction in human relations. But rather than an accidental confluence of aggregates, the bi-polar relation of mind and body is in accordance with the original purpose of creation. For the Unification view, the relational or composite character of reality does not lead to the conclusion of non-existence or non-entity. Unification theology recognizes in this ongoing relational process an original purpose of creation, a principle that is inherently good.

The implication of this relational ontology is that the "sense of self" is properly developed through God-centered and self-giving relationships of love with others. Indeed, the energy and desire for give and take of love is given by God to fulfill the purpose of creation—joy. The true "sense of self" is known only through relations, specifically through the joy returned to the "subject" by the "object". The flow of love is the true basis for life and joy, for God as well as human beings. Therefore, a Unificationist approach to liberation from selfishness stresses restoration of right relations.

Second, the world into which we have been born is characterized by suffering on many levels, and by selfish desires which perpetuate suffering. That which each of us knows existentially as "myself" is entangled in a morass of suffering; it is a "fallen" self. Furthermore, we have the tendency to preserve our fallen notions of selfhood in affirming the true self. From the viewpoint of the fallen self, there is no future reality. This is the way of self-denial in ultimate terms.

Perhaps Buddhists are rightly skeptical of the notion of a good side of the self, simply because, in our subtle selfishness, we reintroduce our selves through the back door. As Reinhold Niebuhr wrote: "Since the self

judges itself by its own standard, it finds itself good." Thus, though there remain many differences, Unification theology can properly learn from the classical Buddhist tradition's teaching on the destructiveness of self-consciousness as we experience it in the fallen world. Not just repentance, but a total re-orientation of the personality, and of relations on every level is necessary. The false sense of self, marked by sacrificing the other for the self, is both illusory (i.e., deluded) and habitual. What is needed is the total emptying of "self and what belongs to self."

Unification theology can appreciate Buddhist discipline, through meditation, as seeking return to a point where the influence of the egoistic self is diminished and eventually eliminated in one's life. From this point our original human nature has the potential of being developed into a true self of complete goodness, harboring no divisions or conflicts and expressed through holy and pure desires.

Third, both Unification theology and the Buddhist tradition offer a large and compassionate vision of human life and concern. The Reverend Moon has remarked,

> I'm sure you have heard of Buddhist monks who sit and meditate for years and years, trying to move out of themselves and go to the point of nothingness; by doing so they want to find the standard of basic human character. Their entire effort can be characterized in one sentence: they deny the smaller, selfish self to find the greater self. That is their purpose.[33]

In the context of other sermons by Reverend Moon, it becomes clear that this "greater self" is not the notion of an unchanging *Atman* which the Buddhist tradition rejects. Instead, the "greater self" represents the fundamental relatedness of an individual human life to larger spheres of activity:

> The person who steps outside of his relationship with the family, society, nation and world and tries to set himself up in some private, isolated realm has actually lost everything! No matter how hard he may work, he cannot connect the results with anything other than himself.

However, when a person stands within his proper position
at the central point of the universe, all his work and
accomplishments are extended and connected with the largest
levels. Such a person simultaneously possesses everything of
value within the universe because he is connected with the
entire universe.[34]

Unification theology affirms the reality and positive value of this "greater
self," constituted by loving relationships with God, others and the created
order. The characteristics of this original nature would include such
Buddhist qualities as loving kindness, compassion, gentleness, and
equanimity.[35]

Unification theology understands the heart and love of God to be the
true ontological basis and center of our human existence and practical life.
The fidelity of God's love is the true ground of identity. When human life
is centered on this original focal point, we will live in a world characterized
by good, pure, and original desires based on love rather than on incessant
craving. We will have personal awareness of the love of God rather than
ignorance. Individuals who have developed a public consciousness of love
and service will form new God-centered families, creating a new lineage
centered on God's love and producing joy.

The Buddhist advice to de-construct our selfish selves in daily life is
well-taken. If it turns out that in so doing a new self (family, society,
nation, and world) is being created, that is the grace of God.

FOOTNOTES

1. For example, John Hick notes in *Death and Eternal Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976, 35-46) " . . . traditional Christian insistence of the special divine creation of each human soul [has the significance of seeing] the human being as a unique individual who is valued and sustained by his Creator and who in virtue of his relationship to the Eternal may enjoy an eternal life."

2. Young Oon Kim, *World Religions,* vol. II, *India's Religious Quest,* (New York: Golden Gate, 1976) ix.

3. *World Religions,* II, 138: "Although eminent scholars may expound mystical interpretations of Buddha's teaching [that *nirvana* is equivalent to "eternal life"], it is difficult to justify such an explanation on the basis of the oldest texts of Buddhist scripture. It is equally irreconcilable with the opinion of the Theravada monks—who claim to have preserved the original teachings of the Buddha."

4. Walpola Rahula argues, "The negation of an imperishable Atman is the common characteristic of all dogmatic systems of the Lesser as well as the Great Vehicle, and, there is, therefore, no reason to assume that Buddhist tradition which is in complete agreement on this point has deviated from the Buddha's original teaching." *What the Buddha Taught,* (New York:Grove, 1974) 55.

5. *Samyutta-nikaya* (Pali Text Society edition) XII, 2, 15, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids as *The Book of Kindred Sayings,* Part II (Oxford: Oxford University, 1922) 13. See also David J. Kalupahana, *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1976) 29.

6. For an extended discussion of this complex subject, see David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1975).

7. *Majjhima-nikaya* III, (Pali Text Society of London), 63, quoted by Rahula, 53.

8. *Samyutta-nikaya* IV, 54, translated in *Buddhist Texts through the Ages,* edited by Edward Conze, *et. al.,* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) 91.

9. As expressed by Walpola Rahula, " . . . what we call 'I', or 'being', is only a combination of physical and mental aggregates, which are working together interdependently in a flux of momentary change within the law of cause and effect and . . . there is nothing permanent,everlasting, unchanging and eternal in the whole of existence." *What the Buddha Taught,* 66.

10. *Samyutta-nikaya* III, 118, translated in *Buddhist Texts through the Ages,* 106.

11. This analogy is found in Sutta 63 of the *Majjhima-nikaya.* See *World of the Buddha: An Introduction to Buddhist Literature,* edited by Lucien Stryk (New York: Grove, 1968) 143-49, and Rahula, 13-15.

12. In this analysis, the question of primal origins is not considered fruitful: "The first beginning of ignorance *(avijja)* is not to be perceived in such a way as to postulate that there was no ignorance beyond a certain point." *Anguttara-nikaya* V (Pali Text Society), quoted in Rahula, 27.

13. See the *Buddhacarita* of Ashvaghosha, translated by Edward Conze in *Buddhist Scriptures* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1968 [1959]) 39-44.

14. See Rahula, 19-20.

15. "Setting in Motion the Wheel of Truth," *Samyutta-nikaya* LVI, 11, translated by Rahula, 93.
16. "The Fire Sermon," *Samyutta-nikaya* XXXV, 28, as translated in *World of the Buddha*, 55; see also Rahula, 96.
17. Young Oon Kim comments, "Buddha preached the extinction of desire instead of the taming of one's desires; he advocated the total suppression of the thirst for pleasures rather than discriminating between lawful and illicit pleasures;he counseled men to uproot the craving for existence instead of merely disciplining their life on behalf of higher ends." *World Religions*, II, 138.
18. *Samyutta-nikaya* III, 19, *Buddhist Texts*, 75.
19. *Majjhima-nikaya* I, 67, *Buddhist Texts*, 75.
20. Young Oon Kim, *Unification Theology* (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 109.
21. *Unification Theology*, 108. For a comparison with Mara the Evil One in the Buddhist tradition, see *World Religions*, II, 178-80.
22. *Divine Principle* (Washington, D.C.: HSA-UWC, 1973) 71-76.
23. Sun Myung Moon, "Stony Path of Death," April 27, 1980, translated by Bo Hi Pak (New York: HSA-UWC, 1980) 8b.
24. David Kalupahana comments, "The problem of reconciling the doctrines of *karma* and rebirth with the doctrine of nonsubstantiality *(anatta)*is... not a problem faced only by Western students of Buddhism, for itcreated difficulties also for contemporaries of the Buddha, as well as for many of his later disciples." *Buddhist Philosophy*, 45. There is much discussion of this issue in the later tradition, which is beyond our scope here.
25. Sun Myung Moon, "I," July 13, 1975 (New York: HSA-UWC, 1984) 1.
26. *Divine Principle*, 88-89.
27. According to Unification theology, not only does the past continue to influence succeeding generations, but the spiritual world is intimately involved in events on this plane through spiritual cooperation. See *Divine Principle*, 181-88.
28. Sun Myung Moon, "The Twenty-Fifth Year of the Unification Church," May 1, 1978, translated by David S.C. Kim (New York: HSA-UWC, 1978), 4b.
29. Rahula, 46.
30. *Buddhist Scriptures*, 70.
31. Rahula has written, "Nirvana is definitely not annihilation of self, because there is no self to annihilate. If at all, it is the annihilation of the illusion, of the false idea of self." *What the Buddha Taught*, 37.
32. Sun Myung Moon, "Breaking the Barrier," December 10, 1978, translated by Bo Hi Pak (New York: HSA-UWC, 1978) 4-5.
33. "Breaking the Barrier," 4.
34. Sun Myung Moon, "Public Life," April 1, 1982, translated by Bo Hi Pak (New York: HSA-UWC, 1982) 3.
35. For discussion of such qualities in comparative perspective, see Antony Fernando, *Buddhism and Christianity: Their Inner Affinity* (Sri Lanka: Empire, 1983) 17.

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