

THE RISING TIDE

A bulletin of information and opinion from the
FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.

PRESS IGNORES DEMONSTRATION

A second three-day fast and demonstration by over 50 members of the World Anti-Communist League, Christian Political Union and Freedom Leadership Foundation, Oct. 23-26, in front of U.N. headquarters in New York, was ignored by local and national press. Organizers say they believe the lack of coverage by the press was intentional. A full report will appear in the next issue of *The Rising Tide*.

Volume I, Number 13

November 15, 1971

How the "People's Peace Treaty" Was Defeated in South Vietnam

FLF Research Associates James Cowin and Hal McKenzie recently returned from a two-week tour of Vietnam, Korea and Japan during which they met with a variety of youth, labor and political leaders. We hope that the following story (taken from an interview with Vietnamese student leader Ngo Quang Viet) will become widely known throughout the U.S., especially among those who believe the "peace" treaty is representative of the desires of the South Vietnamese people. (For background information on the People's Peace Treaty and the assassination of Le Khac Sinh-Nhat, see The Rising Tide, Vol. 1, No.'s 3 and 7.)

Mr. Viet, who majors in architecture at the University of Saigon, is an advisor to the Saigon Student Union and the chairman of the World Youth Anti-Communist League (WYACL), the youth organization of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL).

Mr. Cowin: Who introduced the People's Peace Treaty to South Vietnamese students?

Mr. Viet: An American reporter who accompanied the David Ifshin group introduced the Treaty. When Ifshin and company traveled to Hanoi, he entered Saigon and gave the Treaty to Huynh Tan Mam, then President of the Saigon Student Union. The reporter was later identified as a student anti-war leader. Mam signed the Treaty on behalf of the National Student Union, a non-existent group.

Mr. Cowin: Did Mam allow any public debate on the Treaty?

Mr. Viet: No, he kept it a secret until WYACL students exposed Mam's tactics last April, after FLF President Neil Salonen's trip to Saigon. In mid-May, after much bad publicity, Mam convened the Executive Board of the Saigon Student Union.

[Ed. Note: The Executive Board is the Union's principal decision-making body. Composed of one delegate from each of the seventeen colleges at the University of Saigon, the Board serves as the Union's legislative arm. Each college elects its delegate, who serves as the president of that college. The seventeen delegates elect one of their members as President of the Saigon Student Union.]

Mr. Cowin: How did the WYACL students influence student opinion?

Mr. Viet: We formed the National Student Coordinating Committee for Action. We received support from six organizations: the college of law, architecture, chemistry, and the National Institute of Administration at the University of Saigon; the colleges of political science and business at the University of Dalat; and the University of Saigon chapter of the Catholic Confederation of Students.

[Ed. Note: The total population of these six organizations exceeds 15,000. There are approximately 30,000 college students at the University of Saigon and 50-60,000 college students in South Vietnam.]

We sent out documents to the press and the students. The students were indignant, and Pham Trong Ham, the general secretary of the Executive Board and a Mam supporter, yielded to public opinion and called a meeting to discuss the Treaty. Mam distributed copies of the Treaty to each of the Executive Board members, but Mam's version differed from the copy received from Neil Salonen.

Mr. Cowin: What provisions differed?

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Vietnam Post Mortem

by Charles Stephens
National Chairman, FLF's Committee for Responsible Dialogue



The tragedy of America's involvement in Vietnam is not that the U.S. chose to stand and fight against Communist aggression, but that we chose to stand and fight so badly. Never in our history have such stringent and self-defeating restrictions been placed on the use of American military power. Thus a war which, according to several members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, could have ended in 6 months, has cruelly dragged out over 6 years.

First, we virtually guaranteed the enemy that his homeland would not be invaded; that his sovereignty would remain intact at home even though he was launching aggression

abroad. What greater morale booster, what greater incentive could we have possibly given Hanoi to continue the battle? Second, we did nothing to deny the enemy continued access to vital imports through Haiphong Harbor. Third, we foolishly delayed many years before cutting the enemy's supply lines in Laos and Cambodia. A European General said: "It is the most elementary rule of warfare to cut the enemy's supply lines. Why don't the Americans do it?" Finally, we misused the only offensive element of our strategy, American airpower, by largely limiting it to "reconnaissance" rather than "strategic" bombing, and by unilaterally halting it in the mid-point of the conflict without securing any concessions in return.

It was argued by the Johnson Administration that this was a "limited war" with limited political objectives. Why then was it logical to bomb the docks at the port of Campha (the Chinese did nothing) and not the docks at Haiphong? Why was it right to cut the supply lines in Cambodia and Laos in 1970 and 71, but not right in 1966, 67, 68, 69? Why was it right to bomb certain strategic targets intermittently and not all continuously? These were the years when the Chinese were skirmishing with the Russians along their northern borders. This was also the time of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which plunged China into anarchy and near civil war. If ever there was a time when China was less prepared to bail out North Vietnam and risk a confrontation with the United States, this was it.

Not the "arrogance of power" but the hesitant and timid use of it created the U.S. fiasco in Vietnam. The polarization of our people, the new isolationism, the folly of thinking that we can build a beautiful America while the rest of the world goes up in flames around us—these are the more ominous repercussions of our Vietnam folly.

For while it is true that President Nixon is extracting America from Vietnam, he cannot extract us from the world in which we live. And the world of the 1970's will be a perilous one for Americans as we abdicate our international responsibilities and fail to reverse the alarming decline in our military power—a decline engendered by the present disparagement of all things military which was bound to follow the protracted Vietnam agony. By grim contrast, the Russians are forging ahead of the United States in all categories of strategic weapons. They lead us in missiles, they lead us in megatonnage, they have a better and larger army and a spanking new superior navy. Furthermore, they are investing 40 to 50 per cent more than us in the critical area of research and development. Thus, the breakthroughs in new weapon systems for this decade are more likely to be Soviet than U.S.

Vietnam showed that our leaders lacked the will to use American power. Vietnam has apparently also drained us of the will to *maintain* American power. In the next round of confrontations with the Communists we may not be able to safeguard even our very survival.

Next issue will examine the all important political and ideological aspects of the war in Vietnam.—ed.

Help Support FLF!

Responsible education about communism is a *must* if world freedom is to survive.

Many young people simply don't believe what most of us know to be the historical record of communism's tyrannical, anti-human reign. Too many "atrocities" have been committed in the name of anti-communism for young people to respect an analysis which still sees communism as the greatest single threat to freedom in the world today. ("Hitler was an anti-Communist too, man!")

But if young people really knew what communism has done they would fight against it with zeal, and without hesitation. They would realize that world peace is impossible as long as communism continues to conquer and enslave the people of the world.

FLF programs are geared toward creating an effective, long-range approach toward anti-Communist education and action among American young people. And their effectiveness has been proven! To name just a few of these programs:

—**THE WORLD FREEDOM INSTITUTE** is FLF's educational and training division which has already been responsible for training hundreds of youth leaders, coast to coast, in Communist theory and strategies for overcoming it. Some of the top names in the academic world have given their enthusiastic support to the WFI's fast-growing-educational offensive.

—**FLF ASIAN TOURS** have given scores of young people first-hand knowledge, seeing the countries and meeting the people who have faced the horrors of communism directly. Several international student alliances and exchange programs have resulted from FLF's tours thus far.

—**COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE DIALOGUE** presents a highly articulate, prestigious team of *Challengers* to debate radical spokesmen anywhere in America. This unique program has already won the acclaim of senators, congressmen, academic figures and ordinary citizens everywhere.

—**LITERATURE PUBLICATION** is perhaps the most vital of all FLF programs. Pro-Communist groups literally flood campuses with their emotionalistic rhetoric; and the lack of an alternative analysis is almost incredible to anyone who is not currently attending a major college or university. FLF literature is distributed to an expanding number of campus activist groups throughout the nation.

For more information about these and other FLF programs, please write FLF headquarters and we'll send you brochures detailing our activities.

YOUR SUSTAINED SUPPORT IS THE ONLY ASSURANCE THAT OUR SUCCESS WILL CONTINUE. So, *please* if you possibly can, **CONTRIBUTE TODAY.** (All donations to FLF are tax-exempt.) Help us do something to bring America's commitment to freedom and justice back to life!!!

How the "People's Peace Treaty" Was Defeated in South Vietnam

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Mr. Viet: Mam omitted the one calling for a new provisional government. If he had included that provision, most members would have walked out of the meeting. Most members were puzzled. Neither version was the original, and the *NSA Bulletin* and articles by Ifshin gave the background of the Treaty, but not the details. Members asked Mam whether or not he had signed the document. Mam replied that he had received the document, but that he had not signed it, and he asked the members if they had proof of his signature. They could offer no proof at that time [although they obtained proof later], and the meeting was adjourned. Before they left the meeting room, however, most members told Mam that they would not accept any declarations made without their approval. Mam remained silent. The Executive Board considered the matter closed and turned their attention to other issues.

Mr. Cowin: Did you personally attend this meeting?

Mr. Viet: Yes. I attended as Ly Buu Lam's observer. At this time he was president of the college of architecture and therefore a member of the Executive Board. I was the vice-president for public relations on his slate.

Mr. Cowin: You are also familiar with the details of the election of Ly Buu Lam and the assassination of Le Khac Sinh-Nhat. What issues did Lam emphasize in his campaign to unseat Mam?

Mr. Viet: First of all, the People's Peace Treaty. Second, Mam allowed only his supporters in the student government. Also, Mam involved himself in many political activities outside the scope of student activities and beneficial to the Communists. He allowed off-campus groups to set up offices in the Saigon Student Union headquarters, including high school student unions [as he had many high school student workers] and non-student committees. Most were anti-war and Leftist, and many were infiltrated by Communist cadres, with whom Mam had contact.

Mr. Cowin: Describe the proceedings of the meeting at which the votes were counted.

Mr. Viet: On June 20 the votes were tallied thusly: Lam 8, Mam 6, one blank, one ballot unopened. [Evidently, only sixteen out of seventeen members voted.] Mam's supporters, who comprised most of the crowd, started a riot as soon as Lam's eighth vote was counted. They intended to stop the election proceedings. They rushed to the podium, kicked the ballot box, and struck members of Lam's slate with chairs. Six were injured; and one, Phan Chanh Tam, the president of the National Institute for Administration, and vice-president for planning of Lam's slate, was hurt so seriously that he had to be carried to the hospital.

Because of the fight one ballot was left unopened, and the Organizing Committee for the election could not declare the winner. The Executive Board had the authority to declare the winner at its next meeting, but the Board meets regularly only twice a year: the beginning of the school year and the end of the school year. The election took place at mid-year. Only the Secretary-General of the Board, Pham Trong Ham, had the authority to call a special meeting, but Ham, a Mam supporter, refused to do so.

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Viet Cong: "Liberators" of the Working Class

On October 4, 1971, 70,000 Vietnamese workers from thirty different unions staged a six-hour general strike in Saigon and the surrounding suburbs. They did not protest against low wages or poor working conditions, but against the Viet Cong campaign of terror against their organization, the Vietnamese Confederation of Labor (CVT).

Comprised of half a million workers and divided into five federations (the fishermen, tenant farmers, petroleum workers, textile workers, and transport workers) this Vietnamese equivalent of the AFL-CIO exerts a major influence in national politics. The CVT, for example, initiated the idea of the South Vietnamese land reform program, the Land to the Tiller program, which President Thieu put into effect in July, 1970. The CVT also sponsored an educational program to combat Communist propaganda among farmers and workers. Most workers, though they distrust government sources, believe the CVT information. Because of CVT influence, the workers have refused to respond to the Communist cries for a general strike.

The Communists, who regard labor as one of their main targets, regard the CVT as one of their main enemies in South Vietnam. Since 1969, the Viet Cong have assassinated more than 60 CVT leaders and local organizers. Mr. Tran Quoc Buu, the President of the CVT, knows he is a marked man. Several attempts have been made on his life by the Communist terrorists.

On Sept. 21 of this year the Viet Cong tried again. A large bomb planted outside the wall of his reception room exploded, demolishing the reception room and three automobiles in the courtyard outside, and severely damaging three adjoining offices in the CVT building.

Mr. Nguyen Van Thang, the International Affairs Director of the CVT, said, "It was providential that no one was hurt." Mr. Buu had finished a meeting with Vietnamese students only a few minutes earlier and had retired to a private room. Mr. Thang said, "It was the only



*FLF tour members
inspect terrorist
damage at CVT
Headquarters,
Saigon.*

moment of the year when nobody was in the reception room, nobody was in the courtyard, and nobody was in the other three offices."

Eleven international labor organizations, including the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the Domei (the Japanese labor organization) and the Asian-American Free Labor Institute, sent telegrams condemning the Communist attack.

The Vietnamese Confederation of Labor has done more to improve the lot of the proletariat in Vietnam than probably any other non-governmental organization. The terrorist campaign against the CVT exposes the emptiness of the Communist claim that they struggle in the interest of the working class. As Mr. Buu commended, "They say they hate the elite, but their real targets are the people."

(Be sure to see next issue for the full text of the FLF interview with Mr. Buu.)

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**How the "People's Peace Treaty"
Was Defeated in South Vietnam**

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Mr. Cowin: How did Lam finally take office?

Mr. Viet: Mr. Lam made use of emergency election procedures. They provide that if the Secretary General refuses three requests by the winning slate to convene a special Board meeting, any members of the Board may call a special meeting. Lam held three press conferences and requested a special meeting at each conference. Ham refused three times, and Lam called a special meeting. Provisions of the Saigon Student Union required a two-thirds quorum in order to declare a new president. However, the six Mam supporters did not attend, and the meeting fell short of its quorum.

Lam had recourse to another provision, which enables ten members to declare a president after three unsuccessful attempts to convene the whole Board. The remaining ten Board members had met twice, when on June 28, 1971 Le Khac Sinh-Nhat was killed. On July 2 they met unsuccessfully for the third time and afterwards declared Lam the winner.

Mam refused to surrender possession of his headquarters offices, so about one hundred pro-Lam students stormed the Saigon Student Union headquarters and took possession of the offices. They also found the original copy of the People's Peace Treaty, containing both Mam's and Ifshin's signatures.

Mr. Cowin: Could you describe the events of the assassination?

Mr. Viet: At 10:30 a.m. on June 28 an 18-year old high school student named Nam Loi entered the Law School offices, posing as Sinh-Nhat's relative. He handed Sinh-Nhat a letter written by the student body of the NLF in Saigon, in which the NLF condemned Sinh-Nhat and the other members of the newly-elected Saigon Student Union. Then he shot Sinh-Nhat. [Mr. Viet has a copy of the letter. The police have the original.]

The police caught the murderer and his accomplice, who was waiting outside on a Honda. The killers identified several other members of their group. They said that all belonged to the NLF, and all supported Mam.

Mr. Cowin: How did the Vietnamese students react to the murder?

Mr. Viet: Every university in Vietnam condemned the terrorist act and set aside one day for mourning. Ten thousand students attended Sinh-Nhat's funeral procession.

Mr. Cowin: Thank you very much. You persevered through a long and hard struggle.

NEXT ISSUE: A report from Hal McKenzie on the delegation's trip to Korea and Japan, and an interview with Vietnamese labor leader Tran Quoc Buu.

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