The Global Congress World's Religions Proceedings 1980-1982 Edited by Henry O. Thompson

II -- An Inter-religious Dialogue: Its Reasons, Attitudes and Necessary Assumptions by Philip H. Hwang

There are unfortunately some religious people who sincerely doubt or consciously ignore any possibility for a genuine dialogue between different religions. They are in short outdated. But most religious as well as nonreligious people seriously talk about it. They often do not understand exactly why there should be a meeting between religions in the first place, which attitude is most appropriate for such a meeting, and what necessary assumptions, if any, are needed. In this paper, I will first elaborate some practical and theoretical reasons why all religions must work together, and secondly, discuss several attitudes we can have toward the religions of other people, and finally, propose some "rules" to follow if we are to engage in a genuine dialogue between different religions.

Why Should All Religions Work Together?

What are the reasons that all religions, while making "conflicting truth-claims," should dialogue and work together?

1. Politically, we are living today in "one world." What happens at one corner of the world is no longer a "fire over the river" to the rest of the world, due to the fast development of transportation and communication systems during the last century. In other words, we are now "forced to live together," whether we like it or not. For example, we Koreans deal with Russians and Communist Chinese, not because we want to but because we must. Truly there is no -- and there cannot be -- Robinson Crusoe in this 20th century. This means that the East and the West, Koreans and non-Koreans, our religions and other people's religions, must meet and influence or be influenced by one another. Politically speaking, in short, the inter-religious dialogue is a must in this "one world."

2. Anthropologically, it is a plain fact that all human beings have many similarities as well as differences according to place and time, and, in addition, that we cannot make any arbitrary value judgments on these differences. There is no reason whatsoever to claim an essential superiority or inferiority of one culture to the others. Thus Levi-Strauss says that the difference between the so-called primitive mind and the modern mind...

lies, not in the quality of the intellectual process but in the nature of things to which it is applied... the same logical processes operate in myth as in science, and... man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in the alleged progress of man's mind, but in the discovery of new areas to which it may apply its unchanged and unchanging powers.1

Mircea Eliade goes one step further and argues that if we are to find a real essence of homo religious, it is always better to study primitive people who were living close to the realm of the sacred than modern people who are living in a desacralized society2 This is why, we can say, there are many similarities as well as many differences in all religions, i.e., in man's pursuit of Ultimate Reality.

3. Sociologically, all religions should be able to make some positive contributions to society, since they are after all one form of human culture. This does not mean all religions are only epiphenomena of society. Rather, it means that the language of religion is, and must be, a human language. Of course, sometimes we can have sensible talk about an Almighty God within certain religious contexts, assuming that such substance in fact exists. But even here we should not forget that such talk is still made by imperfect human beings, and, in this sense, there cannot be by definition one proper interpretation of God's words. This is why, I think, James Cone, an American Black theologian, argues that even God's revelation presupposes human capacity to understand it.3

Now it is only the next step that all religions should dialogue and cooperate with one another, if they are to make any genuine contributions to society. This was clearly shown by an historical example of the Sam-Il Movement, where all Korean religious leaders, regardless of their denominations, united to fight against Japanese aggression. When religions do not meet with each other, but fight instead, they will only follow the dictates of society, rather than lead society in a desirable direction.

4. Religiologically, it is possible and even desirable, in certain contexts, for all religious people to have a feeling of superiority towards their own religion compared with those of others, just as all individuals should have a self-affirmative attitude. Thus Paul Tillich says:

If a group -- like an individual -- is convinced that it possesses a truth, it implicitly denies those claims to truth which conflict with that truth. I would call this the natural self-affirmation in the realm of knowledge; it is only another word for personal certainty...It is natural and unavoidable that Christians affirm the fundamental assertion of Christianity that Jesus is the Christ and reject what denies this assertion. What is permitted to the skeptic cannot be forbidden to the Christians -- or, for that matter, to the adherent of any other religion."4

But in order to have such a superiority feeling, we must first know other people's religions. Uncompared superiority or inferiority does not even make sense.5 Furthermore, we must first know others in order to know who we are. To know others is a necessary condition to know ourselves.

Now some might argue that if we know all religions, assuming this to be possible, then we will find only one among them has truth and the rest have none. But this is a gross mistake. On the contrary, we will find, I think, that truth cannot be monopolized by any one religion. This is why Joachim Wach declares that the proper attitude of religiology is not that we can know all religions if we know one, but that we can claim to know one only if we know all religions, however superficially.6

5. Theologically, an inter-religious dialogue is necessary for the refinement, development or revision, if necessary, of one's own religion. For religious faith is never static or fixed, but it always moves forward by meeting other religions or social ideologies. A tadpole must become a frog one day; it cannot remain a tadpole forever. And as a grown frog, it must live with other frogs within the same pond. In a similar way, no religion can remain in its early stages; it must mature and meet other religions in a dynamic fashion.

Thus Tillich, who admits that one sect of Christianity has been very harsh and cruel to other sects, argues that Christianity as a whole has always been more generous to other religions.7 In a similar way, Wach declares that "Christians are not born, but made"8

Several Attitudes

I have so far described political, anthropological, sociological, religiological and theological reasons why all different religions should dialogue and work together.9 I will now discuss several attitudes one can have toward other people's religions by borrowing Raimundo Panikkar's key points, and then discuss some necessary postulates we must have in order to have a genuine dialogue.

1. There is an extreme exclusivism which considers any attempt to have a genuine inter-religious dialogue impossible. Panikkar states the reason for this attitude:

A believing member of a religion in one way or another considers his religion to be true. Now, the claim to truth has a certain built-in claim to exclusivity. If a given statement is true, its contradictory cannot also be true. And if a certain human tradition claims to offer a universal context for truth, anything contrary to that 'universal truth' will have to be declared false.10

This attitude has several advantages. Since one believes that he follows a universal, even an absolute truth rather than a partial and imperfect truth, he can truly be committed to his truth and even considers his defense of his own religion as a command of God. He thus can be a "true believer." On the other hand, this attitude has many difficulties:

First, it carries with it the obvious danger of intolerance, hubris and contempt for others. 'We belong to the club of truth.' It further bears the intrinsic weakness of assuming an almost purely logical conception of truth and the uncritical attitude of an epistemological naivete. Truth is many faced and even if you assume that God speaks an exclusive language, everything depends on your understanding of it so that you may never really know whether your interpretation is the only right one. To recur to a superhuman instance on the discussion among two religious beliefs does not solve any question, for it is often the case that God speaks' also to others, and both partners relying on God's authority will always need human mediation, so that ultimately God's authority depends on Man's interpretation (of the divine revelation).11

2. At the opposite pole from extreme exclusivism, there is an extreme inclusivism which claims that since every religion has its own truth, one can follow one's path and cannot condemn the others. This attitude honestly admits the plurality of religions and the varieties of religious experiences, and does not admit any inconsistency or contradiction among religions.

On the other hand, this attitude also entails some difficulties. First, the attitude tends to be an extreme relativism of truth and thus denies the very existence of truth, as many sophists did in the pre-Socratic period. Or, it tends toward an extreme cultural relativism and thus denies any positive role which religions can play in society. Furthermore, it also presents...

... the danger of hybris, since it is only you who have the privilege of an all-embracing vision and tolerant attitude, you who allot to the others the place they must take in the universe. You are tolerant in your own eyes, but not in the eyes of those who challenge your right to be on top. Furthermore, it has the intrinsic difficulties of an almost a logical conception of truth and a built-in inner contradiction when the attitude is spelt out in theory and praxis.12

On this position, one can easily make a mistake by saying something like only Christians, or only Confucians, or only Buddhists are generous toward all other religions.

3. Between an extreme exclusivism and an extreme inclusivism, there is a general parallelism which claims that all different religious creeds, "in spite of meanderings and crossings, actually run parallel to meet only in the ultimate, in the eschaton, at the very end of human pilgrimage." Thus one can say on this position that Christian love, Confucian humanity and Buddhist compassion all run parallel and are "similar paths."

Now it is easy to see that the attitude presents some positive advantages:

It is tolerant, it respects the others and does not judge them. It avoids muddy syncretisms and eclecticisms that concoct a religion according to our private tastes; it keeps the boundaries clear and spurs constant reform of one's own ways.13

On the other hand, this attitude is not free from difficulties either:

First of all it seems to go against the historical experience that the different religious and human traditions of the world have usually emerged from mutual interferences, influences and fertilizations. It too hastily assumes, furthermore, that every human tradition has in itself all the elements for further growth and development; in a word, it assumes the self-sufficiency of every tradition and seems to deny the need of convenience of mutual learning, or the need to walk outside the walls of one particular human tradition -- as if in every one of them the entire human experience were crystallized or condensed. It flatters every one of us to hear that we possess in nuce all we need for a full human and religious maturity, but it splits the family of Man into watertight compartments, making any kind of conversion a real betrayal of one's own being.14

It is indeed a desirable beginning to compare Socrates with Confucius, Logos with Tao, Jesus with Buddha, love with compassion and so forth. But a true inter-religious dialogue should not end there; it should go beyond making "catalogues." A real dynamic meeting is not static, but lies in a "moving encounter."

4. Finally, there is a dynamic pluralism. This attitude honestly admits the de facto phenomenon that there are many different religions in this world and one can have varieties of religious experiences even within one religious tradition. In other words, it believes that one cannot talk about "ought" without mentioning or referring to "is," although it may be possible to deduce "ought" from "is." Furthermore, it believes that the existence of so many religious types, sects and creeds is not necessarily a regrettable thing. William James writes on this point:

We must frankly recognize the fact that we live in partial systems, and that parts are not interchangeable in the spiritual life. If we are peevish and jealous, destruction of the self must be an element of our religions; why need it be one if we are good and sympathetic from the outset? Unquestionably, some men have the completer experience and the higher vocation, here just as in the social world; but for each man to stay in his own experience, whatever it be, and for others to tolerate him there, is surely the best.15

But this "factual" pluralism needs to transform itself into "dynamic" pluralism. The word "dynamic" here means a dialectical power to find a meeting point between an unrelated plurality and a monolithic unity, a power to reject both the victory of one religion over all other religions and the unity of all religions within one system. In other words, this attitude claims that one should treat all religions of other people as a teacher of one's own religion and should not neglect the importance of differences as well as that of similarities among religions. Panikkar explains the rationale behind this attitude:

The aim of the intrareligious dialogue is understanding. It is not to win over the other or to come to a total agreement or a universal religion. The ideal is communication in order to bridge the gulfs of mutual ignorance and misunderstandings between the different cultures of the world, letting them speak and speak out their own insights in their own languages. Some may wish even to reach communion, but this does not imply at all that the aim is a uniform unity or a reduction of ail the pluralistic variety of Man into one single religion, system, ideology or tradition.16

I have briefly discussed several attitudes one can have toward the religions of others.17 It must be noted, at this moment, that these attitudes are hierarchic matters of degrees. That is, the second is better than the first, the third than the second, and the fourth than the third. But this does not mean of course that all attempted dialogues must pass through each step. On the contrary, we can sensibly hope to reach the most desirable stage in our first few attempts, if we are sincere enough.

Some Necessary Assumptions

In this section I will list and discuss five necessary assumptions we must postulate in order to have a genuine dialogue between religions. Now I am using the phrase "necessary assumption" in a Kantian sense. As you all know, Kant says that we cannot even sensibly talk about morality unless we postulate the existence of freedom, the immortality of soul and the existence of God. In a similar way, we must have these sorts of "required assumptions" to postulate, or some rules to follow, if we are to engage in a genuine inter-religious dialogue.

1. The first assumption is that we should make no hasty value judgments. For example, we wrongly believe that X is true just because it was spoken by Jesus or Buddha. But we should instead believe that X is true because it might have been spoken by Jesus or Buddha. It is like we should not believe some theory simply because it was held by Plato or Confucius. In other words, we should not confuse the problem of who said X with that of whether X is true. Otherwise, we commit the fallacy of ad hominem or the genetic fallacy. Furthermore, as I will explain later, it is a very difficult thing to claim to know other people's religions. And even if we assume we know their religions, the meeting between religions should be held on the same level, so to speak.

Therefore, what we need today is an open-mindedness and a generosity of faith if we are to avoid an extreme exclusivism. It is useful here to read Jaspers' comments on different sects of Christianity because it can also apply to different religions:

It is not permissible to define the common element as the essence of Christianity and on the basis of such a definition to judge what is Christian and what is not. From a historical point of view such definition can never be anything more than speculative ideal types of Christianity or dogmatic tenets on the strength of which particular churches or groups claim to be the sole repositories of Christianity, while all others are no better than heretics or heathen. Thus insofar as the Western World is Christian, this Christian element, when it is not usurped by limited groups from the Roman Catholic Church to the Protestant sects, can only be the Biblical religion, which encompasses all Christian faiths as well as the Jews and those who believe without a church and even in some way those who expressly abjure all faith. Biblical religion thus becomes the all-embracing whole, reaching through the millennia from Abraham to our own day. No Westerner can disregard Christianity, but no one is entitled to claim it for his own possession.18

Furthermore, we should not make hasty value judgments on our own religions as well as other religions. We should not believe that only my religion has a generosity toward all other religions or more generosity than any other religion. This is why we should also reject an extreme inclusivism.

The most exclusive religions in the world are Christianity, Judaism and Islam, which claim that there is one and only one way to salvation. Perhaps this is why these religions more than any other religions have committed crimes in the long history of the world. There are many ways to go from here to the Lotte Hotel. Then why should there be only one way to truth? Religion without faith is a formalism, and religion without generosity is a fanaticism.

2. The second necessary assumption, is that we should make no hasty distinctions, say, between Eastern Mysticism and Western Rationalism, Chinese Continentalism and Japanese Islandism, Korean situation and American situation, etc. These distinctions are not as clear as we assume. This is why we also have to reject a general parallelism. Why? I can think of four reasons.

a. A genuine meeting between religions should go beyond a comparison between systems, such as realism and nominalism, monism and dualism, spiritualism and materialism, intellectualism and intuitionism. For religion is a "total activity" including all these different modes of actions. No general conceptualizations alone can bring about a genuine dialogue as far as religions are concerned.19

b. A genuine dialogue between religions should not ignore the difference between religions. George Santayana, for example, argues that religions can meet "by blurring or emptying the differences between them." I think this is a mistake. Of course, it is a desirable beginning, perhaps, to compare, on the same spirit, Christian love with Buddhist compassion. But we should not forget or ignore the differences between these concepts. No oversimplifications can bring about a genuine dialogue.

c. A genuine dialogue cannot be made by efforts to explain all different concepts of different religions by one concept of one religion. Thus we should not fancy that Taoistic Tao or Confucian humanity or Christian love can explain all religions. No fake generalizations can bring about a genuine dialogue.

d. A genuine dialogue cannot be made, to use Raju's phrase, by "unhelpful comparisons." We all know that we can have many different conclusions from the same premises or the same conclusion from different premises. If we confuse this point, we make the "fallacy of the same premises" in the former and the "fallacy of the same conclusions" in the latter.

Let me give you an example: Both Mencius and Buddha emphasize the importance of mind. Even Bishop Berkley, who said "to be is to be perceived," did the same thing. But we all know that the conclusions they drew are completely different from one another. In a similar way, we all know Nietzsche, Marx and Voltaire all denied the existence of God but the reasons for their denial are very different. Unless we know those reasons, we cannot claim to know their conclusions. (Aristotle said in the first chapter of his Metaphysics that to know is to know causes and principles.) Comparing two different concepts without knowing their real causes is only an unhelpful comparison. Such a comparison cannot bring about a genuine dialogue.

3. I said we should make no hasty value judgment and no hasty distinctions. What does that mean in practice? It means, I think, we should recognize both similarities and differences of religions, and this is my third necessary assumption.

As I mentioned before, all human beings have some anthropological similarities beyond space and time. But, it is equally true that all human beings have their own uniqueness. As Eliade said, every man is a cosmos. Or as we ordinary say, every man has his own castle.

Emphasizing similarities alone will lead to an empty universalism which ignores all uniqueness in each religion. Emphasizing differences alone will lead to a narrow provincialism which ignores common factors of all religions. In other words, each religion has its own uniqueness, but this uniqueness should not be identified with absoluteness. Now we can draw one practical lesson from the fact that there are similarities as well as differences between religions. It is this. No one religion can become a model to unify all other religions or to re-explain or re-construct all other religions. For our goal in a dialogue is not a unity but an understanding, not a dominance but a development.

What we need is to recognize differences in similarities or similarities in differences (not in the Hegelian sense of course). For example, Albert Schweitzer asserted that Christianity is life and world affirming, whereas Indian religions are life and world negating. This has been sufficiently countered by Radhakrishna and other scholars. The mistake of Schweitzer was that he noticed the differences between Christianity and Indian religions, but did not see, or perhaps did not want to see, the similarities between them.

4. So far I have said that we have to reject both extreme exclusivism and extreme inclusivism, and then we must recognize both similarities and differences among different religions. Now I want to emphasize that these things are very difficult things, and this brings us to my third necessary assumption.

Now this seems to be common sense, but I think it is very important. We usually think that a genuine dialogue can be done by meeting other people or studying the dogmas of other religions. But we must not forget that it is so difficult that perhaps it may not even be possible at all. Unless we have such a humble attitude, we will achieve nothing.

All religions are, without exception, always absolute for all sincere religious people. Of course, they sometimes take their religions as a means for their living. But, ultimately, if they are sincere enough, they take their religion in an absolute sense. Furthermore, all religions request an ultimate commitment of their followers. So it is, in a way, natural that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to know other religions. Actually, there are three stages we have to go through before we claim to know other religions:

a. We have to study intellectually those doctrines, rituals, symbols, languages which are peculiar to that religion. Exactly how far we have to study I do not know. But we have to know enough to have a religious discussion with the followers of that religion. And this will take more time perhaps than we might like to believe. This stage we may call a philosophical learning.

b. We have to observe directly to some extent those doctrines, rituals, symbols, and languages. We should be able to identify those practical activities with the appropriate concept. For example, if one cannot understand the meaning of the Mass ceremony, then he is not in a position to talk about Catholicism. If one cannot understand actual Zen Meditation, then he is not in a position to talk about Zen Buddhism. This stage we may call a theological learning.

c. But religion is more than a philosophical understanding and a theological knowledge. One must experience it himself, however superficial it may be. For example, it is a necessary condition to become a Korean Shaman to experience a state of ecstasy. And if one wants to be a master Shaman, she should be able to repeat that state of ecstasy whenever she wants. In a similar way, we must have some direct religious experience before we claim to know that religion, because a religion without experience is not a religion in the proper sense. This stage we may call a religious learning.

Of course, the three stages I have just mentioned are not always necessary, nor do we need to go through them in that order. However, this sufficiently illustrates, I think, the great difficulty involved in the knowledge we claim about religions other than our own. We usually think that we know other religions. But as Socrates said, we must humbly admit our ignorance of other religions if we really want to know and talk with them. This is why I think Tillich wants us to be "an observing participant" rather than a simple participant and why Oxtoby argues that although there are many ways to understand other religions, all those ways must be based on "a mutual reformation by a participant and observer."20

5. Now I will mention the fifth and final necessary assumption. It is that we must admit the very possibility for us to be converted to other religions. If we are really open-minded and honestly acknowledge the similarities and differences between religions, in the due process of time, it is quite possible to come to believe that the religions of other people are somehow much better than mine in many ways. I do not mean, of course, that every comparative religionist should convert to other religions. But I sincerely mean that he must be willing to be converted, if necessary, and risk all the consequences. Unless we seriously entertain this sad thing, yes it is a sad possibility, we will not get a genuine dialogue. (Furthermore, I do not mean by conversion that we keep our exclusive attitude to accept one religion and reject all others while simply changing the object of our rejection and acceptance.)

Of course, conversion may not be the final point. As in the case of Thomas Merton, one can have more profound faith in his religion by learning more about other religions. Mohandas Gandhi was always proud of being a Hindu in his life, and yet did not want to be a representative of Hinduism alone. He was truly a religious cosmopolitan. For him there was no conflict between one religion and many religions. I take this to be a very important suggestion. I was born and raised in a Christian family. Suppose I became a Buddhist, which is possible, what would my mother say? She would cry all day and night. But I think we should entertain that possibility.


I believe that a genuine inter-religious dialogue is a necessity in this 20th century. On this belief, I have discussed several attitudes one may have toward other people's religions and then suggested several rules to follow in order to engage in a serious and genuine dialogue.

Now I would like to emphasize, one more time, that religion is after all for human beings and "the study of religion is the study of persons." If religion has nothing to do with man, then there is no need for us to believe such a religion, nor to talk about it in the first place. It is important that Jesus is the son of God, but the more important thing is the fact that he came down to the world of sinful men. In a similar way, it is important that Buddha is an enlightened person, but the more important thing is that he came back to the world he had belonged to before.

Religion as such does not and should not exist. It has its values only insofar as it is related to human beings. In this sense, we can boldly say that "Brahman is Atman" or, more boldly, "Man is Heaven."21 All religions are, in short, an activity for the benefit of human beings. This is the very point where all different religions can meet together.

Furthermore, I will emphasize again, no one religion can claim to possess all the truth. It is indeed misleading to say that only Jesus taught us the way to Heaven or that only Buddha taught us the way to Nirvana. The way to Heaven or Nirvana could have been taught either by Jesus or by Buddha, or, for that matter, by many other religious sages. This is why, I think, Jaspers argues that the passage in scripture, "I am the Way, the Truth and the Life," could not have been spoken by Jesus himself, but might have been inserted by some exclusive Christians in later periods.

Two more quotations from Tillich and Carrie Dunne will suffice to prove this point:

Early Christianity did not consider itself as a radical-exclusive, but as the all-inclusive religion in the sense of the saying: 'All that is true anywhere in the world belongs to us, the Christians.' And it is significant that the famous words of Jesus, 'You, therefore, must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect' (which was always an exegetic riddle), would, according to recent research, be better translated, You must be all-inclusive as your heavenly Father is all-inclusive.'22 Thus, from a Christian perspective I see Gautama Buddha as a precursor, preparing the way of the Lord. From a Buddhist perspective I see Jesus as a true successor of the Buddha.23

I would like to conclude my presentation by repeating what I said earlier. What we need today is an open-mindedness and a generosity of faith.24

Thank you very much.


1 Quoted from Jerome S. Brunner, Toward a Theory of Instruction. Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 88.

2 M. Eliade. Sacred and Profane. A Harvest Book, New York, 1959, p. 15.

3 James H. Cone. God of the Oppressed (1975), trans, by Younghak Hyun, Ewha Women's University Press, 1980, pp. 61 and 63.

4 P. Tillich. Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, Columbia University Press, New York, 1964, pp. 28-29.

5 Socrates rhetorically asks Ion who believes himself to "deserve to be crowned with a wreath of gold by the Homerides" because he is more skilled in Homer than anybody else, although he is not in other poets such as Hesiod and Archilochus: "How is it, then, that you are skilled in Homer, but not in Hesiod or the other poets? Does Homer treat matters different from those that all the other poets treat? Wasn't his subject mainly war and hasn't he discussed the mutual relations of men, good and bad, or the general run as well as special craftsmen, the relations of the gods to one another and to men, as they forgather, the phenomena of the heavens and occurrences in the underworld, and the birth of gods and heroes? Are not these the subjects Homer dealt with in his poetry?" Plato, Ion. trans, by Lane Cooper, Princeton University Press, 1961, 530d-531d.

6 Joachim Wach, "Introduction: The Meaning and Task of the History of Religions," The History of Religions, ed. by Joseph Kitagawa, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, pp. 7-8.

7 Tillich, op. cit, pp. 30-36.

8 Joachim Wach, The Comparative Study of Religions, Columbia University Press, New York, 1958, p. 40.

9 Strictly speaking the fourth and fifth reasons apply to all areas of theology, religiology and philosophy of religion. For these three approaches to the study of religion, refer to Philip H. Hwang, ed. Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 3rd ed. Chong-Ro Publishing Co., Seoul, 1981, pp. 277-281.

10 Raimundo Panikkar, The Intrareligious Dialogue, Paulist Press New York, 1978, pp. xiv.

11 Ibid., p. xv.

12 Ibid., p. xvii.

13 Ibid., p. xviii.

14 Ibid., p. xix.

15 William James, Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature, Macmillan, New York, 1961, p. 379.

16 Panikkar, op. cit., p. xxvii.

17 Tillich distinguishes three attitudes, namely, the position of "rejection of everything," that of "a partial rejection, together with a partial acceptance," and that of "a dialectical union of rejection and acceptance," and argues that the most desirable position is the last one. Tillich, op. cit, p. 29.

18 Karl Jaspers, Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus. Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962, pp. 82-83.

19 P.T. Raju, Introduction to Comparative Philosophy, Southern Illinois University Press, 1962, p. 292.

20 W. C. Smith, "Comparative Religion: Whither -- and Why," Religious Diversity, ed. by Willard G. Oxtoby, Harper and Row, New York, 1976, p. 142.

21 This is a well-known slogan of Chondoism which was founded in Korea by Mr. Je-Woo Choi.

22 Tillich, op. cit, pp. 35-36.

23 Carrin Dunne, Buddha and Jesus: Conversations, Templegate, Springfield, 111., 1975, p. 8.

24 This is why I personally believe that a true theology is a comparative theology, a true religiology a comparative eligiology, and a true philosophy of religion a comparative philosophy of religion. 

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