Sun Tzu said:
"Opposing forces may face each other for years, striving for the victory which may be decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver is the height of stupidity.
One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his cause, no master of victory. Thus, what enables the wise commander to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men."
The US military runs its own intelligence organization in S Korea. US does not trust S Korean Army intelligence agents - "too emotional and tendency to exaggerate." When the war broke out, the CIA had a 3-men station in Tokyo but nothing in Korea. By contrast, MacArthur runs a huge spy operation (G2) headed by a German, Gen. Charles Willoughby (real name, Adolph Charles Weidenbach, a bastard son of a rope-maker).
Willoughby's credential for intelligence work is nil. He got the job thanks to his blind loyalty to MacArthur. His job is to mold intelligence reports to fit Mac's grand scheme of things - the ultimate glory of commanding a global nuclear war, the Mother of all wars.
MacArthur despises the CIA and refuses to allow CIA agents in Korea. He prefers to gather intelligence through diplomats, prisoners, and enemy documents. Willoughby publishes Daily Intelligence Summary (DIS) which covers daily highlights of odds and ends in Far East - much of which come from Mac's old friend, Chiang Kai Sek; others come from second-hand tales from low-level defectors, refugees, captured guerrillas, diplomats and newspapers.
In S Korea, some of the key intelligence (G2) operatives working for MacArthur are:
Donald Nichols
A former US Army master sergeant, organized and ran an effective spy and counter-spy operation in S Korea for the 8th Army - later for the CIA (Combined Command for Recon Actions inn Korea - CCRAK). Nichols was born on February 18, 1923 to an impoverished family. His mother deserted her family a few years after his birth.
Nichols enlisted in the US Army on June 28, 1940 as a truck driver. He was sent to the India-Burma sector where he drove trucks ferrying supplies to Chiang Kai Sek's troops. In 1946, Nichols (a master sergeant by now) volunteered and received training as a special intelligence agent in Tokyo.
On June 29, 1946, Nichols was assigned to a 3-man "K" sub-detachment of the 607th CIC (Counter Intelligence Corp). The unit's mission was to guard the US Air Force base at Kimpo. From 1947 to 1948, Nichols travelled to Pyongyang disguised as a supply convoy commander for the US Mission in Pyongyang. Nichols expanded his counter-spy operation with full personal support from Rhee Syngman.
Nichols placed several moles among the ruling group of the S Korean Workers Party (Korean Communist Party) and received high level intelligence on the N Korean war plans including the exact date of the invasion. Nichols supplemented human intelligence with aerial recon flown by S Korean pilots in L5 observation planes. However, his intelligence reports fell on deaf ears in Tokyo and Washington.
When the war broke out, Nichols' unit was based at Pupyon in Seoul and he was the last American to leave Seoul. On his flight south, he participated in one of the worst massacres of civilians by US - some 1,800 civilian prisoners were systematically shot to death by Nichols' S Korean employees at Suwon.
Nichol's CIC unit evolved into the 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS) in 1948 located near Yongdonpo. Chief Warrant Officer Nichols was its commander.
The 6004 AISS was redesignated as the 6006 Air Intelligence and Recon Squadron in 1953 under the CCRAK (a CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force and ROKA joint intelligence command) reorganization. Originally Nichol's outfit was designated as Special Activities Unit #1, 6004th Air Intelligence Services Squadron. Later on a SAU #2 was added. SAU #2 was the AF's radar and electronic intel outfits on Yodo (Wonsan Harbor), Paengnyong-do and Ch'o-do.
Nichols was removed from his command in November 1957 for certain irregularities and sent back to US awaiting for official investigations of the allegations against him. He was officially discharged in 1962. Nichols roamed Mexico and US suffering one personal disaster after another. He became an alcoholic and a pedophil of young boys. He died in a VA hospital in 1992, destitute and nearly insane.
KLO - Korean Labor Organization:
KLO goes back to pre-Korean War. It was established by MacArthur in 1948, intended to convince Truman that MacArthur had no need for the CIA in Far East Command. KLO belonged to FECOM G-2 and was the positive intel (agents) and intel gathering outfit in Korea. When the war started, it began expanding under cover of Oceanic Survey Dept., ROK Ministry of Fisheries.
When the CCRAK (Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities, Korea) 8240th AU was formed, KLO came under their umbrella KLO's operational section - agent delivery and pickup by sea - retained its cover as "Oceanic Survey Dept." while the designation "KLO" became the cover for agent recruiting and training. KLO did a section on Yondo and Kojedo as well as sections spread throughout Korea.
Feb. 27, 1952 - Pusan: Dean Acheson orders Muccio to inform Rhee that he must stop working against the truce talks or else. Truman sends Rhee a personal letter -
"The degree of your assistance which your government and the people of Korea will continue to receive in repelling the aggression, in seeking a just settlement, and in repairing the ravages of that aggression will inevitably be influenced by the sense of responsibility demonstrated by your government, its ability to maintain the unity of the Korean people, and its devotion to democratic ideals."
Rhee stick to his guns - no armistice and he will fight on - alone if needed.
March 1, 1952 - Gen. Ridgway cables the JCS -
"A major ground offensive in Korea, having as its objective large scale destruction of hostile personnel and materiel, would require acceptance of a serious risk of successful enemy counter-offensive which could inflict heavy materiel and personnel losses on our own forces.
Even if our operations were successful and hostile counter-offensives, if launched, were defeated, the operations would still exact heavy U.S. battle casualties. Employing all forces available for this effort, the operation, even though successful, could do no more than deal a hard blow to Communist forces... .
It could not inflict a decisive military defeat. Without substantial organizational reinforcement, a major ground offensive would offer too marginal a chance of success to justify its undertaking."